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# **Polish and Central European Priorities on NATO's Future Nuclear Policy**

*In the present debate over the future of the NATO's nuclear policy, and especially the stationing of the U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, the countries of Central Europe (understood here as the Baltic Three—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—plus Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) are usually presented as the staunch supporters of the nuclear status quo, in favour of the permanent deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe out of the fear of Russia. In fact, their attitude towards the role of nuclear weapons and wider issue of the deterrence policy of the North Atlantic Alliance is much more varied and nuanced, and reducing them to a “no changes” camp can result in the oversimplification of the picture and hampers the understanding of the motives of their choices in foreign and security policy.*

It is worth underlining that when the discussion of the nuclear dimension of NATO intensified in recent months, the countries of the region have been publicly confronted with policy choices they would have preferred to make in a low-key fashion inside the Alliance. The collusion of external elements, such as the Obama administration's emphasis on nuclear disarmament, the heightened interest of the international expert community in NATO's nuclear policy, and the public method of

preparing the new Strategic Concept, forced the Central Europeans to take a stance on the issues that previously had been the subject of interest only to a small group of foreign affairs and defense officials dealing with the NATO nuclear portfolio at the capitals and in Brussels.

The analysis of the positions of the countries of the region begins with the continued relevance of Alliance's three political commitments on nuclear policy. The

Alliance's three no's unveiled in 1996 and declared in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. The Alliance declared there that it had *no* intention, no plan and *no* reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, *nor* any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy.<sup>2</sup> This pledge was an element of a larger package of concession made to alleviate Russian concerns about the effects of NATO enlargement.<sup>3</sup> Notwithstanding the criticism of the political pledges limiting the Alliance's freedom of action, the candidate countries accepted the *three no's* as an unavoidable part of the enlargement bargain. In the context of the nuclear policy of the Alliance, this means that while countries of Central Europe have been participating in the proceedings of the Nuclear Planning Group and have been playing a role in shaping of NATO nuclear policy (including the formulation of the new Strategic Concept in this aspect), they are not involved in nuclear sharing arrangements *per se*. Moreover, from the point of view of the region, in the current and foreseeable future it is difficult to envisage a situation in which the *three no's*-policy would be changed, e.g. to allow for stationing of nuclear weapons in Central Europe.<sup>4</sup>

### **Perception of the role of nuclear deterrence**

While nuclear deterrence has been present in the background of many debates on security in the Central Europe, little attention has been given until recently about the specific aspects of the nuclear extended deterrence provided by the United States through NATO.<sup>5</sup> In general, the strategic

establishments within the countries of the region perceive the need for nuclear weapons as stabilizing elements the relationship between the United States and Russia. Support for nuclear disarmament is virtually non-existent in the public discourse, therefore it is also by and large absent from the programmes of the political parties and from the media.<sup>6</sup> Many in the experts' community in these countries remain sceptical about the wisdom of pursuing the goal of zero nuclear weapons in the present strategic environment, particularly because of lingering not only security anxieties concerning Russia, but also due to the possibility that Iran or other countries in the vicinity of Europe may acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup> Such attitudes are further reinforced by the memories of the Soviet era, when the so-called peace narrative was often used by the official Communist propaganda, and the Western European supporters of nuclear disarmament were seen by many as playing into Kremlin's hands.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the perspective of an open debate over NATO's role in nuclear disarmament was met with little enthusiasm in the Central European countries. While recognizing the validity of questions asked about the Alliance's future nuclear policy, especially the continued deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, there was also a fear that the debate would divide member states, with a clash between an idealistic agenda and a more cautious approach. It was argued that the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. weapons from Europe could result in the weakening of the transatlantic link and the Article 5 guarantees,<sup>8</sup> and that it could be perceived

as a victory in Russia. As put in a 2009 interview by a Hungarian official, "opening Pandora's box" was not seen as being in the interest of the Alliance.<sup>9</sup>

When the issue of the future role of nuclear deterrence in the Alliance was put on the agenda in the context of the discussion over the new Strategic Concept, the reactions from the countries of the region tended initially to re-emphasize the strategic, political and symbolic significance of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement. It was being lauded as one of the most important elements of the transatlantic link, binding the security of Europe to the United States through a wide share of risks and burdens between the Allies. As put by an NATO ambassador of a newer member state, "Nuclear deterrence by the US and through NATO and with the presence of American warheads in Europe is the ultimate test of NATO's credibility."<sup>10</sup> Consequently, the removal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe was presented as a development that would radically change the implementation of the Alliance's function of preventing aggression through credible deterrence. It was also alleged that such a change would have a significant impact on the level of confidence in NATO and in the United States, as felt in the region. This argumentation has been reflected e.g. in the 2009 U.S. Congressional report *America's Strategic Posture*, which stated that "some allies located near Russia believe that U.S. non-strategic forces in Europe are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow and indeed that modernized U.S./NATO forces are essential for restoring a sense of balance in the face of Russia's nuclear renewal."<sup>11</sup>

The statements made in the initial phase of the discussion can be interpreted as an attempt to pre-empt an early decision on the future of the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. While the issue had previously been considered as secondary for the countries in Central Europe, the perspective of a unilateral withdrawal driven by nuclear disarmament arguments was interpreted in the context of a wider discussion about the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe, Article 5 guarantees and the policy towards Russia. The prevailing opinion in the region was that the U.S. presence and link with Europe should be strengthened, rather than weakened, hence any proposals to change the *status quo* were met with suspicion and resistance<sup>12</sup>.

### **The similarities and differences in the region**

The Central European members of NATO held generally similar views regarding the need to re-emphasize and strengthen the common defence function of the Alliance. While taking part in the out-of-area missions of the Alliance, they were increasingly worried about what they have perceived as the neglect on the "classical" NATO agenda of defence planning and preparation for Art. 5 contingencies. Their views regarding the possibility of aggression or strategic coercion applied against the NATO countries have been much more pessimistic than those of the Western European allies, with Russia still seen as a source of possible future threats.

Still, differences in geographic location, as well as foreign and security policy objectives influence the positions of the

countries of the region. Among the Baltic Three countries, the issue of the credibility of Article 5 guarantees is front and center. Given the location and modest military capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, NATO's deterrence potential (including the ability to deploy on their territories and reinforce their sea and air defences), is seen as an indispensable insurance in the event of a security crisis involving Russia.<sup>13</sup> Despite concentrating on the demands of strengthening the conventional re-assurances, the Baltic states' opposition to the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe might stem from the assumption that this capability could provide NATO with additional instruments to counter any aggressive actions on behalf of Russia, providing a credible escalation option between conventional capabilities and the strategic nuclear forces.

The position of Poland, as the biggest and probably most influential country of the region in the Alliance, differs in some aspects. First, Poland's leaders do not consider their country to be as dependent on NATO's support and deterrence capabilities during a crisis as the Baltic Three countries are, both because of the potential of their own armed forces and Poland's perceived political weight in conducting relations with Russia, the United States, and other NATO countries. The fear of abandonment by other Allies during a crisis, while still present in the Polish thinking, is offset by a growing sense of self-confidence as a medium-size European power. Secondly, Warsaw considers itself capable of conducting a proactive policy going beyond the defence of the nuclear status quo, drawing from its

previous experiences and record of activities related to the arms control and non-proliferation (e.g. Polish participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative).

To the surprise of many observers, Poland became engaged in the public debate on the future of the tactical nuclear weapons, presenting forward-looking ideas on their removal. In February 2010, a joint op-ed was published by the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Poland Carl Bildt and Radosław Sikorski.<sup>14</sup> The ministers called for the wide-reaching reductions, and ultimate withdrawal by the United States and Russia of the sub-strategic nuclear weapons from the European territory, calling them "dangerous remnants of a dangerous past."<sup>15</sup> Next, in April 2010, Poland together with Norway put forward a non-paper to NATO Allies, arguing that the issue needs to be addressed in the larger framework of the Russian-NATO relations and suggesting a "step-by-step" approach, including transparency and confidence-building measures as well as balanced and mutual arms reductions.<sup>16</sup>

Through these initiatives, Poland wanted to prevent other members of the Alliance from taking unilateral actions. Warsaw also wanted to frame the issue as the problem of reducing and ultimately withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe as such (Russia included) instead of looking at it as an internal NATO problem. At the same time, because of its policy of re-establishing a political dialogue with Russia (which was initiated in late 2009 with the additional dimension created by the tragic death of President Lech Kaczyński in a plane crash in Russia in April 2010), Poland wanted to highlight the potential of using

the dialogue with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons as a confidence-building measure.

The rest of the countries of the region – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia – belong to the group of “Article 5 supporters” in NATO, and therefore have remained wary of the fast-tracking of any unilateral decisions by NATO on the nuclear issue. However, their official attitude towards Russia has been less emotional and less cautious than that of the countries in the northern part of Central Europe. Consequently, the arguments about the deterrence value of U.S. sub-strategic nuclear weapons had not been as important for them as the arguments connected with the solidarity, Alliance cohesion and transatlantic link embodied by the nuclear sharing arrangements. Additionally, during the most heated phase of the debate over the new Strategic Concept, the three countries have been going through the parliamentary elections process, with the left-wing ruling parties losing to their right-wing opponents. In the case of the Czech Republic, an *experts’* caretaker government was in place between March 2009 and May 2010 elections. While foreign and security issues played a marginal role in the election campaigns, the new center-right and right-wing coalition governments have engaged in the last phase of the debate on the Strategic Concept, bringing with them a strong emphasis on the need to strengthen the common defense function of the Alliance.

### **Nuclear sharing and the non-nuclear elements of deterrence: – priorities of the Central European countries**

When discussing nuclear sharing, the influence of the Central Europeans is limited because of their “passive” status in the implementation of the Alliance’s nuclear policy. However, the position of the countries of the region has been one of the factors influencing the development of the debate on the nuclear issues at NATO. They have been acting as a counterbalance, of sorts, to the German initiative of providing consultations inside NATO and with the United States on the removal of nuclear weapons from the German territory.<sup>17</sup> This initiative has been followed in February 2010 by a joint letter of the foreign ministers of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Norway to NATO Secretary General Rasmussen calling for a “comprehensive discussion” on the NATO’s contribution in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, while continuing to provide “credible deterrence”.<sup>18</sup>

In contrast to these actions, the Central European representatives have been acting in a low-key fashion, advocating restraint and the gradual approach to the change of the Alliance’s nuclear weapons policy. Their position, which is worth noting, bears a close resemblance to the position ultimately taken by the Obama administration. Despite the widespread calls to take bolder steps towards the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from Europe, the April 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review Report* stated that in Europe, “the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements [ ]

contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.<sup>19</sup> That argumentation seems to mirror the stance prevailing in Central Europe (and also probably in some circles in Turkey) that the times are not ripe yet for a radical change of the nuclear policy and unilateral withdrawal. The Polish diplomats also pointed to the fragment of the report listing topics for the U.S.-Russian strategic dialogue, which would include Russia discussing steps it could take to allay concerns in the West about its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, such as further consolidating its non-strategic systems in a small number of secure facilities deep within Russia.<sup>20</sup> The idea of consolidation of the non-strategic nuclear weapons away from the Russian borders was included in the Polish-Swedish and Polish-Norwegian proposals presented earlier.

The countries of the region were also satisfied with the five NATO nuclear policy principles formulated by State Secretary Hilary Clinton at the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn on 22-23 April 2010, and the accompanying statement by the Secretary General, who pronounced his belief that the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential part of a credible deterrent.<sup>21</sup> While controversial in a number of more progressive-thinking NATO member states, the formula proposed by Clinton was welcomed by the Central European states.<sup>22</sup> The U.S. position seemed to remove the possibility of a policy split in the Alliance at the Nov. 19-20 Lisbon summit over the non-strategic weapons and nuclear sharing arrangements, while opening up the

possibility to seek the engagement of Russia in the reductions of the sub-strategic arsenals.

The position on the nuclear strategy of the Alliance taken by the NATO Group of Experts (chaired by Madeleine K. Albright, with the participation of the two members from the region: Adam Rotfeld of Poland and Aivis Ronis of Latvia) in the May 2010 report *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement* also echoed the general preferences of the countries of the region. It stated that the retention of some U.S. forward-deployed systems on European soil reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence, while broad participation of the non-nuclear Allies is an essential sign of transatlantic solidarity and risk sharing. Participation by the non-nuclear states can take place in the form of nuclear deployments on their territory or by non-nuclear support measures.<sup>23</sup> The latter formulation is especially important for the countries of the Central Europe, which according to the three no's have limited options for participating in the nuclear risk- and burden-sharing.

The experts in the region recognize that their preferred gradual approach is difficult to accept by those NATO member states which support a more radical change in the nuclear strategy (including partial or complete withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe), and also does not address the dilemma posed by aging of the dual-capable aircraft deployed by the European Allies. Therefore, it is understood that these issues, and especially the future of nuclear sharing, will be dealt with at a later stage, possibly in a form of a review of

nuclear policy initiated after the Lisbon summit.

### **The non-nuclear instruments of assurance**

While the terms and intensity of the NATO debate over the nuclear policy forced the countries of the region to take a stance on the issue, it remains crucially important to underline that this issue plays a minor role in the overall bid of the Central European members of NATO to boost the importance of the collective defence and deterrence function (Article 5) of the Alliance. From their point of view, it is primarily the non-nuclear dimension of the deterrence policy of NATO that is in urgent need of fixing.<sup>24</sup> They might support the nuclear sharing arrangements and the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, but their underlining motive is not the perceived utility of the sub-strategic weapons in any future threat scenario (with a possible exception of the threat perception by some analysts in the Baltic Three states), but rather a strong preference for preserving the security link with the United States and the mechanisms and capabilities serving directly the defence of the Alliance's territory.

The debate over the re-assurances (i.e. ways to increase credibility of security guarantees of NATO and the United States in the eyes of members of the Alliance, primarily in Central Europe) has focused not on the nuclear, but on the conventional dimension: the political, bureaucratic and military decisions which the Alliance can take to balance the recent emphasis on expeditionary operations, as well as to provide a basic level of insurance needed

for Central Europeans to embrace the policy of engagement with Russia. In the view of the countries of the region, the two-track approach of reassurance and reengagement with Russia may provide the basis for consensus on the new Strategic Concept.

On the political level, there is an expectation that the new Strategic Concept will uphold collective defence as a core task of the Alliance. The understanding of this task should of course take into account the recently emerged threats of cyber-attacks or and large-scale terrorist acts, but it must also include the sustained political will and readiness of NATO member states to act together in case of an attack against their territories, or in the situation of a political coercion supported by military means. For the countries of Central Europe, the uncertainty regarding the future course of Russia remains the primary cause for highlighting the need to maintain the readiness to conduct collective defence-related tasks. Nevertheless, they also have a more general fear of NATO being gradually transformed into an instrument for out-of-area interventions, or (even worse), an organization with a constant identity crisis. They hope that collective defence could provide a backbone to NATO for the next decade, especially since the ISAF operation in Afghanistan reveals tensions and different visions of priorities between the Allies.

The support of Central European allies for making territorial missile defence a NATO mission can also be treated as a means for strengthening the collective defence function of the Alliance. Countries of Central Europe supported the previous U.S. administration's plans for deploying missile

defence assets in Europe (including interceptors in Poland and a tracking radar in the Czech Republic) as a way of securing stronger transatlantic link and tying the security of the region to the United States. They also viewed Russia's opposition to the deployment as a signal that Moscow is eager to put limits to their freedom of action in the security domain. Therefore, in spite of the immediate negative backlash of the September 2009 decision by the Obama administration to switch to the Phased Adaptive Approach, which changed the previously agreed deployment decision, Central Europeans are still eager to embrace territorial missile defence as a NATO project, based on U.S. capabilities. At the same time, they expect that such a decision would ultimately bring the deployment of U.S. assets to the same places as envisioned by the George W. Bush administration (Warsaw and Washington have already agreed that the SM-3 interceptors should be based Poland in later stages of the project). They also make clear that the offers of cooperation with Russia on missile defence should not include giving Moscow a veto right over the future development of a NATO system.<sup>25</sup>

On the bureaucratic-military level, Central Europeans look primarily at the following elements of reassurance:

- increased attention to Article 5 tasks in the functioning of the Alliance's institutions and in the work of the military command structure, which should be capable of conducting operations across the whole spectrum of scenarios, including defensive operations; reform of the intelligence-sharing and cooperation system;

- resumption of the practice of routine defence planning, in the form of updating or preparing plans for Article 5 contingencies for specific countries or regions and correspondingly setting the criteria for the development of capabilities of the NATO countries' armed forces;
- placing additional NATO facilities and developing further NATO infrastructure on the territories of the Central European states;
- conducting exercises testing NATO's readiness for conducting Article 5-related missions, including at the territories of the Central European members;
- developing the NATO Response Force with the Article 5 missions in mind.

Taken together, these proposals aim at anchoring NATO more firmly than before to the traditional concept of the defence of its members' territories. This is of paramount importance for the Central European leaders and the strategic communities in these countries as they try to generate support for the Alliance among their populations. In their view, NATO's engagement in out-of-area missions (which is generally not questioned by Central Europeans) must be paired with increased visibility of the Alliance's security umbrella for the citizens. It can be argued that this aspect of NATO's new Concept would be far more important for the countries of the region than the subtleties of the adaptation of NATO's nuclear strategy.

## **Conclusion: nuclear strategy in the new Strategic Concept**

The more successful the Central European NATO members are in securing proper language on the reassurance package and the adoption of the two-track approach to Russia (as outlined above), the less inclined they would be to act as spoilers in the area of the nuclear policy. Elements such as pronouncing NATO's general support for the goal of the world free of nuclear weapons, stronger emphasis on arms control, or the adoption of the declaratory policy on the use of nuclear weapons based on the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, would most likely not be contested by the Central Europeans, even if they might be problematic for France or the United Kingdom..

On the core issue of the future of the sub-strategic nuclear weapons, the countries of the region would most probably resist any eleventh-hour attempts to commit NATO to withdrawal of the U.S. weapons from some or all locations in Europe, by referring to the principle of "no unilateral decisions" on the future of the deployments. They would also insist on sending a clear signal on the linkage between NATO's future actions and the Russian stance of its deployment of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Given

the fact that Moscow remains non-committal on engaging in any talks on sub-strategic weapons, it would be too early to draw a precise roadmap for future negotiations in Lisbon, including the question of whether future talks should take place between NATO and Russia or between the United States and Russia.<sup>26</sup> Still, from the point of view of the region, Russia should be pressured further on the issue of its sub-strategic weapons, including the calls for more transparency.

Taking into account that the new Strategic Concept is to be a short document, it might be sufficient that it reaffirms the principle of NATO as a nuclear-weapons alliance, without mentioning the specifics of the deployments and the nuclear sharing. These issues could be decided later in the process of the internal NATO review, during which the attitudes of the countries that do not want to participate in the nuclear sharing arrangements, such as Germany, can be addressed. That may be a formula acceptable to all the Allies, and it would be useful in maintaining the cohesion of NATO and sending a message of solidarity from Lisbon – which seems to be the ultimate policy goal for the countries of the Central Europe.

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## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The author is an international security analyst and Deputy Head of the Research Office of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).
- <sup>2</sup> *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, 27 May, 1997; [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_25468.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm).
- <sup>3</sup> Another statement emphasized that the Alliance does not envisage in the current and foreseeable security environment, permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in those countries.
- <sup>4</sup> There seems to be no hard evidence supporting the argument of the German Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, who, referring to the new NATO member states, asserted in November 2009 that they could have partners in mind who probably would be glad to offer their grounds and their soil for any weapons. While his statement is true regarding the willingness to host additional NATO infrastructure and strengthen the conventional force posture, the special nature of the nuclear weapons seems to be well understood in the region. See zu Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor, *The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship: Afghanistan, NATO's New Strategic Concept, and the Challenges of Burden Sharing*. Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 November 2009, <http://csis.org/event/statesmens-forum-karl-theodor-zu-guttenberg-minister-defense-germany>.
- <sup>5</sup> For a unique take on the subject, see: Vaidotas Urbelis and Kestutis Paulauskas, "NATO's Deterrence Policy – Time for Change?", *Baltic Security and Defence Review* 10, 2008; [http://www.bdcpl.eu/files/documents/Research/4\\_%20Vaidotas%20Urbelis-Kestutis%20Paulauskas-NATO%20Nuclear%20Deterrence-Time%20for%20Change.pdf](http://www.bdcpl.eu/files/documents/Research/4_%20Vaidotas%20Urbelis-Kestutis%20Paulauskas-NATO%20Nuclear%20Deterrence-Time%20for%20Change.pdf).
- <sup>6</sup> One notable exception being the letter in support of the nuclear disarmament agenda, written by two former Polish Presidents and a former Prime Minister; Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Lech Wałęsa, "Wiat bez broni i drowej" [A World without Nuclear Weapons], *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 3 April 2009.
- <sup>7</sup> The following paragraphs describing the attitude of the countries of the region are based on the interviews conducted with the representatives of the public administration (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defense) and the strategic community of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia in August-September 2009 in the framework of the PISM-SIPRI project "The attitudes of the Central and Eastern European members of NATO towards the Alliance's nuclear strategy".
- <sup>8</sup> In Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty enshrines the collective defense commitments of the Alliance, with parties agreeing that "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all".
- <sup>9</sup> Personal interview, September 2009.
- <sup>10</sup> Cited in: Malcolm Chalmers, Simon Lunn, *NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma*, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Occasional Paper, March 2010, p.16.
- <sup>11</sup> *America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States*, US Institute for Peace Press, Washington D.C., 2009, pp. 20-21.
- <sup>12</sup> The level of anxiety among the Central European strategic community can be seen in the July 2009 *Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe*, signed by 22 high-ranking former politicians and diplomats; [http://www.rferl.org/content/An\\_Open\\_Letter\\_To\\_The\\_Obama\\_Administration\\_From\\_Central\\_And\\_Eastern\\_Europe/1778449.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/An_Open_Letter_To_The_Obama_Administration_From_Central_And_Eastern_Europe/1778449.html).
- <sup>13</sup> Personal interview with a Latvian analyst, August 2010.
- <sup>14</sup> Carl Bildt, Radosław Sikorski, "Next, the Tactical Nukes", *International Herald Tribune / New York Times*, 2 February 2010. See: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html>.
- <sup>15</sup> Carl Bildt, Radosław Sikorski, "Next, the Tactical Nukes", *International Herald Tribune / New York Times*, 2 February 2010. See: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html>.
- <sup>16</sup> *Joint Statement by Foreign Ministers of Norway and Poland*, April 9, 2010; <http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/JOINT-STATEMENT.pdf>.
- <sup>17</sup> The pledge to pursue the withdrawal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany in contacts within NATO and with the US was included in the coalition agreement between the FDP and CDU/CDU from 24 October 2009. See: <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091026-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp.pdf>.
- <sup>18</sup> <http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Letter%20to%20Secretary%20General%20NATO.pdf>.
- <sup>19</sup> Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. xii.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* p. 29.
- <sup>21</sup> See: Oliver Meier, *NATO Chief's Remarks Highlight Policy Rift*, *Arms Control Today*, May 2010.
- <sup>22</sup> *Insider View: The Road Ahead, an Interview with the Permanent Representative of Poland to NATO Bogusław Winid*, Central Europe Digest, September 15, 2010; [http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record\\_id=261](http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=261).

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- <sup>23</sup> NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement; Analysis and Recommendations of the Group Of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 17 May 2010, p. 43;  
[http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2010\\_05/20100517\\_100517\\_expertsreport.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf).
- <sup>24</sup> See e.g. Marek Madej, *Poland's Priorities in the Debate on a New Strategic Concept for NATO*, PISM Strategic File No. 12, April 2010; Ronald Asmus, Stefan Czumur, Chris Donnelly, Aivis Ronis, Tomas Valasek, Klaus Wittmann, *NATO, New allies and Reassurance*, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, May 2010.
- <sup>25</sup> *Poland cautious of Russia-NATO co-operation*, October 14, 2010;  
[http://www.thenews.pl/international/artykul141561\\_poland-cautious-of-russia-nato-co-operation.html](http://www.thenews.pl/international/artykul141561_poland-cautious-of-russia-nato-co-operation.html).
- <sup>26</sup> See Steven Andreasen, Malcolm Chalmers and Isabelle Williams, *NATO and Nuclear Weapons. Is a New Consensus Possible?*, RUSI Occasional Paper, August 2010, pp. 20-23.