UK Trident Replacement: The Facts

A briefing by BASIC

Updated April 2015

This fact sheet outlines the main facets of the debate on the renewal of UK’s Trident nuclear weapon system. Replacement of the submarines is already underway in several respects, and the ‘Main Gate’ investment decision immediately prior to the start of construction of the submarines, due in 2016, is quickly approaching.

History and development

The UK was involved in partnership with the US on the development of nuclear weapons in the Manhattan Project during World War II. It then acquired its own nuclear weapons in 1952 in the context of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

An important factor in the early development of Britain’s nuclear weapons programme was the power and prestige associated with them. In particular, nuclear weapons were seen to ensure the UK commanded respect from the US within a special relationship; the UK became America’s first and most reliable ally both politically and militarily.1

UK and US partnership grew as the countries agreed on the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958, Nassau Agreement 1962, and the Polaris Sales Agreement 1963. These agreements shape the nuclear weapons relationships between the two.

The final first generation Trident decision, involving the lease of 58 US Trident II-D5 missiles from a common pool, was made by Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s, for deployment on four Vanguard ballistic missile submarines in the 1990s.2

In 1993 the UK decided not to replace the WE177 free-fall bomb. These left service in 1998, making the UK the only nuclear weapon state to deploy a single type of system.3

Why talk about Trident now?

The ‘successor’ programme is the replacement for the current Vanguard class submarines with a new SSBN fleet before they become unreliable or too expensive to maintain. The government announced the start of the process on 4 December 2006 and approved ‘initial gate’ in May 2011.

The Vanguards are not expected to last beyond 2030, and it is claimed that construction of the first replacement submarine needs to start soon after 2016 to be available when the first Vanguard submarine is withdrawn from service. If the policy of continuous-at-sea patrolling were relaxed it could enable a further delay on spend. Plans for renewing Trident overlaps with US plans, and both countries are developing a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) for both successor submarine types. Estimates of the cost of capital replacement range from £20bn to £34bn.4 The current plans to construct and deploy four replacement SSBN submarines with missiles and warheads over the period 2028 to 2062 amounts to an equivalent annual cost of £2.9bn in 2012 figures, or 9.4% of the defence budget.5

Acronyms

CMC Common Missile Compartment
SSBN Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (Ballistic Missile Submarine)
SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review
AWE Atomic Weapons Establishment
CASD Continuous at sea deterrence
TAR Trident Alternatives Review
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
SNP Scottish National Party

5 Trident Commission background paper no. 3, July 2014
The Successor Programme

The new successor SSBNs currently in development are expected to be finalised by 2028. The submarines will be operated by a ‘third-generation nuclear propulsion system developed in collaboration with US Navy, and will feature leading-edge hull design from BAE Systems, superior missile capability and enhanced electrical systems.’

The Threats

The 2010 National Security Risk Assessment identified wider security risks that the UK should give greatest priority to, including:
- Terrorism
- Instability and conflict overseas
- Cyber security
- Civil emergencies
- Energy security
- Organised crime
- Border security
- Counter proliferation and arms control

The 2010 SDSR suggested that “[T]here are a number of capabilities - weapons of mass destruction, emerging technologies with potential military application, and the systems used to deploy them - which could dramatically increase these risks should they reach the wrong hands.” The 2010 SDSR identified direct threats to the UK to include:
- An attack by a terrorist group,
- Or a state, using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Further to these: ‘the proliferation of these capabilities can create instability overseas and increase regional tensions, with potentially serious consequences for UK national security’

The Current System: Trident

The Trident system consists of four Vanguard-class submarines, that can carry up to 16 Trident II D5 missiles but which are now limited by policy to 8 carrying a total of 40 warheads. The submarines are based and loaded at the Royal Naval bases in Faslane and Coulport in Scotland. Nuclear weapons research, development and maintenance takes place at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire. Submarines maintenance facilities are located in Devonport. Submarine commanders are under orders to be ready to fire their missiles on several days’ notice, though they are often capable of firing well within an hour.

Timeline of Trident Replacement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>UK acquires nuclear weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>UK-US sign Mutual Defence Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Nassau Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Polaris Sales Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>NPT enters into force</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>First Trident submarine patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>WE177 leaves service</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>UK Parliament votes to replace Trident</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>SDSR announces reduction of warhead stockpile and deferral of main decision to build submarines until 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Initial Gate decision announcement to spend £3bn on new submarine design</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Trident Alternatives Review released</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>BASIC Trident Commission Final Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Scottish referendum</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>May: General Election</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Main Gate decision</td>
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8 Ibid
In early 2015, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that the number of warheads deployed on each of the Vanguard class submarines has been reduced from 48 to 40, and the number of missiles carried by each submarine has been reduced to ‘no more than eight operational missiles’. This is in line with the government’s commitment in the 2010 SDSR to reduce the operational warheads from 160 to 120.\(^9\) The current Trident warheads are expected to last well into the late 2030s and possibly beyond.\(^11\) The UK maintains a policy of continuous-at-sea-deterrence (CASD), meaning that one of the Navy’s four nuclear armed strategic submarines is always on patrol with others involved in patrol hand-overs, training, or maintenance. It is thought they have not missed a single day on patrol since April 1969.\(^12\)

**Who is saying what about Trident?**

**Political Perceptions:**

UK Prime Minister David Cameron has stated his support for full replacement of the fleet. He said in 2013: ‘How can anyone be confident that the global security environment will not change in the next 10 years? This is not the time to be letting our guard down.’\(^13\) The country’s major political parties have varying views on the subject of Trident replacement: see the chart on the right.

**Cabinet Office Review:**

In July 2013, the Cabinet Office released the final report from its Trident Alternatives Review (TAR). The TAR considered over 700 alternatives to the current system including: fast jets, surface ships, three different submarines, and large aircraft. However, the report concluded that the alternatives could end up being more costly without providing the same level of credible deterrence. In order to ensure credible deterrence, the TAR focussed on five main tenants: reach, resolve, readiness, survivability/invulnerability, and destructive power. The TAR did not include non-nuclear weapon options nor did it factor in ‘costs and impacts on economic security of replacing and maintaining a new generation of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and platforms. These are particularly acute at a time of austerity’.\(^14\) The TAR lacked the emphasis on non-proliferation and the role that the UK could play by influencing other states towards this path, in order to attain success in the non-proliferation regime.\(^15\)

**Public Opinion:**

Public opinion remains deeply divided on nuclear weapons and choices around Trident replacement. The over twenty opinion polls conducted since 2005 suggested that many people are in favour of abandoning the UK’s nuclear deterrent when given a simple yes or no choice when the costs are included in the question, but opinion tends to be split more evenly when a third option of a smaller, cheaper replacement is introduced.\(^16\)

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**The Trident policies of the main UK political parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Policy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservatives</strong></td>
<td>Supports a like-for-like replacement of Trident and a continuation for CASD</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
<td>Leadership supports Trident renewal and maintaining CASD, though may be open to reviewing this policy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lib Dems</strong></td>
<td>In September 2013 the party adopted a policy to replace the Trident system at a lower level, though much of the party advocates for not replacing Trident.</td>
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<td><strong>SNP</strong></td>
<td>Advocates for the removal of Trident from Scotland, and stopping renewal altogether.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Green Party</strong></td>
<td>Advocates the immediate disbandment of the nuclear weapons system and abandoning plans to replace it.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Plaid Cymru</strong></td>
<td>Opposes the replacement of Trident.</td>
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https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_03/News-Brief/UK-Downsizes-Its-Nuclear-Arsenal

11 Chalmers, Hugh, ‘The Bang Behind the Buck’, RUSI, 2014,
https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201403_OP_Bang_Behind_the_Buck.pdf

12 ‘Continuous at Sea Deterrent’, Royal Navy, N.d,

13 Swinford, Steven, ‘Trident should not be cut at a time of ‘growing threats’ David Cameron warns’, The Telegraph, July 2013,

14 Ingram, Paul, ‘Reading the findings of the UK Trident Alternative Review’, BASIC, July 2013,
http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basictar-prebrief_0.pdf

15 Ibid

16 Ritchie, Dr. Nick and Paul Ingram, “Trident in UK Politics and Public Opinion’, BASIC, July 2013,
The BASIC Trident Commission:

In 2011 BASIC launched an independent cross-party commission to examine the UK's nuclear system and Trident renewal. The Trident Commission's final report, published in July 2014, concluded that Britain should retain nuclear weapons for national security purposes but it rejected several arguments in favour of renewing Trident, particularly as a general insurance policy against uncertainty or to back up our global influence, but agreed that Britain should retain nuclear weapons for deterrence against possible overwhelming threats from hostile nuclear-armed states and as a contribution to NATO. The Commissioners also concluded that Britain should be at the forefront of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Why is this debate important?

Internationally

UK and its role in NATO:
The UK is a member of the NATO defence alliance. The UK's nuclear weapons are assigned to NATO's nuclear defence and are also seen as contributing to NATO's collective security.

UK-US relations:
The United Kingdom and United States have been partners in several agreements including the 1958 MDA and their nuclear programmes are intertwined in several respects.

NPT and Treaty obligations:
In accordance to Article VI of the NPT, member states are obligated to 'pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.' To date, the UK has played a role in global disarmament reducing its delivery systems down to one and decreasing its 400 (approximately) warheads during the Cold War to the current 225 total operational and stockpiled combined.

Nationally

Politics:
Political parties are signalling their positions in advance of May's General Election. The new government will inherit the plans for the renewal of the SSBNs and if current plans are followed through, the UK will be spending only 1.5% of its GDP on defence, and a big slice of that will be on Trident renewal and running costs. An incoming government has a chance of coalescing around a position that adopts a proper review of the options it faces, a review that goes further than the 2013 Trident Alternatives Review in considering non-nuclear and flexible options. This should be considered in light of international obligations to the NPT and the new government's Security and Defense Review process.

Industrially:
There are a number of jobs dependent on the development of submarines and nuclear warheads. The naval base in Scotland supports some 6,700 jobs, expected to rise to 8,200 by 2022. The UK submarine industry accounts for 3% of employment in the UK's scientific and defence industrial base. A replacement as currently planned could employ up to 26,000 people at some point in the process.

Scotland:
The SNP, who led the charge for a referendum in Scotland in September 2014, remains committed to the removal of nuclear weapons from Scotland. If Scotland had voted for independence, the future of Britain's nuclear weapon system would have been a key item on the negotiating table. But with 44.7% of the population wanting independence and a vast majority of the population discontent with having nuclear weapons on its soil, this may be an issue that officials in Westminster need to reconcile sooner rather than later.

Economically:
This replacement even gives rise to a question over the 'rationality of such spending at a time of austerity and cuts across the MOD's entire conventional equipment procurement programme'. There needs to be transparency about the cost of maintaining and renewing Trident. The security and defence budget will face a tight squeeze though a contraction in public spending. This will coincide with a procurement bulge forecast and the peak spending on the Trident renewal project. Decision-makers will face difficult choices of priority between defence capabilities in the coming years.

19 Mills, Claire, ‘Update on the Trident Successor Programme’, Library House of Commons, 2013
21 Mills, Claire, ‘Update on the Trident Successor Programme’, Library House of Commons, 2013