BASIC'S NATO E-MAIL SERIES

NATO Foreign Ministers Meetings, December 8-9, 2004

December 9, 2004

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How Deep and How Long Will 
NATO Go in Afghanistan and Iraq?

By Chris Lindborg*

KEY POINTS

·        While NATO is developing a training program for Iraqi security forces, European troop contributions to the U.S.-led occupation are declining.

·        NATO’s involvement in ISAF is remaining steady for the most part, but may need to expand security participation ahead of planned parliamentary elections next spring.

·        Transatlantic politics during the past few months have not healed the rift over Iraq and will result in dampening prospects for any broader NATO contribution to a peacekeeping-type operation in Iraq, while Afghan operations have been relatively unaffected.

·        The different transatlantic experiences over Afghanistan and Iraq bolster reasons for supporting engagement in multilateral institutions.

Introduction

NATO is relinquishing its main duties in Bosnia-Herzegovina[1] to the European Union just as the alliance has been reinforcing its efforts in Afghanistan and taken more steps toward engagement in the reconstruction of Iraq.  Yet while NATO is moving its troops further eastward, the center of gravity in NATO policy-making is still firmly placed in the United States with either mixed support of, or frustrated disengagement from, these policies by the rest of the alliance.

This brief BASIC article analyzes the NATO missions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the light of this December’s NATO Foreign Ministers meetings.  Three questions will be raised:

• What are NATO’s current force contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq?
• What recent transatlantic political developments have occurred that may influence NATO’s level of involvement in these missions?
• What is likely to become of the alliance’s missions in Afghanistan and Iraq? 

While it is not possible to arrive at definitive answers about what will happen, considering these issues may help to provide European and U.S. policymakers with a better way to approach alliance relations in the future.

The Current Level of NATO Force Contributions in the Afghanistan and Iraq Missions

While NATO has been more formally engaged in Afghanistan since taking command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003, in Iraq, NATO only recently moved beyond its logistical support of Poland with the development of a training mission for Iraqi security officials.

Afghanistan

• NATO – International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Between 6,500 – 9,000 troops.  All NATO countries are contributing troops. The United States is contributing about 70 troops and Canada is contributing 1,576 troops.[2]  Non-NATO countries are also contributing about 370 troops. The remaining troops come from NATO European countries with Germany (1,900), France (565), and Italy (491) being among the top three European contributors.[3]  ISAF provides general security, trains the Afghan National Army and national police, and demobilizes local militias.  They are also helping to set up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are small groups of civilian and military people conducting specific reconstruction tasks.[4]

• Non-NATO U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom – 17,000 troops in total. Of these, about 15,000 U.S. soldiers are deployed for combating Taliban and Al-Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan and are supported by 2,000 troops from other countries.[5]
  

NATO’s Contribution in Afghanistan Through ISAF
NATO suffered from a stale response to calls for NATO troop increases in Afghanistan ahead of its October 9 presidential election.  At the NATO Istanbul Summit in June, NATO agreed to reach a troop-strength of about 10,000 and to help strengthen its presence beyond Kabul, which never fully came to fruition in time for the elections.  The challenge included protecting over 5,000 polling stations in Afghanistan.[6]  For the most part, the presidential elections were relatively quiet, with ‘only’ 40 people reported killed, and widespread attacks on polling stations apparently did not occur.[7]

NATO has five PRTs in northern Afghanistan: German teams in the town of Konduz and Feyzabad; British teams in Mazar-e-Sharif and Maimana, and a Dutch team in Baghlan province.  NATO plans to add two or three more PRTs and a forward support base in the Western part of the country.  The alliance plans to establish the new PRTs before the April 23 parliamentary elections, or at least by mid-2005.[8]

The French and German-led Eurocorps took over command of the ISAF from Canada in August 2004.  The countries that make up Eurocorps include Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain, yet all of these countries are also members of NATO.[9]  The Afghan operation has been Eurocorp’s first mission outside of Europe since its creation in 1992.[10]

In October, NATO agreed to rotate ISAF leadership after Eurocorps completes its duty in February 2005.  The rotation will include the following NATO countries with terms of six to eight months each: Turkey, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain.[11]  This confirms that NATO is forming a long-term plan for Afghanistan.[12]

In addition to wanting more troops before the parliamentary elections, more equipment will be needed from the allies.  In particular, the main problem for NATO in Afghanistan will be providing enough transport helicopters, according to Supreme Allied Commander Europe General James Jones.[13]

Possibility of Merger with U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan
NATO’s Secretary General has pointed to the possibility of having ISAF and the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom coordinate their missions more closely:

I think in the longer run we should find synergy between these two operations. ISAF is nation building; Operation Enduring Freedom is hunting Taliban and Al Qaeda, based on the logic that the more successful one is, the more successful the other will be.[14] 

Both U.S. and European leaders say that NATO troops would unlikely be placed under U.S. command until the end of 2005 or 2006.[15]  More recently, the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested at the Foreign Ministers meeting on December 8 that eventually all American military and NATO forces should work under one command and that NATO, not the United States, should direct those forces.[16]  Fears remain, however, that the United States may attempt to drag NATO into a wider combat role in Afghanistan to free up its forces for Iraq.  This would leave Europe with the main international responsibility for Afghanistan. 

Iraq
While NATO has provided logistical and other support to the Polish-led multinational force deployed in South-Central Iraq,[17] it has not formally contributed ground troops.  European countries that are NATO members have contributed troops to the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. NATO’s most vigorous role is an emerging training program for Iraqi security forces.

European NATO Countries Participating in the U.S.-led Coalition[18]
While the United States is increasing its forces from 138,000 to 150,000, according to the Washington Times, “about one-third of coalition troops in Iraq, other than British or American soldiers, have left” or are scheduled to leave after the January 30 elections.[19]

Thirteen countries (not all NATO countries) have pulled out their troops or are planning to leave or reduce their presence, although some additional troops from countries such as Britain and Georgia (a non-NATO country) may help to replenish force numbers.[20]  According to Lt. Col. David C. Farlow of Central Command, the United States does not provide a comprehensive listing of countries that are supporting the operations in Iraq because of security concerns.[21]  The following list is an estimate of force numbers that European NATO countries are contributing to the U.S.-led coalition.           

• United Kingdom – 8,300.[22]
• Italy - about 3,000[23] - but might not extend its commitment by more than three to six months.[24]  Italy may send extra troops in advance of the January 30 election, and then bring them back if all goes “smoothly.”[25]  However, Prime Minister Berlusconi has said Italy’s troops will remain in Iraq as long as the Iraqi government wants them to stay there.[26]
• Poland - Between 300-500 troops may leave after January 30 elections[27] out of the 2,400 troops it has in Iraq now.[28]
• The Netherlands - expected to pull out its 1,300 troops by March 2005.[29]
• Spain - pulled out its1,300 troops in April 2004.
• Romania – 730 in Iraq – this total may rise if needed before the January elections.[30]
• Denmark – about 500 - that will “stay as long as needed”.[31]
• Bulgaria – may “slightly reduce” its 480 infantry soldiers.[32]
• Hungary - withdrawing its 300 troops by the end of 2004.[33]
• Latvia - 122[34] – plans to stay through at least until June 2005.[35]
• Portugal – 120 police contribution.[36]
• Slovakia – 105.[37]
• Lithuania – 105[38] - plans to stay through at least until June 2005.[39]
• Czech Republic – 100 troops[40] - plans to pull troops out by end of February 2005.[41]
• Estonia – 55[42] - plans to stay through at least until June 2005.[43]
• Norway – 10.[44]

NATO’s Training Program for Iraqi Security Forces
The NATO Istanbul Summit in June produced a lackluster commitment to commence a NATO training program for Iraqi security forces.  France and Germany were not keen on any NATO role in Iraq’s security development, and so only a vague commitment was made for the alliance to help train Iraqi security forces: on a small scale and outside of Iraq.

Originally, France and Germany were willing to accept having NATO train Iraqi security forces outside of Iraq.  But their reluctance about the entire endeavor never truly disappeared.  By August, however, 40-50 NATO instructors went to Iraq as part of the “Training Implementation Mission in Iraq.”[45]  At that point, NATO was tasked to work closely with Iraqi authorities to rebuild infrastructure, including the Ministry of Defense and Military Headquarters; establish liaison agreements with the interim Iraqi government and the multinational force; and identify the Iraqi personnel to receive training outside of the country.[46]

By September, however, progress had been made in the way of ratcheting up the program.  NATO agreed to send an additional 300 instructors beyond the previously agreed 40-50 instructors.  In November, the plan was made official.[47] The overall mission objectives will remain focused on training, equipment and technical assistance.  On December 3, NATO’s Secretary General formally opened the NATO Headquarters in the Green Zone area of Baghdad.[48]  NATO assistance will also include the creation of a "Training, Education and Doctrine Center in Iraq," which will be supported by NATO.[49]  Moreover, Germany agreed to provide 20 armored vehicles to Iraq’s new military.[50] 

The short-term goal is to train enough officers in time for the elections, which are still scheduled for January 2005.  Sixteen of the 26 NATO allies have agreed to help with the training mission.[51]  As of the December 8-9 Foreign Ministers Meetings, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain are refusing to send their NATO officers to Iraq to take part in the mission.[52] 

Transatlantic Political Developments that May Influence NATO’s Role in Iraq and Afghanistan

More recent transatlantic political energies have been spent on the U.S. Presidential election.  In the run-up to the election, much speculation surrounded the possibility of a new U.S. administration opening a window of opportunity to heal transatlantic wounds and to further engage European NATO allies in the Iraq effort.  However, with the re-election of President Bush, European attention is now focused on the re-vamping of the Bush cabinet.  The political wrangling over Iraq has overshadowed the more steady transatlantic relations regarding Afghanistan.

The Outcome of the U.S. Elections and the Response in Europe
Much had been speculated about the chances of a John Kerry presidency in 2005 having better luck bringing in more European troops to Iraq, especially from France and Germany.  The Kerry election team consistently argued for a more vigorous internationalizing of the Iraq effort, particularly targeting NATO for a broader role in the reconstruction process.  Supporters of a Kerry presidency, including Democratic Senator Joseph Biden (Delaware) thought, as recounted in an editorial by George F. Will in the Washington Post, that “maybe Kerry could embarrass NATO into greater involvement” at least when it came to adding more trainers for developing Iraqi security forces.[53]  Senator Biden was aware, however, of how hard a sell that would be, even with a fresh U.S. administration.[54]

In June, one of Kerry’s foreign policy advisors, Richard Holbrooke, held a meeting with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.  Schroeder “asked Holbrooke what Kerry would do if he were elected.  Holbrooke replied that one of the first things would be to get on the phone and invite him and President Chirac to the White House.  The chancellor laughed out loud. Then he said, ‘That’s what I’m afraid of.’”[55]  In other words, it would not have mattered who tried to bring in more troop contributions from NATO into Iraq.  The damage had already been done.

The re-election of President Bush may make less of a difference in what happens with European involvement in NATO’s Afghanistan operations.  The main debate during the U.S. presidential campaign season focused on whether the United States should have focused more resources on Afghanistan and the hunt for Osama bin Laden, rather than rushing to war in Iraq.  While this debate will surely be discussed in other policy analyses for years to come, it does not help to guide the short-term decisions of what Europeans will do now in Afghanistan. 

All Eyes on the Second Bush Term
After Bush’s re-election, his first overseas visitor was NATO’s Secretary General.  The British Prime Minister visited soon after.[56]  Even Germany and France sent their formal congratulations to President Bush.[57]  However, in early November, the French President revealed his frustration with the election results at a meeting in Brussels, saying, “European cohesion is naturally the right way to deal with what some people might consider the worries or concerns” as a result of the American election.  Chirac then left the meeting early and consequently missed a luncheon that was held for Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allwai.[58]

Yet changes in the foreign policy section of the Bush administration would seem to suggest an even less sympathetic line to European concerns about the long-term consequences of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Most notable of these changes is the stepping down of Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Powell has been considered a moderating voice in the Bush administration, having pointed out to his boss that once the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, it would automatically become responsible for following through with the conflict and building the peace.  Eventually, Powell went on to make the case for the war before the United Nations - a case that was based on faulty evidence.  Nevertheless, he still had the respect of European officials and he was not seen as the concocter of the way the Iraq war was carried out.  This gave at least some cushioning in foreign relations between the United States and Europe.   Knowing that he will not stay on for a second Bush term, Powell has continued to argue that the United States has been a multilateral player, but he also advertises Bush’s approach to foreign policy, saying that some issues “need to be dealt with by the nation with the most power in the world.”[59]

His nominated replacement, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, is known for being more unilateralist and realpolitik in her approach to foreign policy.  Rice was quoted as saying in 1999, before she held the position of Bush’s National Security Advisor, that “I am a Realist.  Power matters.  But there can be no absence of moral content in American foreign policy. …Europeans giggle at this and say we are naïve and so on, but we’re not Europeans, we’re Americans – and we have very different principles.”[60]  Rice’s philosophy reflects a profound skepticism about European motivations for foreign policy and in turn, a lack of trust toward European policymakers.  This may make mending transatlantic relations, and thus, working within NATO, all the more difficult.

At the same time, others have said that she is so loyal to Bush that her main role is to better articulate his policies, and not extensively help to develop or question those policies.  Once Powell announced that he would be stepping down and it appeared that Rice would eventually take his post (which is contingent on Senate approval), European reaction was one of concern and even fear.  The Spanish newspaper El Pais said, “The White House has lost its moderate face.”  The conservative French newspaper Le Monde said, “Among the most pessimistic conjectures made when George W. Bush gained re-election was that with a mandate, he’d keep Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and nominate Rice to replace Powell.  The second of those has now come true. …It is bad news for European leaders.”[61]

In tandem, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has announced that he will continue in office, as will his Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz.  Wolfowitz is still infamously remembered as saying that higher troop levels would not be needed in Iraq and that, “I am reasonably certain that they [Iraqis] will greet us as liberators and that will keep requirements down.”[62]  Such an approach to pre-and post-combat planning is all the more dangerous when allies are not brought into the decision-making process, especially now that U.S. troops numbers are increasing from 138,000 to 150,000 while European coalition contributions are decreasing.  Back in September, even Rumsfeld was saying that the insurgency was “getting worse.”[63]  He now expects U.S. troops to remain in Iraq until 2009.[64] 

Recent Political Developments in European Countries
Before the November U.S. elections, European leaders faced their own obstacles, at least with regards to Iraq.  The U.K. Labour Party (the party of Prime Minister Tony Blair) avoided a vote at its party conference on whether or not to pull out U.K. troops from Iraq after a deal was struck with unions. The revised motion – that U.K. troops would stay in Iraq as long as Iraq wants - was supported by 86 percent of the delegates.[65]

Opposition leaders continued to criticize the Labour Party.  Liberal Democrat defense spokesman Paul Keetch said, “I’m not sure that anybody’s going to be that interested or trust what they are hearing from the Labour Party today.  The fact that Tony Blair took us into Iraq without the support of the majority of the people of this country and the situation is getting worse not better.”[66]  The recent U.S. request for the re-deployment of the U.K. Black Watch Regiment from Basra to the outskirts of Baghdad caused additional political turmoil for Prime Minister Blair.[67]

In Hungary, the parliament could have voted to extend its troop presence into 2005, but the necessary two-thirds majority was not met and Hungarian troops will go home at the end of the year.

Poland, which has contributed one of the largest contingents in Iraq, still faces public opposition to its commitment to the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq.  Over 70 percent of Poles are opposed to their soldiers being in Iraq.[68]  As mentioned earlier, between 300-500 troops might leave after the January elections.

While the German government had opposed the Iraq war, it has since confronted some difficulties with defending the presence of its troops in Afghanistan.  Parties on the right, including the Christian Democrat Union, were concerned that German troops lacked enough support and that the U.N. mandate for reconstruction operations in Afghanistan was not clear enough.[69]

Although NATO would like to have more troops and equipment in Afghanistan, the operation has not been fraught with the same level of divisiveness and has not eaten away at alliance cohesion the same way the Iraq debate has.  A second Bush administration that is retaining officials who were not keen on prolonging diplomatic avenues with Europe before the Iraq invasion suggests that political developments will further contain NATO’s contributions to Iraq in the near future.

Alliance Engagement: Longer and Deeper in Afghanistan and Shorter and Shallower in Iraq

Depending on what becomes of political leaders and parties in Afghanistan and Iraq, and whether the level of violence escalates or de-escalates, all things being equal, it would seem that NATO will remain committed to Afghanistan, but will do as little as possible in Iraq.  This does not necessarily mean that Europeans see Iraq as less vital to their national security interests than Afghanistan.  The influx of illegal drugs from Afghanistan into Europe is a problem, but then so is the direction of oil flows out of Iraq. And, of course, the stability of the Middle East is a major concern of all transatlantic partners, even if different route maps are on the table in Washington and Brussels.  Moreover, the European Union does plan to open a mission in Iraq after the January elections to “help train police, legal officials, and administrators.”[70]  The European Union is also offering $38 million to bolster the Iraqi election process.[71]  It could turn out to be that one of the vital security objectives for Europe will be to successfully teach the United States a foreign policy lesson in multilateralism that ultimately will serve U.S. interests as well. 

Afghanistan
Some have argued that, “NATO countries have more than one million troops in uniform and a plethora of weapons such as attack helicopters and tanks, and yet less than one per cent of these forces have been seconded to ISAF.”[72]  NATO has and will face problems in Afghanistan, but they are not of the sort that will tear at the fabric of alliance relations.  This does not mean that NATO will be able to produce a peaceful Afghanistan single-handedly.  Other organizations will need to continue their participation in reconstruction efforts.  And of course, final decisions for policy will need to rest with the peoples of Afghanistan.

NATO will need to find ways to avoid discouragement because the challenges ahead could become overwhelming.  The U.N. peacekeeping chief Jean-Marie Guehenno said that “Parliamentary elections will be much more complicated and fraught with security concerns.”  He added, “The influence of local commanders, the widespread and tangled web of narcotics and arms and the absence of an efficient local civil administration continue to constitute serious obstacles.”  He also warned that the newly elected president of Afghanistan should “take into account the need for the cabinet to be representative of the ethnic, cultural and geographical diversity of the country.”[73]

While NATO spokesman James Appathurai says that, “NATO regards its operation in Afghanistan a success and intends to expand its role in ISAF, and especially in PRT missions,”[74] it should be noted that some civilian aid agencies have had difficulties in their relations with military forces working in the PRTs.[75]

No one knows whether Afghanistan will rise from the decades of war and destitution that are still fueling battles in the southern and eastern portions of the country and re-igniting the production of illegal drug crops.  Even after the recent Afghan presidential elections, the integration of mujahadeen commanders has apparently given the commanders more power, but they are using that power to continue corrupt practices, including theft and kidnapping.[76]

Despite these obstacles, NATO seems as if it will continue to engage in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.  NATO plans to install PRTs around the country in four phases with a concentration on one geographical area of the country at a time. Stage 1 in the northern part of the country has been completed.  Stage 2 in the West will be the next phase of the strategy,[77] with NATO troops stationed in the northwest by mid-2005.[78]  Stages 3 and 4 will take place in the southern and eastern sections, which are the more violent parts of the country.[79] 

Iraq
U.S. troops will provide most of the security for NATO trainers, who will have no combat role.  In a country that does not seem to experience any denouement in dangers, Germany, France, Belgium and Spain simply do not want to risk their troops and put them in harms way when they did not agree with the premises or timing of the U.S.-led invasion in the first place.  Hostage taking is a continuing tactic of insurgent groups, which is scaring away future troop contributions.  U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said that violence in Iraq was indeed “getting worse.”[80]  Violence in the country may only escalate leading up to the January 2005 elections.

The waves of violence and uncertain future for Iraq have driven some nations to pull out or create timetables for pulling out their troops.  Poland, which had remained within the top five of troop contributors (by number), is making plans to pull out of Iraq by the end of 2005, although the Polish president has emphasized that this is not certain.[81]  The Polish contingent, under which most coalition troops (save British and U.S. troops) have been serving in the Central-Southern section of Iraq, are losing troops under their command.  Robert Jamro, managing director of Polish Exchange, has “worked closely with Polish officials” and concludes that the status of the Polish multinational division may have to change and be placed under U.S. command.[82]

The New York Times reported that NATO could eventually send as many as 3,000 personnel to help train Iraqi senior non-commissioned officers and senior officers in command and control procedures.[83]  But this is the most optimistic prospect for NATO engagement in Iraq, and actual contributions are likely to fall far short of this.

As for the future of the Iraq War coalition, having 13 countries drawing down and only the United States (and possibly Britain, Romania, and non-NATO Georgia) beefing up troop numbers, does not bode well for U.S. management of the conflict, although much will depend on the outcome of the elections planned for January.  The U.S. approach seems to be one of hoping to train as many security forces and police as possible to free up the coalition.  Yet, Iraqi security forces, especially the police, have been heavily targeted by the insurgents, and have found it hard to sustain their new roles - sometimes fleeing when attacked.[84]  Iraqi security forces are reported to have performed more capably during the assault on Fallujah, but that was only one battle and one led by U.S. Marines.  Senator Jack Reed (Democrat-Rhode Island) of the Armed Services Committee, upon his return from Iraq, said that Iraqi forces probably would not be capable of replacing U.S. forces for another five to ten years.[85]

Conclusion: The Impact of Multilateral Engagement

In Iraq, despite the wishes of U.S. policymakers, NATO will not go beyond its support of Polish operations and the training of Iraqi security forces.  Recent political events do not portend any change in this trajectory. This is despite Bush re-pitching his “effective multilateralism” argument.  As Ivo H. Daalder, a former Clinton administration official now working at the Brookings Institution, has said, Bush’s “concept of effective multilateralism is to get people to agree with the United States. …Ineffective multilateralism is to give a voice over our [United States] policies.”[86]

The reason that NATO has been able to formally withdraw most of its operation and hand it over to the European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina is because, despite European reluctance for engagement at the very beginning, Europeans were brought in through NATO and other multilateral organizations into managing the conflict relatively early on.  Moreover, frustration has persisted in Europe over the absence of explicit U.N. Security Council backing for the original invasion of Iraq. In Afghanistan, while the United States may not have used NATO to coordinate its military operations in that country, it was able to bring NATO into the mission in other ways, and within U.N. guidelines. This is why European countries, through NATO, are still well committed to seeing through a more stable Afghanistan.  U.S.-led diplomacy over Iraq, however, was an example par excellence of pushing multilateral organizations away.  A European diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that “…[W]hen you work alongside the U.S., and are open to the U.S. viewpoint on the war on terror, you also want to convince your public by showing them that the relationship with the U.S. is a two-way street.”[87]

NATO, as do other multilateral organizations, helps build repertoires and norms, along with expectations for contributions.  To be sure, the alliance has incurred its share of disagreements over expectations and contributions, but it is clear that the alliance works better than an ad hoc coalition of the sort-of-willing.  In the future, the United States will have to bring its NATO allies into the dialogue early on before any type of peacekeeping and reconstruction activities should be expected of the alliance.  Moreover, such discussions need to take place even before initiating combat because how the war is fought will impact how the peace is built.

Without the engagement of multilateral institutions from the beginning of an intervention, reconstruction and peace-building phases in future conflicts will be all the more difficult because the pressure and expectation to remain committed to a mission will not be as strong.  This is why European countries have not been able to garner the unity to have NATO more extensively involved in Iraq.  Individual European countries have found it hard to stay and are anxious to leave.  As the difference between the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq are beginning to show, the power of multilateral institutions should not be underestimated.

Endnotes

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