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NATO Foreign Ministers Meetings, December 8-9, 2004

December 8, 2004

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NATO’s Nuclear Posture: What’s Next?

By Alistair Millar and Jason Ipe[1]*

·       U.K. and U.S. nuclear postures are leaving their NATO allies’ decade-old force posture behind.

·      The Alliance should undertake an updated, comprehensive review of NATO nuclear strategy to ensure that non-proliferation policies and confidence building measures are strengthened.

·       The NATO review should include an analysis of the risks to non-proliferation and overall security posed by U.S. and U.K. nuclear modernization programs.

The Bush administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) signaled a shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy by outlining new “offensive” roles for usable nuclear weapons and blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear capabilities.   As the United States is the dominant military and nuclear power within the Atlantic Alliance, its nuclear weapons policy has often been mirrored in the evolution of NATO nuclear doctrine.  Will the new types and roles for nuclear weapons outlined by the Bush administration, therefore, portend a shift in NATO nuclear policy in the near future?[2]

There is little evidence to suggest that the Atlantic Alliance as a whole is willing or able to depart from the status quo it has maintained for over a decade. There are indications, however, that U.K. nuclear doctrine and its submarine based weapons capabilities are being adapted to complement and fulfill relevant aspects of the Bush administration’s controversial nuclear posture.

NATO’s Frozen Cold War Posture

Throughout the Cold War there was constant debate about the purpose, function, and number of U.S. nuclear weapons assigned to NATO in Europe, but the vast majority of civilian and military leaders in the United States and Western Europe were convinced that nuclear weapons in the NATO context were necessary for two principle reasons: to deter the Soviet Union from initiating nuclear war and to persuade the Soviet Union to terminate conflict if NATO’s conventional defenses failed.[3]  The idea of deploying nuclear weapons in NATO nations was also sold, not least to the U.S. Congress, as a cost-effective alternative to stationing massive U.S. conventional forces in Europe.  By the time the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union had disintegrated, NATO nuclear weapons had been reduced dramatically from the highest level of over 7,000 deployed on over a dozen systems (artillery shells, mines, etc.) in the early 1970s down to less than 480 deployed for use on one system (dual-capable aircraft) by the mid-1990s.[4]  The Alliance enshrined its reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in a new Strategic Concept approved in 1991.[5]

NATO nuclear policy has not been significantly altered since then. The most recent overhaul, the 1999 Strategic Concept, for example, contained significant new developments on eastward expansion and out-of-area missions, but the language with regard to the character and purpose of NATO’s nuclear weapons stayed essentially the same as it had been in 1991.  During the 1990s, Canada, Germany, and other Allies did attempt to initiate further review of NATO’s nuclear policy, but to no avail.[6]  The 1999 document continued to characterize  “the fundamental purpose” of NATO’s nuclear forces as “political,” but the language describing their potential use was changed from “even more remote” to “extremely remote.”[7]

NATO’s reduced reliance on nuclear weapons reflected in its official policy documents was matched by dramatic reductions in the numbers, types, storage locations, and readiness level of U.S. nuclear forces deployed to NATO throughout the 1990s.  This trend has continued in recent years as NATO: 

·      further reduced the readiness requirements of its dual-capable aircraft (now said to be measured in months);

·      quietly removed its nuclear custodial units from Greece; and,

·      restructured some of the remaining deployments of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. 

Although NATO has neither officially confirmed nor denied the allegations, it is widely believed that the U.S. B61 bombs hosted at the Araxos Air Base were removed in early 2001, “bringing to an end 41 years of U.S. nuclear deployments in Greece.”[8]  Also, although it is now believed that there have not have been any reductions in the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium since 1994, in remarks to the Belgian Senate, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General James Jones indicated this year that the United States would reduce its nuclear weapons in Europe, saying: “The reduction will be significant.  Good news is on the way.”[9]  A June 2004 fact sheet from Brussels, “NATO Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment,” would appear to confirm at least some of those reductions in a graphic representation that indicates a slight decrease in the number of NATO’s nuclear storage sites from 1999 to 2003.[10] The international security environment has changed dramatically in the last four years, U.S. nuclear posture has been reviewed and changed twice in the last decade, so why has NATO posture not been significantly altered since the end of the Cold War?

Why is NATO Nuclear Policy Stuck?

There are four main reasons for NATO’s nuclear policy paralysis.

The first one is strategic. Paul Buteux, a Canadian security policy analyst, has aptly labeled NATO nuclear strategy one of “latent deterrence.”[11]  Buteux describes NATO nuclear policy as “a de facto strategy of deterrence in waiting,” and claims, “the effective rationale for NATO’s nuclear weapons is the reassurance of allies that the capacity to deal with latent threats is retained.”[12] It should be noted that the consequences of this strategy are not as benign as the term “latent deterrence” would suggest.  The mere presence of those forces impedes progress on reducing Russian tactical nuclear weapons, which are particularly vulnerable to theft by terrorists or organized crime.[13]

The second reason is tied to public opinion on the Continent and unease among significant portions of the European public over the continued presence of U.S. nuclear weapons.  During the Cold War, Europe’s fundamental strategic position was founded on a close alliance with the United States (and “coupling” to its nuclear arsenal) but even then European governments faced fierce public opposition to “modernization” efforts during the late 1970s and early 1980s.[14]  As the strategic environment changed after the Berlin Wall fell, European politicians remain acutely aware of the havoc nuclear weapons “modernization” can cause.  Senior officials in NATO and in member state capitals acknowledge—but refuse to say so on the record—that the members of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group want to avoid doing anything that would raise public awareness surrounding the issue of nuclear weapons deployed on European soil.[15]

The third reason is that U.S. officials (mainly in or consulting for the Pentagon) are reluctant to let NATO play a significant role in nuclear policy matters.  The only aspect of the NPR directly applicable to NATO relates to the maintenance and replacement of dual-capable aircraft.  It stated that, “DoD [U.S. Department of Defense] will not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment,” and indicated that “a plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer of 2002."[16]  Yet the 2002 NATO Prague Summit and the 2004 Istanbul Summit have both come and gone without communicating any substantive changes in NATO’s position or plans related to nuclear strategy. 

Furthermore, a February 2004 Defense Science Board report actually recommended “eliminating the nuclear role for forward-based, tactical, dual-capable aircraft”[17] and called for “minimal reliance on foreign bases and foreign-based support packages, to reduce dependence on wavering allies.”[18] While there is little doubt that U.S. officials are skeptical of European allied defense contributions, there is also a broader problem within the Alliance.

The United States has garnered some cooperation from the Allies on missile defense and on improving responses to WMD attacks, however, the Bush administration’s 2002 NPR remains highly controversial in Europe.  Its emphasis on new “offensive” roles for and types of nuclear weapons and vision of using new types of nuclear weapons to counter a range of WMD threats is fundamentally at odds with the approach preferred in most Western European capitals which attaches more value to nonproliferation tools such as treaties and international regimes and views military force, even conventional, as an option of last resort, if at all.[19] 

The fourth and final reason is that the United States can avoid the aforementioned political, diplomatic, and military headaches associated with NATO consensus planning by continuing quiet bilateral cooperation with the United Kingdom.  As Timothy Garden has pointed out, U.K. nuclear “policy is developed always with an eye on where the U.S. is going.”[20] 

U.S./U.K. Nuclear Cooperation: New Directions for the Special Relationship?

Unlike many other NATO allies, Britain has demonstrated an increasing willingness to cooperate with the United States on a range of issues related to nuclear weapons policy. 

·         The United Kingdom already works closely with the United States on counterproliferation. 

·         A majority of its population tolerates its own nuclear deterrent capability.[21]

·         The United Kingdom cooperates closely with the United States on stockpile stewardship.

·         It recently renewed and updated its nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.

·         It has invested heavily in upgrading its nuclear weapons infrastructure.

·         The government has quietly begun contemplating options for a post-Trident nuclear capability.

This high degree of cooperation offers compelling reasons to question the direction of U.S./U.K. nuclear doctrine and examine how the United Kingdom’s submarine based weapons capabilities might be adapted to complement and fulfill relevant aspects of the Bush administration’s controversial nuclear posture.

The United Kingdom and the United States have been close partners on nuclear policy throughout the nuclear age.  Even in the late 1990s – when the Labour government completed a comprehensive Strategic Defense Review that resulted in substantial reductions in U.K. nuclear force readiness, delivery vehicles, and deployed warheads – statements from U.K. officials moved closer to U.S. positions on the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.[22]  This alignment in policy became particularly evident after excerpts of the United States’ NPR were made public.  Statements by Secretary of Defence Hoon and other U.K. officials indicated a similar willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively or at least first against non-nuclear targets.  Referring to Iraq and other “states of concern,” Secretary Hoon told a defence select committee of Parliament in March 2002: “They can be absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons.”[23]  In a subsequent television interview, Secretary Hoon explained that “if there were strong evidence of an imminent attack, if we knew that an attack was about to occur… we could use our [nuclear] weapons to protect against it.”[24]  The Secretary reiterated that threat in advance of the Iraq war on a BBC morning show, saying that the United Kingdom reserves “the right to use nuclear weapons in extreme self defence.”[25]  Sir Timothy Garden of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London describes this drift in U.K. nuclear policy as “moving to a mixture of pre-emption” and “apparent willingness to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear assaults.”[26]

The current configuration of U.K. nuclear capabilities already provides it with some flexibility to potentially fulfill missions outlined in the Bush administration’s NPR,[27] but the U.S. conversion of four of its retired Trident submarines into guided missile submarines (SSGNs) may provide an indication of where the United Kingdom is heading.  The United States’ new SSGNs will have 22 missile tubes capable of carrying a total of 154 Tomahawk missiles (140 on submarines configured for Special Operations Forces) – each with specialized warheads that would include earth penetrator rounds.  The House Armed Services Committee stipulated that the conversions “should not detract in anyway from the overall U.S. deterrent posture,”[28] but to date those submarines are only being equipped with conventional missiles.  A 2004 report from the Defense Science Board indicates, however, that the Navy is “ensuring flexibility in the SSGN strike design to support the integration of future payloads and sensors… the flexibility provided by the SSGN missile-tube volume supports payload adaptability to meet emerging mission requirements.  Although 22 of the 24 missile tubes are today being configured to support Tomahawk conventional strike, in the future these tubes could be reconfigured.”[29] 

Although its nuclear variant, the Tomahawk Nuclear Land-Attack Missile (TLAM-N), is currently only deployable on certain nuclear-certified attack submarines, conventional and nuclear variants of the Tomahawk have been designed for interchangeable use in the past.  As an Office of Technology Assessment report describes, TLAM-Ns “fit into standard-size submarine torpedo tubes, are capable of delivering a moderate yield nuclear weapon with accuracy that maybe sufficient to destroy even hardened targets such as missile silos and launch control centers.”[30]  As such, converted Trident submarines equipped with nuclear variant(s) of the Tomahawk would be an ideal weapons system for the types of missions laid out in the 2002 NPR.[31]

The U.S. Navy puts the capability of the SSGN squarely within the operational concepts for a new era in naval war fighting capabilities dubbed “Sea Power 21.”  That vision translates the strategic vision laid out in the NPR to the operational capabilities of the U.S. Navy.  As Admiral Vern Clark, chief of Naval Operations and the vision’s principal architect, explains, “this combination of Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities fits perfectly within the new strategic triad envisioned by the Secretary of Defense, which bases American security on enhanced strategic defenses, a secure nuclear strike capability, and expanded conventional warfare capabilities.”[32]  This vision calls for an indistinguishable network of conventional and nuclear power projection that seems to signal a new direction in U.S. naval capabilities.

The United States and Russia pledged in 1990 and 1991 to disband large portions of both nation’s sub-strategic nuclear arsenals, including all tactical nuclear capabilities for surface ships and attack submarines.[33]  The United States nevertheless maintains some 320 TLAM-Ns;[34] shows no sign of giving up this capability in the near future; and has actually invested in improving elements of that weapons system.  In his fiscal year 2000 Annual Report to the President and Congress, then Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that the United States’ “nuclear weapons capability on surface ships has been eliminated, but the capability to deploy Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles armed with a nuclear warhead on submarines has been maintained.”[35] 

Not only does the United States continue to maintain nuclear-tipped Tomahawk missiles, it recently invested in modernizing the launching and targeting systems for those weapons aboard a number of its attack submarines.  “Beyond changes to the current TLAM-N cruise missile,” according to a 2004 report by the Defense Science Board, there are also proposals for “developing a nuclear variant of the new Tactical Tomahawk missile, which is currently under development.”[36]  It is interesting that same report goes on to recommend the elimination of “the nuclear role for Tomahawk cruise missiles,” pointing out that, “there is no obvious military role for these systems.”[37]  The Pentagon had, nevertheless, decided in a study carried out in 2003 as a follow-up to the 2002 NPR to retain the nuclear-tipped variant of the Tomahawk.[38]  A 2003 Inside the Navy article notes that decision was taken subsequent to “the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review [which] aims to build a new triad relying on non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, new defenses and a ‘responsive infrastructure.’”[39]

In January 2003 the U.S. Navy made history by firing Tomahawk cruise missiles from a converted SSBN missile tube.  The exercise dubbed Operation Giant Shadow simulated an exercise where Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs) and Special Forces were launched from the submarine to verify a possible WMD threat and upon doing so, two Tomahawks were fired and destroyed a chemical and biological weapons factory.[40]  According to Dave Restione, head of the Applied Physics Lab contracted to work on the exercise, “this exercise demonstrated that SSGN submarines will soon be able to expand their traditional roles to include combating the global terrorist threat.”[41]

If a nuclear variant of the Tomahawk were in the mix, submarine conversion of this type could also be appealing to the United Kingdom. It could give the 25 year old Trident fleet, which by then would be nearing the end of its operational lifetime, an extra 20 years of service life with missiles that are less costly to produce and maintain than Trident.[42]  As Michael Clarke explains, “[Trident] will provide a serviceable substrategic system during its lifetime.  But it would be a very expensive, and overcomplicated, way of providing substrategic deterrence if that were its prime purpose.  Much cheaper means of delivery over shorter distances, using cruise missiles and/or aircraft, for example have long been feasible.”[43]  Conversion would also buy time.  According to a U.K. Ministry of Defense White Paper, “decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed this Parliament but are likely to be required in the next one.  We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point.”[44]

As the United States proceeds with the planned conversion of its older Trident submarines, the United Kingdom (which has been engaged in an ongoing cooperative relationship with the United States on the submarine development, Tomahawk missiles, and relevant hardware components) is pondering future uses for its own Trident fleet.  Reports from analysts in the United Kingdom indicate that a future British submarine force could undergo a conversion to a multipurpose platform able to “fire nuclear missiles and conventional land-attack missiles like Tomahawks from the same launch tubes.”[45]  Along those lines, it is interesting to note that the U.S. Navy has begun development of a much smaller dual-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile for potential deployment on certain attack submarines.[46] 

Although the U.S. Navy has not overtly stated its intention to deploy nuclear weapons on the converted Trident system, it does intend to remain flexible by employing a multiple-use platform.  The vision of the U.K. post-Trident system looks remarkably similar.  A “multipurpose submarine” that the United Kingdom is said to be pursuing as a replacement for the Trident fleet[47] might even take advantage of the Multiple All-Up-Around Canister subsystem system that allows the newly converted U.S. SSGNs to “launch” numerous types of missiles, UAVs, underwater surveillance vehicles, and up to 66 Special Forces personnel.[48]  The new Astute-Class attack submarine is on order, is already over budget, and may only be an interim system[49] as the United Kingdom moves towards combining the functions of its SSNs and SSBNs in a single system on either converted Trident submarines such as the U.S. SSGNs or an entirely new system.  Whatever form Trident’s successor ultimately takes, analysts in the United Kingdom predict it will most likely be “a single generic platform able to conduct land attack, nuclear deterrence and deploy special forces.”[50]

There is no indication that United Kingdom is willing to give up the last remaining leg of its nuclear triad in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the United States and the United Kingdom appear to be working together to produce “a new family of miniaturised nuclear warheads at U.S. labs and at a facility about fifty miles west of London.”[51]  In 2002 it was reported that more than £2 billion had been approved for upgrading Britain’s nuclear warhead production, maintenance, research and development facility, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) run by three companies, including Lockheed Martin, at Aldermaston.  According to an official from the Ministry of Defence, the investment is for a “project that would enable Britain to produce a new generation of weapons.”[52]  The decision to convert U.S. Trident to nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines is worth monitoring as it could provide clues about the direction that U.K. submarine-based capabilities are heading.  Although it remains unclear what a post-Trident system will look like and whether it will make use of nuclear cruise missiles, there is a high probability that future systems (converted or entirely new) will deploy nuclear weapons and fulfill the vision spelled out in the U.S. NPR. 

Conclusion

While NATO nuclear posture has for the most part remained frozen since the end of the Cold War, the United States and the United Kingdom appear to be charging ahead on counterproliferation and nuclear force modernization.  In light of the usable and war fighting roles that the Bush Administration has assigned to nuclear weapons in the NPR, a decision to deploy additional tactical nuclear weapons or even converting the United Kingdom’s current Trident fleet into dual capable submarines would further erode the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons with far reaching implications for efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and for relations between NATO and non-NATO allies.  The following issues require urgent discussion and consideration:

·         Nonproliferation – The United States and United Kingdom, as nuclear weapons states, have made solemn commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to reduce nuclear weapons.  Devoting resources to the development of new nuclear weapons (although these funds have been blocked in the FY05 budget in the United States) and expanding doctrine to include nuclear use against non-nuclear weapons states sends the wrong signal and undermines this commitment.

·         Transatlantic relations – Differences of policy are getting worse at a time when continental Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States face a common security threat from terrorism. Many European allies are concerned about the future of the NPT, prefer normative measures for tackling nuclear proliferation issues, and worry that the direction of U.S. nuclear posture is having a negative affect on non-military preventative measures.

·         Building Confidence with Russia – The potential U.S. and U.K. nuclear weapons developments outlined in this paper could further erode confidence and exacerbate problems linked to Russian security concerns.  The United States and Russia pledged in 1990 and 1991 to disband large portions of both nation’s sub-strategic nuclear arsenals, including all tactical nuclear capabilities for surface ships and attack submarines.  There are no such restrictions on the United Kingdom, which could, in the future, deploy nuclear cruise missiles on its current fleet of attack submarines, a converted Trident system, or an entirely new submarine-based system.  Dual-capable submarines would make it next to impossible for Russia to verify U.S./U.K. tactical deployments.  “Indeed, because of the similarities between SSGNs and SSBNs, friends and foes will be unable to tell initially whether a missile launch involves a conventional Tomahawk cruise missile or a nuclear-armed Trident.” [53]

What action can NATO take to discuss and address these issues?  In December 2000, NATO foreign ministers adopted a report on options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament.  In light of profound changes in the security environment over the last five years, NATO should engage in another review process to update this document and consider not only whether its own dormant nuclear posture is of any benefit to the Alliance, but also whether the nuclear modernization programs of the United States and United Kingdom increase risks to NATO and its relations with other allies, such as Russia. 

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