The Shadow NATO Summit:
Options for NATO - pressing the reset button on the strategic concept

31 March - 1 April 2009, Brussels
A shadow conference to coincide with NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit.
Organised by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Bertelsmann Stiftung, International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe and NATO Watch with the support of the Marmot Charitable Trust
What is NATO?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949. The fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. NATO’s “Strategic Concept” is its core mission statement, and the current 1999 version predates the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the sending of NATO forces to Afghanistan — its first peacekeeping mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area that it was set up to protect. The 60th Anniversary NATO Summit held in Strasbourg/Kehl in April this year launched the process that will lead to a new NATO Strategic Concept. This exercise is expected to be completed by the time of NATO’s next Summit in 2010. For further details see: www.nato.int

What is the shadow NATO Summit?

A shadow conference organised by non-governmental stakeholders to coincide with the 60th anniversary NATO Summit earlier this Spring - and the subject of this report. It was initiated on the simple premise that the 890 million citizens within NATO Member States should have a voice in shaping the future strategic direction of the Alliance. This inaugural Shadow Summit brought together senior NATO officials, civil society and policy experts to identify, share and examine ideas on NATO’s future, including a new Strategic Concept. It is our aim to shadow future NATO Summits and explore creative way to increase NATO-wide civil society participation in our events.

The co-hosts:

**BASIC**

(www.basicint.org) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental research and advocacy organisation. Founded in 1987, it facilitates the exchange of information and analysis of transatlantic security and arms control issues focused on promoting the steps necessary to achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. With offices, staff, advisors, governing board and patrons on both sides of the Atlantic, BASIC plays a unique role as a transatlantic bridge for policymakers and opinion shapers.

**ISIS Europe**

(www.isis-europe.org) is an independent research and advisory organisation that works to increase transparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden participation in EU and NATO policy-making. Through its publications and events, ISIS Europe facilitates parliamentary and inter-institutional dialogue and provides policy input to strengthen common approaches to conflict prevention, crisis management, peace building, arms control and disarmament. ISIS Europe has worked in Brussels since 1996 and was established as a Belgian not-for-profit legal entity (ASBL) in January 2001.

**NATO Watch**

(www.nato-watch.org) is a new, independent project that collects and disseminates information and research on NATO and Euro-Atlantic security issues. It is the only independent non-governmental organisation with a remit to monitor and analyse NATO on a daily basis. A web-based information portal is being constructed to provide comprehensive, accurate, reliable and up-to-date information about NATO. Research reports and briefing papers will explore NATO reform.

**Bertelsmann Stiftung**

(www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de) is dedicated to serving the common good, in keeping with the longstanding social commitment of its founder, Reinhard Mohn. Its work is based on the conviction that competition and civic engagement are essential for social progress. The foundation aims to identify social problems and challenges at an early stage and develop exemplary solutions to address them. It is formulating new approaches to intergovernmental and international governance, developing strategies for peaceful conflict resolution and supporting those countries making their way toward democracy and a market economy.

About the editor

Dr. Ian Davis is the founding director of NATO Watch and an independent human security and arms control consultant, writer and activist. He received both his Ph.D. and B.A. in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, in the United Kingdom. He was formerly Executive Director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) (2001-2007) and before that Programme Manager at another UK-based think-tank, Saferworld (1998-2001).

Acknowledgements

The views expressed in this report by speakers are personal opinions and not necessarily the views of the organisation they represent, nor of the four organisations that co-hosted the Shadow NATO Summit. Reproduction in whole or part is permitted, providing that full attribution is made to this publication and to the source(s) in question, and provided that any such reproduction, whether in full or in part, is not sold unless incorporated in other works.
The Shadow NATO Summit:
Options for NATO
- pressing the reset button on the strategic concept

31 March - 1 April 2009, Brussels
A shadow conference to coincide with NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit.

Organised by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Bertelsmann Stiftung, International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe and NATO Watch with the support of the Marmot Charitable Trust

This report of the Conference was compiled and edited by Ian Davis of NATO Watch in May and June 2009

Design by Shtig.net

Cover photo credits:
Main photo of NATO headquarters in Brussels - photo from NATO photos
Soldiers conduct a body-search in Afghanistan - photo by Philippe de Poulpiquet / Le Parisien
NATO ice sculpture - photo by Sabrina Tang
Ruined Serbian ministry building in Belgrade - photo by M. Goodine
Afghan villager receives a gift from the Afghan Army - photo from NATO photos
Back cover: Sea of sunflowers - photo by Tey Ratcliffe
Photo of NATO headquarters in Brussels on page i - photo from NATO photos
Contents

1. Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security 1

2. Shadow NATO Summit - Summary 4
   Introduction 4
   NATO’s role and relevance in the 21st Century 4
   Afghanistan and beyond 5
   An open conversation about Article V and Collective Defence – What does it mean today? 6
   Assessing NATO capabilities 7
   “NATO-izing” US ballistic missile defence in Europe 8
   Pressing the re-set button on the Strategic Concept – Examining potential new headline goals for NATO 9

3. Shadow NATO Summit - Selected Presentations 11
   Launch of NATO Watch Policy Network and a ‘Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security’ 11
   Ian Davis, Director, NATO Watch

   Session I: NATO’s role and relevance in the 21st Century 14
   NATO’s political and military transformation – the story so far 14
   Stefani Weiss, Director, Europe’s Future / International Governance, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Brussels Office 17
   NATO – Abolition or Reform? 18
   Karel Koster, Research Department, Socialist Party Netherlands 19
   Collective defence versus winning the peace in far-flung places: or NATO – crisis as normality 21
   Mark Webber, Dept. of Politics, Int. Relations and European Studies, Loughborough University 23
   NATO and the Responsibility to Protect 23
   Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group 24

   Session II: Afghanistan and beyond 27
   A NATO military perspective - Or: Failure is an Option… 27
   Tim Foxley, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 28
   The need to acquire accurate casualty records in NATO operations 31
   John Sloboda, Executive Director, Oxford Research Group 33

   Session III: An open conversation about Article V and Collective Defence – What does it mean today? 34
   Securing collective defence without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable? 34
   Oliver Meier, Arms Control Association & Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg 37
   Improving collective defence through improved NATO-Russian relations – a possible road map 39
   Dmitry Polikanov, Vice President, PIR Center - the Russian Center for Policy Studies 41
**Session IV: Assessing NATO capabilities**

The NATO Response Force - flagship or shipwreck?

**Martin Smith**, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst UK

---

**Session V: “NATO-izing” US ballistic missile defence in Europe**

Dave Webb, The Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK

---

**Session VI: Pressing the re-set button on the Strategic Concept**

– Examining potential new headline goals for NATO

Goal 1: “Affirming collective defence and “moral, muscular multilateralism” as the primary purpose of NATO”.

**Ian Davis**, Director, NATO Watch

**Catriona Gourlay**, Marie Curie Fellow, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva

Goal 2: “Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and moving towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance”.

**Paul Ingram**, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council;

**Guy Roberts**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, NATO

Goal 3: "Improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement".

**Ádám Földes**, Project Manager, Access Info Europe, Madrid

---

**4. Framing Paper for Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security**

---

**Appendices**

1. Shadow NATO Summit - Agenda
2. Shadow NATO Summit - List of Participants
3. NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit—Outcomes:
   - Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration
   - Declaration of Alliance Security
   - Summit Declaration on Afghanistan
4: Five Principles for an Open and Accountable NATO
A Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security

Heads of State issued a **Declaration on Alliance Security** at the NATO 60th Anniversary Strasbourg/Kehl Summit (see Appendix 3 in this publication). A few days prior to this a **Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security** was launched at a Shadow NATO Summit. It was prepared by NATO Watch and revised in the light of discussions and comments received during the Shadow Summit.

This Citizens Declaration outlines the basic principles for equipping the Alliance to meet the different and diverse challenges of this 21st century. It is being used to kick-start a NATO-wide, civil society-led public consultation on a new Strategic Concept to be negotiated in 2009-10. An accompanying Framing Paper (see Section 4 herein) provides further background and justification for the principles.

The Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security (and Framing Paper) are being circulated widely throughout NATO Member States, Partnership and Contact Countries. Support for the Declaration and further feedback is being actively courted via the NATO Watch website www.natowatch.org. Towards the end of 2009 a similar process will be initiated to launch a Citizens Strategic Concept.

### Section I: Creating a New Vision and Mission for NATO

#### 1. Promoting moral, muscular multilateralism

Effective multilateralism means supporting a range of international treaties, norms and institutions, even when it presents difficulties for short-term national or collective NATO interests. It also means moving beyond ‘à la carte multilateralism’ to a new era of cooperation within the Alliance and by developing a wider and more inclusive network of partners as part of a broader, more comprehensive approach.

#### 2. Synthesising non-offensive collective defence and human security

The new Strategic Concept should explore the principles of Non-Offensive Defence and human security in shaping a revised collective defence posture for the Alliance. The human security dimension involves the protection of all civilians, and gender equality is an integral part of all stages in NATO operations.

#### 3. Reconnecting with citizens

In order to deepen and extend the shared values-base within the Alliance, NATO needs to become closer to its citizens and civil society. This means an updated, more open, transparent and accountable Alliance, appropriate to 21st century expectations. Parliamentary accountability within NATO requires clear and adequate mechanisms, and a relaxation of secrecy rules.

---

Stefani Weiss (Bertelsmann Stiftung), Paul Ingram (BASIC), Giji Gya (ISIS Europe), Jamie Shea (NATO) and Ian Davis (NATO Watch) at the Shadow NATO Summit
Section II: Putting the mission into action - practical implications

4. Decisions over use of force

NATO is morally and legally obliged to exhaust all other means possible before taking up arms, and force should only be used in accordance with the UN Charter. This either means authorised by the UN Security Council or in self-defence (when there is a real, imminent and severe danger and the UN Security Council is unable to act in time).

5. Upholding humanitarian and international laws of war

NATO must uphold the highest standards of international law, including humanitarian law, when choosing to threaten or use force, and in the application of force.

6. Responsibility to Protect – Part I: preventing genocide and mass atrocities

Preventing genocide and mass atrocities should be a priority for NATO and not merely an idealistic add-on to the core collective defence agenda. It is a moral and strategic imperative for the Alliance to implement the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda and resources should be directed towards the development of a comprehensive approach to genocide prevention.

7. Responsibility to Protect – Part II: civilians during conflict

NATO must move towards a human security approach, contributing to the protection of every individual human being and not focus merely on the defence of territorial borders. This means prohibiting military activities that indiscriminately impact on civilians, safeguarding the economic and social infrastructures of civilian life and accurately accounting for civilian casualties arising from NATO operations.

8. Responsibility to Protect – Part III: NATO service personnel

The Alliance should prioritise better equipment, pay and conditions for service personnel as part of a renewed compact between the military and wider society.

continued overleaf...

The 28 members of NATO as at June 2009

1 Albania 11 Greece 21 Portugal
2 Belgium 12 Hungary 22 Romania
3 Bulgaria 13 Iceland 23 Slovakia
4 Canada 14 Italy 24 Slovenia
5 Croatia 15 Latvia 25 Spain
6 Czech Rep 16 Lithuania 26 Turkey
7 Denmark 17 Luxembourg 27 United Kingdom
8 Estonia 18 Netherlands 28 United States
9 France 19 Norway
10 Germany 20 Poland
Section III: Challenges for the mission

9. Moving beyond war-fighting (in Afghanistan and beyond)
There will be no stability in Afghanistan without a comprehensive peace process including all relevant internal actors and neighbours. There is an urgent need to pursue a process that is capable of forging a new and inclusive Afghan national consensus, rather than persisting in the current fight to try to defeat those outside the consensus.

10. Bringing Russia in from the cold
A real partnership needs to be developed between NATO and Russia where both parties work together to resolve the multitude of modern security problems. NATO should avoid needlessly provocative deployments.

11. Civilian-led counter-terrorism
NATO counter-terrorism policy should focus on international cooperation to improve the intelligence base, strengthen civilian law enforcement capabilities, restrict terrorist access to funds and weapons, and reduce the root causes driving people to radical violence.

12. Preventive diplomacy
The Alliance needs to identify the conditions required to create stability and how it can contribute to good governance, prior to intervention. To this end, NATO should seek to counter inequality and discrimination and promote peaceful resolution of conflict.

13. Disaster relief and reconstruction
NATO should consider how it could improve its capabilities to respond to the growing number of natural, complex humanitarian and human disasters, while upholding the MCDA and Oslo guidelines.

14. Arms control and disarmament
The Alliance and Member States should review the contribution that an active Arms Control policy can make to collective security. NATO should support universalisation and strengthening of multilateral arms control agreements. Alliance weapons collection and destruction activities are an important contribution to collective security and should be expanded.

15. Achieving security without Weapons of Mass Destruction
NATO’s nuclear posture as outlined in the Strategic Concept needs to be consistent both with its Member States’ efforts to secure stronger global non-proliferation rules and enforcement, and with moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons. It needs to evolve in this way over time towards a non-nuclear posture. The primary counter and non-proliferation goal of Alliance policy in the current era should be preventing the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.

16. Achieving security at lower levels of armaments (and at lower cost)
The Alliance and Member States need to undertake a fundamental reassessment of spending priorities, with the aim of achieving effective ‘moral, muscular multilateral’ responses proportional to the overall threat posed. Defence spending is ultimately about making full, productive use of precious human skills that NATO Member States can ill-afford to waste.
Introduction

This summary reflects the contributions of the 22 speakers and over 100 participants at an inaugural Shadow NATO Summit co-organised by BASIC, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, ISIS Europe and NATO Watch.

The Shadow Summit took place in Brussels on 31 March – 1 April 2009 and brought together senior NATO officials, civil society and policy experts to identify, share and examine ideas on NATO’s future, including a new Strategic Concept. It was modelled on The Other Economic Summit (TOES), which from 1984 to 2004 raised issues such as international debt onto the agenda of the G7 and G8 summits. The Shadow Summit also explored ways in which civil society groups and parliamentarians within the Alliance could work together more effectively to advance NATO-related policies and actions, in line with the shared democratic and humanitarian values of its members.

The Shadow Summit was initiated on the simple premise that citizens of the 28 Member States of NATO should have a voice in shaping the future strategic direction of the Alliance. Both NATO Watch and a “Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security” were launched during the Shadow Summit. Throughout the conference, participants were invited to comment and provide input to the Declaration, which was revised and finalized at the close of the Summit and will now form the basis of a NATO-wide public consultation on a new Strategic Concept.

NATO’s role and relevance in the 21st century

Stefani Weiss (Bertelsmann Stiftung) gave an overview of NATO’s political and military development. She identified three historical phases of Alliance activity: the Cold War period (1945-1989) dominated by “passive deterrence”; a post-Cold War phase (1989-2001) in which NATO took on a stabilisation and pacification role, including its first war in the Balkans; and the current, post 9/11 phase, in which the further consolidation of Europe is taking place alongside a global war fighting/ stabilisation role, most notably in Afghanistan. Ms Weiss suggested that the process of agreeing a new Strategic Concept could be a unifying experience for NATO, but that several stumbling blocks needed to be overcome, including the force transformation/ capabilities gap, the Cyprus and Macedonia questions, and the role of the EU in security decision-making.

Gareth Evans (International Crisis Group) asked whether NATO should be used for a wider range of global peace and security tasks, and in particular the role it might play in helping implement the international responsibility to protect (R2P) agenda. He argued that NATO has still not worked out what kind of post-Cold War organisation it wants to be and raised three broad future options: a retreat into Cold War nostalgia with little change from the past; a slightly modified approach involving an inner ring of transatlantic members and two outer rings of partners and allies; and his preferred third option of NATO “fundamentally recast” as a global military resource, potentially available to prevent and resolve security problems worldwide in partnership with others, but only with appropriate UN authority. Mr Evans concluded that such a fundamental reshaping of NATO’s role is not likely to be possible “any time soon”.

The Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security will now form the basis of a NATO-wide public consultation on a new Strategic Concept

The Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security will now form the basis of a NATO-wide public consultation on a new Strategic Concept
In discussing whether abolition or reform was the best way forward, Karel Koster (Netherlands Socialist Party) highlighted a number of “legitimacy” issues and hidden agendas, including the increased use of “long-distance weaponry”, media manipulation, ‘blowback’ from questionable interventions and nuclear sharing arrangements that undermined non-proliferation commitments. He concluded that the present NATO policies are “self-defeating”. However, Mark Webber (Loughborough University, UK) while describing a permanent “narrative of crisis” within the Alliance, argued that it possessed “a seemingly inexhaustible capacity for recovery”.

The legitimacy and legality of NATO interventions was further discussed in a wide-ranging Q&A session in which Mr Evans argued that a non-UN sanctioned coercive military intervention might still be legitimate, but only if the R2P criteria were met. There were also calls for a realistic appraisal of what NATO could do, given that it has to “muddle through” as an Alliance of sovereign states. And despite being described as a mainly “reactive actor” and one suffering a “downward spiral of trust and cohesion”, it was also given the accolade of being a “Bodleian Library of operational practice for coalitions”.

Selmin Caliskan (medica mondiale) spoke about the critical and deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan, including increases in maternal mortality rates (around 2,600 per year and higher than military casualties), forced marriages (around 80% of all marriages) and the militarisation of development. She also focused on the difficult civil-military relationship and on the importance of having an exit strategy from the conflict. About half of women prisoners in Afghanistan are convicted of moral ‘offences’ and only 1% of civilian funds are directed towards women. Ms. Caliskan concluded that both extremist and NATO actions in Afghanistan worked against the interests of women, and that ultimately only women and civil society could provide the basis for peace. Conflict resolution starts, she said, in families and community projects, not with arms. John Sloboda (Oxford Research Group, UK) emphasised the importance and the benefits of accurate casualty recording in Afghanistan and NATO operations more generally. He described why accurate and detailed casualty data is crucial for justice and reparation and called on NATO to play “a leading role in such an initiative, sooner rather than later”.

In the Q&A session the position of women in Afghanistan, the effectiveness of the Provisional Reconstruction Teams, the role of Private Military Companies and the consequences of US “unilateral” decision-making were further discussed. It was suggested by one participant that the patriarchal nature of Afghan society and the counter-insurgency meant that improvements in women rights would be a slow or secondary process.

Ms Caliskan responded by arguing that it had to take place in parallel since “women cannot afford to wait”. She also highlighted further concerns among many humanitarian organisations about the “ideological differences” within NATO’s mandate that was making civil-military cooperation more difficult and dangerous than in Kosovo or Bosnia. The decision to paint military vehicles white (the colour used by most humanitarian groups) was cited as one visible example of how civilian relief workers were now more vulnerable as a result of NATO assuming a partial humanitarian mandate.

Afghanistan and beyond

Mr Webber’s observation that at any given moment “there is good news as well as bad” emanating from the Alliance certainly applies to the mission in Afghanistan. Tim Foxley (SIPRI, Sweden) analysed the problems encountered by NATO and emphasised the limited understanding, sharing of information and coherence of Alliance operations. He described NATO’s unspoken aim as “extraction with credibility”. Although critical of the Alliance, its naïve initial deployment to Afghanistan and dominance of the US at all levels, Mr Foxley posed the question, “If not NATO, who else?”
There was also a discussion on the costs and benefits of talking to ‘moderate Taliban’, and while there was general agreement that it should happen, both Mr Foxley and Ms Caliskan warned of the risks, especially in being seen to capitulate or in ceding fundamental rights and protection for Afghans. Ms Caliskan was also sceptical of externally-imposed solutions that limit voices at the negotiating table. Other participants called for greater clarity of ownership in building the Afghan police and army – a process that was described as “ineffective”, even today – and for better care of NATO military personnel suffering from injuries and trauma.

Finally, there were also questions on how to undertake accurate civilian casualty counts in Afghanistan, where there are few or no records and distorted incentives (e.g. around blood money) for fraudulent claims. Mr Sloboda did not downplay the difficulties but argued that a “local professional practitioners’ network” should be created, which would gather data using a variety of means and sources “to knit a web of information”.

**An open conversation about Article V and Collective Defence – What does it mean today?**

“146 words that changed the world” is how the chair, Donald Steinberg (International Crisis Group), introduced this panel on Article V. By pledges to respond collectively or individually to an attack on any of the Alliance members, proponents of Article V argue that it “effectively banned major inter-state warfare in a region that had spawned two World Wars in the previous three decades”. However, Mr Steinberg also stressed that the article is marked by “extreme paradoxes”. Most notably, “while Article V was originally intended to keep the troops of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from marching across the Fulda Gap, its only invocation was in response to a terrorist attack in New York emanating from the mountains of Afghanistan.”

Tasked with assessing the impact on Article V of France’s re-entry into NATO’s military command, Jean-Pierre Maulny (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, France) argued that it would have a negligible impression, since the country was “already 95% in the Alliance”. He also noted that there would be no change to France’s position in terms of capabilities, the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (NRF) or in troop contributions to Afghanistan, but suggested that Paris might wield slightly more influence in military planning and transformation debates. Overall, however, Mr Maulny cautioned that the US remains very much in control of NATO’s agenda and that European influence is limited, in part due to divisions in Europe and a lack of trust in France (which is perceived by some European allies as seeking to undermine NATO through promotion of ESDP).

Oliver Meier (Arms Control Association and Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Germany) argued that Article V had lost its relevance in the Post Cold-War world and noted that the only realistic scenario for invoking Article V would be the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists. He also outlined how US missile defence plans and nuclear sharing arrangements contributed to “outdated notions of territorial defence and deterrence” and undermined a reorientation of NATO towards future missions and tomorrow’s security needs. He also argued that the concept of NATO nuclear sharing contradicts the spirit of the NPT and that public opinion favoured an end to the arrangement. Based on NATO’s 60-year history, Mr Meier concluded that securing collective defence without strategic missile defence and nuclear sharing is both feasible and desirable.

An East European perspective on Article V was provided by Liviu Muresan (EURISC Foundation, Romania). In the context of a rapidly changing global security environment, Article V is “an iron-clad all-for-one and one-for-all” commitment and one that is seen as being vitally important by new members of NATO. In the wake of 9/11, this collective defence commitment also took on a diplomatic dimension, being the focus for expressions of sympathetic support to the United States.
Given that the latter attack was not predicted in the writing of the Charter, Mr Muresan posed a number of questions as to whether to maintain ambiguity or to evolve Article V into a more specific commitment. He also warned that further NATO enlargement would likely “dilute the Article V drug so that all that is left is homeopathy”. And if so, will it still be effective? One answer, Mr Muresan suggested is to focus on bottom-up and regional security initiatives.

Dmitri Polikanov (PIR Centre, Moscow) spoke about the importance of joint NATO-Russia activities but deplored the lack of significant examples, especially joint military exercises. He also described how persistent negative stereotypes and myths among the public, both in Russia and in NATO Member States were making NATO-Russia reconciliation more difficult. An obsession with structures over content needed to be countered, he said, by both parties “taking off their diplomatic suits and being open and honest.”

Mr Polikanov concluded by identifying seven priorities for NATO-Russia relations: (i) ratification of the CFE Treaty; (ii) an agreement on a joint missile defence system; (iii) mutual understanding in emergency situations; (iv) cooperation on funding for peacekeeping operations; (v) the common problem of Afghanistan and Russia’s potential assistance; (vi) a joint approach to frozen conflict zones and (vii) PR partnerships to shift public opinion towards the Moon or regarding piracy.

The Q&A session further elaborated on French policy in NATO with some participants questioning France’s capacity to supply the required 500 military officers to fully take up its place in the Alliance’s military planning cell. (Mr Maulny replied that 150 French officers would be made available initially and that the others would follow in due course). Others wanted to know why this should be a problem specific to France alone and not other Member States of comparable size. The discussion on tactical nuclear weapons focused on the barriers to their withdrawal and especially the issue of inertia – no European country is willing to take the lead.

However, there was general agreement that the nuclear paragraphs in the Strategic Concept review would need to be addressed, if for no other reason than the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 2010. Many participants saw addressing the issue of tactical nuclear weapons as the only possible NATO contribution to a successful conference.

Other comments concerned linkages between cyber warfare and Article V, and whether the Russian deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad was conducive to a new NATO-Russian partnership. In response it was argued the debate on the scope of Article V would be a difficult one and a cautious note was struck with a warning not to include all threats within the collective defence remit. However, according to Mr Evans, NATO should “no longer focus on collective defence but collective security on the global stage”. Mr Polikanov argued that the Russian deployment in Kaliningrad was a forced measure in response to the proposed US BMD in Poland. The latter was in itself the wrong way to develop a partnership, he said, especially since the Russians wanted to develop a shared missile defence facility.

Assessing NATO’s capabilities

The second day of the conference took place in the European Parliament and was opened by MEP Helmut Kuhne (Socialist Group in the European Parliament - PSE). During the first session on assessing NATO’s capabilities, Andrew Michta (Georges C Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany) drew attention to the disparity in financial commitment between European members of the Alliance (with only four spending 2% of GDP on defence) and the United States (that has been spending around 4% of GDP on defence since 2004). Every European defence budget is shrinking, he said, a reflection of the difference in how the US and Europe defines the approach to terrorism and radicalism: Europeans see it as primarily a policing and legal issues, while Americans see it through a military prism.
Afghanistan is where a critical Alliance shortfall is most damaging, Mr Michta argued, and he stressed that NATO needed to build a strategy based on a shared view of the threat and then properly resource it – something that it had not done since the Cold War. Mr Michta concluded that “NATO a la carte would have a corrosive impact” and exacerbate US resentment that Europe was not pulling its weight.

Daniel Keohane (EU Institute for Security Studies) spoke about NATO’s limited role in counter-terrorism. He acknowledged that there were plenty of terrorist plots, but that almost all fail. Mr Keohane also argued that the highest risk areas for terrorist attacks are in the Middle East and East and South East Asia, where most are inspired by local circumstances. Since this means that most counter-terrorism is also locally based (with only around 5% of counter-terrorism taking place at the international level), where then does NATO fit in, he asked. Apart from a limited homeland defence role—such as the provision of AWACS to survey US airspace after 9/11 or during the 2006 World Cup—Mr Keohane concluded that NATO is not well designed for counter-terrorism and should not look to expand its role during the Strategic Concept review.

Martin Smith (Sandhurst Military Academy, UK) discussed NATO’s “political flagship” rapid reaction force (NRF). In shifting from deterrence to active defence, NATO has been on a “steep learning curve” according to Mr Smith, and one made even harder by the lack of a substantial joint threat analysis and threat assessment.

Is NATO in essence a military alliance, or an Atlantic community with military manifestation, he asked? Mr Smith concluded that it was the latter, and thus there was a strong emphasis on the political dimension, and that we should not be surprised therefore that NATO NRF has had limited effectiveness.

Divergent threat assessments and spending differentials featured prominently in the Q&A session. One participant asked, are we converging or diverging over threat assessments and is the Strategic Concept review going to lay bare the differences? Another asked how might the political will be generated to enable convergence? One response was that NATO’s real added value is the framework of allies and partnership countries being brought together, and that the current financial crisis could lead to some convergence of spending and burden sharing, especially as US defence spending is likely to decline. Mr Keohane argued that the process of drafting a strategic concept will lead to important questions being asked in relation to Afghanistan and Russia, and the meaning of Article V, but that “overall the ties that hold together the transatlantic relationship are very weak”.

Regarding the impact of the economic recession on the ‘capability gap’, Mr. Michta argued that the US Administration would continue to borrow the necessary money for its defence budget (despite a national debt of $3 trillion), whereas the Europeans are unlikely to do so. He also argued that the US focus would be increasingly on Asia rather than Europe.

**“NATO-izing” US ballistic missile defence in Europe**

Peter Flory (Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investments, NATO) and Dave Webb (Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK) debated the NATO-izing of US ballistic missile defence in Europe. Mr. Flory rejected the idea of any serious citizens’ opposition while Mr. Webb argued that the majority of the citizens in the Czech Republic, Poland and the UK, where US missile defence systems exist or are being proposed, are against the establishment of these bases.
In the Q&A session, it was stressed that there are frequent threat briefings exchanged between Russia and NATO to try and find a compromise to the current impasse. On the cost issue it was noted that President Obama has indicated that the European deployment might be cancelled in exchange for Russia’s cooperation on the Iran and North Korea issue.

Another question asked if NATO had managed to reach consensus on the right mix of deterrence/offence, and the place of missile defences within the mix. Mr Flory said that achieving the right mix of deterrence/offence is a complex issue that NATO is trying to come to grips with. He also said that Russia had some legitimate concerns regarding transparency.

In answer to a question on the impact of missile defence on nuclear disarmament, Mr Flory considered that, in time, such defences would make nuclear weapons less useable and would therefore encourage disarmament. Mr Webb took the opposite view arguing missile defence will not lead towards disarmament as the technology could not be guaranteed to work, as Ronald Regan discovered with his ‘star wars’ project.

Pressing the re-set button on the Strategic Concept – Examining potential new headline goals for NATO

The last session of the conference was divided into three panels, each defining potential future goals for NATO. On the first panel “affirming collective defence and “moral, muscular multilateralism” as the primary purpose of NATO”, Ian Davis (NATO Watch, UK) spoke about measures to provide security guarantees to East European states without alienating Russia and argued for synthesising non-offensive collective defence and human security principles in re-shaping the Alliance’s collective defence posture. He gave the creation of a joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Training Center in Poland as one practical example. Catriona Gourlay (UNIDIR) focused on NATO’s peacekeeping. After highlighting the Alliance’s comparative military advantages and weaknesses she concluded that NATO is currently not ideally suited to peacekeeping operations.

If this is to become a core goal of the Alliance, Ms. Gourlay argued that it would need to adapt its doctrines to clearly separate peacekeeping from war-fighting.

In the Q&A session several participants questioned the validity of using non-offensive defence (NoD) as a deterrence posture, noting that few weapons exist that do not have an offensive character in one way or another. While agreeing that most individual weapons could be used offensively, Mr. Davis stressed that the arguments of those who advocated NoD in the mid 1980s was that it was possible to significantly restructure military forces for defensive, rather than offensive operations.

He stressed that little research had been carried out on the pros and cons of NoD in the contemporary security environment, and this was something that merited closer examination as part of the Strategic Concept review.

Another participant argued that military forces must first and foremost be trained for high intensity operations as then you will also have a low intensity capacity. Ms. Gourlay replied that if you are solely trained for combat operations and this turns out not to be part of the mission, experience suggests that it is hard to keep cohesiveness and it is not conducive to flexibility. She also argued that civilian organisations are often better equipped than NATO for many aspects of the “comprehensive approach” to security and cited an example of world food programme having better airlift capabilities than the Alliance.

Catriona Gourlay (UNIDIR) and Ian Davis (NATO Watch, UK) discuss “moral, muscular multilateralism”, chaired by Stephanie Blair (ISIS Europe)
Guy Roberts (Office of the Secretary General for WMD, NATO) and Paul Ingram (BASIC) shared their views in the second panel on “eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and moving towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance as part of a global leadership strategy in moving towards a nuclear weapon free world”. While Mr. Roberts, arguing that the absence of war in Europe in the last 50 years proved that nuclear deterrence works, dismissed the need to move towards a nuclear free world, Mr. Ingram believed that removing US nuclear weapons from Europe was an essential step. He further stressed the importance of putting confidence building and disarmament on NATO's agenda.

Mr Roberts described three “inconvenient truths” that needed to be understood: first, that it is “a dangerous and uncertain world out there”; second that “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture will continue to play a role, albeit smaller role, in the security posture of the Alliance”; and third, there is no evidence that reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles on the part of Moscow and Washington have had a significant impact on the strategic desires of third countries – in short, the link between disarmament and proliferation was unproven. Mr Ingram responded by arguing that we all have to let go of our security blanket at some stage in our lives – just as his four-year old child was now learning. The two discussants also disagreed on the impact of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements on the NPT.

While Mr. Roberts argued that it was not a violation of the NPT, which, in any case was not a disarmament Treaty, Mr Ingram, stressed that it broke the “spirit of the NPT”, which did contain disarmament commitments under Article VI. In the Q&A session in response to a question, why does Europe need tactical nuclear weapons?, Mr Roberts argued that the European nations chose to take part in the nuclear deterrence planning. As a follow-up, another participant asked, why do we need missile defences if tactical nuclear weapons work? Mr Roberts replied that a comprehensive security approach was necessary and that nuclear weapons were still needed to play a deterrent role. Another participant linked Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Mr Ingram agreed, but said that the West’s tacit approval and support for this situation, was seen as hypocritical on the Arab streets, especially when seeking to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, Syria and others.

Adám Földes (Access Info, Spain) and Michael Stopford (Public Diplomacy Division, NATO) spoke during the third panel on “improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO especially with regard to defence planning and procurement”. Mr. Földes discussed the lack of transparency within NATO, arguing that the Alliance should move towards more openness and transparency, notably by allowing all NATO citizens greater access to its documents. Mr. Stopford responded that NATO had made efforts towards improving information dissemination of NATO activities but agreed that more could be done to improve transparency and open access within the Alliance. He also highlighted some of the difficulties facing an intergovernmental organisation that works in the diplomatic, foreign policy and military worlds. By its very nature, he argued, NATO operates through “layers of constrictions”, is inward looking and discourages transparency.
NATO Watch will be unique: the only independent non-governmental organisation with a remit to monitor and analyse NATO on a daily basis. It will seek to promote a reform agenda that draws on the shared democratic and humanitarian values of member states, including the defence of human rights and civil liberties, prevention of genocide (‘responsibility to protect’), accountability and openness, promotion of peace and cooperative security, and strengthening of international law. It is my sincere belief that NATO could be at the heart of a new “moral, muscular multilateralism”, a cooperative approach to world problems that uses international organisations and law to the full.

“...there is a democratic deficit at the heart of NATO.” Mr. Obama said at a swearing-in ceremony for senior officials in January. He added, “Transparency and rule of law will be the touchstones of this presidency.” “Starting today, every agency and department should know that this administration stands on the side not of those who seek to withhold information, but those who seek to make it known.” While President Obama was talking about Washington DC, he could have equally been referring to Brussels. And while most people equate a lack of transparency in this city with the institutions of the EU, it is my contention – and a key rationale for establishing NATO Watch – that there is a similar democratic deficit at the heart of NATO.
As you know, the Heads of State are expected to issue a Declaration on Alliance Security at the Summit later this week. So we thought that it would be rather interesting to develop a parallel process from a citizens’ perspective. The draft Declaration in your information pack—and the accompanying Framing Paper—seek to undertake a more explicit questioning of the extent to which NATO is engaging with the fundamentals of its purpose in our present world and how it must fit into a wider (albeit struggling) security and conflict prevention architecture.

I would stress that this situation is by no means all of NATO’s doing—NATO’s public affairs and diplomacy division, for example, has attempted to bring the Alliance closer to the people and often uses creative forms of communication to do so—but within the limitations of NATO’s own disclosure mandate and with a clear public relations remit.

One of the major problems is the dearth of what the New York Times describes as “the journalism of verification”: that is, discovering information, examining it for its truth and narrating it in a comprehensible way. Without such investigative journalism, there is a real danger of the official version of events becoming the only version. This is especially true when the media reproduce press releases from NATO or from the defence ministries of member states unchecked and unchallenged as the cheapest way to acknowledge new information.

The contesting of official versions of civilian casualties arising from air-strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan is just one example of the important but diminishing role of good journalism.

The bottom line is that the vital habits of democracy are based around reliable sources of information and then deliberation and debate. And this is where NATO Watch comes in...
To what extent is it measuring up to the new challenges and context, or is its mindset and motivation still being driven by the legacies of the past? Its purpose has to be clear to all citizens, and only then will they be able to better hold it to account.

Now, you may rightly ask, who are the ‘we’ that I keep referring to – and on what basis do we claim to represent the 890 million citizens living in the NATO Member States? Well, the Declaration as it currently stands has only been peer-reviewed by around 30 people in about a dozen member states, so I make no extravagant claims as to its current status – other than it reflects the views of a very small group of reasonably well-informed citizens.

However, we see it as the beginning of a process in which the Declaration is used to kick-start a NATO-wide, civil society-led public consultation on a new Strategic Concept.

**The consultation process will include the following elements:**

- **Further revision during the NATO Shadow Summit** – with the aim of reaching consensus (or close to it) on a final version of the Citizens Declaration

  Everybody at this conference has a feedback form and we invite you to complete it and post it in the suggestion box by lunchtime on Day 2 of this conference. In short, we welcome suggestions for tweaking the existing principles, deleting or adding new ones. A Drafting Committee consisting of one person from each of the four organising institutions of this conference will then consider the suggestions and produce a revised Declaration that will be unveiled in the final session on Day 2. I should add that the current Draft has also been sent to a peer review group of around 60 academics and NGO representatives who couldn’t attend the conference and they have also been invited to submit revisions by email. These suggestions will also be considered by the Drafting Committee.

- **Publication of the Declaration as part of a conference report and circulation widely throughout NATO Member States, Partnership and Contact Countries.** Three key aims (subject to funding) are to:
  - translate it into all the languages of the Alliance;
  - publish it alongside the official NATO version; and
  - send it to every parliamentarian within the Alliance.

- **Further feedback and support for the Citizens Declaration via the NATO Watch web site; and**

- **Initiation of a follow-on process towards the end of 2009: a Citizens Strategic Concept**

---

**Slide: Conclusion: Yes, We Can**

- “Can we fix it?”
- “Can we change it?”
- “Can we transform it?”

---

During a recent visit to Israel, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, said: “we must never let our future be decided by the pessimists”. I am also an optimistic person by nature and I share the ‘Yes, we can’ mentality – which my four year old son believes started with Bob the Builder rather than Barack Obama. Nonetheless, I can foresee the day when a NATO Secretary General makes a speech announcing new rules on NATO transparency and ethics, and not unlike President Obama, demands that officials disclose more information. And that this trading of a presumption of secrecy for a presumption of disclosure will also help facilitate an authentic transformation: an across-the-board shift in priorities, values and tone within NATO.
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, dear conference participants,

Taking up the topic of “NATO’s political and military transformation – the story so far” could have led a couple of people to consider a very brief speech that would more resemble an outcry. Likewise, it could have led a couple of others to an almost endless recollection of shortcomings and failures thereby unduly overstretching the goodwill of any audience as well as that of the other speakers on the panel.

Be therefore assured: I am neither impatient nor disappointed with NATO. As in other cases I tend to be a realist and I hope this should help you and me to find just the right time for this introduction – even as one has to admit that the object under closer examination here is getting on a bit and is in fairly rough sea.

When NATO was founded on the 4th of April 1949 even optimists were not sure of how long this alliance would keep and probably no one would have bet that it would turn 60 years. And neither optimists nor pessimists would have probably foreseen that it has grown so old only to find itself at this mature age in its first real midlife crisis terribly occupied with reinventing itself.

Seeing NATO under such stress it might be a little bit too realistic and too less caring to remind us that any alliance is in first place a marriage of convenience concluded at a particular moment in history reflecting on the given circumstances of that moment or period in time. From this follows that if those circumstances change for the worse or the better, either the intended purposes and objectives as well as means change accordingly, or the alliance becomes obsolete.

But this means too, that if the purpose is served, one’s aim achieved and the task fulfilled, there would be nothing wrong if such a successful alliance retires or transforms itself into something really new.

In contrast to the uncertainty we face today regarding NATO’s role in a globalised world for most of its time there was no doubt about what purpose this alliance shall serve. In rather unmatched clarity the first Sec-Gen of NATO, Lord Ismay, was able to explain the strategic concept as easily as follows: NATO is there for keeping the US in – and we shall add in Europe, the Russians out of at least that part of Europe and the Germans down.

This general framework for NATO has stayed more or less unchanged for much of its past. In its first phase and for almost 40 years it was the East-West conflict which gave it purpose and determined NATO’s strategic thinking. And it is this long part of its history that dominates still today the perception of the general public.

In this phase NATO served as an instrument of self-assertion of the West against the politico-military challenges posed by the Soviet Union.

In this phase
NATO served as an instrument of self-assertion of the West against the politico-military challenges posed by the Soviet Union.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, symbolized in the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, marked the beginning of the second phase of NATO. A phase which lasted already much shorter and can be stretched until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001.

This phase was characterized by taking over more and more responsibilities for the whole of Europe and was guided by a Strategic Concept adopted in Rome 1991 that broke with much of the former worst case military thinking of forward defence and flexible response. What was instead favoured by then was comprehensive security adding cooperation as new concept to defence and dialogue. Sometimes referred to as a “strategy without an enemy” the new concept equally embraces crisis management and arms control as new tasks of NATO and foresaw the transition to a more flexible set of armed forces.

Politically, this concept manifested itself in the manifold partnership for peace agreements NATO concluded with former foes and the inauguration of the NATO-Russia Council. Militarily, this pan-European approach led NATO to fight its first war ever in the Balkans and engaging itself there hitherto in peacekeeping operations until today.

The intervention in the Balkans revealed already that the time had drawn to a close where the security concept of NATO was resting only on passive deterrence. It also amplified that the security interests of NATO were not anymore congruent to its territory. Thus, already by then NATO saw itself confronted with the need to adapt (or shall I rather say: transform) to guarantee the security of it member states also outside of its territory. These developments were reflected in 1999 when the Alliance only after eight years managed at its 50th anniversary to agree again on a yet further up-dated strategic concept. This time, alas, the new strategic concept was less “revolutionary” but comprehended in theory what has already taken place in practise. To achieve its essential purpose to safeguard the freedom and security of its members NATO should perform henceforth the following security tasks: security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, and partnership.

In addition the concept has been recognizing EU’s new role in foreign and security policy by stating its support for the European Security and Defence Identity and calling for a broad approach to security and effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the UN.

One might be able to judge also this second phase of NATO benignly. Overall, NATO has proven itself as an able framework for the political and military transformation processes in Europe and NATO earns esteem for its stabilizing and pacifying role in the Western Balkans.

Nevertheless, when NATO is lauded for its performance in these days one should not forget about the role the EU has played. Undoubtedly, the enlargement process of the EU was much more decisive in transforming the former Warsaw Pact members to market democracies respecting the freedom of the individual as well as the rule of law than NATO could ever have been. Especially regarding the democracy record of NATO, one shall remind oneself from time to time that not all members of this organisation over time were qualifying to be called democracies, even though in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty it reads that the parties to this Treaty “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”.

The terror attacks of 9/11 marked the beginning of the third phase of NATO in which we still reside. With those attacks it became apparent that the greatest challenges for transatlantic security would not stem anymore – as in the Cold war area and its immediate aftermath - from Europe but from outside. Hence, the traditional self-conception of NATO as a euro-centric alliance was made obsolete. Of course consolidation of Europe as a common security space would have to go on, but vis à vis the global reach of the new challenges a pure regional approach would no longer suffice.
When NATO only one day after the attacks invoked Art 5 for the first time in its history this was not only for showing off solidarity with the US. With expanding collective defence to include a terrorist attack by a non-state actor NATO became itself part of the global conflict and since then finds itself fighting a war in Afghanistan – although some parties like to see it for good reasons as a stabilising operation providing a secure environment for reconstruction and nation-building. Be this as it may, the paradigm shift from a geographical security concept to a functional security approach has ultimately taken place in the very moment when NATO took over the command of ISAF in 2003.

It is this third phase we are right in the middle of which seems to let NATO face the most complex and demanding tasks in its history – a history one shall not forget which was never free of internal disputes and constraints.

But things are obviously not easier since NATO lost its main enemy. This makes it not only more difficult to hedge transatlantic consensus. For common threat assessment as well as force planning it poses even great difficulties when the threat is no more apparently and territorially fixed and therefore neither quantifiable nor qualitatively assessable. At least, this makes it impossible to follow the longstanding logic to simply match inversely the military capabilities of the enemy by its own capabilities. But it makes it also difficult to convince the citizens of the necessity of further security and defence investments.

Taking this brief history of NATOs political and military transformation up to the present, it becomes obvious that NATO is now in urgent need of a new strategic concept.

Such a new concept should be embraced as a unifying exercise as NATO members now seem prepared to try to do. As we will discuss during this day and tomorrow the new concept has to:

- a) assess the full spectrum of threats and challenges and thereby analyze the causes for conflict and thus the possibilities for prevention;
- b) spell out and not camouflage differing threat perceptions;
- c) overcome unilateralism in favour of multilateralism;
- d) agree in a principled manner on the use of force and the role of nuclear deterrence as well as missile defence;
- e) elaborate on a comprehensive approach combining diplomacy, defence and development policies and instruments;
- f) define benchmarks for interventions, temper ambitions with an achievable set of objectives and foreclose overstretching of both civilian and military forces;
- g) reassure member states on security;
- h) outline what relations we want to have with our neighbours and other actors;
- i) reinvoke solidarity;
- j) reform decision-making processes, realign civil and military staff within NATO and find new funding mechanisms for enabling forces and operations;
- k) decide on which tasks should and could be taken up by NATO and which are better performed and taken care of by other organisations or in collaboration with these organisations or other partners; and
- l) decide on a force transformation and set forth interoperability standards that do not pretend that the existing capability gap between the US and European forces can be closed any time soon and only thereby raising the bar to a level which will inhibit almost all Europeans to even try to jump.
And here come my last remarks.

France rejoining the military alliance will surely give a positive push. Still, I see two to three other stumbling blocks on the immediate road ahead before this alliance will win over again joint shaping power. This is the Cyprus question and the way Greece and Turkey instrumentalize this conflict to the detriment of NATO and the EU. To a lesser extent also the battle between Greece and Macedonia about the historically correct naming of the latter inhibits NATO reforming as well as progress on enlargement of NATO and the EU.

And I see yet another stumbling block which might be the more difficult to get across. What I mean is the all too human behaviour that not many would try and punch when an 800-pound gorilla is in the competition.

How would you overcome such a natural inhibition and resist bandwagoning? I guess only, when both the gorilla and the shy always come to the superior insight that in the changed security environment in almost all contingencies the military can only excel in collaboration with other partners and instruments and therefore force is of lesser use. In my view NATO will, therefore, only succeed in the future when it does not strive to deal with all threats and take over all those new tasks, but instead serves as the platform or inter-linkage between the US and a more self-assured EU. There is unfortunately another condition to be met for this. In the first place, the EU has to become the autonomous security and defence actor of which it has been speaking and dreaming for quite a while.
Introduction

The change in the Socialist Party position on the Netherlands’ NATO membership – from calling for withdrawal to a conditional acceptance – exemplifies the dilemmas that continue to challenge the Atlantic Alliance. Although it has left its Cold War legacy behind, there are still good reasons for opposing present NATO policies in the new world order. The question can legitimately be asked: should NATO not be abolished as a useless relic of the past? Or is reform of the organisation possible?

There are good reasons for a fair degree of scepticism regarding the latter. Can NATO adjust to the new, multi-polar world? Or has it already missed the chance of doing so? A litmus test will be provided by the way in which the new Strategic Concept is debated and the degree to which NATO can adjust its course and configuration in the years ahead. This is a brief overview of the key problems and challenges facing the alliance, which are very much the consequences of the 1999 Washington summit decision to operate ‘out-of-area’.

Problems associated with the present course

The first and perhaps the most important issue is that of legitimacy. The three most important operations in which the NATO or its member states were involved seriously called into question NATO’s legitimacy. NATO waged a war against Yugoslavia in 1999 on dubious pretexts, which resulted in the final dismemberment of Yugoslavia, without the mandate of a Security Council resolution. The ISAF operation in Afghanistan from 2003 onwards did have UN approval but has doubtful legitimacy because of its ambivalent nature: is it a counter guerrilla war or a peacekeeping operation?

The third case, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the basis of a fictitious threat (weapons of mass destruction in defiance of UN resolutions) was carried out by a ‘coalition of the willing’, which circumvented the split between leading NATO governments on the legality of this war.

The second problem is the set of consequences of industrialised societies such as NATO and its allies waging war in less developed regions of the world. Technological advances have increased the distance between the military personnel of the member states and the consequences of the application of their weaponry. The use of long-distance weapon systems has gravely corroded ethical constraints that tend to limit the full-scale application of such weapons. Such rules of engagement as do exist tend towards force protection, rather than the saving of civilian lives. This is particularly relevant in guerrilla warfare situations, where distinctions between combatant and non-combatant disappear. Today an increasing proportion of conflicts is intra-state, rather than between nations. The long-term 20th century trend towards increasing numbers of civilian casualties is therefore continuing into the present century, at least in relative terms. Media perceptions to the contrary, the average uniformed soldier is today much safer than a civilian in a conflict zone.

There are also far-reaching consequences for the citizens and soldiers in the countries deploying those soldiers elsewhere. Increasingly, the citizenry of industrialised states is far less inclined than in the past to undertake work involving even a limited risk to life and limb. This is true for armies based on conscription, as well as those based on volunteers. The present shift towards increasing dependence on military contractors for many military functions will therefore continue. This shift, together with the deployment of long-distance weapons will further increase the distance between military and the civilian population of the countries where they are deployed.
Therefore, the chance that the civilian population will be injured or their property damaged will also increase. Furthermore, the nature of guerrilla warfare is such that ever more violent and illegal methods are resorted to in order to gain the upper hand. The most extreme consequence is the use of counter-terror and illegal methods of incarceration and interrogation, including torture, which inevitably involve non-combatants. A dangerous adjunct is the increased use of civilian nation-building agencies and expertise in all-encompassing strategies—the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’—in which the civilian element is entirely subservient to military aims. Waging this type of war is a recipe for defeat.

Long-term changes within the countries deploying the military are also inevitable. Conscription armies were firmly rooted in the societies from which they were recruited. Volunteer armies less so and contractors not at all. That has consequences for the political involvement of the civilian population and the way it relates to the military involved in far-off wars and, crucially, the consequences of those wars. Whereas under conscription returning casualties impressed on the citizens the extreme seriousness of the enterprise in which their government was involved, the modern-day situation involves at best, small communities of the military and their families while in no way influencing the lives of the majority of the population, except in possible increased taxation.

The combination of both trends, the increased use of long-distance weaponry and the increased distance of the home front from the consequences of the actions of armies acting in its name, has the effect of increasing the political freedom of the government to wage war when and where it pleases. As a result, the shared responsibility between government and population for such warfare, underpinned by what I would describe as strategic morality (or the morality of the casus belli), has been seriously, perhaps fatally undermined.

As a consequence of the coincidence of the long-term trends described above waging war is becoming a more common instrument of policy than in the past.

A third problem associated with the kind of war NATO is waging, is related to media exposure and the attempts by the various parties concerned to control the information stream to the media and thus shape public opinion in favour of the intervention. Because of the lack of involvement of the population of the member states in the wars (because there are few if any conscript armies involved) a premium has been placed on shaping public opinion—if necessary falsely—through the media and thus ensuring continued funding and broad political support for the war.

There is a fourth problem which may well flow from the intervention wars waged elsewhere, which is that in the modern globalised world with its rapid communication and transportation methods and massive population displacements, ‘blowback’ has become more likely. Although NATO governments argue that operations in, for example, Afghanistan, are necessary to prevent terrorist assault on the soil of member states, the reverse process is seldom mentioned: namely that the operations are themselves the driving force behind jihadi operations in the industrialised world. That is, the assumption that one can wage war elsewhere without consequences for one’s own population is no longer valid. This is all the more so if ethnic or religious minorities who sympathise with the inhabitants of the country where the war is waged, live in the NATO member states involved in such a conflict.

A fifth legitimacy problem involves the maintenance of a nuclear umbrella over all the member states of the alliance, the great majority of whom describe themselves as non-nuclear weapon states in terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This ‘nuclear exceptionalism’ itself undermines the alliance’s foreign policies, especially as regards proliferation issues.
Finally there is a sixth problem: that of the alliance being used as a tool for geo-political machinations by its major member states, in central Asia for example. Such involvement in the ‘Great Game’ changes the dynamics of wars such as the one in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Apart from the lack of public support for such policies, these manoeuvres can lead to unwanted confrontations in the immediate neighbourhood of rival states, whose government will tend to regard the operations as a threat and act accordingly. The conflict in August 2008 between Georgia, supported by leading NATO states on the one hand, and Russia on the other, is a case in point. Expansion of NATO membership in a way that can only be interpreted as confrontation and disruptive is ill advised.

The above sets of problems leads me to conclude that present NATO policies are self-defeating.

An alternative Strategic Concept

The cul de sac into which NATO has manoeuvred itself may well lead to a fatal fissure in the organisation, for example involving the Afghan war and its probable expansion into Pakistan. Although that particular war will dominate the public debate in the coming years, it is highly advisable to tilt the discussion to a more general level, to question the 1999 ‘out of area’ intervention concept. The public review of policy will provide a good opportunity for evaluating recent policies and decision-making and reformulate the Strategic Concept. That should not be a theoretical process, or be reduced to a public relation exercise aimed at selling present policies.

A key part of that is the question of legitimacy, which can only be solved by an acceptable relation with the UN. Certainly there have been some steps in the right direction. In September 2008 an agreement was signed with the UN secretary general regarding cooperation between the two bodies. However, the formulation of the agreement led to strenuous objections by Russia and therefore lost its legitimacy.

Clearly, NATO should only deploy its considerable forces as the final step of a political process in the Security Council. That course should, most empathically, not be followed in reverse sequence – i.e. no more faits accomplis by ‘coalitions of the willing’. NATO must not be the vehicle for transatlantic aspirations tied to the foreign policies of one or more of its leading member states.

This is not just important as regards out of area operations, which should clearly be restricted to mandated peace operations. It is also important vis a vis the threatening renewal of the old style confrontation with the Russian Federation.

The logical adjunct of a more restrained policy is the acceptance of a new European security architecture involving Russia. Suggestions in that direction have been made by the Russian government and supported in one way or another by the French and German governments. It would be wise, also in view of geopolitical realities like energy supplies, to negotiate such a new arrangement in central Europe. Clearly the construction of a missile shield in Eastern Europe would serve to intensify the confrontation. Despite East European misgivings a new and stable security arrangement is needed. The coming crises, related to energy, climate and vital resources, cannot be dealt with by reliving the Cold War. That indeed, is history.
Collective defence versus winning the peace in far-flung places: or NATO – crisis as normality

Mark Webber, Dept. of Politics, Int. Relations and European Studies, Loughborough University

Slide: The crisis in NATO?
“the Soviet threat provides the glue that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent; the defensive alliance it has headed for forty years may well then disintegrate, bringing an end to the bipolar order that has kept the peace of Europe for the past forty-five years.” (John Mearsheimer, 1990)

“NATO, paralyzed into inaction, was shown to be irrelevant in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. If NATO is not relevant to Bosnia, the greatest security crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War, what is it relevant for? In sum, it appeared to me that [in 1995] NATO was in the process of unravelling.”(Wm. Perry, 1996)

“a NATO failure [in Kosovo] could spell the end of the alliance, save perhaps as a formal shell with no real substance.” (Charles Dick, 1999)

Over Kosovo ”NATO itself was at risk of irrelevance or simply falling apart.” (Wesley Clark, 2002)

“NATO as a military alliance is dead. It took ill with the fall of the Berlin Wall and then died in Afghanistan.” (Charles Krauthammer, 2003)

Should the alliance fail in Afghanistan, its “cohesion, effectiveness and credibility will be shaken and the rationale for NATO’s expeditionary, out-of-area role [will] be undermined.” (Gen. James Jones, 2008)

Slide: ‘The miscalculation of NATO’s death’
• The narrative of crisis is clouded by imprecision; how and when a crisis becomes terminal is never specified
• ‘Peter cried wolf’ syndrome
• NATO, despite repeated crisis is possessed of a seemingly inexhaustible capacity for recovery

Slide: Crisis as normality (1)
On the one hand:
• NATO is constantly confronting virgin territory
• Is running to stand still (acquisition of new tasks to justify purpose)
• Its current and seemingly most pressing task is regarded as the acid-test of credibility and worth

Slide: Crisis as normality (2)
On the other hand:
• Crisis is interspersed with recovery and revival
• Many activities (‘in-area’) continue with little controversy
• NATO is self-consciously engaged in continuous transformation and mission adjustment
• At any given moment (i.e. now) there is good news as well as bad
Slide: Crisis as normality (3)
Crisis is permanent, negotiable but not terminal. Crisis is a prelude to disintegration only when one or more members are indifferent between:
- making the effort needed to repair whatever divisions have emerged between them; and
- leaving the alliance in favour of new security arrangements elsewhere
This state of affairs has not (and has never) been reached (see W.J. Thies)
NATO’s record at moments / situations of crisis is mixed – ‘good enough is good enough’. Survival and relevance is assured but ‘crisis as normality’ will endure.

Slide: Crisis as normality (4)
Evidenced in:
- Operations (‘winning the peace in far-flung places’)
- NATO’s multiple identities (‘more than a defence alliance’)
- Challenging context (‘NATO at 70’)

Slide: More than a defence alliance
- NATO has already disproved the adage that alliances dissolve after victory
- NATO persists because it is sui generis – it is an alliance, an institution and a community
- NATO’s core tasks (‘to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down’) as well as its more tasks remain relevant. NATO means different things to different states and is capable of obtaining a balance of interests and functions over time – even though this balance is sometimes contested and requires constant negotiation and development

Slide: Winning the peace in far-flung places?

Bosnia
- Crisis
  - Unwinnable
  - Divisive
  - Breeds enemies
  - Creates new problems
- Good enough
  - Promotes resolve, purpose and relevance
  - Promotes transformation
  - Winning the peace?

Kosovo
- Unwinnable
- Divisive
- Breeds enemies
- Creates new problems

Afghanistan
- Unwinnable
- Divisive
- Breeds enemies
- Creates new problems

Slide: NATO at 70
NATO faces two contexts which means crisis as normality will be chronic and acute:
- ‘out-of-area’ has become the driving logic of purpose. This is inherently divisive and problematic
- NATO inhabits a world of ‘risks’ rather than a world of ‘threats’
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in terms of conventional military capability, is by far the best resourced and most sophisticated regional or multilateral organization in the world. Its 26 countries – which will become 28 following the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO summit later this week - together have a formidable war-fighting and peace enforcement capacity, in terms not only of the raw numbers of both personnel (some 2.5 million in uniform) and equipment (over 5,000 helicopters for a start) but also their interoperability, highly professional and integrated military command structure, and ability to draw on the contributions of non-EU countries like Turkey and Norway.

Moreover, while never having had to fire a shot during the Cold War, it has demonstrated in more recent years considerable competence in the actual conduct of military operations, whether those missions have been highly controversial, as with Operation Allied Force in Kosovo from March to June 1999 (because of the absence of Security Council authority), or much more accepted, as in the cases of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia from 1995 to 2004 (NATO’S first ever out-of-area deployments), the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from June 1999, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2001.

It is true that some significant institutional problems have become apparent in the course of these operations, particularly in Afghanistan, and remain to be resolved: notably serious differences in the willingness of its member states to contribute troops and resources, to make them available for hard-end fighting tasks when they are contributed, and to agree on common rules of engagement when they are so deployed. But any way one looks at it, NATO is a formidable fighting force. And it's one that has shown at least some signs of being willing to spread its wings beyond its traditional roles of defending its members from attack, from within or without, and in a way that is basically confined to the Euro-Atlantic area.

In 1999 NATO updated its Strategic Concept to provide for members of the alliance to defend not just other members but to conduct a full range of “non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations” to ensure peace and stability in its region and periphery; then at its Prague conference in 2002, it agreed even more specifically that its forces could be sent “wherever they are needed,” abandoning the restriction of acting in defence of the treaty area alone. This has been followed by some significant reorganization of NATO’s military structure to meet evolving demands of this kind, with there being at least notionally fully operational since 2006 a NATO Response Force (NRF) of 25,000 troops—with land, air, and sea components that train together and become available for six months before being replaced. Its role is to act as a stand-alone military force available for rapid deployment as a collective defence, crisis management, or stabilization force, although so far NRF members have so far performed only relatively minor and uncontroversial tasks, like providing humanitarian relief after Hurricane Katrina and the Pakistan earthquake in 2005.

The question arises as to what all this capacity is for, and whether it can or should be used for a wider range of global peace and security tasks.
And in particular the question arises as to what role NATO can and should play in helping implement the international responsibility to protect vulnerable populations against mass atrocity crimes – genocide, ethnic cleansing, other crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in internal conflicts. As most of this audience will know, the responsibility to protect norm was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 2005 by over 150 heads of state and government meeting as a World Summit on the UN’s 60th anniversary, against a background of long failure to reach any kind of consensus on how to react to these atrocities, which dates back centuries but came to a head in the series of catastrophes in Rwanda and the Balkans through the 1990s.  

The core elements of the new responsibility to protect norm can be very simply stated. First, sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own people against mass atrocity crimes. Second, where they need assistance in doing do, others have a responsibility to help them (including where necessary by providing, at the request of the government in question, military forces for human protection purposes). And third, where they are manifestly failing to protect their people – perhaps because of ill-will rather than incapacity – then the wider international community has the responsibility to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner (including in extreme cases, if the Security Council agrees, the use of coercive military force). The responsibility to protect – unlike the doctrine of the right of humanitarian intervention, which it was expressly designed to supersede – of course involves much more than just the use of military force, but it is that small part of the total picture which is relevant to the present discussion about NATO’s role.

As efforts have continued since 2005 to consolidate and effectively implement the new norm, one of the many issues that arises is where – in those cases that need it – is the relevant military capacity to come from, not only in peacekeeping operations accepted more or less voluntarily by the governments concerned (which may have a significant ongoing peace enforcement dimension, as for example is the case with the UN’s MONUC operation in the Congo, or the combined UN-AU UNAMID operation in Darfur), but more particularly, for present purposes, in straight-out fire-brigade type coercive peace enforcement operations (of the kind mounted briefly by the EU’s Operation Artemis in the Congo in 2003, or – going back further - the UK in Sierra Leone in 1997 or the West African regional organization ECOWAS in Liberia in 1992, and which should have been mounted, but wasn’t, in Rwanda in 1994).

Finding that sharp-end capacity has been a recurring source of immense frustration for policymakers. The idea of a standing UN volunteer army is endlessly debated but no closer to acceptance than it has ever been. Even just a UN rapid reaction force, built of national components on standby but almost immediately deployable, has proved impossible to construct. On the face of it, NATO’s NRF – assuming it could be made in practice to work as well as it does on paper – is exactly the kind of “highly mobile, self-sustaining rapid reaction force …uniquely prepared to respond to a fast moving genocide, such as occurred in Rwanda in 1994.”

There are practical issues to be resolved if NATO is to play this role, in addition to some of the institutional problems already mentioned. Given the other demands on NATO members in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, it cannot be assumed that the necessary troops, even if formally committed to the Response Force, will be readily available.
Force configurations in most NATO countries are still very much those of the Cold War, and the percentage of uniformed military personnel that are actually deployable on international peace operations at any given time is very small—most informed estimates suggest the figure is only 3–4 per cent. It certainly cannot be assumed, given the requirement for consensus in any decisions of this kind by NATO’s governing body, the North Atlantic Council, that agreement will be reached, quickly or at all, to send them. And it certainly cannot be assumed that any military enterprise by NATO, even if mandated or endorsed by the Security Council, will be greeted without suspicion or hostility elsewhere.

But the more fundamental problem is that NATO has still not worked out, in the post–Cold War world, what kind of organization it wants to be, and there is bound to remain a degree of both external hostility and internal division until it does. There seem to me to be three broad options among which the organization, sooner or later, has to choose.

One is for it to retreat into Cold War nostalgia and remain essentially the organization it was in the past, a transatlantic regional defence alliance concerned above all about threats from the east, willing to embrace as new members any Euro-Atlantic countries committed to democratic, market-oriented values but nervous about Russia -- incapable of even conceptualizing it as a member of the organization itself -- and prepared to deploy out-of-area only in situations, like Afghanistan after September 11, where the security interests of alliance members are seen as directly and immediately at risk.

A second option, advanced in 2007 by five retired NATO generals (Naumman, Shalikashvili, Inge, Lanxade and van den Breemen), is one certainly rooted in Cold war nostalgia but with some nuanced and sophisticated additions: there would continue to be an inner ring of transatlantic members wholly committed to existing standards of democracy, human rights, and good governance, and to mutual defence (including by nuclear first strikes if that’s what it took).

A second circle of partners—including Russia, and possibly China and India—with whom the inner ring could work on conflict and crisis prevention; and an outer ring of more distant partners and allies who shared inner-ring values and convictions—presumably including countries like Japan and my own Australia—with whom the inner group could promote general stability and possibly join in coalition-of-the-willing interventions and stabilization operations, not necessarily feeling constrained by the need to seek prior approval from the UN Security Council for any use of coercive force.

A third option, and one that I very much prefer, would be for NATO to quite fundamentally recast its role and become a global military resource, potentially available to prevent and resolve security problems worldwide in partnership with others as circumstances required or allowed, but deploying anywhere only with UN authority. Such a NATO would not just defend its members against attack from within or without but be prepared to contribute when asked to human protection missions, and above all to play the role of emergency force provider in response to conscience-shocking mass atrocity crimes – the responsibility to protect situations I have been describing. Gendarmes du monde—“policemen of the world”—is a phrase that already causes much concern both for nervous NATO members themselves and for others concerned by the organization’s perceived liking for throwing its weight around, and this badge would no doubt be applied to any enterprise of the kind described.

But there is a large difference between an organization operating within constraints set by the UN Security Council and one working freelance, and it is not inconceivable that in this context the badge could become one of honour. That said, a fundamental reshaping of NATO’s role in this way is not likely to be possible any time soon and certainly will not be achieved in a single leap.
Perhaps the best starting point for rethinking the kind of contribution NATO could most usefully make to global peace and security in the twenty-first century is the “three circles” approach in the second (‘five generals’) option described above, but to put aside its Cold War flavour once and for all and make it more universally attractive. This would probably involve NATO being prepared over time to relax the wholly Euro-Atlantic geographic character of the inner ring; and certainly would involve it being prepared, in a way the five generals were not, to accept the constraint of Security Council approval for any use of force not involving self-defence in response to actual or genuinely imminent attack.

But above all, it would seem to require that NATO be overtly willing to welcome Russia itself into the “inner ring”, at least if it satisfies the kind of democracy and human rights conditions being demanded of other former Soviet bloc countries. With the tensions and feelings generated by Russia’s invasion of Georgia still running high, not least among the Central and Eastern Europe members of NATO, it is not easy to contemplate such a membership offer being made any time soon. But the apparent failure of a general ability to even conceptualise, let alone offer, Russian membership of the organization, seems to my outsider’s eyes, to have been wholly counterproductive. The problem with NATO’s expansion was never that it extended to Russia’s borders: it was that it stopped there. To so obviously continue to regard Russia as the beast from the east, whose aggressive resurgence would be only a matter of time, was from the outset manifestly a very self-fulfilling enterprise, and so it has proved to be.

An expanded and open-minded NATO, no longer focused on collective defence but collective security in the broadest sense, still able and willing to protect its own members from threats both without and within but also focused on a wider global role, and willing to use its resources, working with the United Nations, to advance and protect our common humanity, would be an exciting new player on the global stage, and one that over time would generate far less global suspicion and antagonism than it would global support.

Notes


Session II: Afghanistan and beyond

A NATO military perspective
Or: Failure is an Option...

Tim Foxley, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Introduction
Although it is easy to be critical, given the high expectations and standards demanded of NATO, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan seems increasingly to becoming one of extracting itself from Afghanistan with some shreds of credibility intact while maintaining the pretence that it is a viable organisation for the 21st century. There has been much criticism (and hindsight is a great asset in this respect), but perhaps it is also useful to remind ourselves of the scale of the problem – not all the problems are the fault of NATO and the problems in Afghanistan are common to all international efforts.

The scale of the problem
International efforts in Afghanistan, even after seven years, continue to be widely criticized as fragmented, lacking in leadership, wasteful of all manner of resources, without cultural sensitivity and often of poor quality. We should remember the extensive nature of the obstacles: destruction of infrastructure over decades, the dispersal of human resources and the collapse of government capacity – the country would have been a phenomenal challenge even if there had been no significant security problem. The physical difficulty of the climate and terrain—from mountain ranges to desert—greatly restricts activity.

There are complex and fluid cultural, ethnic and tribal factors—in particular the gun culture. A strong antipathy towards foreigners and centralised state control further complicate prospects for progress. The malign influences of neighbouring countries complete the picture of an exceptionally challenging operating environment.

The difficulties of NATO and the International Community
Those were the general ‘scene-setting’ problems, but now into a little more specific detail, more related to NATO. The large-scale involvement of international community has ensured a significant array of problems connected with coordination and control. The Afghan government works with 60 individual nations and 42 Troop Contributing Nations, not to mentioned hundreds of NGOs. The political and military agendas of the contributing nations routinely dominate decisions and procedures and the short timeframe turnaround of personnel (many only serve 3-6 months before leaving) often means that staff may only be really effective at end of their tour. A further and longer-term problem of rapid changes in personnel is that valuable experience is lost and lessons have continually to be relearned. There is an incoherent operating environment of differing expertise, experience, capability, resources, agendas and expectations.

Measuring the effectiveness of all these individual strands of activity is difficult – does anyone know or care to suggest what “victory” or “defeat” actually means? Is it relevant at all?

What is the experience of the military under NATO command in Afghanistan?
There was perhaps some complacency in NATO’s decision to go into Afghanistan in 2001. Perhaps not on the detailed planning side (security, force protection, logistics etc), but in terms of a lack of understanding of the country, the mission and the potential scale of the problem.
Perhaps understandably there was a tendency to
default to the Balkans experience – defaulting too
much to previous templates and deployment
experiences - “desk officer syndrome”, as at least
one senior Afghan government official has called
it.

There has been “Mission Creep”. I am exaggerating
to make a point, but I sense that NATO went in
prepared for peace-keeping operations and was not
really expecting the sort of security problems it
ultimately encountered. But, to be fair, in 2002-
2003, when NATO was gearing up, not many of us
were expecting this scale of problem.

Within NATO there appears to be different
interpretations of the mission and a lack of
knowledge of counter-insurgency techniques – and
indeed only a limited desire to learn about it and
apply it.

There has been poor storage and
sharing of information and use of
data and databases.

US policy decisions and military
capability dominates everything –
and the US has the capability for
actions independent of NATO,
through its own force, Operation
Enduring Freedom. Many of these
activities risk cutting across or contradicting
NATO actions.

Caveats continue to hamper operations – there are
at least two ‘tiers’ of forces – those who will fight
and those who will not. And, even if this
statement is considered unfair, this is the way the
issue is being presented in the international media.

The dragging reluctance of NATO. SACEUR, John
Craddock, himself comments:

• It takes Nato an average of 80 days to respond to
  an urgent request for equipment from a
  commander in the field – according to NATO
  officials.

• There are more than 70 caveats – restrictions on
  what individual nations will or will not do in
  Afghanistan – imposed by national governments
  on their NATO troops.

• Craddock asks: “Do we really need to achieve
  consensus at every level” of NATO decision-
  making?

• NATO countries were not delivering the number
  of troops they had promised. Another senior
  NATO official said: “I want more forces from all
  nations”.

• Craddock described NATO’s operations in
  Afghanistan as “disjointed in time and space”.

• Craddock again: “It is this wavering political will
  that impedes operational progress and brings
  into question the relevancy of the alliance in the
  21st century”

We are continually hearing that the Taliban have a
sophisticated and effective information operations
campaign and that NATO and ISAF have been left
behind. More often than not, we hear this from
NATO and ISAF themselves. This attitude is to
concede defeat in the all important information
war. But certainly in the area of
Hearts and Minds and information,
NATO is not proactive – it is almost
happy to accept.

The rapid turnover of NATO
personnel means loss of experience,
lessons continually being relearned
and a tendency towards short-term
high profile projects – “I want to
achieve a visible success on my tour...” syndrome.
This is particularly applicable in the work of the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where the
Afghan populace are getting frustrated by loss of
personal relationships. They are also learning to
exploit this (“the last PRT commander promised us
x, y and z...”)

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer recently made the following
comments – we can do better – and we must:

• Develop Afghan leadership,

• Ensure NATO has a cohesive approach

• Recognise Afghanistan is a regional problem

• Develop a comprehensive approach

• And communications are important
This is all difficult to disagree with technically, but – “Comprehensive Approach”, “Regional Approach”, “Cohesive Approach” (and UN now talking about a ‘Integrated Approach’) don’t seem to have much bite. The problems that de Hoop Scheffer identifies have been highlighted for four or five years and it is surely a little bit disappointing to hear them aired once again and in such a weak fashion without a hint of any “real” solutions – this is what a lot of people say is needed but who is actually supposed to put this into practise? And, more importantly, how? Who is supposed to grip this and fix it if it isn’t the NATO Secretary General?

Many of the NATO goals are still unrealistic – caveats are not going to be dropped, troops will not appear in large numbers and “wobbly” nations are going to cling to their safe areas like limpets – if they stay in the country at all (Canada, Denmark, Netherlands are all scheduled to unilaterally pull out their troops within the next two years – so much for an Alliance which declares “an attack on one is an attack on all”).

Is NATO trapped by this very naïve statement that “failure is not an option” and that instead, war-weariness, casualties and cost are dictating the pace?

What are the lessons for NATO’s role in the future?

- How you can get quickly sucked into an operation on a wave of media and popular sentiment - because it seemed a good idea at the time – without understanding or considering the implications.
- How dependent on, or dominated by, the US NATO is – In terms of the Obama strategy – NATO seem like they have been invited to comply rather than discuss as equals…
- The value of good information – intelligence yes, but also analytical expertise – perhaps NATO should be pulling in experts not normally used in NATO circles
- NATO’s Information Operations failures – A vital and growing part of modern military operations – but NATO has practically ceded the IO battlefield to the Taliban. NATO actions, commitment, failings and weaknesses are now very public (it publicly struggles to get individual helicopter reinforcements and is very publicly reluctant to fight). To state “failure is not an option” is a real hostage to fortune. Other IO failures - not studying the opposition (what the Taliban say, how they say to and why), NATO’s media image, civilian casualties, not proactive in tackling Taliban IO (NATO doesn’t know how to). More so than every before – these kind of failings are being scrutinised by potential opponents. …NATO seems to be good at a lot of things, org, planning logistics, moving stuff, going places - but will they fight?? Potential opponents are probably learning that NATO doesn’t like to fight and it prefers to hide behind caveats – NATO credibility is being eroded.

How has the Alliance worked with NGOs and civilian institutions?

Probably more than ever before - positive intentions, much achieved and learnt. The “Comprehensive Approach”—although I have problems with the term, is—a helpful reminder of intent. However, it risks becoming meaningless cliché. Again, a problem of theory versus practise—PRTs may be a good idea, but there has been a very flawed and fragmented application on the ground.

Is there an exit strategy in Afghanistan?

I am not entirely sure what “exit strategy” means? Is it clever packaging to cover failure? Of course it roughly means ensuring the Afghan government can stand on its own feet, but there has been nothing specific in the Obama grand unveiling aside perhaps from a greater emphasis on building up Afghan National Security Forces.
The Taliban look at what NATO says and does – it is looking for weak links and vulnerabilities – one Taliban commander said: “We must kill more Germans”. I wonder what calculations Russia now makes about a future NATO commitment to protect Georgia if Georgia became a member of NATO…

• The nature of warfare NATO will face is shifting – major land strike a la Soviet Union extremely unlikely – future warfare will be more messy: COIN, terrorism, local militias, sponsored group, proxies, special forces, cyber attack, IO/Media warfare… Is NATO up to this? Does NATO want to become up to this?

• Problems of wavering commitment – Three quotes –
  • Canadian PM, Steven Harper on Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan: “I think 10 years is enough”
  • Craddock: "It is this wavering political will that impedes operational progress and brings into question the relevancy of the alliance in the 21st century"
  • Former US presidential candidate John McCain: “We lost in Vietnam because we lost the will to fight, because we did not understand the nature of the war we were fighting, and because we limited the tools at our disposal”.
It is trivially easy to discover the current death toll for NATO military personnel in Afghanistan since 2001. Several official and unofficial sources exist. For instance the NGO icasualties.org shows the breakdown by country, and also provides a list of names, continually updated. The list contains date of death, name, rank, age, service branch, cause of death, place of death, and hometown. This tally is accurate, complete, and uncontested - because it is entirely based on official information, principally from the US Department of Defense.

In contrast, it is virtually impossible to get a clear and uncontested account of Afghan civilian deaths. There is no agreed total and there are no comprehensive or systematic rolls of the dead. What we have instead is a chaotic jumble of incomplete, contradictory and contested data. No organisation has undertaken sustained and consistent data gathering and presentation, and so there is no agreed authoritative record, nor any widely respected body able to authenticate future claims to such authority.

Some partial data has been put into the public domain by a variety of players. These include the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Nations Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the NGO Human Rights Watch, the press agency Associated Press, and – with unique sustained dedication - the New Hampshire academic, Professor Marc Herold who, from day 1 of the start of US bombing in 2001 has maintained a documentary record of all reports of Afghan civilians killed by US air-raids.

However, these partial attempts provide incompatible data, which, at current levels of disclosure, are impossible for third parties to verify or reconcile. Looking just at the two most recent years, 2007 and 2008, we can observe a jumble of figures whose cumulative effect is to confuse honest enquiry, and sow deep scepticism regarding the motives and competence of the parties concerned.

Figure 1 below shows some key data for these two years. Only UNAMA provides comprehensive figures for both years, proposing a total civilian death toll for 2007 of 1523 rising to 2118 in 2008 (a year on year increase of 39%)

ISAF’s figures for 2008 are 1234 (representing 58% of the UNAMA total). Meanwhile, Marc Herold provides data in support of a plausible claim that the US alone killed over 800 civilians in 2008. ISAF only admits to killing 247 civilians in that year, some 30% of Herold’s total. This chaotic situation leads to an environment in which the ordinary citizen comes to believe that no source can be believed or trusted. This sense of general disillusionment is well expressed by an Afghan journalist, interviewed by the Christian Science Monitor in July 2008. Zubair Babakarkhail of Pajhwok, an independent Afghan news service, says Taliban reports enable him to put out stories on time. “It is difficult to reach the spokesperson of the president’s office and the Ministry of Interior and often when they do return a call it is too late”. Mr. Babakarkhail says he does not feel that the information from the military is any more credible. “The Taliban makes claims, and the other side also makes claims,” he says. “We don’t believe in either”.

The need to acquire accurate casualty records in NATO operations

John Sloboda, Executive Director, Oxford Research Group
There are many reasons why figures produced by different bodies don’t match up. These include different start and end dates of compilations, different categories of casualty included in the count, disagreements about the civilian status of victims, different sources of information used (e.g. eye-witnesses, officials), different political motivations of the data presenters (needing to downplay or exaggerate certain facts), different means of verifying data (means which are often obscure and unpublished). And finally, names of victims and dates and locations of death are not published by the key official sources, so there is no means of resolving differences with reference to such issues as double counting or missing data.

A growing body of expert opinion around the world is now coalescing around the view that the time has come for civilians killed in conflict to be recorded with the same detail and care with which we document our own military losses. There are a range of reasons for doing this.

Some reasons are moral. The acknowledgement and recording of individual death is a fundamental human and humanising impulse. This impulse transcends race, culture, or status of the victim.

There are reasons of truth to do this. Truth is required before any reconciliation is possible. That is why we have “truth and reconciliation” processes. Families will never rest until the fact of their loss is incorporated into the public record of their society. Having a definitive and publicly owned list takes the issue of casualties out of the arena of political controversy. It is hard to see how any broad societal acceptance of the past can happen until the truth is made public in the name by name fashion that will allow individual verification – “the list contains my dead husband”.

There are immediate humanitarian needs that casualty data can assist, in relation to determination of survivor needs and provision.

Accurate and detailed data is crucial for justice and reparation.

Military commanders and strategists need this kind of detailed data for the evaluation and adjustment of their own tactics, and to learn the appropriate lessons for the future. Such data allows an agreed baseline against which to test notions of proportionality. And publicly interrogable data at the level of individuals creates data that can stop the toxic politics of contested casualty numbers stone dead.

The effects of having detailed casualty data are not speculative. We can now actually observe their positive effects in conflict. One little-known example of this is the Bosnian Book of the Dead. In 2007 a team of researchers funded by the Norwegian Government created an integrated database with all available information on the 97,207 identified victims of the Bosnian War of 1992–95. It contains names, photographs, official records, media reports, and is open to scrutiny and the submission of new information by any citizen. Before the publication of this database, Bosnian political life was riven with inflammatory sectarian claims and counter-claims regarding the number of people killed.
Figures ranging from 50,000 to 300,000 were bandied about, and the main effect of these claims was to fuel hatred and to stoke new conflicts. Since 2007, no politician or demagogue has dared mention any other number than 97,000. The debate on numbers is over, precisely because the number is transparent and verifiable. It is just a by-product of adding up the names. If anyone can prove a name to be missing, such missing data can be added to the database, one by one.

Another important by-product of detailed incident-based casualty recording is the possibility it allows of assessing differential lethality of different weapons and tactics. For example, using data of this sort collected in the Iraq War, my colleagues at Iraq Body Count were able to show that aerial bombardment was the form of armed violence that produced the largest proportion of child victims. Small arms fire used in combat situations tended to kill the smallest proportion of non-combatants.6

What are the implications of all this for NATO? The world needs progressive alliances of states to recognise the principle that all those killed in conflict, whether military or civilian, need identifying and publicly recording. In order for such work to be as free as possible from corruption and contestation it needs to proceed within agreed international regulatory frameworks, which set standards, and levels of accountability. And such work needs resources – trained personnel and data management systems – and access for personnel to data collected and held by states.

The key elements of such a system are that the name of each victim and the date of their death is the minimum recording requirement. The identity of each victim should be made public and not hidden in some technocratic domain. Recording methods must be transparent and replicable. And practical difficulties in completing the work should be no excuse for not starting. It is necessary to do whatever is possible to do, and continue until the task is complete.

Oxford Research Group, which I direct, is not a disinterested party in this. I am pleased to declare our interest as lead organisation in an international partnership to develop good practice in this area and promote state commitment to it.7

Our partnership already includes such organisations as the International Commission for Missing Persons, the International Centre for Transitional Justice, and Human Rights Watch. It also has the support of a growing number of organisations around the world that already undertake casualty recording, as well as specialists in international law, humanitarian action, and opinion formers within civil society.

Our hope and expectation is that NATO will see the logic and political good sense in playing a leading role in such an initiative, sooner rather than later. There are some encouraging signs. Earlier this month the US military ran a training session at Fort Leavenworth on minimising and addressing civilian casualties, at which there was both NATO member-country and NGO participation.8

Such initiatives should be supported and built upon. Given NATO’s stated aim of protecting civilian lives, serious and objective monitoring of civilian deaths, conducted openly and transparently in all NATO-involved conflicts, is an indispensable component of accounting to the citizens of NATO member countries and the countries in which NATO intervenes.

Notes
3 Marc Herold, University of New Hampshire - Personal communication 8 March 2009 and http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/, http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/memorial.htm
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Research_and_Documentation_Center_in_Sarajevo
8 Post-presentation discussion revealed that NATO’s Afghanistan report for 2009 (published 31 March 2009) reports that COMISAF has revised his Tactical Directive on minimising the risk of harming civilians, which now includes practical measures to establish a transparent methodology of civilian casualty recording http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1207830A-5C4F2DA6/natolive/news_52204.htm. However, public outcomes of this new process are not yet available.
The diminished relevance of collective defence

Compared to the Cold War, the collective defence commitments contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty – implying the “one for all, all for one principle” - have lost relevance. An “armed attack” against the territory of a NATO member state by an adversary that could be held accountable for it is almost impossible to imagine. Likewise (with the possible exception of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction) it seems improbable that an attack on NATO troops deployed “out of area” would trigger invocation of Article V.

One reason for the decreasing relevance of Article V commitments is the growing disparity between perceived security threats to the Alliance and NATO’s policy toolbox of predominantly military instruments. Today’s security agenda is dominated by soft security issues, including the economic crisis, energy security, climate change and cyber security. Yet on these issues, the type of military response envisaged under Article V has become largely irrelevant.1

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (and particularly the potential connection between the two) tops the security agendas of most NATO allies. But a classical collective defence response to these diffuse challenges is difficult to define. For example, the drafters of Article V assumed that NATO allies would have to defend against an attack “from abroad”. But this notion appears eerily strange in the age of transnational terrorist networks, which rely increasingly on “homegrown” terrorists.

While Article V has lost relevance in the post Cold War world, the concept of solidarity among NATO members continues to remain relevant. In case of any serious attack on one of its member states, NATO allies will respond collectively. But the nature of that response will depend on the circumstances as well as the nature and scale of an attack. Fortunately, the wording of Article V is flexible enough to accommodate a range of responses, including non-military ones.

Yet even NATO’s immediate invocation of Article V in response to the 9/11 attacks, which arguably were masterminded “abroad”, in retrospect, is of dubious value. While the decision of NATO allies states to invoke the collective defence clause was an important gesture of solidarity with the United States, the Bush administration’s subsequent refusal to seriously take up the transatlantic offer of assistance as well as today’s difficulties of reaching agreement to terminate the invocation of Article V demonstrate how difficult it is to apply the concept of military defence to today’s security threats. Operation Active Endeavor, still being conducted under the Article V mandate, is certainly not the kind of military response to an armed attack originally envisaged under Article V. It is therefore no surprise that the terror attacks on Madrid and London did not trigger a comparable response by NATO allies, as the 9/11 atrocities did.

The debates on strategic missile defence and nuclear sharing exemplify the declining value of collective defence requirements. Plans to base components of the U.S. missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic were not born out of the desire to strengthen NATO’s collective defence (although the issue is today sometimes framed in this context).
And the case for a continuation of nuclear sharing arrangements does not rest on the need for joint defence against an attack from outside. Rather, both concepts stand for outdated notions of territorial defence rather than for a modern NATO, engaged in conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building. Indeed, it can be argued that strategic missile defence and nuclear sharing undermine rather than help a reorientation of NATO towards future missions and tomorrow’s security needs.

Is securing collective defence without missile defences feasible?

Based on NATO’s 60-year history, securing collective defence without missile defence is entirely feasible. During the Cold War, when thousands of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles were targeted at NATO member states, collective defence remained unquestioned and indeed some would argue that fear of an attack has strengthened collective defence commitments.

Compared to the Cold War, the direct threat to allied territory from missiles has declined dramatically. Apart from Russia, which NATO fortunately sees as a partner and no longer as an enemy, no state can substantially threaten NATO member states’ territory with missiles.

Collective defence is based on a common threat assessment, sharing of risks and a basic agreement on how to respond to common threats. Viewed from this perspective, a decision by NATO to deploy a missile defence system is likely to negatively affect collective defence commitments. First, missile defences may lead to a false sense of security and reduction of non-military efforts to tackle proliferation challenges. If (at least a significant number of) NATO allies feel they are protected against a limited missile strike, they may conclude that there is no urgency to address to root causes of proliferation.

Second, differences in threat perception are likely to grow, particularly if member states arrive at different conclusions about the effectiveness of such system. The Obama administration has initiated a rigorous testing scheme for missile defences to improve the basis for such an assessment. However, it is unlikely that even the most extensive series of test will lead to a consensus of how well missile defences will be able to protect allies. The results of tests will remain ambivalent. This uncertainty has been and will continue to be exploited for political ends.²

Is securing collective defence without missile defences desirable?

Any assessment of the desirability of a missile defence system must be based on cost-benefit analysis. Apart from the questionable feasibility of protecting NATO territory (as discussed above), the case for missile defences is also based on the notion of dissuasion. As the argument goes, a proliferator will not undertake the effort to build-up a costly strategic arsenal of missiles if he believes that missile defences would render this offensive capability ineffective.

Historically, however, one would have great difficulties of finding examples of states that have abandoned offensive programs because they were faced with effective defences. Rather than caving in, competitors are more likely to search for alternative offensive options. An arms race, which can undermine collective security in the long run, seems the more likely result of a strategy aimed at dissuasion. (In political science terminology: balancing, rather than bandwagoning, is likely to continue to remain the policy of choice of NATO’s competitors, particularly in situation of asymmetrical threats.)

The direct costs of missile defences are significant. Introducing strategic missile defences into NATO raises a number of fundamental and practical problems for collective defence that will be costly for the Alliance in financial and political terms.
Three problems are likely to undermine the solidarity upon which collective defence is based:

1. **Joint threat assessment:** an Alliance decision to base security on missile defences must be built on a shared threat assessment, which determines the system’s design. However, the process of arriving at a coherent threat assessment is notoriously difficult and politically divisive. The deep split among allies in the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was based on fundamentally divergent threat assessments. Few allies are likely to be keen to revisit this conflict-ridden discussion in order to arrive at a shared assessment of a missile threat.

2. **Decisions on deployment of strategic missile defences.** Even if there is a consensus decision that threats to NATO territory exist which merit the deployment of missile defences, allies are likely to arrive at different conclusions about deployment patterns. The fact that the Bush administration “privileged” Poland and the Czech Republic by offering them missile defence bases, has already led to misgivings among allies. Collective defence is based on the notion that an attack on some is an attack on all. Missile defences undermine this notion because the architecture of any system is likely to provide different levels of security. It is thus no surprise that in the early phase of discussions, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer argued that it was essential for the Alliance “to ensure that there are no ‘A-grade’ and ‘B-grade’ Allies when it comes to security.”

3. **Decisions about use:** It will also be difficult to develop adequate mechanisms to enable NATO allies to participate in decisions to use an allied missile system. While NATO during the Cold War has developed some procedures to delegate decisions about the use of military instruments on short notice, the timelines of a missile attack are very short.

Increased tensions with Russia, which continues to oppose missile defences, are another factor that Allies should take into account. Last but not least, the financial burden of establishing such a system is likely to cut into the defence budgets of those allies that decide to participate, making it harder for NATO to finance core missions like the one in Afghanistan.

### Is securing collective defence without nuclear sharing feasible?

According to the current Strategic Concept, NATO nuclear forces “preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war”. They “fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression”. But the Strategic Concept states that strategic nuclear forces are the “supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies”, specifically those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France. Thus, ending nuclear sharing does not mean that NATO will not rely on nuclear deterrence.

According to the Strategic Concept, US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are supposed to contribute to collective defence in three different ways. First, “widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements” is required as part of “a credible Alliance nuclear posture”. However, it is difficult to see how in today’s world US tactical nuclear weapons can be part of a credible nuclear posture. Practically, these weapons would be extremely difficult to use and most experts believe they are military obsolete. In the debates about nuclear sharing the potential use of these weapons seems to play hardly a role.

---

**Greece and Canada have ended their involvement in nuclear sharing without any negative impact on Alliance solidarity**
Second, US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are supposed to demonstrate “Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention”. Against the background of discussions on burden sharing in Afghanistan and in the context of other “out of area”-operations it would be difficult to find anybody who would seriously argue that alliance solidarity is tested through the willingness of non-nuclear weapon states to deploy US tactical nuclear weapons on their soil and train air forces for their use. In any case, Greece and Canada have ended their involvement in nuclear sharing without any negative impact on Alliance solidarity.

Third, US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are described as “an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance”. This argument stems from the Cold War and is rooted in the anachronistic doctrine of “flexible response”. Linking Europe and North America through the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons seems hardly relevant in today’s security environment.

Fourth, the secrecy surrounding NATO nuclear deployments is undermining calls for greater transparency by other states, particularly Russia. NATO is neither confirming nor denying numbers of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe nor details about nuclear weapons bases. Even Parliamentarians in host nations are denied access to information about nuclear weapons deployments. At the same time, NATO is very much interested in increasing transparency related to thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, which would be ideal targets for terrorist networks.

Polls in NATO nuclear sharing states show that the majority of citizens are in favour of withdrawal of nuclear weapons and several Parliaments have made statements in this regard.8 Viewed from this perspective, it certainly would strengthen political and public support for collective defence if NATO would bring its nuclear policy in line with public expectations.

**Is securing collective defence without nuclear sharing desirable?**

Proponents of nuclear sharing therefore argue that nuclear sharing strengthens collective defence because it is a hedge against unforeseen threats, a kind of insurance policy. But this presumes that NATO's reliance is cost-free and does not have in itself side-effects that undermine collective defence and security.

One of the main political costs associated with nuclear sharing is that it undermines cooperative efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in a number of ways.

First, nuclear sharing contradicts the spirit of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT’s core goal is to limit access of non-nuclear weapon states to nuclear weapons, while nuclear sharing is extending access of non-nuclear weapon states to nuclear weapons. Vice versa, a decision by NATO to end to nuclear sharing would contribute to a successful NPT review conference in 2010.6
Conclusion

The debate about new Strategic Concept will also be a debate about the meaning of Article V thus about the NATO’s role in a post-Cold War world. NATO’s Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has pointed out that such a discussion is unavoidable and should lead to a broadening of Article V:

“Given the globalized nature of the threats and challenges we face, a major feature of the debate will doubtless be the meaning of collective defence and Article 5. Article 5 is still without question the cornerstone of the Alliance. But I believe we need to take a broader approach and gradually consider the notion of collective security, rather than strictly collective defence”.

Taking the argument one step further, Peter van Ham recently argued that “the concept of collective defence itself requires revision. The notion of ‘one for all and all for one’ has less relevance in a strategic context of international terrorism and humanitarian interventions. Although this change may be logical and even positive, it also erodes the very foundation of the alliance”.

In this sense, strategic missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons represent an outdated notions of territorial defence and deterrence. That is why collective defence without strategic missile defence and nuclear sharing is not only feasible but, indeed, desirable.

Notes:

1 Thus, NATO Secretary General Jaap den Hoop Scheffer recently conceded that NATO allies could not agree to discuss cyber attacks as an issue related to collective defence. “On cyber defence it was discussed not in relationship by the way with Article 5. Article 5 was not mentioned. But on cyber defence itself, you start with a national responsibility and nations have a course a responsibility to protect themselves against cyber attacks, but here again NATO can offer first of all all consultations; that is what NATO is for in the case of serious cyber attacks”.
Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, Vilnius, Estonia, 8 Feb 2009, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080208c.html.


Improving Collective Defence through Improved NATO-Russian Relations – A Possible Road Map

Dr. Dmitry Polikanov, Vice President, PIR Center – the Russian Center for Policy Studies

NATO-Russia relations have always been moving like a pendulum. Now it seems that we are back into 2000, when there are hopes for de-freezing the partnership and cautious steps in this direction are taken. However, this time these measures are even more timid – they are impeded by a Georgian-Ossetian conflict that happened in the close vicinity to the Russian border (let alone that many people still remember the 1999 Kosovo bombings).

The years that passed were mainly the lost epoch – the parties failed to build trust and the attitude to NATO in Russia, as well as to Moscow in Brussels remains skeptical.

There were a number of cooperation programs and action plans, which mainly remain on paper – there hasn’t been any significant joint large-scale exercise, similar to those Russia conducts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Collective Security Treaty Organization. There are problems with the exchange of intelligence information, existing hotlines do not really help and it takes years to validate the status of forces agreement, which would allow for the transit through the Russian territory. There are some success stories – joint peacekeeping in the Balkans, Active Endeavor, TMD staff exercises, exercises to eliminate the consequences of man-made and natural disasters, a training program for the Afghani drug police and the center for retraining of the Russian retired officers. But they are few and are not as publicized as the negative stereotypes about NATO.

The parties are obsessed with setting up structures and institutions, which are good for times when they don’t care about each other, but fail any time when even a petty crisis occurs – be it an impasse over the CFE Treaty, independence of breakaway republics in Georgia, NATO expansion, NATO exercises in neighboring countries, or missile defense. As people say, “if you want to kill the idea, establish a working group”.

Hence, for any partnership to exist, the parties have to take off their diplomatic suits, sit down together and make an honest assessment of differences and commonalities. The list of true, not propagandistic claims to each other should be prepared, together with a list of areas for joint work with very specific projects. They can be fewer than listed in the annual plans of action, but there should one or two large-scale events and numerous small-scale activities, which would create the link of engagement.

To do so, Russia will have to abandon several myths about NATO. Firstly, it is the conviction that NATO jeopardizes Russia’s national interests. If national interests are formulated in the way they should be – i.e. security of borders and neighboring territories, economic and social stability, demographic improvements, prevention of crime, extremism and terrorism, as well as environmental safety – there is nothing NATO can infringe upon.

Secondly, “NATO will die soon”. It won’t and even if it does, it will ‘die hard’. For nearly 20 years now Russian experts and decision-makers keep repeating the mantra about the weakness of the Alliance, which will grow further after each wave of expansion.
However, NATO continues to exist even though its mission is vague. And there should be no useless hopes about its collapse in the near future – even if it is not successful in Afghanistan. And NATO will become global and involve such countries as Australia or Japan one day.

Thirdly, “NATO is the U.S. puppet and the only thing the United States wants is to weaken Russia”. After all, the United States even with its unilateral policy is more predictable than some of Russia’s allies, e.g. Belarus. Both parties should agree to be more transparent with respect to each other and the “reset” should not end up with disappointment.

NATO, on its part, should also get rid of some myths.

First of all, it has to learn to respect Russia’s psychology – from historically inherited Great Power mission to suspicion with respect to the military alliance, which 60 years after the establishment remains an adversary which does not keep promises. This is a generational issue and soft step-by-step approach may help to cure it.

Secondly, NATO should stop building dividing lines following the will of radical politicians in some Eastern European countries. There is a need for an open dialogue and Russia should be involved in it on an equal basis, not as a parvenu. It is often the matter of language and interpretations, so there is no need to tease the Russian bear more than is necessary. Russia should be invited, should be engaged in NATO projects – the more the better, even if Moscow resists such initiatives at first.

Thirdly, NATO-Russia relations should eventually develop an economic basis, which will be more reliable than any empty political declarations. Such cooperation may extend from strategic airlift to modernization of arms and joint efforts to ensure the security of energy supplies, police and military training, etc. The lobbies that are interested in the development of partnership should be created on both sides – so far there are no such influence groups.

Before any projects are taken up, Russia’s top-down bureaucratic culture should be considered. General political consensus should be reached and a clear sign should be sent to the entire bureaucratic system – NATO and Russia are no longer adversaries.

This means the eradication of anti-NATO rhetoric from the Russian doctrines, as well as the anti-Russian rhetoric from the speeches and actions of the Allies. Such mood should be further enhanced with the active public diplomacy, reciprocal expansion of NGO networks, intensification of military-to-military contacts and PR-activities to change of tone in the media in Russia and in the West.

And all of this is quite achievable – the Soviet Union gave us the examples of the policy of détente, including improvement of relations with Western Germany in the 1970s. Another example is Armenia and NATO – mechanisms used their enable Yerevan to keep its self-sufficiency and independence in foreign policy and security matters, maintain good relationship with Russia and the Alliance at the same time without risking sovereignty of Armenia or spoiling its ties with each side.

Which are the areas where the progress is more probable after such political consensus is reached? Just like the current Russian government anti-crisis plan, the roadmap for NATO-Russia relations may comprise seven priorities.

First of all, these are the ratification of the CFE Treaty and broader discussion on European security platforms. There is no problem in ratifying the adapted CFE but for the political will of the NATO states, which actually once agreed even to persuade the Baltic nations to join. It is clear to everybody that the adapted treaty reflects the reality, will not pose a threat to security of any nation and, on the contrary, will help to disarm and set up improved mechanisms for reduction and limitation of arms. This is, by the way, quite topical in the era of global financial crisis. So ratification of the CFE Treaty is just a formality (just as the elimination of the Jackson-Vanik amendment), which should easily be passed and should not push away the future.
Besides, there is no need for putting forward a separate NATO security concept, as if it was aimed against Russia and Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal on the comprehensive European security treaty. On the contrary, if we want to come to some consensus, NATO initiative should be “sold” as a constructive response in development of the Russian ideas, i.e. with “win-win” logic.

Secondly, the parties should go on with the development of the joint TMD system. It will be a protection shield for Europe anyway, whenever the United States builds its strategic missile defence. Russia and NATO has already accumulated substantial knowledge and experience in this area and it should be quickly converted into some tangible system – with early warning centres, radars, interceptor missiles, etc. Again, here it is the political will that is needed – the military has mostly come to the agreement on the matter (and moreover, such project could be one of the elements of the aforementioned economic basis).

Thirdly, there is an ideal mutual understanding in the area of emergency operations. Russia and NATO keep saving each other’s vessels, protecting oil platforms, training people in securing the nuclear power plants, and so on. Cooperation in this sphere should be expanded and commercial agreements should go beyond national selfishness.

Fourthly, Russia and NATO should eventually find a hotbed of conflict for joint peacekeeping operation. Recent developments around Moldova indicate that this region may soon become such a test ground. However, it would be better to find a more neutral place – be it Africa, or the Middle East, or some other part of the world, where the scope of the danger is unambiguous and where immediate action is needed. This would help the parties to build on combat experience and interoperability, just as it happened once in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia should not limit this interoperability to one specially designated brigade only – more Russian units should be involved in such joint activities.

Fifthly, Afghanistan seems to be the common headache for both parties. Therefore, instead of playing muscles in Central Asia and putting Kyrgyzstan in a difficult position of choosing between the two giants, the parties should focus on stabilizing Afghanistan.

Russia should not be involved militarily, but joint anti-drug programs, training courses for the Afghani armed forces and police, intelligence sharing and consultancy, mild forms of pressure on the Afghani government, etc. should be used.

Sixthly, the parties should develop a joint approach towards frozen conflicts. Probably each of the conflicts should be treated individually. But it is clear that it makes little sense nowadays to oppose the recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – their independence is a fact and they are economically sustainable entities which do not want to live together and to have any deals with their once “mother states”. However, the federation model has not yet exhausted its potential with respect to Moldova. And Nagorno-Karabakh may be resolved as well if conflicting parties feel the real pressure from the mediators. To support this, Russia and NATO may sign the agreement providing security assurances and fixing the new borders of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, these small nations may pledge to maintain neutrality and avoid from getting into blocs. After all, their military significance is extremely low, they are too poor to be preoccupied with militarization and the costs of merging with any alliance. And the neutral status does not prevent them from adapting the best practices and trainings from both NATO and Russia.

Finally, Russia and NATO should think of one or two realistic and nice PR-projects; the ones that will help to radically shift the public opinion on both sides in favour of cooperation. For instance, Moscow and the Alliance are now trying to militarize the Arctic zone and put a flag there. Instead it would be good to start up joint exploration and patrolling (e.g. against illegal fishing, environmental control, etc.) and think of the same treaty with respect to the Arctic as there is with respect to the Antarctic or to the Moon, which are the assets of ‘mankind’. Another project could be the joint fight against piracy – and not only near the shores of Somalia, but also in the Strait of Malacca, for example.

Hence, there are opportunities for partnership – it is just important the parties are ripe for moving on instead of repeating the old mistakes over and over again.
It can be argued that NATO, despite an elaborate military structure developed since the early 1950s, was never primarily designed to facilitate the actual operational use of conventional forces. During the Cold War its primary focus was, of course, on deterrence. The main Cold War purpose of NATO’s integrated military structures was to contribute to this rather than active defence. The relative lack of confidence in the utility of NATO forces for defence was publicly recognised from an early stage. Field Marshal Montgomery, the first D/SACEUR, famously said in 1954 that, if the allies were ever required to actually mount a collective defence effort then “there would be chaos”.

It is important to remember that there are few actual ‘NATO forces’. The main integrated assets are the military planning and command structures and the AWACs early-warning planes. Ground forces are overwhelmingly national: assigned or earmarked for possible NATO tasking by the member states.

Overall therefore, we should maintain a realistic sense of what ‘NATO’ can and cannot contribute to international military operations. It may well be true, as Gareth Evans stated yesterday, that NATO is “the world’s best multilateral military institution”. But competition for this accolade is not fierce and it does not therefore mean that NATO is necessarily terribly well-equipped to effectively undertake the kind of operations its member states have allowed it to be drawn into.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) can best be described as a political flagship. There is a tradition of NATO members creating high-profile multinational forces to signal their resolve and togetherness in light of dramatic or wrenching developments. Previous examples include the creation of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) in the early 1960s, as part of the great debate about the proper role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy, and the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in the aftermath of the Cold War’s end in the early 1990s.

The military utility of the NRF to date has been limited, though not completely negligible. It has provided the framework for the NATO contribution to disaster relief efforts in Pakistan and also headquarters elements for ISAF in Afghanistan. Problematically however, there sometimes seems to be an expectation that a ‘NATO force’ must be deployed at full strength in order to be operationally useful. This has not happened with the NRF, and may never do so given the divisive political circumstances in which it was conceived in 2002 (the aftermath of the US ‘refusal’ to deploy NATO to Afghanistan post-9/11 and the build-up to the Iraq war).

There were no NATO military operations during the Cold War. Since 1992 and the first deployments in Bosnia, both the Alliance and its member states have been on a steep learning curve in the conduct of combined operations under NATO auspices. Experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan strongly suggest a pressing need to, as has been said, “put the practice into theory”. At present the utility of NATO on operations is undermined by the lack of a substantial joint threat analysis and threat assessment.
An important consequence of this has been the growth in the use of national caveats (‘red cards’) on NATO operations. The debilitating effect of these has been publicly noted and criticised by the current SACEUR. At present there exists no systematic mechanism or means for reducing them however.

In conclusion it may be said that:

1. NATO is by no means without utility for international operations involving the use of military force. It brings to the table two main assets: tried and tested integrated command and planning structures and practiced habits of co-operation amongst many of its member states. These can facilitate the conduct of effective multilateral operations.

2. NATO does, however, face a ‘capability-expectations gap’, not dissimilar to that identified by Christopher Hill in the case of the EU. Too much perhaps can (and has) been expected of it.

3. Contrary to some views, NATO is not well-practiced in the deployment of conventional forces on operations. None were mounted between 1949 and 1992. Since then, there has been a conspicuous failure to learn the lessons of successive operations in order to build up a set of commonly-agreed assessments and principles upon which current – and future – operations can be based.
I would like to thank BASIC, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, ISIS Europe and NATO Watch for inviting me to participate in this important debate.

In this session we have been asked to consider the following questions:

1. What are the outcomes of NATO’s assessment of the political and military implications of the planned missile defence systems in Europe?
2. Will NATO and US missile Defence systems be bolted together?
3. Should NATO go ahead with BMD proposals in Europe even in the face of Russian opposition?

and I would like to consider each in turn.

1. What are the outcomes of NATO’s assessment of the political and military implications of the planned missile defence systems in Europe?

The Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008 contained the following:

"We …recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision."

However, many of the leaders of NATO’s member states are skeptical and have not embraced it. A few months after this statement French President Nicholas Sarkozy said:

"Deployment of a missile defense system would bring nothing to security in Europe … it would complicate things, and would make them [Russia] move backward."

2. Will NATO and US missile Defence systems be bolted together?

The final decision on this has yet to be made by NATO. During the Bush Administration the US was very keen to combine the two; the Obama Administration is less clear. It might be useful to quickly review the two systems at this stage.

US Missile Defence – Despite Russian objections, President Bush withdrew unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 in order to pursue a missile defence programme for the US. Since then, his administration has poured some $10 billion a year into the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and managed to install a small number of experimental interceptor missiles in Alaska and California. In addition, agreements to upgrade the early warning and tracking radars in Greenland and the UK were obtained before the presidential election of 2004. Although there are around twenty or so interceptors today, their capability has not been advanced that much and tests have not been particularly successful or convincing - even when the targets have emitted signals for the interceptors to home in on. Cloud cover and bad weather have also affected a number of tests which is not a good sign. In fact test results have proved to be so controversial that the details were classified in 2002. Many scientists and engineers have also questioned the ability of the system to deal with missiles that can deploy decoys.
In 2007, the Bush administration, saying it was concerned about the possibility of Iran developing long range missiles, announced plans to install 10 modified versions of those interceptors (2 stage missiles rather than the 3 stage ones deployed in the US) in Poland and an X-band radar in the Czech Republic. Together with a forward based radar (in an unspecified location) and the newly upgraded phased array radar at Fylingdales in the UK, this system would, it is claimed, be able to detect, track and intercept long range missiles from Iran by 2013.\(^3\)

**The NATO system** – NATO’s Missile Defence Feasibility Study was conducted before the plans for the US European Site were announced. Its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme (ALTBMD) is designed, at a cost of some 20 billion euros, to protect deployed forces within or outside NATO territory against short and medium-range ballistic missiles (with a range of up to 3,000km). NATO leaders agreed to endorse the US plan in April last year at the summit in Bucharest, Romania. The NATO-funded command and control ‘backbone’ will integrate American Patriot PAC-3, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), US-German-Italian Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Franco-Italian Surface to Air Missile Platform Land based (SAMP/T) and various ground, air and space-based components provided by several NATO nations. The ALTBMD is scheduled to become partly operational next year and fully operational by 2016. In February last year a special NATO testing facility was inaugurated in The Hague to test different components of the ALTBMD and ensure their interoperability.\(^4\)

In Bucharest NATO embraced the idea of including territorial protection. However, two major questions need to be addressed:

- how to fit the US European Site into a NATO system and
- how to provide protection for the southeast parts that would not be covered by the proposed US system?

The integration of the US and NATO systems should not be too difficult - NATO has considerable experience in managing multinational military structures such as the integrated air defence system. However, with missile defence there is a very tight timeline for decision-making. It takes less than 30 minutes for an ICBM to travel to the other side of the planet, there is no time to convene a meeting of the North Atlantic Council to make a joint decision on what to do. Therefore, new rules of engagement will be required. Procedures will be needed to authorise commanders to take responsibility and make decisions under certain circumstances that will need to be agreed in advance. An ICBM attack would have devastating consequences for any country; therefore delegating decision-making powers to supranational commanders will require an unprecedented level of trust in the Alliance.

The Bucharest Summit also specifically tasked NATO to develop options for defending Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania from short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats originating from the Middle East. This implies that NATO’s ALTBMD should be redirected to provide protection for population centres in these countries, as well as its original mission to protect deployed troops. ALTBMD can be easily adapted for territorial defence but they are terminal-phase interception systems and can cover only very limited areas. A significant number of extra platforms will be required to provide the cover needed.

A US Congressional Budget Office Study published in February considered 4 options for European Missile Defence:\(^5\)

**Option 1:** The European capability proposed by MDA, consisting of 10 Ground-Based Interceptors permanently housed in silos to be constructed in Poland, an X-band radar in the Czech Republic, and a forward-based X-band radar at a location to be determined. CBO assumed that the forward-based radar (FBR) would be located in Azerbaijan. Current plans call for the system to be fully fielded by 2013. Cost $9.2 – 12.8 billion.
Option 2: A standing sea-based defense comprising Aegis ballistic missile defense ships of the U.S. Navy equipped with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, which are slated to start entering the fleet around 2015. Those ships would maintain three stations—in the waters off Romania, eastern Italy, and Poland—and would be supported by forward-based transportable X-band radars in Azerbaijan and Qatar. Cost $18.3 – 21.9 billion.

Option 3: Land-based SM-3 Block IIA interceptors operating from mobile launchers at two existing U.S. bases: Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany and Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey. Tracking would be provided by forward-based transportable X-band radars in Azerbaijan and Qatar. This system would be available around 2015. Cost $9.2 – 12.8 billion.

Option 4: Land-based Kinetic Energy Interceptors operating from mobile launchers at Ramstein and Incirlik Air Force Bases, supported by forward-based transportable X-band tracking radars in Azerbaijan and Qatar. Given the current development schedule for those interceptors, this system would probably not be available before 2018. Cost $9.6 – 13.6 billion.

The alternatives considered would locate mobile or sea based interceptors closer to Iran than MDAs planned system and therefore would generally provide more extensive defence of southeastern Europe. In addition, because they would be composed of mobile or transportable components, deploying the alternative systems would not require building permanent facilities—including missile silos—at European sites. However, none of the systems that CBO analyzed, including the system proposed by MDA, would be capable of defending all of Europe against all of the threat missiles that Iran has either already tested or might develop.

3. Should NATO go ahead with BMD proposals in Europe even in the face of Russian opposition?

Basically – no and I will explain why.

Firstly, I think we need to seriously consider the question of who NATO serves. The citizens of the member countries? Their governments? Select governments or individuals? The military industrial complex? I would suggest that the current deployment of US missile defence systems in Europe is challenging democracy.

The majority of the citizens in the Czech Republic, Poland and the UK, where US missile defence systems exist or are being proposed, are against the establishment of these bases. In fact, the recent fall of the Czech Republic has been due, in part, to the support by the Czech 3 party coalition government for the US missile defence radar. The Czech government demonstrated how weak it was when it withdrew treaties for accepting the radar from discussion because it was worried that it would lose the vote. The Social Democrat opposition (who are against the radar) then realised that were in a good position to challenge the government by a vote of no confidence.

Polls have consistently shown that around 70% of Czech citizens do not want the radar in their country. Just a few weeks ago three bus loads of mayors from the ‘League of Mayors against the Radar’ arrived here in Brussels to meet with and explain their protest to Members of the European Parliament. The delegation represented 130 Czech mayors who publicly oppose the project and they were supported by 13 of the total 14 heads of regional governments as well as many mayors from other European countries. 100,000 people have also signed a petition calling for a referendum on the issue – something the government has been particularly reluctant to agree to.

The plan to place 10 interceptors in neighbouring Poland, also does not have the support of the citizens of the host country. The majority of the Polish people remain unconvinced and are not in favour of the missile base.
In addition, the centre-left government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk are considerably cooler on the issue than the previous government, which lost power in October 2007. Concern has been expressed over the Russian statement that it would aim nuclear missiles at Poland if American interceptors were placed there. The Polish Defence Minister is reported to have requested greater security guarantees, insisting on US help in strengthening Poland’s short- to medium-range air defences (by Patriot or THAAD missiles) and identifying 17 areas in which the US could help modernise the Polish military. At one time there even was some doubt as to whether agreement could be achieved and Lithuania was floated as a possible alternative location for the interceptors. However, it seems that the recent problems in Georgia did increase concerns over Russian intervention and the US and Poland signed an agreement in August 2008.

The UK government has already given permission for the US to use two bases in North Yorkshire for missile defence. These are the phased array radar system at Fylingdales and the receiving dishes at the US Menwith Hill electronic interception base. The UK first received an offer of participation in Missile Defence just after the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked the UK Ministry of Defence for permission to use the ballistic missile early warning radar at RAF Fylingdales for missile defence. This request had been expected for some time and the fact that it hadn’t yet been made was often given as the reason for not debating the issue in the House of Commons. The public were given a few weeks over the Christmas holiday to register their views on missile defence with the MoD. A few weeks later the government announced its decision to grant the US permission. In October 2004 the UK and US governments signed an agreement and the House of Commons was informed of this through a Written Statement. This prompted strong comment from Defence Select Committee:

“Despite the Secretary of State’s unequivocal statement that he wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively curtailed such discussions”

Even at that time it was known that the US electronic interception base at Menwith Hill would be used for missile defence. In fact the Ministry of Defence had issued a statement as long ago as 1996 to say that it was:

“pleased to announce that the European Relay Ground Station (RGS-E) for the new Space Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) will be established at RAF Menwith Hill.”

SBIRS was to act as a space based system to give early warning of missile launches and detailed information about the missile’s trajectory. Two receiving dishes were built at Menwith Hill even before the US gave notice to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. However, the UK government did not admit to the missile defence role until July 2007 when it was announced that the US had been given permission to use it for just that. Prime Minister Tony Blair had also offered to host US interceptors in the UK the previous February. The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Select Committee voiced their concern:

“We regret the manner and timing of the Government’s announcement that RAF Menwith Hill is to participate in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and the resulting lack of Parliamentary debate on the issue... We recommend that there should be a full Parliamentary debate on these proposals.”

There was no discussion or debate in the House of Commons. However, a debate in the House of Lords enabled Lord Wallace of Saltaire to comment that he hoped the Government would be shamed into providing a “fuller and more detailed justification of its decision”. They haven’t and polls show that the British public have also been consistent in their opposition to missile defence – with some 54% saying that they believe that US Missile Defence would make Europe less safe, while only 24% think otherwise.

So, despite the controversy surrounding this issue, there has been little discussion and exchange of views in the parliaments of Europe. Not only that but countries are making their own decisions without consultation with their European partners, despite the fact that all European countries will be affected by the decision of any individual state to participate.
No country in Europe has stated that it is worried about a threat from immediate missile attack. Concern is often expressed however about the possible development in 5-10 years of longer-range missiles by Iran. It is interesting then to recall that back in February 2002 the Guardian newspaper reported William Cohen, then US defence secretary, as saying the same thing during a speech in Munich. He said there that the US needed go ahead with their missile defence plans because North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya:

“want long range missiles to coerce and threaten us – the North American and European parts of NATO.” “We project that in the next 5 to 10 years these rogue countries will be able to hold all of NATO at risk with their missile forces”\(^{14}\)

Now, seven years later, we know that no nuclear weapons were discovered in Iraq; Libya abandoned its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 following diplomatic negotiations with the US and Britain; and in 2007, after four years of protracted six party talks, North Korea has agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for aid and improved relations with the US and Japan (admittedly, these negotiations have not progressed well and there are severe problems with relations between the US and North Korea). So, almost ten years after that statement three of the four threats no longer exist. Yet we are being told again that in another 10 years the one ‘rogue’ remaining - Iran - may have the ability to fire a long range nuclear missile towards Europe or the US. This is despite the fact that, in December 2007, US intelligence officials concluded that Iran had probably halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.\(^{15}\)

Supporters of missile defence in Europe suggest that it can be seen as and extension of NATO’s “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). However, critics argue that it is actually a “Reason to Proliferate”. It has often been said that development of an effective missile defence system would lead to a new arms race. A bigger shield enables you to wield your sword with more confidence that there can be no successful retaliation - therefore the opposition swords grow bigger and so on. Missile Defense is one of the components in the New Triad described in the US Nuclear Posture Review of 2002.\(^{16}\)

The other components being nuclear and non-nuclear weapons systems and the plan to field by 2020 a fully operational Prompt Global Strike system that will provide the capability of striking targets anywhere on Earth within 60 minutes.\(^{17}\)

Missile defence has an additional aggressive use. The shooting down of a ‘rogue’ satellite by the US ship based missile defence system\(^{18}\) demonstrates a possible anti-satellite capability. Do we really want to extend war fighting there - with all the possible consequences of a new arms race in outer space?

### The View from Russia

Russia sees these US moves as part of a military expansion of bases close to its borders, into former Warsaw Pact countries. Russia is convinced that the US is targeting their silos and not those of Iran. If Iran poses a threat of a missile-launched nuclear attack, then why aren’t the interceptors to be stationed in Turkey and the radar in Azerbaijan, not in Eastern Europe?\(^{19}\) The Pentagon denies this, stating that the interceptors could not catch missiles fired from Russian silos but some recent calculations\(^{20}\) indicate that the MDA may have overestimated the velocity of Russian missiles and underestimated the velocity of US interceptors. This, together with fears that many more interceptors would follow, leads to concerns about the strategic balance of nuclear weapons between the two major states.

President Obama does appear to be cooler than Bush to missile defence, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who remains in office under Obama, supports missile defence. The new president has said he supports missile defence in general but that it should be developed pragmatically and cost-effectively and be proven to work.\(^{21}\) Who will determine whether these conditions are met? Who will say, for example, whether the system works? The MDA? The aerospace corporations who make billions from associated R&D programs? Even if missile defence were to work would it be desirable? It would inevitably mean that other methods of persuasion, such as diplomacy and negotiation will be neglected.
Whether or not you consider NATO as a community, it is widely recognised (and has been operating primarily) as a military alliance and therefore tends to focus on military solutions to problems. Missile defence is a high tech military solution. Such solutions are extremely costly in many ways. Apart from the escalating financial implications, which may now be regarded as unsustainable, there are significant costs to the reputation of the US, NATO and Europe.

In recent years the power of argument, diplomacy and example has given way to control by dominance and “shock and awe.”

**In Conclusion...**

NATO was established sixty years ago to counter the military power and perceived threat of the Soviet Union and, as Lord Ismay famously stated, to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. The end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union has seen NATO looking for new roles and a stated aim of this conference is:

“To identify, discuss and share ideas concerning the future of NATO, including a new Strategic Concept and innovative solutions to some of the Alliance’s most pressing security challenges.”

So – what are the threats and security challenges that need addressing? The two biggest threats that Europe faces at the moment are climate change and the global economic crisis. According to the March emergency summit in Copenhagen, 2,500 climate experts agreed that climate change might surpass the worst-case scenarios outlined in the 2007 report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). At the same event, Sir Nicholas Stern, economist and author of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, said he had

"underestimated the climate crisis." Scientists are discovering new mechanisms that accelerate climate change all the time. A recent preliminary report published by a UN commission of experts on reforms of the international monetary and financial system, focuses on the impact of the global financial crisis on developing countries and the poor. An estimated 30 million more people will be unemployed in 2009 compared to 2007. The increase could even reach 50 million.

Progress in reducing poverty may be halted. The report warns that:

“Some 200 million people, mostly in developing economies, could be pushed into poverty if rapid action is not taken to counter the impact of the crisis.”

Poverty, hunger and desperation will undoubtedly lead to clashes between different ethnic and social groups.

How can/will NATO help tackle these problems? How will it help the huge numbers of refugees forced from their homes by drought, flooding or poverty? In a recent article in “Counterpunch” Diana Johnstone made the point that:

“This might be the time to be undertaking diplomatic and political efforts to work out internationally agreed ways of dealing with such problems as global economic crisis, climate change, energy use, hackers (“cyberwar”).

NATO think tanks are pouncing on these problems as new “threats” to be dealt with by NATO. This leads to a militarization of policy-making where it should be demilitarized.”

NATO could have a role in emergency response - helping distribute humanitarian aid, assisting in the housing and feeding of refugees from global and financial disaster. Maybe it will do this to some extent. However, while it also continues to put an emphasis on expensive high tech military systems, like missile defence, as a modus operandi, it will continue to suppress or even exacerbate problems - not solve them.

Missile defence will not help and is actually a diversion – an attempt to preserve old methods and ideas of threats, evil empires and containment. We have created a special status for states that posses nuclear weapons and then declared that others should not try to pursue it. As Oliver Meier said yesterday – it is time to think in terms of collective security rather than collective defence and collective security from nuclear weapons can only come from removing that special status and achieving global nuclear disarmament.

while NATO continues to put an emphasis on expensive high tech military systems, like missile defence, as a modus operandi, it will continue to suppress or even exacerbate problems – not solve them
Notes:
1 See: 'Bucharest Summit Declaration - Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008' - http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html
10 As reported in 'US Bases in this country are being used to protect America, not Britain', Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian, 18 November 1999
24 As reported in 'Reform is needed. Reform is in the air. We can’t afford to fail', Joseph Stiglitz, The Guardian, 27 March 2009 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/27/global-recession-reform
A lot of the focus this morning was on the challenges facing NATO. This portrays a general tendency in the security policy community to emphasise risks rather than to identify chances. Indeed, that was one of the conclusions of the recent New Horizons consultation by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. But this conference has been about opportunities for creative thinking; and exploring what NATO can do and can do better.

This particular headline goal encapsulates many of the principles in the Citizens Declaration: collective defence (principle 2); moral, muscular multilateralism (principles 1, 4-7); disaster relief (principle 13); conflict prevention (principle 12); and counter- and non-proliferation (principles 14 and 15). So in the 10 minutes available to me I will be focusing on the collective defence issue, since as we have heard throughout the conference, this is one of the key areas of division within the Alliance. On the one hand, are those NATO Member States that are emphasising ‘away’ missions and have (or are looking to) transform their armed forces into expeditionary combat forces – and led by the United States and United Kingdom, this view is now almost the orthodox approach within the Alliance.

On the other hand, several of NATO’s easternmost countries are in favour of homeland collective defence and want to see a focus on in-place forces that are largely unsuitable for sustained expeditionary combat operations. Those countries want stronger security guarantees in the face of growing tensions with Moscow, and pressure is rising to move beyond the ‘virtual’ military presence in some of the new NATO members.

How then to enhance collective defence and provide stronger security guarantees to the eastern front, without further alienating Russia? Part of the answer lies in changing the terms of the debate with Russia—we heard earlier Dmitry Polikanov’s road map towards such an end and yesterday Gareth Evans spoke about the missed opportunity of embracing Russia as part of NATO’s expansion—but it also requires more realistic thinking as to the limitations of collective defence: military options are an inappropriate response, for example, to cyber attacks and energy disputes.

Thus, the second principle in the Citizens Declaration is an attempt to square this particular circle. It argues for synthesising non-offensive collective defence and human security principles in re-shaping the Alliance’s collective defence posture. For example, if additional NATO and/or US installations are to be included on the soil of the new NATO members, these need to be unambiguously defensive in nature (unlike the missile defence proposals). Dmitry talked about “positive PR” measures between NATO and Russia – one might be to establish a joint NATO-Russian Peacekeeping Training Centre in Poland (rather than missile interceptors). Discussions about Non-Offensive Defence in the mid 1980s suggested that it was possible to significantly restructure military forces for defensive, rather than offensive operations, and to adopt a non-nuclear policy, while still retaining the capacity to inflict serious damage against an aggressor.

In reflecting the new security environment, collective defence also needs to be predicated on a fundamental redefinition of what constitutes security. This should include a human security centred approach in formulating collective defence.
This means providing protection against all threats to human life, whether they emanate from terrorism, ‘rogue states’, the spread of nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, energy or infrastructure insecurity, outbreaks of disease or instability arising from deep-rooted poverty and hunger. This would entail a greater Homeland security type approach.

It also means that many of the most dangerous threats that the Alliance faces are not amenable to traditional ideas of collective defence – or even extended notions of collective defence that have seen greater use in recent years with expeditionary forces in support of ‘peace enforcement’ missions. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions. The mismatch in resources that devotes far too much funding to traditional military missions at the expense of the more diverse set of tools needed to address current and future threats to security also needs to be addressed. In the United States, for example, the GAO reports that major weapon programmes are a “staggering” $296 billion over budget and calls for some to be cancelled.

In my view, over reliance on intelligence makes the doctrine of preventive war a flawed and dangerous instrument of foreign policy. Greater caution has to be exercised in thinking about preventive and pre-emptive warfare and its consequences. Moreover, if preventive war became widely acceptable, it could encourage other countries that fear an assault to attack their rivals first, pre-empting the ‘preventor’ and escalating a conflict that might have been resolved without force. Or a nation under a sudden attack might choose to deploy CBW or nuclear weapons it otherwise might not use. When much of the world is working toward common understandings about the legal use of force, the very act of one country preventively or pre-emptively attacking another carries troubling echoes of vigilante justice.

Either in the case of the R2P agenda this holds true. The argument that tyrants hide behind the protection of the UN Charter may be true in practice, but it does not change the law. The essence of international law since 1945 is that the use of force should be authorised as a last resort, as a means for self-protection against an ongoing or imminent attack. The key lesson from Iraq is that intelligence is not yet reliable or adequate to support military operations against proliferating powers or to make accurate assessments of the need to pre-empt. To utilise force on the basis of sketchy intelligence or mere accusations of wrongdoing or bad intent weakens the foundation of the law and presents, in the long run, a grave threat to international stability.

Thank you for listening and I look forward to a vigorous discussion.
What it should do: collective security and peacekeeping. I’ll focus my remarks on NATO’s out of area operations and its role as a peacekeeping actor.

‘NATO’s greatest strength is that it does the military. NATO’s greatest weakness is that it does the military’ - Jamie Shea, NATO, 2008

What does this mean for NATO’s engagement in peacekeeping? What are NATO’s key military comparative advantages?

- It is nearly the only international security organisation that developed nations are prepared to deploy their troops under (exception with France in the EU). E.g. Balkans and Afghanistan. (These countries provide financial resources to the UN and some logistical assets)
- Operationally, it is the only international security organisation capable of conducting low-intensity war fighting, i.e. ‘stability operations’.
- Doctrinally, it is the only international security organisation capable of conducting war-fighting. Doctrinal and operational trends in the most significant troop contributing states increasingly blur war-fighting and peacekeeping tasks. They are viewed as different by degree rather than in kind. Rather, these powers re-conceptualise peace operations as low-intensity conflict with a ‘hearts and minds’ annex.
- NATO doesn’t necessarily operate on the basis of consent or UN SC authorisation e.g. Kosovo. ‘Opposed entry’ is an option. Rather than relying on local consent as a source of operational legitimacy, the US for instance posits that firm and fair implementation of post-conflict reconstruction will generate local consent. This may have worked in Iraq, but few other organisations or operations will have this level of resources.

More commonly, they will lack resources and will experience ‘an obsolescing welcome’ or increased civilian anger as they fail to meet expectations in relation to civilian protection or peacebuilding mandates e.g. UNMIK in Kosovo. Hence, NATO ‘may’ have the advantage of political flexibility to enter even where opposed, in line with R2P, but this is inherently risky and resource intensive. While a theoretical possibility, it is not likely to be a common characteristic of NATO operations for political and operational reasons. I therefore hesitate to call it a ‘comparative advantage’.

In short, NATO is the international security organization most suited to peace ‘enforcement’ tasks or war-fighting in the context of stability operations. (Although NATO also suffers from inherent weaknesses, including national caveats both explicit and implicit, that multilateral operations bring).

What are its comparative weaknesses?

- NATO’s doctrinal alignment with war-fighting, also makes its suitability for peacekeeping questionable. The major trend for NATO nations, particularly its dominant powers, is the creation of omni-competent and flexible forces that can adapt from peacekeeping to war-fighting including counter-insurgency or counter-terrorist operations. It is not clear, however, that soldiers are collectively capable of doing as much role-shifting and as rapidly as doctrine now seems to require. Perhaps an experienced veteran, yes, but hardly the bulk of infantrymen.
- It does not have comprehensive capacities required for 'multi-dimensional' peacekeeping. For instance, it has neither police, nor rule-of-law capacities common to all integrated UN missions and to EU civilian missions. In other words it does not have peacebuilding capacities, over and above 'hearts and minds' annex to war-fighting doctrine. The experience of Afghanistan has highlighted this shortfall.

- NATO’s approach to filling the gap through ‘comprehensive’ operations is unrealistic. It assumes that NATO can plan to integrate the capacity of others in a predictable way through partnerships. The PRTs are experiments in this direction. In some cases, as in the UK, development counter-parts are on-side and there has been integrated planning. But this cannot be assumed more broadly. The fact remains that humanitarian, and development actors are ‘sovereign’ often with somewhat contradictory or incompatible mandates. Much attention has been paid to the challenge of ‘external coherence’ in peacebuilding. One common finding is that, at best, you can only hope for different degrees of coherence: that gaps and duplication is an inherent feature of complex peacebuilding. Indeed some (including the OECD DAC) argue that in complex operations, some degree of ‘messyness’ or overlap is operationally sound; it makes the system more fit to respond to unintended developments; operational competition improves services (humanitarian sector), and encourages greater innovation in approach. Given that peace processes are rarely linear, it is argued that a fragmented, multi-layered action is a more sound systematic approach than a lean integrated operation.

Therefore, the peacebuilding community is working towards the more modest objective of limiting system-wide incoherence through the agreement of common strategic objectives. Moreover, these, for development actors, need to be defined in cooperation with the host government. It is therefore inherently difficult and arguably unrealistic for NATO to fill in the civilian gaps through integrating other civilian actors or forming predictable partnerships on the basis of a NATO-centred planning process.

In summary, NATO is not ideally suited to peacekeeping operations. If this is to become a core goal of the Alliance, it would need to adapt its doctrines to clearly separate peacekeeping from war-fighting. It also needs to adjust its approach to planning. Rather than seeking to make NATO operations ‘comprehensive’ by bringing a greater range of actors into its planning process, it needs to orient its planning towards implementation of core military peacekeeping tasks, as defined in a peace agreement or a commonly agreed peacebuilding/recovery strategy. While it must evidently strive to be networked with other civilian actors – and well informed of its operational context – it must relinquish its ambition to direct the entire international reconstruction effort. This is not only politically unrealistic, but is arguably unhelpful in so far as it limits the diversity and innovation in support of complex political stabilization or peacebuilding processes, and reduces the space for local leadership in the peacebuilding effort.
There has been a dramatic change in the disarmament and non-proliferation landscape these last two years. Opinion shapers and global leaders have endorsed the vision of a nuclear weapon free world, and serious work is currently underway on the initial steps to get there. In the UK, for example, government ministers have gradually been increasing their commitments, the latest being a pledge from Gordon Brown to put British nuclear weapons into the negotiation mix when it becomes useful to do so.

The single most significant event has been Barack Obama’s election. He and members of his election team made strong arms control commitments during the election campaign, and the White House has since reinforced these with stated policy. This is all the more remarkable as this is really not a strong vote-winner in the US. He is doing it because he believes this to be right. His appointment of Ivo Daalder as Ambassador to NATO is also highly significant – Daalder published perhaps the most influential US article on disarmament, in Foreign Affairs, that outlined deep cuts and the placing of a limit on nuclear deterrence to simply deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other states. The Congressional Strategic Posture review will be reporting this month in advance of the US nuclear posture review, expected late 2009 or early 2010. Everyone in Washington is now talking CTBT and START. Radical arms control, even disarmament, has taken root in Washington.

There are two reasons for this. First, a renewed belief that US security is strengthened by multilateral nuclear disarmament, and second, that there is a powerful link between disarmament and non-proliferation, and that we will only acquire international support for the tighter verification and inspection measures we need to build confidence if we live up to our Article VI NPT commitments. All eyes are on the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. And whilst it would be over-dramatic to suggest that the future of the non-proliferation regime hangs in the balance around the Review Conference, it could play an important long-term role in determining its direction.

There is also a lack of trust on the part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In a recent conference on multilateral nuclear arrangements (re the international production or guarantee of nuclear fuel for reactors), it was startling to see just how much suspicion there was from NAM states of the intention behind the arrangements – understandable perhaps due to their late entry to the discussions, but also by the general tone of the relationship.

Discussion on Goal 2:
Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and moving towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance

Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council

The problem for the Nuclear Weapon States is that they are experiencing a credibility gap. They are seeking to provide global leadership in the direction of disarmament and stronger non-proliferation, whilst many are modernising their arsenals, or otherwise appear to have plans to retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. There is also a lack of trust on the part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In a recent conference on multilateral nuclear arrangements (re the international production or guarantee of nuclear fuel for reactors), it was startling to see just how much suspicion there was from NAM states of the intention behind the arrangements – understandable perhaps due to their late entry to the discussions, but also by the general tone of the relationship.
There are two factors that I think particularly heighten the problem of the credibility gap. First, the ambiguity in the deterrence policy, which may make sense from the military perspective, but undermines the trust in international negotiations, and means that Non-Nuclear Weapon States feel insecure. President Obama may well soon recognise this problem when he comes to limit the application of deterrence theory – perhaps to deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons only. The other I would like to highlight is the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe. TNWs have no realistic or credible scenario for their use. Their deterrence value therefore is highly questionable. The principal reason for their continued deployment appears instead to be to ensure Alliance cohesion. The argument is that burden sharing is the expression of commitment to NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture, the implication being that the strategic umbrella is insufficient. This amounts to a very expensive security blanket. Children who are to mature properly need to say goodbye to their security blanket at some point and grow up, facing the world. The same goes for NATO partners. The deployment of TNWs holds back more effective and credible measures that would genuinely strengthen a forward-looking Alliance, rather than attachment to a backward-looking Cold War posture. This is particularly so at a time of shrinking defence budgets and a financial crisis that will hit public sector budgets dramatically over the next few years.

Whether or not tactical nuclear deployments in Europe break the letter of the NPT, they certainly weaken the spirit of it – in involving European Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the planned deployment of nuclear weapons, compromising their status under the Treaty. Burden sharing, beyond the nuclear umbrella aspects, present a peculiar problem in this way.

I conclude by observing that in my opinion, it is only a matter of time before the decision becomes clear and obvious. The choice is therefore not whether to scrap TNWs, but how we arrive at that choice. We can do so positively and strategically, with a clarity of purpose that feeds into a stronger Alliance in the future… or we can take longer over it, sweep the issue under the carpet, muddle through, and then be forced to abandon because of prohibitive cost. This second option would be criminal irresponsibility, and could well weaken the Alliance in exactly the way that those who continue to see TNWs as playing a cohesive force in the Alliance warn of.
Prospects for Withdrawing US Tactical Nuclear Weapons From Europe: The Continuing Importance of NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent in an Increasingly Uncertain and Dangerous World

Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, NATO

Let’s start by acknowledging that the desire for a world free of nuclear weapons began at almost the same time as the dawn of the nuclear age. Subsequently, during the Cold war, John Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Regan, George H.W. Bush genuinely wanted to eliminate all nuclear weapons and said so publicly. More recently George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn and others here in Europe have echoed those sentiments.

Despite calls for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons has been around since the dawn of the nuclear age, yet it has failed to materialise. There are several reasons for this but for NATO, while we collectively work towards the goal of a safe, peaceful and secure world free from all weapons of mass destruction, it is clear that for now an essential element of our collective security is maintaining a US nuclear presence in Europe.

So, The First Inconvenient Truth: It is a dangerous and uncertain world out there. So long as serious political differences exist between nations and peoples, and given that the possibility of nuclear weapons exists, the Alliance believes that nuclear weapons deter potential opponents and serves to avoid intimidation by other states seeking a capability of weapons of mass destruction. In any case, even in the absence of overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, the great predominance of US conventional forces would remain a strong motive for aspiring states to seek nuclear weapons. The threat is real. The greatest threats to our safety and security in the next 10 to 15 years are WMD terrorism and WMD proliferation. As the recently released US WMD commission report states, WMD proliferation is inevitable. We can slow and impede it but it will happen.

Our non-proliferation efforts will help but by retaining a strong and credible nuclear deterrent we ensure that the costs of using such a weapon against would be incalculable and thus a disincentive for pursuing the proliferation path.

I would draw your attention to the recent indictment of Sudan’s leader, Omar al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). In fact, Sudan’s decision to expel Western humanitarian aid groups in retaliation for Bashir’s prosecution now threatens to make the grave humanitarian crisis in Darfur even worse. While the Security Council has tried for years to create an effective international peacekeeping force in Darfur to reduce the violence and provide security for humanitarian relief deliveries, the world’s hard men, like Bashir, are not deterred from committing outrageous and inhumane acts for fear of being arrested if they travel to the great capitals of Europe. That may deter those who create institutions like the ICC, but Bashir and his ilk are quite content to stay in the world’s Khartoums and run their cruel and authoritarian governments as they see fit.

Deterrence offers an insurance guarantee against the possible failure of reducing the likelihood of war by other means. Nuclear weapons are crucial to NATO’s future policy as they provide something that conventional forces cannot: incalculable risk. One need only look at the potential threats we face, the known and future unknown. Does one really want to put our security in the hands of the Ahmadinejads of the world or their junior counterparts in places like Sudan, Burma or North Korea? While one may hope for a more peaceful world, hope is neither a policy nor a strategy. While our deterrence posture threatens no one, everyone should know—and therefore fear—the consequences of an attack on our nations.
The Second Inconvenient Truth. NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture will continue to play a role, albeit smaller role, in the security posture of the Alliance. The US extended nuclear deterrence Umbrella has, for 60 years, has sheltered NATO, Japan and other allies from outright attack and forced submission. The threat of nuclear retaliation, while not stopping all conflicts, has prevented large-scale conventional war in Europe and any form of coercion against the Alliance.

NATO has taken drastic steps to reduce its nuclear force levels and deploys a minimum deterrence posture. Treaties, like the NPT, START (strategic arms reduction treaty) and SORT (strategic offensive reduction treaty, also knows as the Moscow treaty) have all been helpful in making our security environment less tense. In fact, I’ve seen a report this month from the Arms Control Association that the US has already reached the Moscow Treaty reductions—three years early!

It is crucial for today’s purpose that in the discussion of NATO’s future we have in mind NATO’s fundamental purpose. As set forth in our founding treaty, it is: “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”. US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe—one half of NATO’s nuclear deterrent— helps us to protect this fundamental principle while recognizing in today’s environment our threats and Security challenges have evolved.

The argument I hear most often is that NATO policy is outdated. We are forcing new and old member states to follow a nuclear weapons policy they, and their citizens, do not want. Some even point to public opinion polls to show such sentiment exists. Between 1999 and 2004, NATO membership grew from 16 to 26, and soon to be 28. Do not discount the importance that these nations place on nuclear deterrence, especially those new members who have emerged from the oppression of Soviet rule. Clearly our leaders don’t think so.

Recently Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that the military nature of the alliance must ensure that its military capabilities correspond to its members’ security and operational requirements. Indicating that for the foreseeable future “we must [for the foreseeable future] adhere to the principle of nuclear deterrence”. Nuclear deterrence thus serves as a political and psychological tool capable of maintaining the security of the allies. It is the only current weapon capable of destroying an entire society; indeed raising the cost of aggression to an unacceptably high level.

A unilateral withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe in the current security environment would unacceptably increase the risks to the security of the Alliance. If the proliferation of nuclear activity continues to increase in the Middle East as predicted, Europe would be faced with a neighbouring region in which each confrontation or conventional conflict would carry the threat of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Any withdrawal whether immediate or gradual will be seen as a move by the US to ‘decouple’ its security from that of the alliance.

Another argument towards the removal of US nuclear weapons is that we should move towards the improvement and effectiveness of strategically mobile conventional forces, capable of taking out pinpoint targets; however, the Alliance’s conventional forces, alone, cannot provide a credible deterrence. Both an improvement of NATO’s conventional forces and the continued presence of nuclear deterrence are needed to ensure that NATO’s strategic concept both present and future is maintained. One cannot exist without the other. While our conventional capabilities are second to none notwithstanding the budget crisis, conventional deterrence alone has historically never been as effective as nuclear deterrence. Our deterrence posture is designed to demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not an option. Given the political nature of these weapons I would remind you all that we actually use these weapons every single day.
Now, of course, we continue to hope for the time when a nuclear deterrent would no longer be necessary and we’ve made great strides, based on the improved security situation. The record of the US, UK and France is very positive in that regard with over 95% of the US weapons being removed from Europe with overall reductions below that of the Eisenhower level. The UK has reduced their numbers to fewer than 160 and the French have or will to a number under 300. Indeed, one of the obligations under Article VI has been fulfilled. There is no longer an arms race. But this leads to another Inconvenient Truth. It would be very unlikely that if on the removal of US nuclear weapons in Europe all other nuclear states and states pursuing nuclear weapons would follow that example. There is no case that I know of in history where a nation has been secure by pursuing a policy of vulnerability. The nuclear cuts that were agreed upon between the US and Russia at the end of the Cold War have had no impact on the nuclear ambitions of other countries. If anything, proliferation actually accelerated during that time. In fact, there is no evidence that reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles on the part of Moscow and Washington have had a significant impact on the strategic desires of third countries like North Korea or Iran to acquire weapons or of countries, such as Libya, Ukraine and South Africa, to reverse course and get out of the nuclear weapon business. Indeed, the idea that disarmament and non-proliferation has no empirical or even anecdotal basis (see diagram).

Our deterrence posture—based on the fundamental purpose of security—must be responsive to the security environment. That environment currently requires the Alliance to hedge against resurgent nuclear powers, and against the potential for a strategic surprise.

If you want peace prepare for war: The Special Case of NATO.

The recently completed Schlessinger Report on the Nuclear Mission for the US discussed the reasons why US nuclear capabilities remain a pillar of NATO unity. To summarize:

1. The weapons couple US and NATO allies’ security, tangibly assuring the US commitment to Alliance security.

2. NATO Dual-Capable Aircraft—the nuclear sharing arrangement—contributes directly to the nuclear deterrent mission and increases the deterrent value of the weapons. They convey the will of multiple allied countries, creating real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use of WMD.

3. The presence of these weapons serves as an anti-proliferation tool by eliminating any reason for Allies to develop and field their own nuclear arsenals.
Recently, President Medvedev indicated that Russia intends to rearm and re-modernise its nuclear forces due to his belief that the threat of conflict has significantly increased. In light of this, it would be foolish to unilaterally remove US tactical nuclear weaponry from the territory of our allies. In any event, it is hard to logically postulate that the removal of the few hundred nuclear weapons that make up NATO’s nuclear deterrent from Europe would serve as any incentive for Russia to eliminate its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, which numbers in the thousands.

For those who support the idea of “going to zero” I would suggest that simply staking out some anti-nuclear moral high ground is not enough, and if you’re serious you will need to address the policy and practical issues of how to get there without sacrificing our security. As the Cold War nuclear strategist Herman Kahn stated “[i]t is the hallmark of the amateur and the dilettante that he has almost no interest in how to get to his particular utopia”. Details matter and before disarmament can be realistically possible a compelling case that getting rid of nuclear weapons are a per se good needs to be made.

Disarmament advocates must prove their case that no world with nuclear weapons would be preferable to any world without them. While some future worlds without nuclear weapons would be greatly preferable to our own, some would not be. The last thing we would want to do is make the world safe again for large-scale great power conventional war!

There are serious issues that require study and resolution before we can ever begin the process of total disarmament. For example, how is it possible to verify? Recently, Chancellor Merkel noted that while “the goal remains of the complete elimination of all WMD, to get to that goal in a responsible way means proceeding phase by phase and, above all, establishing watertight verification mechanisms on all sides”. And, if the capability has existed to create nuclear weapons, how can we rely on another not to cheat? As Edmund Burke warned: “There is no safety for honest men but by believing all possible evil of evil men”. This includes assuming they will lie, cheat and betray.

The Soviet Union concealed an advanced biological-weapons program for decades after agreeing to destroy its stock under the BWC, Germany rearmed clandestinely during the interwar years, fooling the victorious powers of the First World War. The cases of Iran or Libya are also illustrative.

Without an effective system of monitoring nuclear weapons and monitoring the transfer of knowledge; the uncertainty of further states proliferating is an enormous risk. Many states are virtual NWS; that is, they possess all the expertise, technology and materials to produce nuclear weapons, lacking only for now the political will to do so. Most disturbing is the collusion of proliferant countries such as Pakistan, Libya, Iran, Syria and North Korea to cooperate in developing WMD and the means to deliver them, or proliferation networks, such as the AQ Khan network, to sell the means to build nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. Assuming we can build the “airtight” verification regime envisioned by Chancellor Merkel, that of course is only half the solution. Once non-compliance is detected proliferators need to be absolutely convinced that the international community will respond positively and aggressively to ensure the costs of non-compliance far outweigh the benefits. So far, we have had an exceedingly poor record of enforcing compliance. Again, Iran and North Korea are illustrative.

Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated. Foreign policy must be based on this reality but at the same time NATO will work with other nations on those achievable objectives that lower the risks of the spread of nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

You’ve probably noticed that I have come back time and again to emphasize the importance of security which is the ultimate good.
In a world where states and terrorists actively seek nuclear weapons, where verification and enforcement of international norms is problematic, where proliferation of the knowledge, materials and technology is accelerating despite the significant reductions by NATO's NWS; where uncertainty remains about our future relationship with Russia, the possessor of the largest nuclear arsenal; the international community’s continuing concern over the security of Russia’s fissile materials and in an era of shrinking defense budgets, it is hard to see how our security can possibly be enhanced by the US removing its nuclear weapons from Europe or the UK and France giving up their nuclear deterrent. The most important and difficult task is to change the underlying security circumstances that lead nations to seek nuclear weapons. To that end, direct negotiations involving positive incentives (economic, political and security arrangements) for states willing to abandon nuclear weapons aspirations, as well as cooperation with others to impose negative sanctions across an escalating spectrum on recalcitrant actors, are essential. These are concrete actions, analogous to the Marshall Plan, to take a historical example, not mere gestures like the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, which “outlawed war.”

As we contemplate a future free of nuclear weapons we must ask and satisfactorily answer the difficult questions, which I’ve set out for you today. And the most difficult is how to ensure our security. For now our security—the ultimate good—requires the Alliance to maintain a nuclear deterrent. I end with this quote from the diplomat, writer and scholar Salvador de Madariaga for your contemplation, and I look forward to our discussion.

“The trouble with disarmament was (it still is) that the problem of war is tackled upside down and at the wrong end. Upside down first; for nations do not arm willingly. Indeed, they are sometimes only too willing to disarm, as the British did to their sorrow in the Baldwin days. Nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter. Let the weather be warm, and people will discard their clothes readily and without committees to tell them how they are to undress.”

Salvador de Madariaga
Discussion on Goal 3:
Improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement

Ádám Földes, Project Manager, Access Info Europe, Madrid

The long way from ‘need to know’ to ‘right to know’
(\textit{also see Appendix 4: Five Principles for an Open and Accountable NATO})

\textbf{Slide: 1988}
“The search for improved and more stable relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe is among our principal concerns. We call upon these countries to work with us for a further relaxation of tensions, greater security at lower levels of arms, more extensive human contacts and increased access to information.”

\textit{Declaration of the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council}

\textbf{Slide: 1989}
“The aspirations of the peoples of Eastern Europe have been expressed beyond doubt or question: and I think the Alliance vision of Europe in the year 2000 meets them:

- self determination - the right to live as one independent nation and to enjoy one’s national identity;
- the right to choose one’s own government at regular intervals;
- the right to freedom of speech, travel, access to information, to organize politically;”

\textit{Speech by Secretary General Manfred Wörner at the 35th Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association}

\textbf{Slide: 2001}
“Freedom of the Media and public’s access to information are key to democratic development, and need to be safeguarded and enhanced, consistent with the principles of journalistic integrity and objectivity.”

\textit{South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities}

\textbf{Slide: 2005}
“Public Information Officers are the spokespersons for their Commanders, the public interface for NATO’s operations. Their task is not to be confused with that of Public Relation Officers, whose job it is to maintain a favourable public image of their product, company or person they represent. […] Information should be provided in such a way that media representatives and citizens concerned are able to make their own judgement as independently as possible, even if this means having to give information on matters which might draw public criticism or embarrassment.”

\textit{NATO’s Military Public Information, its role in the modern security environment and its relationship with the media}
**Slide: Freedom of information in international law**

- Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
- Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights
- Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents

**Slide: Freedom of information national legislation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (period)</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>period</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1766-1950</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1960</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>France, Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1990</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Austria, Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>Hungary, Spain, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Portugal, Belgium, Belize, Iceland, Lithuania, South Korea, Ireland, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Israel, Latvia, Albania, Portugal, Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece, Japan, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Moldova, Slovakia, South Africa, United Kingdom</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2009</td>
<td>Poland, Romania, Serbia, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, Angola, Armenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Slovenia, Turkey, St. Vincent &amp; Grenadines, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Switzerland, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Germany, India, Montenegro, Taiwan, Uganda, Honduras, Macedonia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Nicaragua, Cayman Islands, China, Chile, Cook Islands, Indonesia, Bangladesh</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Slide: NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)**

**Security issues**

“Aspirants would be expected upon accession to have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy.”

**Legal issues:**

“The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information (Brussels, 6 March 1997)”

“Domestic legislation of aspirants should, as much as possible, be compatible with the other arrangements and implementation practices which govern NATO-wide cooperation.”
## Slide: Freedom of Information: ‘Rule of Law’ System and NATO Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rule of Law System</th>
<th>NATO System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classifier</strong></td>
<td>identifiable</td>
<td>no name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Originator)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protected Interests</strong></td>
<td>list</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedure</strong></td>
<td>well defined</td>
<td>defined somehow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protected Subjects</strong></td>
<td>defined</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expiry</strong></td>
<td>no unlimited expiry</td>
<td>no clear limits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Slide: Public Information or Public Relations?

“We underscore our commitment to support further improvement of our strategic communications by the time of our 2009 Summit.”

*Article 10 of the Bucharest Summit Declaration*
This Framing Paper borrows language and ideas from numerous reports, books and policy papers and also reflects additional comments received over the past two months and at the Shadow NATO Summit. Further feedback will be actively courted via the NATO Watch web site www.natowatch.org and it will be further updated and revised accordingly – possibly as a Framing Paper for a Strategic Concept.

Section I: Creating a New Vision and Mission for NATO

NATO at 60: the Strasbourg / Kehl Summit

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) turned 60 at the Strasbourg/ Kehl Summit. The historical threads between 1949 and 2009 are crucial. The atomic age marked the start of the Cold War, fought hot in proxy wars from Korea to Russia’s Afghan War. Nuclear proliferation, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, tensions with Russia and the re-emerging divisions in Europe are a continuing legacy of that period. NATO today is a complex hybrid of a political-military alliance and a multilateral institution that is unrivalled in history. It has begun the transition from a Cold War Alliance focusing exclusively on territorial defence through deterrence into a pan-European instrument for crisis management and peacekeeping. But the engagement in Afghanistan has led to mounting operational difficulties and a growing loss of confidence in the very concept of that mission and in NATO’s strategic direction.

2. Thus, in addition to being an opportunity to celebrate NATO’s past achievements, the 60th Anniversary Summit in France and Germany is also time to look forward. This Framing Paper for a Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security explains how and why citizens want to engage in a process to advance NATO’s transformation. It sets out some of the basic values and principles to inform this debate; it seeks to help shape a clear vision of what NATO should stand for and achieve as it strives to meet the different and diverse challenges of this 21st century. It is intended to contribute to a broad intra-Alliance debate on the role of NATO in the coming years. The elements raised herein that should contribute to a new vision include:

- Accountable ways of working;
- Upholding human security;
- Being at the forefront of developing and implementing new and more effective approaches to conflict prevention and security building;
- Meeting future disaster response needs; and
- Developing a wider and more inclusive network of partners.

Moral, muscular and multilateral

Principle 1: Effective multilateralism means supporting a range of international treaties, norms and institutions, even when it presents difficulties for short-term national or collective NATO interests. It also means moving beyond ‘à la carte multilateralism’ to a new era of cooperation within the Alliance and by developing a wider and more inclusive network of partners as part of a broader, more comprehensive approach.
3. After the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Soviet Union disintegrated, an unprecedented opportunity was missed by NATO to build a new rules based international system. NATO should now seek to develop a vision for, and take genuine practical steps towards, an inclusive international system that would potentially be an alternative, not an addition, to the Alliance. In seeking to develop a wider and more inclusive network of partners, NATO should review the purpose of Partnership for Peace and explore the creation of other mechanisms for partnership with non-member countries and other relevant international organisations (such as the EU, OSCE, G8, G20 and the UN and its agencies). One of the biggest failings of the Alliance to date, for example, has been in leaving UN ‘Blue Helmet’ operations to others. Another has been in undertaking divided missions, as is the case in Afghanistan. Divided missions do not work because there is no overarching common political framework and chain of command. Only with fully integrated missions can the myriad challenges of modern, complex, multidisciplinary peace operations be met.

Synthesising non-offensive collective defence and human security

Principle 2: The new Strategic Concept should explore the principles of Non-Offensive Defence and human security in shaping a revised collective defence posture for the Alliance. The human security dimension involves the protection of all civilians, and gender equality is an integral part of all stages in NATO operations.

4. Collective defence under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty forms the backbone of the Alliance bargain. But with several of NATO’s easternmost countries seeking stronger security guarantees in the face of growing tensions with Moscow, pressure is rising to move beyond the ‘virtual’ military presence in some of the new NATO members. How then to enhance collective defence and provide stronger security guarantees to the eastern front, without further alienating Russia? Part of the answer lies in changing the terms of the debate with Russia (see below) but it also requires more realistic thinking as to the limitations of collective defence: military options are an inappropriate response, for example, to cyber attacks and energy disputes.

5. However, if additional NATO and/or US installations are to be included on the soil of the new NATO members, these need to be unambiguously defensive in nature (unlike the missile defence proposals). Discussions about Non-Offensive Defence in the mid 1980s, for example, suggested that it was possible to significantly restructure military forces for defensive, rather than offensive operations, and to adopt a non-nuclear policy, while still retaining the capacity to inflict serious damage against an aggressor.

6. In reflecting the new security environment, collective defence also needs to be predicated on a fundamental redefinition of what constitutes security. This should include a human security centred approach in formulating collective defence. This means providing protection against all threats to human life, whether they emanate from terrorism, ‘rogue states’, the spread of nuclear weapons, environmental degradation, energy or infrastructure insecurity, outbreaks of disease or instability arising from deep-rooted poverty and hunger.

7. It also means that many of the most dangerous threats that the Alliance faces are not amenable to traditional ideas of collective defence – or even extended notions of collective defence that have seen greater use in recent years with expeditionary forces in support of ‘peace enforcement’ missions. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions. The mismatch in resources that devotes far too much funding to traditional military missions at the expense of the more diverse set of tools needed to address current and future threats to security also needs to be addressed.

Reconnecting with citizens

Principle 3: In order to deepen and extend the shared values-base within the Alliance, NATO needs to become closer to its citizens and civil society. This means an updated, more open, transparent and accountable Alliance, appropriate to 21st century expectations. Parliamentary accountability within NATO requires clear and adequate mechanisms, and a relaxation of secrecy rules.
8. NATO is not only the sum of its intergovernmental political and military parts, but also of the 890 million citizens living in its 26 Member States – and the more than 540 million additional citizens in states with partnership or contact agreements with the Alliance. Over 20% of the global population is therefore directly associated in some way with NATO. These citizens, rather than military forces, police and other means of law enforcement, are at the heart of Alliance security. This is because security is largely based on shared values – it was this failure to respect the citizens’ values that partly undid the Soviet Union. NATO’s inner strength depends on the existence of a shared moral culture among its citizens.

9. Throughout NATO’s history, MPs in their national parliaments when asking questions about NATO decisions have invariably been told that such decisions require collective confidentiality. When the same questions were put to the Secretary General, he invariably replied that NATO was but an alliance of governments of sovereign states, each of which are responsible to their own parliaments. This Catch 22 situation may have served a purpose during the Cold War, but is no longer appropriate today.

10. Parliamentarians and citizens in NATO and partner countries are bound by secrecy rules that were drafted in a very different era – when the public had different expectations about participation in defence and foreign policy, when few of its Member States had adopted a national right-to-information law, and when the threat posed to the Western alliance was more profound and immediate. All of these circumstances have changed, but the regime that governs the handling of shared information remains unchanged in important respects. Legislators and citizens are being denied the right to participate in the formulation of policies that have a profound effect on their liberties and security.

11. Transparency should be the main rule in every phase of NATO’s decision-making procedures: policy-making, settings up plans, and before and after decisions are made (‘before’ to enable citizens to participate and ‘after’ to hold decision-makers accountable). Freedom of Information within NATO and its partner states would not only help improve the quality of decision-making but also provide better oversight over the use of funds.

Section II: Putting the mission into action - practical implications

Decisions over use of force

Principle 4: NATO is morally and legally obliged to exhaust all other means possible before taking up arms, and force should only be used in accordance with the UN Charter. This either means authorised by the UN Security Council or in self-defence (when there is a real, imminent and severe danger and the UN Security Council is unable to act in time).

12. Military force is not an effective tool for solving political problems. The majority of citizens both within and outside the Alliance understand and share this view. Force can be justifiable in some circumstances, in domestic law and international law. The difficult issue is when, and the answer to that often turns on the particularities of each case. Under the rules of the UN Charter, military force is lawful in just two circumstances: self-defence (when an armed attack has occurred or is imminent) or where the UN Security Council authorises its use. The nexus of failing states and fears of WMD proliferation led to deeply misguided and even illegal pre-emptive or preventive wars of alleged self-defence. But numerous other options (both military and non-military) are also available, and may be more appropriate and effective in achieving security objectives. The alternatives to pre-emption include diplomacy, conflict prevention, deterrence, containment and collective defence.

Upholding humanitarian and international laws of war

Principle 5: NATO must uphold the highest standards of international law, including humanitarian law, when choosing to threaten or use force, and in the application of force.

13. In seeking to promote a world in which everyone renounces violence against other peoples and their own, it is crucial that NATO upholds the highest standards of international and humanitarian law. If not NATO, then who? Torture, for example is illegal and self-defeating. It is a crime in both peace and war that no exceptional circumstances can permit.
Those who break our laws should be judged in court: terrorists and torturers alike. NATO should declare its position on this unequivocally and all those engaged in interrogation properly trained. Similarly, inhumane weapons should be withdrawn from NATO’s arsenals, and a fast-tracked Alliance consideration of which weapons fit into this category should be conducted. They may include cluster bombs, Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME), depleted uranium ammunition and white phosphorus (where used in an anti-personnel mode).

**Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept**

For those at risk of genocide and mass atrocities

**Principle 6:** Preventing genocide and mass atrocities should be a priority for NATO and not merely an idealistic add-on to the core collective defence agenda. It is a moral and strategic imperative for the Alliance to implement the UN Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda and resources should be directed towards the development of a comprehensive approach to genocide prevention.

14. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the principle that sovereign states, and the international community as a whole, have a responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. The world’s heads of state and government unanimously accepted the concept of R2P at the UN World Summit in September 2005. The UN Security Council has also accepted the general principle (by adopting Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict). While the main emphasis should be on non-military preventive measures, preventing or halting genocide may, at times, require the non-consensual use of force. In such circumstances, policymakers face major challenges in determining whether, when, and how to use military force to prevent or counter the escalation of violence to the level of genocide. There is no military ‘solution’ to genocide, but military options can be critical parts of a comprehensive solution. NATO is the most capable potential actor for genocide response, with some experience and willingness to lead multinational forces in areas where violence is escalating.

15. Any deployment of NATO’s military assets under R2P must be in accordance with international law, which, in turn, means that the UN Security Council must authorise it. A comprehensive approach to genocide prevention in NATO might include improved early warning mechanisms, early action to prevent crises, timely diplomatic responses to emerging crises, greater preparedness to employ NATO military assets in UN peacekeeping operations, and action to strengthen global norms and institutions. In enhancing its commitment to R2P NATO member states also need to make greater effort to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which addresses the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. Gender based violence has been found to continue and even escalate in post conflict situations. NATO forces need to become more gender aware in order to protect the victims of gender-based sexual violence and to pursue and prosecute the perpetrators.

16. NATO should also consider establishing an R2P Committee to: analyse threats of genocide and mass atrocities; develop military guidance on genocide prevention and response; and incorporate guidelines into Alliance doctrine and training (through, for example, a genocide prevention standardization agreement). NATO should also provide capacity-building assistance to international partners who are willing to take measures to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, while the NATO Secretary General could undertake robust diplomatic efforts toward negotiating an agreement among the permanent members of the UN Security Council on non-use of the veto in cases concerning genocide or mass atrocities – as a follow on to the UN-NATO Declaration signed in September 2008.

**For operations in Afghanistan (and all conflict zones where NATO troops operate)**

**Principle 7:** NATO must move towards a human security approach, contributing to the protection of every individual human being and not focus merely on the defence of territorial borders. This means prohibiting military activities that indiscriminately impact on civilians, safeguarding the economic and social infrastructures of civilian life and accurately accounting for civilian casualties arising from NATO operations.
17. NATO forces must always comply with the Geneva Conventions’ requirement that civilians be protected against attack by both the ‘enemy’ and from the Alliance itself. In counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations this is by no means easy. But in Afghanistan, NATO and US forces have too frequently neglected to treat local community members properly. Many everyday operations—from weapons searches to the killing or arrest of wanted individuals—suggest that the local population is alienated for little measurable gain. Military activities that indiscriminately impact on civilians such as air and drone strikes must be immediately stopped. In addition, NATO has failed to put resources into, and be fully open and transparent about, civilian casualties in Afghanistan. It is in the long-term interests of the Alliance for accurate casualty recording to be undertaken in all NATO operations, including the identification of all victims and open publication of a list of those killed.

18. All human life is of equal worth, and it is not acceptable that certain and mainly local human lives become cheap in conflict situations. Unless it is absolutely necessary and it has a legal basis, NATO personnel deployed on R2P, peacekeeping or other human security missions must avoid killing, injury, and material destruction. As with the police, who risk their lives to save others but are prepared to kill in extremis, NATO forces should also strictly adhere to minimum force criteria. This does not mean that the use of force is to be avoided under all circumstances. Nothing should undermine the inherent right of self-defence. But the use of minimal and precise force does put troops at more immediate risk than using overwhelming force. The military, politicians and the general public need to appreciate this fact.

Many soldiers buy their own boots, packs, etc., because the equipment they are given falls apart and shortages of essential equipment (such as helicopters and better protected patrol vehicles) have been regularly reported in Afghanistan. The psychological and physical damage to our soldiers is particularly alarming. Rates of suicide and domestic violence among service personnel and cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are expected to continue to rise. In the US military, for example, there have been 450 suicides by active duty soldiers since 2003 and there may be as many as 75,000 active duty military or recently discharged veterans with PTSD or significant symptoms of PTSD.

Section III: Challenges for the mission

Delivering smart solutions to our shared security challenges

20. NATO in conjunction with other instruments of euroatlantic power will be needed to protect our security for the foreseeable future. What NATO and the political leaders of the Alliance must do is engage its citizens in a discussion about the circumstances for its use. What is the proper balance between NATO’s collective defence at home and expeditionary missions abroad? How should the Alliance deter and defeat aggression, halt genocide and share in peacekeeping? NATO needs to be more agile and flexible, creative and smart about how it analyses the new threats and how it deploys its assets against them.

Moving beyond war-fighting in Afghanistan

Principle 9: There will be no stability in Afghanistan without a comprehensive peace process including all relevant internal actors and neighbours. There is an urgent need to pursue a process that is capable of forging a new and inclusive Afghan national consensus, rather than persisting in the current fight to try to defeat those outside the consensus.
21. Escalating the war in Afghanistan will likely make matters worse. At the same time, simply abandoning the country would lead to another set of serious problems. There are no easy answers to Afghanistan’s ongoing tragic situation, but what is important to recognise, however, is that Afghanistan’s fate belongs to the people of Afghanistan.

22. The first priority in Afghanistan is to provide basic security for the civilian population and the second is to build crucial infrastructure. Indeed, interventions generally under R2P are likely to be best made on the fact that basic security must be afforded the first priority. Democratisation, economic development and nation-building, if the proper investments are made, may follow.

23. The civilian side of the ‘security first’ strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is more important than the military side – training the Afghan National Army, training the police, working to mentor and provide technical assistance on good governance, rule of law, anti-corruption measures, anti-narcotics measures. So far, however, the development of Afghan security forces has been badly managed, grossly understaffed and poorly funded.

24. Seven years after the US-led intervention in Afghanistan expatriates continue to take the lead with minimal Afghan input or participation, the country is still at war against extremists and has developed few resilient institutions. The Afghanistan crisis is the outcome of decades of internal conflict and external intervention. No short-term solution will resolve the crisis overnight. The narrow focus on confronting Al-Qaeda through counter-insurgency measures often characterised by aggressive military action, arbitrary detentions, indiscriminate raids and house searches has not only failed to reduce religious extremism, but fuelled local discontent and violence. Gender insensitivity has also contributed to NATO’s poor civil military relations in Afghanistan. By adopting greater gender awareness NATO forces would secure better access to and communications with the local population, enhance situational awareness and improve mutual understanding and respect, thus enabling NATO forces to build a better, safer and more secure environment.

25. What Afghanistan urgently needs is a “political surge”. As a party to the conflict, NATO is manifestly not equipped to lead on the peace process, but NATO member states could support a new political framework, that might include:

- Bringing all US forces under the unified command of the head of ISAF;
- Greater clarity of NATO’s goals as part of a revised strategy for Afghanistan and the region;
- Focusing NATO forces on securing and protecting population centres and roads, helping to build civilian rule of law and working with Pakistan to secure known crossing points along the border;
- An immediate end to all air strikes, house raids and other offensive tactics that harm civilians and increase anti-NATO sentiment;
- Sustained diplomatic talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia to discuss shared interests and possible cooperation toward promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region;
- Exploring ways to include Afghan women in all future negotiations, as they are 23% of the parliament by law;
- Exploring ways to include religious leaders, community elders and elements of the Taliban at the negotiating table;
- Greater investment by the international community in Afghan and UN-led development and peacebuilding;
- Empowering the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in full cooperating with Afghan leadership to lead on the peace process and the coordination of reconstruction and recovery aid;
- Increasing non-military aid while simultaneously minimizing and overseeing military aid to Pakistan to strengthen civilian rule of law; and
- Establishing a timetable for NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, as requested by the Karzai government.
NATO’s relationship with Russia

Principle 10: A real partnership needs to be developed between NATO and Russia where both parties work together to resolve the multitude of modern security problems. NATO should avoid needlessly provocative deployments.

26. NATO cooperation with Russia is of the outmost importance to global security. Russia needs NATO and NATO needs Russia in order to stand up to the common threats and challenges we all face. The Russian government should be treated with respect and as a world power. NATO should listen closely to Russian concerns and ideas (especially regarding comprehensive security in Europe) and seek to build bridges between our citizens. The NATO-Russian Council is a good start. But further engagement of Russia in joint programmes and full transparency concerning NATO’s future plans will help to enhance the partnership. On the Russian side, there has to be flexibility, reciprocal transparency and good will toward NATO’s intentions. Ending the impasse over the CFE Treaty should be an urgent priority along with further arms control agreements that take into account not only the changed strategic and political circumstances, but also the accelerating qualitative processes and technological advances in military affairs.

Civilian-led counter-terrorism

Principle 11: NATO counter-terrorism policy should focus on international cooperation to improve the intelligence base, strengthen civilian law enforcement capabilities, restrict terrorist access to funds and weapons, and reduce the root causes driving people to radical violence.

27. The framework of the ‘Global War on Terror’ has set up unrealistic expectations of a military victory against non-state actors, and the apportioning of counter-terrorism resources has reflected that flawed approach. Research by the RAND Corporation into the case histories of 648 terrorist organisations that carried out attacks between 1968 and 2006 found that only 7 percent were successfully eliminated through direct military force. This is in contrast to 43 percent who dropped their violent activities after some form of political accommodation and 40 percent who were broken up successfully through some combination of local community policing, infiltration, and prosecution.

28. NATO could develop specialised counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism forces, but only with clearly defined doctrines, rules of deployment and engagement, and effective parliamentary oversight. The comprehensive Action Plan on Terrorism agreed between Russia and NATO is a useful starting point, but a better transatlantic dialogue on these matters is essential. The possible use of NATO air power or Special Forces to target specific terrorist training camps remains an option that should be used very sparingly and in accordance with international law.

Preventive diplomacy

Principle 12: The Alliance needs to identify the conditions required to create stability and how it can contribute to good governance, prior to intervention. To this end, NATO should seek to counter inequality and discrimination and promote peaceful resolution of conflict.

29. The evidence shows that when the international community has both the capacity and the will to act, the effects on conflict can be real and positive. International activism has been working to bring conflict numbers down in recent years. Even more important however, is the fact that waiting for trouble to break out is not only more costly in terms of loss of life but also hugely more expensive than early preventive action. One focus of preventative strategies should be the physical security and well being of women, which evidence suggests is directly linked to the security and stability of the state. UN Security Resolution 1325, for example, recognises the undervalued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building, and stresses the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security. NATO should work on and implement an Action Plan 1325 to mainstream gender perspectives and training into its Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Support Operations and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation programmes.
30. Being at the forefront of conflict prevention would involve NATO in new and fresh thinking. A key question is how to identify the conditions required to create stability and to identify what can be supported. What can NATO do to help create this stability? Stability entails more than dominating the security space. Experience in Afghanistan has led to an acknowledgement that the military is less part of the solution than was envisaged. In which case, how can NATO contribute to good governance, beyond security sector reform measures? For example, how might NATO be involved in longer term training work or in developing security ‘centres of excellence’ in countries emerging from conflict? This is an area ripe for UN-NATO cooperation.

31. Democratic, responsive and resilient states do not get built primarily by strengthening the capacity of government departments but in the relationship between state institutions and a strong civil society. NATO cannot make peace – as witnessed in Afghanistan and Kosovo - the people involved make peace between themselves. So what can be done from the outside to enable peace? Such a discussion should be at the heart of an internal review of NATO’s conflict prevention role.

Disaster relief and reconstruction

Principle 13: NATO should consider how it could improve its capabilities to respond to the growing number of natural, complex humanitarian and human disasters, while upholding the MCDA and Oslo guidelines.

32. NATO’s humanitarian support or disaster relief role is largely non-controversial: NATO helicopters have been used to deliver supplies to disaster zones and evacuate the injured; NATO command, control, and reconnaissance capabilities have been used to sustain humanitarian missions. While civilian agencies should ultimately take the lead in coordination of these activities, NATO can offer capabilities that other organisations simply are unable to offer. Moreover, these are critical security tasks that NATO has shown it can undertake with great professionalism and success. Nonetheless, military humanitarian relief operations can be contentious in some situations and NATO always needs to be sensitive to specific contexts and the impact of its presence on other humanitarian actors.

And the Alliance can play a more legitimate role in disaster response provided its overall mission is clear and it is seen to be acting on the principles that it should uphold.

33. Questions also remain as to how quickly the NATO Response Force can be mobilised in response to disasters in non-NATO (or Partner) countries and the extent to which it can be converted to an organisation with a larger and less costly civilian reserve component, with appropriate skills. If these problems can be resolved, NATO should consider turning the NRF into a premier disaster response force. The NRF would have a mission more focused on dealing with emergencies of either human or natural origin (or more likely a combination of both). Many more of these disasters are expected in the coming years as a consequence of environmental degradation and climate change, so the mission would strengthen NATO’s purpose. NATO already has a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre and a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU). These could be expanded and more adequately resourced, with the NRF adapted to become the emergency response tool for the EADRU. Assigning the NRF this mission would have the added benefit of avoiding more controversial pre-emptive and offensive military missions.

Arms control and disarmament

Principle 14: The Alliance and Member States should review the contribution that an active Arms Control policy can make to collective security. NATO should support universalisation and strengthening of multilateral arms control agreements. Alliance weapons collection and destruction activities are an important contribution to collective security and should be expanded.

34. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as the widespread proliferation of conventional weapons, will remain a real threat to the transatlantic area and beyond. NATO has conducted exercises to deal with the CBRN threat and has overseen the destruction of thousands of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons in the Balkans.
Given NATO’s skills and concrete results, and the ongoing threats that these weapons are likely to pose, the Alliance should continually seek more opportunities for weapons collection, destruction and other coordination activities.

Achieving security without Weapons of Mass Destruction

Principle 15: NATO’s nuclear posture as outlined in the Strategic Concept needs to be consistent both with its Member States' efforts to secure stronger global non-proliferation rules and enforcement, and with moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons. It needs to evolve in this way over time towards a non-nuclear posture. The primary counter and non-proliferation goal of Alliance policy in the current era should be preventing the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups.

35. Nuclear weapons have played a key role in the Alliance’s military strategy since its inception in 1949. NATO’s current Strategic Concept states that the “Fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war”. But this position runs counter to the evolution of Alliance member policies that see the continued existence of nuclear weapons as a strategic danger and that support moves towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

36. In January 2007 and again a year later, four senior US public servants, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn called for national leadership to eliminate nuclear weapons, and set out near-term steps to help advance this goal. Seven other former US secretaries of state, seven former US national security advisors and five former US secretaries of defence now swell their ranks – as do leading figures in the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Russia, and elsewhere. Most significantly, perhaps, President Obama believes that the United States should pursue a global zero end-state. An initiative to reduce total numbers of operational warheads held by Russia and the United States is widely anticipated. Indeed, those who believe abolition is unrealistic and dangerous are probably now in the minority, and the idea of ‘stable’ deterrence – an alternative end-state to abolition – becomes harder as proliferation occurs.

37. NATO nuclear forces include strategic weapons provided by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, along with US ‘sub–strategic’ or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Within NATO these sub-strategic weapons are seen as symbolic of alliance solidarity, but this is not only problematic for member states seeking to strengthen global non-proliferation norms, it also sounds archaic at a time when Alliance solidarity is tested daily in combat with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some may also regard them as a hedge against future uncertainties, although NATO retains overwhelming conventional supremacy.

38. A successful process leading toward abolition requires the progressive devaluation of nuclear weapons. It also requires top-down leadership, as was evident by the meeting at Reykjavik in 1986 between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, which paved the way for the elimination of around 30,000 nuclear warheads over the next two decades.

39. NATO is clearly in a strong position to display such top-down leadership. First, the Alliance’s nuclear weapons policy should be brought into line with NPT commitments and international law. At a minimum, this requires a commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons. NATO states should also stop hosting US nuclear weapons under ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements and the Alliance should move progressively towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine.

40. Second, in terms of preventing the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups, the most urgent short-term goal of NATO policy should be to secure or eliminate nuclear weapons and bomb-making materials in Russia--where there are materials sufficient to build tens of thousands of nuclear weapons--and worldwide, where smaller quantities of bombs and bomb-making material might be seized by a terrorist group. To this end, the absence of any arms reduction treaties covering tactical nuclear warheads in the arsenals of both Russia and the United States is a bewildering dereliction of duty. The United States and NATO should seek to negotiate a treaty with Russia on the verifiable elimination of sub-strategic nuclear weapons and on warhead accounting. Removal of US weapons from Europe would remove Moscow’s main excuse for delaying negotiations on these weapons.
41. Third, NATO’s role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should also be reviewed to see whether a more focused and concerted response to maritime interdiction is possible. For example, how might NATO contribute to local, sub-regional and regional PSI operations in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman? And could NATO play a leading role in adapting the PSI to become one of the key policing mechanisms for the global elimination of nuclear weapons? A NATO-led PSI might be able to provide effective policing of the zero option, both in terms of the crucial drawdown to minimum deterrent postures within the nuclear weapon states and in preventing breakout in a nuclear weapon-free world. The Cold War will only truly be over when the world is rid of nuclear weapons.

**Achieving security at lower levels of armaments (and at lower cost)**

**Principle 16: The Alliance and Member States need to undertake a fundamental reassessment of spending priorities, with the aim of achieving effective ‘moral, muscular multilateral’ responses proportional to the overall threat posed. Defence spending is ultimately about making full, productive use of precious human skills that NATO Member States can ill-afford to waste.**

42. With the world on the verge of the worst recession in a hundred years and global problems like climate change requiring huge preventive investments, a smarter approach to defence budgeting and procurement in the Alliance is required. The debate in NATO has been too narrowly focused on burden sharing with accusations that Europe spends too little on defence. But the United States spends seven times as much on military force as on international affairs and homeland security combined, and its military budget is larger than the next 14 countries put together, accounting for around 45% of the global total. Overall, therefore, the case can be made that the United States needs to spend less on defence—a cut of 25% in the US defence budget over the next five years, for example, would produce a significant peace dividend—while some European states may need to raise their spending or allocate their existing defence budgets more wisely.

43. The NATO missions set out in this document can be accomplished at lower cost than currently, by larger and/or more specialised armies, including increased civilian-led Crisis Response Units to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance, and somewhat smaller Air Forces and Navies—provided that NATO Member States eliminate redundant and irrelevant weapon systems. This includes a progressive shrinking and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals, the cancellation of missile defence and several Cold War era, ‘big-ticket’ high-tech weapon systems. The performance of the US missile defence system, for example, is unproven, requires unending additional resources, faces problems that cannot be solved with existing science and has exacerbated divisions within Europe. Diplomacy and engagement can defuse tensions with North Korea and Iran—and smarter, cheaper and more effective military solutions are available if a real threat ever emerges.

44. Collective defence is not appropriate to many of the most dangerous threats facing the Alliance. Given their cross-border nature, many of these challenges must be addressed through inclusive global economic and political partnerships, rather than military coalitions. NATO military power has a job to do, but it is time to consider whether it really needs military operations that cost double what the rest of the world spends on its various military functions. The current and future fiscal environments facing NATO demand bold action.
Appendix 1

Conference Agenda

The Shadow NATO Summit - Options for NATO: Pressing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept

A Two-Day Civil Society Shadow Conference to Coincide with NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit

Organised by BASIC, Bertelsmann Stiftung, ISIS Europe, and NATO Watch; with the support of The Marmot Charitable Trust, UK

31 March – 1 April 2009 - Hotel Leopold, 35 Rue du Luxembourg, Brussels (Day 1) and European Parliament, Room ASP 3 G 2, Rue Wiertz, Brussels (Day 2)

Objectives:

To bring together senior NATO officials, civil society and policy experts on comprehensive security at a ‘shadow summit’ to identify, discuss and share ideas concerning the future of NATO, including a new Strategic Concept and innovative solutions to some of the Alliance’s most pressing security challenges.

To launch a ‘Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security’—a concise statement of NATO’s purpose, possibly serving as a precursor to a new Strategic Concept— an alternative to the official version that is expected to be unveiled by Heads of State at the Summit;

To explore ways in which civil society groups and parliamentarians within the Alliance could work together more effectively to advance NATO-related policies and actions that are in keeping with the shared democratic and humanitarian values of member states; and

To initiate a permanent NATO-wide civil society policy network (linked to NATO Watch) and to discuss the scope and nature of such a network.

Overview:

NATO continues to operate within a Strategic Concept (1999) that is stuck in the last century, and has so far failed to articulate a truly convincing rationale and coherent strategy for this century. Much still needs to be done in terms of the often-cited ‘NATO transformation’, which has been too narrowly focused on force modernisation, interoperability and membership. This conference will examine present trends in transatlantic security, nuclear weapon proliferation and the attitudes and assumptions underlying current NATO policy. It will take as its starting point the proposition that a new Strategic Concept will be negotiated within the Alliance in 2009-10 and that any review process ought to include a NATO-wide public consultation exercise.

“NATO has almost completely lost its way, unable to work out whether it should be reliving the Cold War -- focusing on containing or deterring a potentially resurgent beast- from- the-east (and thereby inevitably encouraging, human nature being what it is, just that kind of behaviour), or rather transforming itself into a cooperative, common-security organization that could, conceptually, embrace even Russia itself as a member, and play a useful role in applying, with Security Council support, the kind of sophisticated enforcement capacity that not just the trans-Atlantic powers but the world as a whole needs.”

- Extract from Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President & CEO, International Crisis Group and Co-Chair, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, to International Dialogue for Funders on Advancing Peace and Security in 2009 and Beyond, Madrid, 20 November 2008

1 Modelled on The Other Economic Summit (TOES), which from 1984 to 2004 raised issues such as international debt onto the agenda of the G7 and G8 summits.
Agenda

DAY 1:

31 March 2009, Hotel Leopold, 35 Rue du Luxembourg

10.00 – 10.15
Welcome
Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe
Paul Ingram, Director, BASIC
Stefani Weiss, Director, Europe’s Future / International Governance, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Brussels Office

10.15 – 10.45
Launch of NATO Watch Policy Network and a ‘Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security’
Ian Davis, Director, NATO Watch

10.45 – 12.00
Session I: NATO’s role and relevance in the 21st Century
Chair: Simon Lunn, Senior Fellow, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
This session will examine recent developments in NATO and the extent to which the ‘transformation’ agenda is moving the Alliance away from its core collective defence mandate.
Speakers:
NATO’s political and military transformation – the story so far
Stefani Weiss, Director, Europe’s Future / International Governance, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Brussels Office
Abolition or reform - a perspective from the Netherlands
Karel Koster, researcher for the Socialist Party, The Netherlands
Collective defence versus winning the peace in far-flung places: Re-balancing NATO’s “in area” and “out of area” missions
Professor Mark Webber, Dept. of Politics, International Relations and European Studies, Loughborough University, UK
NATO, the UN and RP2: future prospects
Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group

12.00 – 13.30
Lunch

13.30 – 15.00
Session II: Afghanistan and beyond
Chair: Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe
What is the experience of the military under NATO command in Afghanistan? How has the Alliance worked with NGOs and civilian institutions? Is there an exit strategy in Afghanistan? What are the lessons for NATO’s role in the future?
Speakers:
A NATO military perspective
Tim Foxley, Guest Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
An Afghanistan perspective
Selmin Caliskan, Head of Department, Politics and Human Rights, medica mondiale, Cologne
The need for accurate casualty recording in NATO operations
John Sloboda, Executive Director, Oxford Research Group and Co-director of Iraq Body Count project

15:00 – 15.30
Tea/Coffee Break
Session III: An open conversation about Article V and Collective Defence – What does it mean today?

Chair: Donald Steinberg, Deputy President (Policy), International Crisis Group, Brussels

How should NATO deliver on its Article V commitments? Are nuclear deterrence and missile defence crucial to collective defence? Why do perceptions differ among Member States? Is the most effective route to collective security through building peace, respect and trust with Russia?

Speakers:

How will France’s return to the NATO Military Committee impact on Article V and the future of the European Security and Defence Policy?
Jean-Pierre Maulny, Deputy Director, Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Paris

Securing collective defense without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable?
Dr Oliver Meier, Arms Control Association & Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg

A Central and Eastern European perspective on Article V
Dr Liviu Muresan, EURISC Foundation, Romania

Improving collective defence through improved NATO-Russian relations – a possible road map
Dmitry Polikanov, Chairman of the Triadologue Club, PIR Centre, Moscow

Day 1:

1 April 2009, European Parliament, Room ASP 3 G 2, Rue Wiertz

8.30
Arrive at European Parliament for security clearance

9.30 – 9.45
Opening Remarks
Helmut Kuhne, MEP

9.45 – 11.00
Session IV: Assessing NATO capabilities

Chair: Daniel Korski, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations.

What are the capability gaps that NATO must address in order to match its missions to its means? Is the need for improved capabilities largely a European issue? Are defence budgets being spent on the wrong things? Will NATO’s members ever agree on what to do with the NRF? How effective are NATO counter-terrorism operations, such as Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean? Should homeland security be a fundamental NATO mission?

Speakers:

NATO capabilities – shortfalls and surpluses
Dr Andrew Michta, Professor of National Security Studies, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany

NATO and counter-terrorism – effectiveness and accountability
Daniel Keohane, Senior Research Fellow, The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris

The NATO Response Force - flagship or shipwreck of NATO transformation?
Dr Martin Smith, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst UK

11.00 – 11.30
Coffee/Tea Break
**11.30 – 12.30**

**Session V: “NATO-izing” US ballistic missile defence in Europe**

Chair: Dr Armand Cléresse, Director, Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies

What are the outcomes of NATO’s (February 2008) assessment of the political and military implications of the planned missile defence systems in Europe? Will NATO and US missile defence systems be bolted together? Should NATO go ahead with BMD proposals in Europe even in the face of Russian opposition?

Speakers:

- **The case for**
  - Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO

- **The case against**
  - Professor Dave Webb, The Praxis Centre, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK

**12.00 – 13.30**

**Lunch (own responsibility – many cafes/restaurants at Pl Luxembourg)**

**13.30 – 16.30**

**Session VI: Pressing the re-set button on the Strategic Concept - Examining potential new headline goals for NATO**

**13.30 – 14.30 Goal 1:**

“Affirming collective defence and “moral, muscular multilateralism” (including disaster relief, conflict prevention, counter-and non-proliferation, peacekeeping and anti-piracy missions) as the primary purpose of NATO”.

Discussants:

- Ian Davis, Director, NATO Watch; and
- Catriona Gourlay, Marie Curie Fellow, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva

Moderator: Stephanie Blair, Senior Advisor, SSR and Crisis Management, ISIS Europe

**14.30 – 15.30 Goal 2:**

“Eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe and moving towards the adoption of a non-nuclear weapon security doctrine for the Alliance (including, as interim goals, withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian tactical weapons from operational deployment to secure storage) as part of a global leadership strategy in moving towards a nuclear weapon free world”.

Discussants:

- Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council;
- Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, NATO

Moderator: Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe

**15.30 – 15.45**

**Tea/Coffee Break**

**15.45 – 16.45 Goal 3:**

“Improving transparency, accountability and value for money within NATO, especially with regard to defence planning and procurement”.

Discussants:

- Ádám Foldes, Project Manager, Access Info Europe, Madrid
- Michael Stopford, Deputy Assistant Secretary General Strategic Communications Services, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO

Moderator: Vibeke Thomsen, Programme Officer, ISIS Europe

**16.45 - 17.30**

**Session VII: Conclusions and Further Reflections on a New NATO Strategic Concept**

Audience Feedback on the “Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security” and further discussion on a new NATO Strategic Concept

Concluding remarks:

- Ian Davis, Director, NATO Watch
- Giji Gya, Executive Director, ISIS Europe
- Paul Ingram, Director, BASIC
- Stefani Weiss, Director, Europe’s Future / International Governance, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Brussels Office
Appendix 2:
Shadow NATO Summit
List of Participants

Valery Afanasiev
Counsellor
Mission of Russia to the EU

Ana Aguado Cornago
Communication & Public Relations Officer
EUI

Muzaffer Akyildirim
Conseiller
Delegation of Turkey to NATO

Orkhan Aliyev
Project Manager
FASE

Aida Aliyeva
Project Manager
FASE

Oili Aulikki Alm
Secretary General
Conflict Prevention Network KATU

Monica Sofia Amaral Pinto Ferro
Policy Advisor, Crisis Prevention and Recovery
UNDP

Aviel Attias
Research Fellow
Transatlantic Institute

Martin Banks
Journalist
Parliament Magazine

Stephen Benians
Policy Analyst
FourMile

Stephanie Blair
Senior Advisor, SSR & Crisis Management
ISIS Europe

Frederic Bohler
Student in International Security
Grenoble University

Franziska Brantner
Project Manager
Bertelsmann Stiftung

Selmin Caliskan
Head of department, politics and human rights
medica mondiale

Patrick Child
Head of Cabinet
European Commission

Armand Clesse
Director
Luxembourg Institute
for European and
International Studies

Jo Coelmont
Brigadier General and Senior Fellow Associate
Egmont/Royal Institute for International Relations

Ian Davis
Director
NATO Watch

Guadalupe De Sousa
Liaison Officer OCHA
UN OCHA

Dan-Claudiu Degeratu
Head of Defence Section
Permanent Delegation of Romania to NATO

Alain Deletroz
Vice-President Europe
International Crisis Group

Celine Diebold
Research Assistant
Bertelsmann Stiftung

Rory Domm
DG E IV - Transatlantic relations, Council of the
European Union

Andrei Enghis
Policy Coordinator
European Commission

Peter Flory
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment
NATO

Philipp Fluri
Executive Director
DCAF

Adam Foldes
Project Manager
Access Info
Europe & Hungarian
Civil Liberties Union

Tim Foxley
Guest Researcher
Armed Conflict and Conflict Management Programme,
SIPRI
The Shadow NATO Summit: Spring 2009 - Brussels

Simon Lunn
Special Adviser, NATO PA and Senior Adviser DCAF
NATO PA and DCAF

Anne-Claire Marangoni
Academic Assistant
College of Europe

Isabelle Maras
PhD student
Institute for Peace Research & Security Policy at the University of Hamburg

Vasilis Margaras
Visiting Research Fellow
CEPS

Maja Maricic
Postgraduate student
College of Europe

Anne Marrillet
Project Officer
DCAF

Pauline Massart
Senior Manager
SDA

Jean-Pierre Maulny
Deputy Director
IRIS

Alessandro Mauriello
Colonel
CeMiSS

Enrico Mazzon
Attaché
Delegation of Italy to NATO

Stephanie Mbombo Muamba
Student in European Law
IEE/ULB

Jamelle McCampbell
Coordinator, Stabilisation and Reconstruction, Afghanistan
Mission of the United States to NATO

Diane Helen McDonald
Executive Director
Nuclear Information Service

Oliver Meier
Arms Control
Association & Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg

Andrew Michta
Professor of National Security Studies
Georges Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Branislav Milinkovic
Ambassador
Mission of Serbia to NATO

Annalisa Monaco
EU and NATO relations manager
Boeing

Jenny Monnin
Chargée d'études stratégiques
MDBA

Jessica Mosbahi
Assistant, Human Rights and Politics
medica mondiale

Liliana Elena Mulvany
Intern
BASIC

Liviu Muresan
EURISC Foundation

Alexandra Nerisanu
Intern
ICTJ

Federica Pierangeli
Attachée
Delegation of Italy to NATO

Christian Piot
Military Counsellor
Delegation of France to the EU

Claudine Polet
Responsible Peace Commission
CNAPD

Dmitry Polikanov
Chairman of the Trialogue Club
PIR Centre

Valentina Pop
Journalist
EU Observer

Miguel Proença Garcia Francisco
Military Adviser
Delegation of Portugal to NATO

Maximilian Rech
Programme Fellow
Carnegie Europe

Guy B. Roberts
Deputy Assistant to Secretary General for WMD Policy and Director, Nuclear Policy
NATO

Dominic Robinson
Account manager
Hill and Knowlton

Celine Ruiz
Press Officer
Council of the European Union

Vinciane Sablon
Lieutenant Colonel
Belgian Ministry of Defence, Royal Military School
Appendix 3:

NATO Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration

04 Apr. 2009

Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary of NATO. We have adopted a Declaration on Alliance Security which reaffirms the basic values, principles and purposes of our Alliance. We have launched the process to develop a new Strategic Concept which will define NATO's long-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century.

2. We warmly welcome Albania and Croatia into our Alliance. Our nations are united in democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and we reaffirm our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. NATO contributes to stability and security, which are the essential foundations necessary to tackle the global financial hardships and uncertainty we face. Transatlantic cooperation remains essential to protect our peoples, defend our values, and meet common threats and challenges, from wherever they may come.

3. The indivisibility of our security is a fundamental principle of the Alliance. We reaffirm our solidarity and our commitment to the cohesion of the Alliance. We are guided by these indispensable principles in all fields of our activity. A strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of the Alliance and remains our most important security task. NATO’s ongoing transformation will strengthen the Alliance’s ability to confront existing and emerging 21st century security threats, including by ensuring the provision of fully prepared and deployable forces able to conduct the full range of military operations and missions on and beyond its territory, on its periphery and at strategic distance.

4. The venue of our meeting is a powerful symbol of Europe’s post-World War II reconciliation. The end of the Cold War, 20 years ago, opened the way towards the further consolidation of Europe into a continent that is truly whole, free and at peace. NATO has played, and will continue to play, an active role in that process, by engaging partner countries in dialogue and cooperation and keeping open the door to NATO membership in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

5. We warmly welcome the French decision to fully participate in NATO structures; this will further contribute to a stronger Alliance.

6. We express our heartfelt appreciation for the commitment and bravery of the more than 75,000 men and women from Allied and other nations who are serving in NATO’s missions and operations. We extend our deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of the injured and fallen; their sacrifices in advancing the cause of freedom will not be in vain.

7. Today we renew our commitment to a common approach to address the challenges to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We underscore that the existing structures – NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe – based on common values, continue to provide every opportunity for countries to engage substantively on Euro-Atlantic security with a broad acquis, established over decades, that includes respect for human rights; territorial integrity; the sovereignty of all states, including their right to decide their own security arrangements; and the requirement to fulfill international commitments and agreements.

8. Within this framework, NATO and Allies are open to dialogue on a broad, cooperative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, for which the OSCE provides an appropriate, inclusive format. The common aim of such a dialogue should be to improve implementation of existing commitments and to continue to improve existing institutions and instruments so as to effectively promote our values and Euro-Atlantic security.

9. Our security is closely tied to Afghanistan’s security and stability. As such, our UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force mission (ISAF) in Afghanistan, comprising 42 nations, is our key priority. We are working with the Government and people of Afghanistan, and with the international community under the leadership of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Together, in a comprehensive approach combining military and civilian resources, we are helping the Government of Afghanistan build a secure, stable and democratic country, respectful of human rights. We stress the importance of the protection of women’s rights. The international community aims to ensure that Al-Qaeda and other violent extremists cannot use Afghanistan and Pakistan as safe havens from which to launch terrorist attacks. Today we have issued a Summit Declaration on Afghanistan in which we reiterate our strategic vision and set out actions that demonstrate our resolve to support Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. Afghan ownership remains crucial for sustained progress. Strong constructive engagement by countries of the region is also critical and, to this end, we pledge to reinforce our cooperation with all Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan. We encourage further cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and welcome the results of the third Trilateral Summit in Ankara on 1 April 2009. We also welcome the outcome of the International Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague on 31 March 2009.

10. Our commitment to regional security and stability throughout the Balkans remains steadfast. We praise the continued excellent work carried out by the robust UN-mandated NATO-led KFOR to help maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all in Kosovo. We reiterate that KFOR will remain in Kosovo according to its operational mandate, on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, unless the Security Council decides otherwise, cooperating with all relevant actors, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo, as appropriate. We welcome the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX, and encourage all actors to continue their efforts to facilitate the deployment and full operation of EULEX throughout Kosovo.
The Alliance remains fully committed to supporting the establishment of the agreed multi-ethnic security structures in Kosovo. The standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps, as well as the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force and civilian-led oversight, under NATO's close supervision, are in the interest of all parties. We welcome the progress made so far in Kosovo and expect full implementation of the existing commitments to standards, especially those related to the rule of law and regarding the protection of ethnic minorities and communities, as well as the protection of historical and religious sites, and to combating crime and corruption. We expect all parties concerned in Kosovo to make further progress towards the consolidation of peace and order. NATO will continue to assess developments on the ground in shaping future decisions.

11. We reiterate our willingness to continue providing a broad range of training support to the Iraqi Security Forces through the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), and look forward to agreement on a revised legal framework as a matter of urgency. We recall our offer to the Government of Iraq of a Structured Cooperation Framework as a basis for developing a long-term relationship, and welcome the progress achieved towards that end.

12. At the request of the United Nations Secretary-General and on the basis of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, NATO has taken action against piracy and armed robbery at sea. We have launched Operation Allied Protector aimed at conducting maritime operations off the Horn of Africa in order to help counter piracy and armed robbery at sea alongside the efforts of other nations and organisations, especially Combined Task Force 151 and the EU’s ATALANTA operation, which are all complementary in nature. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia plays an important role in order to facilitate coordination among all actors involved. Addressing the root causes of piracy requires a comprehensive approach by the international community. We are considering options for a possible long-term NATO role to combat piracy, including by taking into account, as appropriate, regional requests for maritime capacity-building.

13. We remain deeply concerned by the continued violence and atrocities in Darfur and by the expulsion of humanitarian organisations from Sudan, and call on all parties to cease hostilities and negotiate in good faith. We are also concerned by the ongoing violence and the severe humanitarian crisis in Somalia. We stress the need for a political settlement and are encouraged by recent developments in the consolidation of state and government structures. At the request of the African Union (AU), NATO provided support to the AU Mission in Somalia through coordination of airlift and planning assistance. The Alliance is supporting the development of the AU’s long-term peacekeeping capabilities, including the African Standby Force and its maritime dimension. Stressing the principle of African ownership, NATO remains ready to enhance its dialogue with the AU and consider further requests to support the AU, including for regional capacity-building.

14. Our Alliance provides an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism. We condemn in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motivations or manifestations, and are determined to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, as long as necessary and in accordance with international law and principles of the UN Charter. Our nations will continue to contribute to the full implementation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR), in particular UNSCR 1373, as well as of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

We deplore all loss of life and extend our sympathies to all those who have suffered from acts of terrorism. We reiterate our determination to protect against terrorist attacks against our populations, territories, infrastructure and forces, and to deal with the consequences of any such attacks. We will intensify our efforts to deny terrorists access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery as underscored in UNSCR 1540. We will continue to develop advanced technologies to help defend against terrorist attacks, and we appreciate the role of Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centres and our Centres of Excellence in addressing aspects of terrorism. We also remain committed to strengthening information and intelligence sharing on terrorism, particularly in support of NATO missions and operations. We continue to attach great importance to dialogue and cooperation with our partners in this important area, including in the framework of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. We strongly condemn tactics such as suicide bombing and hostage taking; the recruitment, particularly of the young and disadvantaged, for these purposes; as well as terrorist abuse of freedoms inherent to democratic societies to spread hatred and incite violence.

15. Since its activation in 2001, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), our maritime operation in the Mediterranean which is conducted in the framework of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, has made a significant contribution to the fight against terrorism. We reiterate our commitment to OAE and welcome the continued support of partner countries whose contributions demonstrate both their engagement and NATO’s added value in promoting regional security and stability.

16. As NATO adapts to 21st century challenges in its 60th anniversary year, it is increasingly important that the Alliance communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives and missions. Strategic communications are an integral part of our efforts to achieve the Alliance’s political and military objectives. We therefore welcome the improvements in NATO's strategic communications capability and public diplomacy efforts that we launched at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, particularly the enhancements to the NATO HQ Media Operations Centre, and the increased output of NATO’s television channel on the internet. We underscore our commitment to support further improvement of our strategic communications by the time of our next Summit.

17. We welcome the role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in promoting the Alliance’s principles and values. We also appreciate the role of the Atlantic Treaty Association in fostering a better understanding of the Alliance and its objectives among our publics.

18. Experience in the Balkans and Afghanistan demonstrates that today's security challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, combining civil and military measures and coordination. Its effective implementation requires all international actors to contribute in a concerted effort, in a shared sense of openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths and mandates. We welcome the significant progress achieved, in line with the Action Plan agreed at Bucharest, to improve NATO’s own contribution to such a comprehensive approach, including through a more coherent application of its crisis management instruments and efforts to associate its military capabilities with civilian means. Progress includes NATO’s active promotion of dialogue with relevant players on operations; the development of a database of national experts in reconstruction and stabilisation to advise NATO forces; and the involvement of selected international organisations, as appropriate, in NATO crisis management exercises.
As part of the international community’s efforts, we reaffirm our commitment to enhancing NATO’s intrinsic contribution to a civil-military approach, and task the Council in Permanent Session to prepare an interim report for Foreign Ministers in December 2009 and to report at our next Summit on further progress with regard to the implementation of the Action Plan and NATO’s ability to improve the delivery of stabilisation and reconstruction effects. We also encourage other actors to intensify their efforts in the same spirit.

19. More than a decade of cooperation between NATO and the United Nations, especially in the Balkans and Afghanistan, has demonstrated the value of effective and efficient coordination between our two organisations. Last year’s Joint UN-NATO Declaration represents a major step in our developing cooperation and will significantly contribute to addressing the threats and challenges faced by the international community. It also reaffirms our willingness to consider, within our respective mandates and capabilities, requests for assistance to regional and sub-regional organisations, as appropriate. We are committed to its full implementation in cooperation with the UN. We welcome progress achieved so far, particularly in enhancing dialogue and improving liaison arrangements, and look forward to a report on further progress at our next Summit.

20. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. In this light, NATO and the EU are working together and side by side in key crisis management operations and are cooperating, inter alia, in the fight against terrorism, in the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities and in civil emergency planning, and will continue to do so. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, and welcomes the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges that both NATO and the EU face today. These developments have significant implications and relevance for the Alliance as a whole, which is why NATO stands ready to support and work with the EU in such mutually reinforcing efforts, recognising the ongoing concerns of Allies. Non-EU Allies have made, and continue to make, significant contributions to these efforts. In this context, we continue to believe it important that all possible efforts should be made by all those involved in these endeavours, and also to render possible the fullest involvement of non-EU Allies. Since we last met in Bucharest, various initiatives have been taken as part of the continuing effort to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations. We are also willing to explore ways to further intensify work in the framework of the NATO-EU Capability Group. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for enhanced mutual commitment to ensure effective methods of working together. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, respecting the autonomy of the two organisations.

21. In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

22. We reiterate our agreement at the Bucharest Summit to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and urge intensified efforts towards that goal. We will continue to support and assist the reform efforts of the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We welcome the recent decision by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to increase its contribution to ISAF.

23. We remain committed to the Balkans, which is a strategically important region, where Euro-Atlantic integration, based on democratic values and regional cooperation, remains necessary for lasting peace and stability. We acknowledge the important role played by the South East Europe Initiative and the Adriatic Charter in fostering regional cooperation, building confidence, and facilitating the Euro-Atlantic integration process of the Western Balkans.

24. We welcome the Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro as well as progress made in NATO’s Intensified Dialogue on membership issues with both countries.

25. We welcome Montenegro’s successful and active implementation of its current Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO. We are encouraged by the reforms it has made in a number of areas that are essential to its Euro-Atlantic integration and also by its contributions to cooperation and security in the region. We are looking forward to Montenegro’s further determined efforts in this regard. The Council in Permanent Session is keeping Montenegro’s progress under active review and will respond early to its request to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), on its own merits.

26. We welcome progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s cooperation with NATO, including through implementation of its current IPAP, and acknowledge the country’s expressed intention to apply for MAP at an appropriate time. We welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina’s decision to contribute to ISAF. We are encouraged by the ongoing political process, and urge that the widest possible consensus be found on the fundamental challenges facing the country. Nevertheless, we remain deeply concerned that irresponsible political rhetoric and actions continue to hinder substantive progress in reform. We urge Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to take further genuine steps to strengthen state-level institutions and reinvigorate the reform process to advance the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

27. We welcome Serbia’s first Individual Partnership Programme with NATO as a sound basis for substantial practical cooperation. NATO welcomes, and continues to support, the Government’s stated commitment to Serbia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. We stand ready to further develop our partnership, in particular through elaboration of an IPAP and continued support to Serbia’s defence reform efforts. All NATO partnership opportunities for political consultation and practical cooperation remain open to Serbia. The will and performance of the Serbian authorities are crucial for the further deepening of our partnership. We call upon Serbia to support further progress towards the consolidation of peace and order in Kosovo.

28. We acknowledge the progress achieved in terms of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, Serbia must cooperate fully with ICTY, as must Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we will closely monitor their respective efforts in this regard.

29. Stability and successful political and economic reform in Ukraine and Georgia are important to Euro-Atlantic security. At Bucharest we agreed that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision as well as the decisions taken by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs last December. We are maximising our advice, assistance and support for their reform efforts in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission, which play a central role in supervising the process set in hand at the Bucharest Summit. We welcome in particular the planned reinforcement of NATO’s Information and Liaison Offices in Kyiv and Tbilisi.
Without prejudice to further decisions which must be taken about MAP, the development of Annual National Programmes will help Georgia and Ukraine in advancing their reforms. The annual review of these programmes will allow us to continue to closely monitor Georgia and Ukraine's progress on reforms related to their aspirations for NATO membership. We also welcome the valuable contributions made by both countries to NATO's operations.

30. We remain convinced that the mutually beneficial relationship between NATO and Ukraine, launched twelve years ago with the Distinctive Partnership, will continue to contribute to regional and Euro-Atlantic security. In this context, we appreciate Ukraine's valuable contributions to our common security, including through participation in NATO-led operations. We encourage Ukraine's continued efforts to promote regional security and cooperation. We underscore the importance of Ukraine's commitment to continue implementing needed political, economic, defence and security sector reforms, in order to achieve its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and we will continue to provide assistance to this end. Political stability is of crucial importance to the successful implementation of these reforms.

31. The NATO-Georgia relationship has deepened substantially in the past year. We remain committed to fostering political dialogue with, as well as providing assistance to, Georgia. We strongly encourage Georgia to continue implementing all necessary reforms, particularly democratic, electoral, and judicial reforms, in order to achieve its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We reiterate our continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders.

32. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, UN and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution on Georgia's territory. We welcome as a positive step the agreement reached in the framework of the Geneva talks on joint incident prevention and response mechanisms and we urge all the participants involved to engage in their rapid implementation. We note the renewal of the mandate for the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the roll-over of the mandate for the OSCE Military Monitors. We call for a new mandate for the OSCE Mission to Georgia as well as for unimpeded access for UN, EU, and OSCE observers throughout all of Georgia, including the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We are concerned by the continued tensions and violence along the administrative boundary lines and call on all parties to demonstrate restraint.

33. The NATO-Russia partnership was conceived as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and we remain committed to it. Dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Russia are important for our joint ability to meet effectively common security threats and challenges. We reaffirm the importance of upholding the common values and all the principles enshrined in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration by all members of the NATO-Russia Council. Our relations with Russia depend on trust and the fulfilment of commitments. Since our last Summit, dialogue and cooperation with Russia have suffered from profound disagreements on a number of issues. The Alliance will continue to assess developments in relations with Russia.

34. We urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to Georgia, as mediated by the European Union on 12 August and 8 September 2008. In this context, we view Russia's withdrawal from the areas it has committed to leave as essential. We have welcomed steps taken to implement those commitments, but the withdrawal is still incomplete.

The Alliance has condemned Russia’s recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states, and continues to call on Russia to reverse its recognition which contravenes the founding values and principles of the NATO-Russia Council, the OSCE principles on which the security of Europe is based, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Georgia’s territorial integrity, which Russia endorsed. In addition, the build-up of Russia’s military presence in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia without the consent of the Government of Georgia is of particular concern.

35. Despite our current disagreements, Russia is of particular importance to us as a partner and neighbour. NATO and Russia share common security interests, such as the stabilisation of Afghanistan; arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD, including their means of delivery; crisis management; counter-terrorism; counter-narcotics; and anti-piracy. Following through with the decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers at their meetings in December 2008 and March 2009, we look forward to the reconvening of formal NATO-Russia Council meetings, including at Ministerial level, as soon as possible before summer 2009. We are committed to using the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for political dialogue on all issues – where we agree and disagree – with a view towards resolving problems, addressing concerns and building practical cooperation. We are convinced that the NATO-Russia Council has not exploited its full potential. We therefore stand ready, in the NATO-Russia Council, to assess possibilities for making it a more efficient and valuable instrument for our political dialogue and practical cooperation.

36. Twenty years ago, an historic wave of democratic change swept through Central and Eastern Europe. NATO took this opportunity to engage countries across the Euro-Atlantic area in partnership and cooperation with a view to fostering security, stability and democratic transformation. We reiterate our commitment to further develop the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability. We welcome the offer of Kazakhstan to host the EAPC Security Forum for the first time in Central Asia in June. We thank our Partners for their significant contributions to our operations. We will continue to develop EAPC policy initiatives. In this regard, we welcome the work of the EAPC in education and training activities, and encourage national educational institutions to contribute to these efforts. We also encourage the EAPC to further develop the Building Integrity initiative which promotes transparency and accountability in the defence sector, and to report back to us on this initiative at our next Summit. We remain actively engaged with our Partners in supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, with the aim of having a comprehensive set of measures in place by autumn 2010. We are also contributing with our Partners to international efforts to put an end to the trafficking in human beings.

37. Peace and stability in the Mediterranean region are essential for Euro-Atlantic security. For the past fifteen years, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has provided a valuable forum, including meetings at Ministerial level, for consultations and cooperation with our Mediterranean partners on a wide range of issues, and we welcome their significant contributions to Alliance-led operations and missions. We are convinced that joint ownership remains essential to the success of our relationship. We welcome the finalisation last month of an Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) with Jordan, following those already concluded with Israel and Egypt, as well as the recent initiatives from Morocco and Tunisia in this field.
Against a challenging background in the Middle East and much welcomed renewed international commitment to build peace in the region, we stand ready to further enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with all our Mediterranean partners, including through the continued use of Trust Funds on a voluntary basis. We look forward to the restoration of constitutional rule in Mauritania, which will allow the resumption of its full participation in the Mediterranean Dialogue.

38. The security and stability of the Gulf region is significant to the Alliance. We are pleased with the significant progress achieved in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) since its establishment in 2004. Political consultations and practical cooperation have intensified, and new opportunities have been created in key areas such as energy security, maritime security and training and education. We encourage our ICI partners to develop ICPs. We value highly the support provided by our ICI partners to NATO’s operations and missions.

39. Within the context of our Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, we welcome the substantial progress made in implementing the first phase of the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative, including the establishment of a dedicated faculty at the NATO Defense College and the inauguration of the faculty’s NATO Regional Cooperation Course.

40. Since Bucharest, NATO’s relationships with other partners across the globe have continued to expand and deepen, reflecting their increasing importance to the Alliance’s goals in operations, security cooperation, and efforts, through political dialogue, to build common understanding of emerging issues that affect Euro-Atlantic security, notably Afghanistan. These relationships, which take many forms, offer a flexible means for countries to pursue dialogue and cooperation with NATO, and we reaffirm our intent to enhance them, on a case-by-case basis. We welcome the significant contributions made by many partners to NATO-led operations, and in particular those by Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea to our mission in Afghanistan.

41. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the progress in consolidation of regional cooperation and ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms, and based on transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness. We will continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and dialogue among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.

42. We have already achieved much in transforming our forces, capabilities and structures. The continuation of this process is crucial as it underpins the Alliance’s ability to conduct the full range of its missions, including collective defence and crisis response operations on and beyond Alliance territory. Against this background we must continue to work individually and collectively to improve, both in quality and quantity, the capabilities needed to meet the priorities we set in the Comprehensive Political Guidance.

43. We will continue to adapt NATO’s forces, structures and procedures to meet the changing security challenges we face. We welcome the progress that has been made to make NATO’s command structure more effective and efficient and look forward to further efforts in this regard. NATO’s defence planning process must enable Allies to deliver the capabilities needed to deal with current and future challenges within a comprehensive approach. We therefore also welcome agreement on a new, defence planning process which puts the emphasis squarely on delivery of capabilities we need.

44. We are determined to provide the forces required for the full range of Alliance missions. We continue to support efforts to make our forces more deployable, sustainable, interoperable and, thus, more usable. By design, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has an important role in providing a rapidly deployable, credible force for the Alliance and in driving transformation and capability development. It needs to be able to respond to new and unpredicted crises for either collective defence or crisis operations beyond Alliance borders. We expect our Defence Ministers, at their meeting in June, to agree on measures to achieve these aims by improving NRF resourcing and employability.

45. The Alliance will further develop the capabilities and policies required to conduct the full range of our missions, to remedy specific shortages, and to deal with emerging challenges and threats, at the same time facilitating an equitable sharing of burdens, risks and costs. We will vigorously pursue our work developing and fielding key enablers, such as mission-capable helicopters, strategic lift and the Alliance Ground Surveillance system. We support the greater use of multinational solutions for additional capability development including increased collective responsibility for logistics. We will also continue to pursue many of these initiatives in the existing framework of NATO-EU cooperation in capability development. We encourage our Defence Ministers to agree on an Action Plan to improve the interoperability of our armed forces at their meeting in June 2009.

46. In view of the imminent achievement of full operational capability of the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC) initiated at our 2006 Riga Summit, we invite the Council in Permanent Session to exploit this success further, including by examining the benefits of a new multinational Headquarters.

47. We are committed to provide, individually and collectively, the financial resources necessary for our Alliance to perform the operational and transformational tasks we demand of it. We will strive to prioritise our defence spending and programming for improved efficiency in delivering the ability to conduct the full range of Alliance missions. This is particularly important in the current economic situation.

48. We will continue to improve and demonstrate more clearly our ability to meet emerging challenges on and beyond Alliance territory, including on its periphery, inter alia by ensuring adequate planning, exercises and training.

49. We remain committed to strengthening communication and information systems that are of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks, as state and non-state actors may try to exploit the Alliance’s and Allies’ growing reliance on these systems. To prevent and respond to such attacks, in line with our agreed Policy on Cyber Defence, we have established a NATO Cyber Defence Management Authority, improved the existing Computer Incident Response Capability, and activated the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. We will accelerate our cyber defence capabilities in order to achieve full readiness. Cyber defence is being made an integral part of NATO exercises. We are further strengthening the linkages between NATO and Partner countries on protection against cyber attacks. In this vein, we have developed a framework for cooperation on cyber defence between NATO and Partner countries, and acknowledge the need to cooperate with international organisations, as appropriate.

50. Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory, and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore reaffirm the conclusions of the Bucharest Summit about missile defence.
51. In response to our tasking at the Bucharest Summit to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all European Allied territory and populations, several technical architecture options were developed and subsequently assessed from a politically-military perspective. We recognise that additional work is still required. In this context, a future United States' contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of this Alliance effort.

52. Based on the technical and political military analysis of these options, we judge that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritised manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk. We received a comprehensive analysis of the technical architecture options and agree to its overall assessment that, even though some of these options do not meet the Bucharest tasking, each of them has its strengths and shortcomings.

53. Bearing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, we task the Council in Permanent Session, taking into account the Bucharest Summit tasking, to present recommendations comprising architecture alternatives, drawing from the architectural elements already studied, for consideration at our next Summit. To inform any future political decision on missile defence, we also task the Council in Permanent Session to identify and undertake the policy, military and technical work related to a possible expanded role of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme beyond the protection of NATO deployed forces to include territorial missile defence.

54. We support increased missile defence cooperation between Russia and NATO, including maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence-building measures to allay any concerns. We reaffirm our readiness to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time and we encourage the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States' missile defence cooperation proposals.

55. In Bucharest we reaffirmed that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to make an important contribution to peace, security, and stability. In response to our tasking to the Council in Permanent Session to keep these issues under active review, we note its report on raising NATO's profile in this field. The report displays a broad range of activities being undertaken, including continuing efforts in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and surplus munitions. The Allies continue to seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for collective defence and to fulfill the full range of its missions. NATO and Allies should continue contributing to international efforts in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We aim at achieving a higher level of public awareness of NATO's contribution in these fields. We task the Council in Permanent Session to continue to keep these issues under active review, as part of NATO's broad response to security challenges.

56. NATO Allies reaffirm that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, remains important and Allies will contribute constructively with a view to achieving a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Alliance nations have dramatically reduced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and remain committed to all objectives enshrined in the Treaty. We call for universal compliance with the NPT and universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR 1540.

We will intensify our efforts to prevent state and non-state actors from accessing WMD and their means of delivery. In this regard, we endorse NATO's comprehensive strategic-level policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats. We remain deeply concerned about the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and related proliferation risks and call on Iran to comply with relevant UNSCRs. We are also deeply concerned by the programmes and proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and call on it to fully comply with relevant UNSCRs.

57. We place the highest value on the CFE Treaty regime with all its elements. We underscore the strategic importance of the CFE Treaty, including its flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. We reiterate our endorsement at the Bucharest Summit of the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 28 March 2008 and fully support the December 2008 statement of our Foreign Ministers. We reaffirm the Alliance's commitment to the CFE Treaty regime, as expressed in the Alliance's position contained in paragraph 42 of the 2006 Riga Summit Declaration, the final statement by Allies at the CFE Extraordinary Conference in Vienna, and Alliance statements reflecting subsequent developments. We are deeply concerned that, since 12 December 2007, Russia has continued its unilateral "suspension" of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. Furthermore, Russia's actions in Georgia have called into question its commitment to the fundamental OSCE principles on which stability and security in Europe are based: principles which underpin the CFE Treaty. These actions run counter to our common objective of preserving the long-term viability of the CFE regime and we call upon Russia to resume its implementation without further delay. Because of our commitment to cooperative security and fulfilment of international agreements as well as the importance we attach to the confidence that results from military transparency and predictability, we have continued to fully implement the Treaty despite Russia's "suspension". However, the current situation, where NATO CFE Allies implement the Treaty while Russia does not, cannot last indefinitely. We offered a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for parallel actions on key issues, including steps by NATO Allies on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty and by Russia on outstanding commitments related to Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. We continue to believe that these proposals address all of Russia's stated concerns. We continue to urge Russia to work cooperatively with us and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement on the basis of the parallel actions package so that together we can preserve the benefits of this landmark regime.

58. We remain concerned with the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. It is essential for all parties in these regions to engage constructively in peaceful conflict resolution. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability, and to respect the current negotiation formats. We continue to support the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, taking into account these principles. We welcome OSCE efforts and processes in these regions, to which the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform could be a useful complement.
The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security. In Bucharest we agreed principles which govern NATO's approach in the field of energy security, and options and recommendations for further activities. The Alliance has continued to implement these recommendations. Today we have noted a "Report on Progress Achieved in the Area of Energy Security". The disruption of the flow of natural gas in January 2009 seriously affected a number of Allies and Partner countries. The issues of a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. Today we have declared our continuing support for efforts aimed at promoting energy infrastructure security. In accordance with the Bucharest decisions, we will continue to ensure that NATO's endeavours add value and are fully coordinated and embedded within those of the international community, which features a number of organisations that are specialised in energy security. We task the Council in Permanent Session to prepare an interim report for the Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 2009 and a further report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for our consideration at our next Summit.

Developments in the High North have generated increased international attention. We welcome the initiative of Iceland in hosting a NATO seminar and raising the interest of Allies in safety- and security-related developments in the High North, including climate change.

61. We welcome the Secretary General's report on progress in reforming the NATO Headquarters, to achieve the fastest and most coherent flow of sound political, military and resource advice to support our consensual decision-making, and to enhance our responsiveness to time-sensitive operational needs. The proposed changes aim to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our processes and structures, our ability to integrate the different strands of NATO's work – duly safeguarding the role of the Military Committee – and the optimal use of resources. We endorse the Secretary General's plans for future action and, in line with the mandate we gave him in Bucharest, empower him to take forward this work. We task the Council in Permanent Session to take the necessary decisions to implement these reforms as quickly as possible. We will review a report on implementation at our next Summit.

62. We express our gratitude to the Governments of France and Germany for their gracious hospitality at this first co-hosted NATO Summit. Today we have reaffirmed the indispensable link between North America and Europe, the enduring principle of the indivisibility of Allied security, and our common goal of a Europe that is whole and free. We have taken decisions on our missions and operations, the modernisation of our capabilities, and our engagement with other nations and organisations. We will meet next in Portugal to approve a new Strategic Concept and give further direction to ensure that NATO can successfully continue to defend peace, democracy and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Declaration of Alliance Security
04 Apr. 2009

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to celebrate the 60th anniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era of peace and stability. We have also reaffirmed our adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as non-proliferation efforts.

NATO's enlargement has been an historic success in bringing us closer to our vision of a Europe whole and free. NATO's door will remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability. Today, our nations and the world are facing new, increasingly global threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and cyber attacks. Other challenges such as energy security, climate change, as well as instability emanating from fragile and failed states, may also have a negative impact on Allied and international security. Our security is increasingly tied to that of other regions.

We will improve our ability to meet the security challenges we face that impact directly on Alliance territory, emerge at strategic distance or closer to home. Allies must share risks and responsibilities equitably. We must make our capabilities more flexible and deployable so we can respond quickly and effectively, wherever needed, as new crises emerge. We must also reform the NATO structures to create a leaner and more cost-effective organization. We will strengthen NATO's capacity to play an important role in crisis management and conflict resolution where our interests are involved.

We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges, combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations. In Afghanistan, our key priority, we are committed to helping the Afghan Government and its people to build a democratic, secure and stable country that will never again harbour terrorists who threaten Afghan and international security.
NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts in which their fullest involvement possible is important, as agreed. We are determined to ensure that the NATO-EU relationship is a truly functioning strategic partnership as agreed by NATO and by the EU. Our efforts should be mutually reinforcing and complementary. We will develop our relationships with all our partners, both in our neighbourhood and beyond, with whom we have a joint commitment to cooperative security. Our partners are key in enabling us to implement our vision of a community of shared values and responsibilities. We value the support that many of our partners bring to our operations and missions.

A strong, cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia, based on respect for all the principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 Rome Declaration, best serves security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face.

We are committed to renovating our Alliance to better address today's threats and to anticipate tomorrow’s risks. United by this common vision of our future, we task the Secretary General to convene and lead a broad-based group of qualified experts, who in close consultation with all Allies will lay the ground for the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept and submit proposals for its implementation for approval at our next summit. The Secretary General will keep the Council in permanent session involved throughout the process.

**Summit Declaration on Afghanistan**

**04 Apr. 2009**

**Summit Declaration on Afghanistan**

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

In Afghanistan we are helping build security for the Afghan people, protecting our citizens and defending the values of freedom, democracy and human rights. Our common security is closely tied to the stability and security of Afghanistan and the region: an area of the world from where extremists planned attacks against civilian populations and democratic governments and continue to plot today. Through our UN-mandated mission, supported by our International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, and working closely with the Afghan government, we remain committed for the long-run to supporting a democratic Afghanistan that does not become, once more, a base for terror attacks or a haven for violent extremism that destabilises the region and threatens the entire International Community. For this reason Afghanistan remains the Alliance's key priority.

At the Bucharest Summit last April, we set out our strategic vision based on four guiding principles: long-term commitment, Afghan leadership, a comprehensive approach and regional engagement. These principles remain the foundation of our political-military plan which we have today updated. Afghan ownership remains crucial. Success requires a stronger regional approach that involves all Afghanistan's neighbours and, as this is not a purely military endeavour, greater civilian resources.

We welcome the outcome of the International Conference on Afghanistan in the Netherlands on 31 March 2009, which demonstrated the re-energized commitment and focus of the international community. We share the emphasis placed on balancing civil and military efforts in further contributing to security and stability in Afghanistan. We continue to make progress. The Government of Afghanistan is taking on greater responsibility and increasing its capabilities. Since Bucharest, we have transferred the lead on security in Kabul into Afghan hands. An ever more capable Afghan National Army now participates in over 80% of ISAF operations, taking the lead in half of them. We recognise the UN’s coordinating role over international civilian activities and the need to further improve the coherence of all civilian and military efforts.

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ISAF and the Afghan government are therefore implementing an Integrated Approach to focus our collective efforts. We are boosting our efforts to coordinate the contribution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to build stability and further align their work with Afghan Government priorities. We have improved our measures, in concert with Afghan authorities, to prevent civilian casualties and to respond appropriately when they regrettably do occur. We will continue our efforts in this regard. We are increasing operations in support of Afghan Counter Narcotics activities.

We recognize that extremists in Pakistan especially in western areas and insurgency in Afghanistan undermine security and stability in both countries and that the problems are deeply intertwined. Since Bucharest, we have supported enhanced military-to-military coordination and improved high-level engagement with both governments. We have reinvigorated dialogue to address cross-border security. We welcome the continuation of the Ankara Process including the recent trilateral summit, and the G-8 initiative aimed at further intensifying cooperation and dialogue between the two countries.

Serious challenges remain. Despite significant improvements, insecurity, persistent corruption and the uneven provision of good governance need to be addressed together. We face a ruthless opponent that has a reckless disregard for human life and directly targets civilians. ISAF will do its part to help tackle these threats to Afghanistan’s long-term stability. We will address urgently ISAF’s remaining shortfalls and provide our commanders with the maximum possible operational flexibility for the use of our forces. We must continue, with the Afghan government, to counter extremist propaganda and better communicate our goals, challenges and achievements. As an expression of our commitment to Afghanistan, we have agreed to:

- establish a NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) within ISAF to oversee higher level training for the Afghan National Army, and training and mentoring for the Afghan National Police, capitalising on existing structures and synergies in close coordination with the International Police Coordination Board. We welcome current initiatives in support of the shared objective of training and mentoring the Afghan National Police. The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) could play an active role in this regard;
• provide more trainers and mentors in support of the Afghan National Police. In this regard we underline the importance of other efforts in this field such as the training activities conducted by the European Union police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL);

• assist and support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) secure the upcoming electoral process by temporarily deploying the necessary election support forces;

• provide operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLT) in support of the progressive enlargement of the Afghan National Army to its current target of 134,000;

• expand the role of the Afghan National Army Trust Fund to include sustainment costs. We welcome initial contributions offered and encourage new contributions from the International Community;

• further develop the evolving long term relationship between NATO and Afghanistan;

• encourage and support the strengthening of Afghan and Pakistani government cooperation; and build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan;

• further support the Government of Afghanistan and the UN in the development of the Integrated Approach to strengthen synchronised civil-military efforts across Afghanistan;

• encourage all nations to contribute to the UN election support fund; and

• further develop our engagement with all Afghanistan’s neighbours in support of long term regional security and good relations.

The broader international community and the Afghan government must also play their roles in meeting the challenges as part of a genuine comprehensive approach. In this regard, we welcome the renewal of UNAMA’s mandate. Looking ahead, presidential and provincial council electoral processes must ensure that every Afghan vote counts and that the elections deliver the population the leadership of their choosing. To help the Government expand its reach and effectiveness, greater civilian assistance is required. Greater and coordinated efforts, including at the provincial and district level, are needed to accelerate the development of Afghan capacity to deliver justice, basic services and employment opportunities, especially in the agricultural sector, for ordinary Afghans. Implementation of anti-corruption measures must be enhanced. We stress the importance of the protection of women’s rights. The broader International Community should continue to work with the Government of Afghanistan to support Afghan National Development priorities and Afghan-led efforts to reconcile with those who renounce violence, accept the Constitution, and have no links to Al-Qaeda.

We pay tribute to those who have lost their lives or been injured working for Afghanistan and for our own security. We salute the courage and dedication of the Afghan people and the tens of thousands of men and women, military and civilian from NATO and ISAF partner nations and the broader International Community supporting this important endeavour. Our mission is strengthened by the important contribution of all ISAF nations. To achieve our goals, we will work with Afghanistan and its people in true and long-term partnership. As Afghan capacity increases, our part in providing security will evolve to focus increasingly on mentoring and training. We remain resolute in our commitment to help the Afghan people build a better future.
For the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) to live up the reason for which it was created “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” it must be open, transparent and accountable to the public.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer wrote recently about the lack of public understanding and knowledge about NATO and stressed the need to “make the broader public aware of this new NATO.”

On 1 April 2009 civil society groups called on NATO to “reconnect with citizens”, stating:

“In order to deepen and extend the shared values-base within the Alliance, NATO needs to become closer to its citizens. This means an updated, more open, transparent and accountable Alliance, appropriate to 21st century expectations. Parliamentary accountability within NATO requires clear and adequate mechanisms, and a relaxation of secrecy rules.”

Greater transparency is key to NATO becoming closer to citizens and to increased public awareness and understanding of the Alliance. The right of access to information is firmly established in international and national law as a human right and is essential for upholding the values which NATO was created to protect. It therefore applies to all national and international public bodies and should also apply to NATO.

The right of access to information includes both the right of everyone to request and receive information and a positive obligation on public institutions to compile and disseminate proactively information related to their core functions.

The great majority of NATO’s 28 member states already have legal mechanisms for requesting and receiving information held by public bodies which also apply to information about defence and the armed forces as well as about foreign relations. NATO should be bound by the same transparency norms as its members.

NATO should therefore adopt an Information Openness Policy based upon the following five principles:

1. Principle of presumption of openness and limited exceptions:

In principle all information held by NATO, in its civilian and military structures, and organisations and agencies, should be public unless withholding it can be justified on grounds of harm to a legitimate interest that is codified in the NATO Information Openness Policy and consistent with highest international standards.

The presumption of openness should apply to all information held by NATO, including information which has been provided by member states and third parties. Classification of information does not preclude its release following a request if it cannot be shown that such disclosure would harm a pre-defined legitimate interest.

2. Principle that the public interest prevails:

Even when a legitimate interest applies, information must be released when the public interest outweighs any harm in releasing it. In particular, there should be a strong presumption of public interest when information relates to threats to the environment, health, human rights and information revealing corruption.
3. Principle of proactive disclosure:
NATO should adopt a public disclosure policy under which, at its own initiative, it publishes and actively disseminates core information about its structures, staff, finances, rules, policies, procedures, and decisions. Information should also be made widely available about how to file requests for additional information.

4. Principle of right to request and receive information:
Everyone has the right to request and receive answers to requests for information. This principle means that mechanisms must be established to the effect that:

a. Anyone can request information from NATO regardless of nationality, place of residence, or profession. Both natural and legal persons have this right.

b. No reasons should be required to justify why the information is being sought.

c. Mechanism for filing requests should be simple and free: the only requirement for filing a request should be to supply a contact name, address and description of the information sought. Requestors should be able to file requests in writing or orally. The cost should not be greater than the reproduction of documents.

d. Rapid responses: The NATO information openness policy should establish that information should be provided immediately or within a short timeframe which should not exceed one month (20 working days).

e. Officials have a duty to assist requestors:
Every NATO office should designate an official who is on hand to receive and process information requests and to assist requestors in formulating and filing their requests.

f. Principle that refusals must be justified: NATO should only withhold information from public access if disclosure would cause demonstrable harm to exceptions established by the NATO Information Openness Policy. These exceptions must be clearly and specifically defined by law. Any refusal must clearly state the reasons for withholding the information.

5. Principle of protection of the right to know:
Everyone has the right to appeal refusals to provide information, failures to respond to requests, or other violations of the right to know. NATO should establish an independent review mechanism empowered to have insight into the requested materials and to order disclosure of the information or documents. This review mechanism should be composed of independent experts with experience directly relevant to making a judgment on the right of access to information. The procedures of this body should be in line with international due process standards, including that the information requestor should have the right to legal representation in during the entire appeal process. The decisions of this body should always be made public.

Notes:
1 See the North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxtxt/treaty.htm
3 See .A Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security. developed at the NATO Shadow Summit held in Brussels 31 March to 1 April 2009. For further details see: www.natowatch.org
This report captures the key presentations and debates at an inaugural Shadow NATO Summit co-organised by BASIC, the Bertelsmann Stiftung, ISIS Europe and NATO Watch in Brussels on 31 March – 1 April 2009, a few days prior to NATO’s own 60th Anniversary Summit. It was initiated on the simple premise that citizens of the 28 Member States of NATO should have a voice in shaping the future strategic direction of the Alliance. Both NATO Watch and a “Citizens Declaration on Alliance Security” were launched during the Shadow Summit.

NATO today is a complex hybrid of a political-military alliance and a multilateral institution that is unrivalled in history. It has begun the transition from a Cold War Alliance focusing exclusively on territorial defence through deterrence into a pan-European instrument for crisis management and peacekeeping. But the engagement in Afghanistan has led to mounting operational difficulties and a growing loss of confidence in the very concept of that mission and in NATO’s strategic direction.

The Shadow Summit explored some of the basic values and principles to inform the debate about NATO’s new Strategic Concept, including:

- Accountable ways of working;
- Upholding human security;
- New and more effective approaches to conflict prevention and security building;
- Meeting future disaster response needs; and
- Developing a wider and more inclusive network of partners.