BASIC SPECIAL REPORT
BASIC Special Report 2004.1
· January 2004
Unravelling the Known Unknowns:
Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq
By David Isenberg and Ian Davis
Back to the Contents
Endnotes
1. David Isenberg, Ian Davis and Paul Ingram, BASIC Special
Briefing, "Matters of Emphasis: The Hunt for Chemical and
Biological Weapons in Iraq", BASIC, April 30, 2003. http://www.iraqconflict.org/
2. The failure to find unconventional weapons is not due to lack
of trying. Search procedures were put into place before the war.
Three different approaches were devised. First was the designation
and deployment of Task Force 20, which has been described as a
covert Special Forces unit. Comprised of specialists drawn from the
Army's Delta Force, elements of the task force were inserted into
Iraq prior to the main invasion. Next came Site Survey Team, drawn
from specially trained regular army personnel attached to mainline
units earmarked for the initial invasion. Finally, the Pentagon
created the 75th Exploration Task Force. It was used by the Army
Central Command as a follow-up element to the main invasion force.
Elements of it were later folded into the Iraq Survey Group.
Source: Frank Ronald Clementon, "What Happened to Saddam's Weapons
of Mass Destruction?" Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 7,
September 2003.
3. Bob Drogin, "New Hunt for Iraqi Arms Resembles Old: U.S.,
British and Australian teams will rely heavily on military
intelligence but also use many of the U.N. inspectors' techniques,"
Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2003.
4. Judith Miller, "A Chronicle of Confusion in the Hunt for
Hussein's Weapons," New York Times, July 20, 2003.
5. Dafna Linzer, "U.S. Won't Probe Secret Iraqi Documents: Top
Secret Iraqi Documents Are Strewn Across Missile Facility Americans
Haven't Visited," Associated Press, June 3, 2003.
6. Barton Gellman, "Odyssey of Frustration: In Search for
Weapons, Army Team Finds Vacuum Cleaners," Washington Post,
May 18, 2003.
7. The failure to find unconventional weapons is not due to lack of trying.
Search procedures were put into place before the war. Three different
approaches were devised. First was the designation and deployment
of Task Force 20, which has been described as a covert Special Forces
unit. Comprised of specialists drawn from the Army's Delta Force,
elements of the task force were inserted into Iraq prior to the
main invasion. Next came the Site Survey Team, drawn from specially
trained regular army personnel attached to mainline units earmarked
for the initial invasion. Finally, the Pentagon created the 75th
Exploration Task Force. It was used by the Army Central Command
as a follow-up element to the main invasion force. Elements of it
were later folded into the Iraq Survey Group. Sources: Frank Ronald
Cleminson, "What Happened to Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction?"
Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 7, September 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_09/Cleminson_09.asp?print.
See also Special Defense Department Briefing, "Search for Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction," Pentagon Briefing Room, May 7, 2003,
http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030507-0158.html;
DoD News Briefing on the Iraq Survey Group, May 30, 2003, http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html;
Barton Gellman, "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq: Task
Force Unable To Find Any Weapons," Washington Post, May 11,
2003; and Barton Gellman, "Covert Unit Hunted for Iraqi Arms: Amid
Raids and Rescue, Task Force 20 Failed To Pinpoint Weapons," Washington
Post, June 13, 2003.
8. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Withdraws a Team of Weapons Hunters From
Iraq," New York Times, January 8, 2004.
9. David S. Cloud, "Weapons Puzzle May Not Be Solved: Hussein
Has Little Motive To Detail Arms Activities; ISG Will Continue to
Hunt," Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2003.
10. Dafna Linzer, "Iraq Weapons Hunt Appears To Be Dying,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, December 19, 2003; and Richard W.
Stevenson, " Head Of Iraqi Arms Search May Be Ready To Step Down,"
New York Times, December 19, 2003.
11. William M. Arkin, "Big Fish Caught With Small Bait," Los
Angeles Times, December 21, 2003.
12. Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Matthews, George Perkovich,
WMD in Iraq: evidence and implications, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, January 2004, p. 8, http://wmd.ceip.matrixgroup.net/iraq3fulltext.pdf.
See also Jim Lobe, "Iraqi WMD: Myths and ... more myths," Asia
Times, January 10, 2004.
13. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has compiled
major statements by senior Bush Administration officials on Iraq's
capabilities to manufacture and hide chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. See
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/iraqintell/adminquoteshtml.htm
and http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/IraqWMDpdf.pdf.
See also "Claims and Facts: Rhetoric, Reality and the War in
Iraq," Center for American Progress,
http://www.americanprogress.org/AccountTempFiles/cf/%7bE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-
A521-5D6FF2E06E03%7d/PRIRAQCLAIMFACT1029.HTM. For background
on the publicizing of charges that Iraq possessed NBC weapons,
which posed an unacceptable threat to American security, thus
justifying an invasion of Iraq see Thomas Powers, "The Vanishing
Case for War," New York Review of Books, Vol. 50, No. 19,
December 4, 2003, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16813;
David Cortright, Alistair Millar, George A. Lopez, and Linda
Gerber, Unproven: The Controversy Over Justifying War in
Iraq, Policy Brief F12A, A Project of the Fourth Freedom Forum
and Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the
University of Notre Dame, June 2003, http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/Unproven.pdf;
Scott Ritter, Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and
the Bushwhacking of America (NY: Context Books, 2003); Sheldon
Rampton & John Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception: The uses
of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq (New York: Jeremy P.
Tarcher/Penguin, 2003); Milan Rai, Regime Unchanged: Why the War
on Iraq Changed Nothing, (London: Pluto Press, 2003); Peter
Riddell, Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special
Relationship' (London, Politico's Publishing, 2003; and Danny
Schechter, Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception, How the Media
Failed to Cover the War on Iraq (Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY,
2003).
14. Jean Eaglesham and James Harding, "Blair Signals Retreat On
Iraq Weapons," London Financial Times, December 17,
2003.
15. Peter Eisler and Cesar G. Soriano, "Iraq Scoured For Signs
Of Banned Arms," USA Today, April 16, 2003, p. 5.
16. Michael Isikoff and Evan Thomas, "Follow The Yellowcake
Road," Newsweek, July 28, 2003; "Niger Documents Were Poorly
Forged, Newspaper Reports," July 17, 2003, Global Security
Newswire, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_7_17.html#1;
Sophie Arie, Ewen MacAskill and David Pallister, "Crude Niger
forgeries surface in Italian paper," The Guardian, July 17, 2003;
"Italy Journalist Says Gave U.S. Iraq-Niger Papers," Reuters, July
19, 2003; "Italian Says She Gave Iraq Papers To U.S.," [By
Associated Press] Los Angeles Times, July 20, 2003; and Bill
Gertz, "FBI Probing Forged Papers On Niger Uranium," The
Washington Times, July 19, 2003, p. 1.
17. Ray McGovern, "Iraq Posed An Unclear And Dubious Danger,"
Miami Herald, June 16, 2003.
18. Walter Pincus, "CIA Says It Cabled Key Data To White House:
But Officials Say Document Lacked Conclusion on Iraqi Uranium
Deal," Washington Post, June 13, 2003, p. 16. See also John
Diamond, "Uranium Reports Doubted Early On: CIA insists all
officials were fully informed," USA Today, June 13, 2003,
Pg. 10.
19. [former Ambassador] JOSEPH C. WILSON 4th, "What I Didn't
Find in Africa," New York Times, July 6, 2003.
20. Dana Priest and Dana Milbank, "President Defends Allegations
On Iraq: Bush Says CIA's Doubts Followed Jan. 28 Address,"
Washington Post, July 15, 2003, p. 1.
21. Walter Pincus, "CIA Asked Britain To Drop Iraq Claim: Advice
on Alleged Uranium Buy Was Refused," Washington Post, July
11, 2003, p. 1.
22. John Lumpkin, Associated Press/London Independent,
June 13, "CIA Says It Informed White House of Intelligence Doubts,"
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_6_13.html#1.
23. Seymour M. Hersh, "Who Lied To Whom?," The New
Yorker, March 31, 2003, http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/030331fa_fact1.
24. Robert Scheer, Column Left, A Diplomat's Undiplomatic Truth:
They Lied, posted online on July 9, 2003, The Nation,
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030721&s=scheer20030708.
25. For an administration view on how the NIE was crafted see
"SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL HOLDS BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN IRAQ, AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE
JULY 18, 2003,"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2003/intell-030718-wh.htm.
"Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths," a
defense of the NIE, by Stu Cohen, Acting Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council when the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate
on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction was published. was released
by the CIA on 28 November 2003,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr11282003.html.
See also Thomas Patrick Carroll, "The Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,"
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5 No. 11, November
2003, http://www.meib.org/articles/0311_iraq1.htm.
26. Walter Pincus, "CIA Asked Britain To Drop Iraq Claim: Advice
on Alleged Uranium Buy Was Refused," op. cit.
27. James Risen and David E. Sanger, "C.I.A. Chief to Face Panel
on Dubious Iraq Arms Data," New York Times, July 16,
2003.
28. "CIA Expert Says NSC Official Pushed Africa Charge,"
Global Security Newswire, July 18, 2003, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_7_18.html#1.
See also Matthew Cooper, "Pinning The Line On The Man: Is this NSC
staffer responsible for the uranium allegation in Bush's speech?"
Time, July 28, 2003. For a viewpoint claiming that Joseph,
and for that matter Tenet, are being set up as scapegoats see Peter
Beinart, "Wrongly Accused," New Republic, July 28 - August
4, 2003, p. 6.
29. Walter Pincus, "White House Faulted On Uranium Claim:
Intelligence Warnings Disregarded, President's Advisory Board
Says," Washington Post, December 24, 2003, p. 1.
30. Glenn Frankel, "Allies Didn't Share All Intelligence on
Iraq: Mistrust Between Britain, U.S. Surfaces in Controversy Over
Alleged Uranium Deal," Washington Post, July 17, 2003, p. A14.
31. Jay Bookman, "If One War 'Fact' On Iraq Is False, What Of
Others?" Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 10, 2003.
32. Dana Priest and Dana Milbank, "President Defends Allegation
On Iraq: Bush Says CIA's Doubts Followed Jan. 28 Address,"
Washington Post, July 15, 2003, p. A1.
33. Ibid. For an administration view on the allegations
regarding the Iraqi nuclear program in the State of the Union
address see "Press Briefing on Iraq WMD and SOTU Speech," July 22,
2003
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/iraq/20030722-12.html.
34. David E. Sanger and James Risen, "C.I.A. Chief Takes Blame
in Assertion on Iraqi Uranium," New York Times, July 12,
2003.
35. James Risen, "Bush Aides Now Say Claim on Uranium Was
Accurate," New York Times, July 14, 2003.
36. Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, "Bush, Rice Blame CIA for
Iraq Error: Tenet Accepts Responsibility for Clearing Statement on
Nuclear Aims in Jan. Speech," Washington Post, July 12, 2003; Page
A1.
37. David E. Sanger with Judith Miller "National Security Aide
Says He's to Blame for Speech Error," New York Times, July
23, 2003; Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus, "Bush Aides Disclose
Warnings From CIA: Oct. Memos Raised Doubts on Iraq Bid,"
Washington Post, July 23, 2003, p.A1; and SPECIAL WHITE
HOUSE BRIEFING (AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE) SUBJECT: IRAQ
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE STATE OF THE UNION SPEECH,
BRIEFERS: DAN BARTLETT AND STEVE HADLEY, ROOSEVELT ROOM, THE WHITE
HOUSE, 3:45 P.M. EDT, TUESDAY, JULY 22, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/iraq/20030722-12.html.
See also Interview with Condoleezza Rice, NEWS HOUR WITH JIM LEHRER
PBS TV, JULY 30, 2003.
38. Ibid.
39. "Questioning the Evidence," 60 MINUTES II CBS TV, OCTOBER
15, 2003.
40. David Albright, Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact
from Fiction, Institute for Science and International Security,
December 5, 2003,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/IraqAluminumTubes12-5-03.pdf.
41. Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went
Wrong," The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004,
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/media-preview/pollack.htm.
42. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Some Analysts of Iraq
Trailers Reject Germ Use," New York Times, June 7, 2003.
43. David Wise, op. cit.
44. "Recovered Materials Are Evidence of Concealed WMD Programs,
White House Says," http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_6_27.html#1.
See also Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, Richard
Boucher, Spokesman, June 26, 2003.
45. The DIA's engineering teams had not concluded their work in
Iraq at the time the initial report was drafted, and so their views
were not taken into account at that time. See Douglas Jehl, "Iraqi
Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms," New York
Times, August 9, 2003.
46. June 26, 2003, http://www.levin.senate.gov/cialetter.pdf.
47. "Two Suspect Labs Could Have Produced Hydrogen," Los
Angeles Times, June 21, 2003.
48. Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett and Gaby Hinsliff, "Iraqi
mobile labs nothing to do with germ warfare, report finds," The
Observer, June15, 2003. One experienced observer, Martin
Furmanski, addressed the question of why the Iraqi military should
devote considerable resources to build large, mobile hydrogen
generators, and why should they do this in 2002 and 2003. He
found:
The branch of military meteorology which demands large mobile
hydrogen generators is the meteorological support of ballistic
artillery and ballistic (unguided) missiles. Generating data to
support these military operations requires very large numbers of
balloon soundings, compared to generating data for general
forecasting or aviation support.
For instance, general weather forecasting and civil aviation in
the US is supported by balloons released from only a few dozen
geographic points and only at 12-hour intervals. All of New England
has only two balloon sounding sites: New York and Pennsylvania
combined have only five, Texas has six and California 12.
In contrast, the meteorological data required for unguided
rockets and field artillery is typically drawn from balloon
soundings done on an hourly basis, and data is considered fully
valid only if the balloon launch site is within 20 kms of the
artillery battery or unguided rocket launch location. The large
number of balloon launches required to support this activity both
temporally and geographically is the reason why mobile hydrogen
generators are part of military meteorological equipment. Such
generators can both fill balloons directly and/or fill
high-pressure cylinders to be transported to adjacent units.
A typical 2-meter diameter sounding balloon requires about 4
cubic meters of hydrogen. Not surprisingly, the AN/TMQ-42 US mobile
hydrogen generator produces 150 cubic feet (4.2 cubic meters) per
hour. Given that it was probably less efficient and manufactured
under the difficult conditions of the UN embargo, the larger size
of the Iraqi trailers is not surprising.
The detailed meteorological data is required because "dumb"
projectiles such as unguided artillery shells and unguided
ballistic missiles are influenced by the density, temperature and
wind at all levels of the atmosphere, and these have very
significant effects on where they fall. The US gathers this data to
attempt to achieve a "first round on target" goal with their field
artillery. While it is doubtful Iraq attempted to reach a similar
state of sophistication with their conventional field artillery,
similar meteorological data is needed for aiming an unguided
ballistic missile if it is to hit its target (every such unguided
missile is a "first round"). Iraq did have such unguided ballistic
missiles. Iraq's SCUD missiles of the Iran-Iraq War and the First
Gulf War were such unguided ballistic missiles. It is interesting
to note that the Iraqis reportedly purchased the Marconi Military
Meteorological System in c1985, at the time when SCUD missiles were
being readied for use in the Iran-Iraq war. During the Iran-Iraq
war the SCUD missiles were effective terror weapons against Iranian
cities, and during the first Gulf War the SCUDs were perhaps the
only weapon that the Iraqis successfully brought to bear against
the collation assets behind the immediate battlefront.
I would like to propose that the Iraqi "BW" trailers are indeed
hydrogen generators and nothing more. The reason that they were
manufactured in 2002 and 2003 was in anticipation of the impending
testing/deployment of the Al-Samoud missile program. By March of
2003 Iraq had manufactured approximately 100 of these missiles. If
these missiles were to be tested and/or used in battle, intensive
meteorological balloon soundings would be needed. The discovery of
the second trailer at the major rocketry testing installation is
fully consistent with this function.
The Iraqi "BW" trailers may well be an artifact of the Iraqi
development of a weapon banned by the UN (the Al-Samoud missile),
but it is a weapon identified by UN inspectors prior to the US/UK
invasion.
49. Ibid.
50. Brian Cloughley, "Knocking Down Red Herrings: Never Mind the
WMDs, Just Look at History," Counterpunch, Weekend Edition,
January 3 / 4, 2004, http://www.counterpunch.org/cloughley01032004.html.
51. The actual ISG report was not provided to UNMOVIC or to the
IAEA. Without it UNMOVIC said that it was not in a position to
properly assess Kay's findings. See UNMOVIC 15th quarterly report,
S/2003/1135, 26 November 2003,
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/quarterly_reports/s-2003-1135.pdf.
52. Mike Nartker, "Iraq Survey Group Has Not Shared Information
With U.N. Inspectors, U.N. Says," Global Security Newswire,
December 4, 2003, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2003_12_4.html#732FDA19.
53. "Friends Like These...: Paul Bremer slips up and exposes
Tony Blair's penchant for 'sexing up' intelligence," Mother
Jones, November/December 2003,
http://www.motherjones.com/cgi-
bin/print_article.pl?url=http://www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2003/12/12_533.html.
See also "Bremer 'rejects' Blair WMD claims," BBC, December 28,
2003; Raymond Whitaker "Blair's WMD claim dismissed by America's
Baghdad chief," Independent, 28 December 2003; Sarah Hall,
Richard Norton-Taylor and Luke Harding, "Blair WMD claim a 'red
herring', says Bremer: America's top man in Iraq pours scorn on
PM's allegation," The Guardian, December 29, 200; Toby Helm,
"Bremer Rejects Blair's 'Secret Labs' Claim," London Daily
Telegraph, December 29, 2003, p. 1; and Scott Ritter, "The
search for Iraqi WMD has become a public joke. But I, for one, am
not laughing Hutton stopped far short of a real investigation into
the Blair government's abysmal abuse of power," The
Independent, 4 January 2004.
54. For example, according to Dr. David Franz, a former chief
U.N. biological weapons inspector who is considered among America's
foremost experts on biowarfare agents, there is no evidence that
Iraq or anyone else has ever succeeded in using botulinum B for
biowarfare.
55. Bob Drogin, "Experts Downplay Bioagent: The vial of bacteria
found in Iraq probably was bought legally and its type has never
been turned into a weapon, scientists say," Los Angeles
Times, October 17, 2003, p.1.
56. Bob Drogin, "Friendly Fire: What David Kay really found,"
New Republic, October 27, 2003, p. 23.
57. "Scientists hunted futilely in Iraq for signs of smallpox:
U.S. team's search uncovers no evidence of disease as terror
weapon," Associated Press, September 19, 2003.
58. David Isenberg, "The tangled WMD web," Asia Times,
September 24, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EI24Ak05.html.
See also Bradley Graham, "Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated on
Iraqi Drones," Washington Post, September 26, 2003.
59. James Risen, "Word That U.S. Doubted Iraq Would Use Gas,"
New York Times, June 18, 2003.
60. Ibid.
61. Mitchell Landsberg, op. cit. For the declassified section on
Iraq's chemical weapons program from the classified Defense
Intelligence Agency study Iraq-Key WMD Facilities-An Operational
Support Study see http://www.dia.mil/Public/Press/press12.pdf.
62. It was confirmed in January this year, that the thirty-six
mortar shells found recently in southern Iraq did not contain
chemical agents. Initial tests on the shells had been thought to
show the presence of a blister agent. "No chemical agents in
shells", The Guardian, January 19, 2004.
63. Ron Manley "Iraq and chemical weapons: a view from the
inside," July 10, 2003, OpenDemocracy.net, http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-2-95-1351.jsp.
64. Transcript of The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, "Weapons Search," September
22, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec03/ekeus_9-22.html.
Also see Rolf Ekeus, "Iraq's Real Weapons Threat," Washington
Post, June 29, 2003; Page B7.
65. Robin Cook, "Shoulder to Shoulder and Stabbed in the Back,"
Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2003. See also Robin Cook, The Point
of Departure : Why One of Britain's Leading Politicians Resigned
over Tony Blair's Decision to Go to War in Iraq, (NY, NY: Simon
& Schuster, 2004).
66. Thomas Powers, The Vanishing Case for War," New York
Review of Books, Volume 50, Number 19, December 4, 2003, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16813.
67. Interview with Colin Powell, NIGHTLINE, ABC TV,
January 7, 2004.
68. Christopher Marquis, "Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking
Iraq to Al Qaeda," New York Times, January 9, 2004.
69. Paul Richter, "Powell Defends Prewar Iraq View: He
reiterates his argument before the U.N. last year that Saddam
Hussein possessed illegal weapons, justifying war," Los Angeles
Times, January 9, 2004.
70. Dr. Thomas Inch, oral evidence, taken before the Foreign
Affairs Committee, on Wednesday 18 June 2003,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/uc813-iii/uc81302.htm.
71. Dr. Thomas Inch, op. cit.
72. Scott Ritter, "A Weapons Cache We'll Never See," New York
Times, August 25, 2003, http://www.clw.org/iraqintelligence/ritter.html.
73. Walter Pincus, "Bush Faced Dwindling Data On Iraq Nuclear
Bid," Washington Post, July 16, 2003, p. 1.
74. 'Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on
the Activities of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Before the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence', October 2, 2003,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/david_kay_10022003.html.
75. "Newsmaker: David Kay," News Hour with Jim Lehrer, PBS TV,
October 2, 2003,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec03/kay_10-02.html.
76. Michael R. Gordon, "Weapons Of Mass Confusion," New York
Times on the Web, August 1, 2003. See also Associated Press "Air
Force Assessment Before War Said Iraqi Drones Were Minor Threat:
U.S. arms experts in Iraq came to same conclusion," Baltimore
Sun, August 25, 2003; David Rogers, "Air Force Doubts Drone
Threat: Report Says Bush Exaggerated Perils of Unmanned Iraqi
Aircraft," Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2003; Joseph
Cirincione and Alexis Orton, "The Air Force Dissents," Carnegie
Analysis, September 11, 2003,
http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=5346;
Bradley Graham, "Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated On Iraqi
Drones," Washington Post, September 26, 2003, p. 23.
77. Walter Pincus, "Intelligence Report For Iraq War Was
'Hastily Done'," Washington Post, October 24, 2003, p.
18.
78. Thomas Patrick Carroll, "The Intelligence on Iraq's WMD,"
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 11, November 2003,
http://www.meib.org/articles/0311_iraq1.htm.
79. William M. Arkin, "A Thin Basis For War," Los Angeles
Times, July 27, 2003.
80. Jay Taylor, "When Intelligence Reports Become Political
Tools . . .," Washington Post, June 29, 2003, p. B2.
81. Walter Pincus, "Tenet Defends Iraq Intelligence: CIA Chief
Rebuts Allegations of Pressure From Administration Before the War,"
Washington Post, May 31, 2003; Page A1. See also Dana Priest
and Walter Pincus, "Bush Certainty On Iraq Arms Went Beyond
Analysts' Views," Washington Post, June 7, 2003 and "Iraq's
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reassessing the Prewar Assessments,"
Arms Control Association Press Briefing, National Press Club,
Murrow Room, July 9, 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/events/iraq_july03.asp.
82. Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, "Some Iraq Analysts Felt
Pressure From Cheney Visits Washington Post, June 5,
2003.
83. Massimo Calabresi and Timothy J. Burger, "Who Lost The
WMD?": As the weapons hunt intensifies, so does the finger
pointing. A preview of the coming battle," Time, July 7,
2003, p. 32.
84. New York Times, James Risen and Douglas Jehl, "Expert
Said to Tell Legislators He Was Pressed to Distort Some Evidence,"
June 25, 2003.
85. Jason Vest, "The 'Intelligence' Game," The Nation,
June 30, 2003, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030630&s=vest.
See also John Prados, "Iraq: A necessary war?" Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 26-33, http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/mj03/mj03prados.html.
86. Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff and Evan Thomas, "Cheney's
Long Path to War: The Hard Sell: He sifted intelligence." He
brooded about threats. And he wanted Saddam gone. "The inside story
of how Vice President Cheney bought into shady assumptions and
helped persuade a nation to invade Iraq," Newsweek, Nov. 17.
2003.
87. Thomas Powers, op. cit.
88. Seymour M. Hersh, "The Stovepipe: How conflicts between the
Bush Administration and the intelligence community marred the
reporting on Iraq's weapons," New Yorker, October 27, 2003,
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/031027fa_fact.
89. Seymour M. Hersh, "Donald Rumsfeld has his own special
sources. Are they reliable?" New Yorker, May 12, 2003, http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/030512fa_fact.
See also the Q & A "War and Intelligence" with Hersh regarding
the article, available online at http://www.newyorker.com/online/content/?030512on_onlineonly01.
90. Paul Harris, Martin Bright and Ed Helmore, "US rivals turn
on each other as weapons search draws a blank," The
Observer, May 11, 2003,
http://www.observer.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,953497,00.html.
91. Robert Dreyfuss and Jason Vest, "The Lie Factory," Mother
Jones, January/February 2004. See also transcript of "U.S.
Intelligence in Iraq," Washington Journal C-SPAN, 7:45 AM
January 1, 2004.
92. Ibid.
93. David Corn, "Did Bush Mislead US Into War?" Capitol Games
column, The Nation, June 26, 2003.
94. Greg Miller, "Top Iraq analysts in CIA shuffled: Agency says new jobs normal,
not punishment; Others call it 'deep exile'; Both officials handled
intelligence on weapons," Baltimore Sun, June 15, 2003.
95. Media Advisory: Former Intelligence Officials, Arms Control
Experts Say Bush Administration Misrepresented and Hyped Iraqi
Threat, Arms Control Association "E-Update", July 11, 2003.
96. Nicholas Rufford and Nick Fielding, "No 10 Shelved 'No
Threat' File On Saddam," Sunday Times, 8 June 2003.
97. "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - The assessment of
the British Government," http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf.
98. Glen Rangwala, "New evidence shows crucial dossier changes,"
The Independent, 17 August 2003.
99. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction - Intelligence and
Assessments, Intelligence and Security Committee, British
Parliament, September 2003, paragraph 108, p. 31, http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/isc/pdf/iwmdia.pdf.
100. Clare Short, "It's official - Saddam was not an imminent
threat: Hutton's remit was narrow - yet he has exposed the truth
about the Iraq war," The Guardian, August 23, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1028114,00.html.
101. Nicholas Rufford, "Revealed: How MI6 Sold The Iraq War,"
London Sunday Times, December 28, 2003.
102. Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report
2002-2003, Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Ann Taylor, MP, Intelligence
Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, Cm 5837, paras 81-82. Available at:
http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/intelligence/pdf/annualir0203.pdf.
103. The bulk of the 19-page document (pp.6-16) is directly
copied without acknowledgement from an article in the September
2002 edition of Middle East Review of International Affairs,
entitled "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and
Analysis". http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html.
The author is Ibrahim al-Marashi, a postgraduate student at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies.
104. Nir Rosen, "WMD: 'You have got to be kidding," Asia
Times, October 4, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EJ04Ak02.html.
105. Mark Hosenball and Michael Isikoff, "Cheney and The 'Raw'
Intelligence," Newsweek, December 15, 2003.
106. Robyn W. Klein, Ambassador Ekéus Speaks at MIIS on Detecting WMD
in Iraq, CNS News, December 1, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/cns/media/1103ekeus.htm.
107. Mark Hosenball, "Intelligence: Who's Fueling The Rumors
That Just Won't Die?" Newsweek, January 12, 2004.
108. Phil Reeves, "WMD claims of Iraqi 'colonel' treated
skeptically," The Independent, 8 December 2003.
109. President Bush Discusses Iraq with Congressional Leaders,
Remarks by the President on Iraq, The Rose Garden, September 26,
2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-7.html;
and Radio Address by the President to the Nation, September 28,
2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020928.html.
110. Global Message, White House Office of Global
Communications, September 26, 2003
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraq/20020926-19.html.
The Office acts as a sort of global public-relations firm for the
Bush administration and the U.S. war effort in Iraq. It acts to
tightly coordinates the message of the Pentagon, the State
Department and the military command in the Persian Gulf, ensuring
that any war commentary by a US official is approved in advance by
the White House.
111. Dana Milbank, "White House Didn't Gain CIA Nod for Claim On
Iraqi Strikes: Gist Was Hussein Could Launch in 45 Minutes,"
Washington Post, July 20, 2003; Page A1.
112. John Diamond, "Weak Spy Network Hurt Hunt For Arms: CIA
tried to rebuild year before Iraq war," USA Today, June 17,
2003, p. 1. See also Bill Gertz, "Lack Of Spies In Baghdad Spurs
CIA To Bolster Ranks: Agency to focus on human intelligence,"
The Washington Times, June 18, 2003, p. 1.
113. John Diamond, "Broad Purges Wiped Out Most Iraqis Helping
CIA," USA Today, June 17, 2003, p. 13.
114. Tom Gjelten, excerpt from transcript of Talk of the Nation
(2:00 PM ET) - NPR, July 10, 2003.
115. John Barry and Michael Isikoff, "Saddam's Secrets: The
scientists were supposed to hold the key to Iraq's WMD. They still
insist the weapons were destroyed," Newsweek, June 30,
2003.
116. Mitchell Landsberg, op. cit.
117. Nancy Gibbs and Michael Ware, "Chasing A Mirage: The U.S.
was sure Saddam had WMD, but Iraqi scientists tell TIME the weapons
were destroyed long before the war," Time, October 6, 2003,
p. 38.
118. Jonathan B. Tucker, "Can We Find the Weapons?" Washington Post,
March 14, 2003, p. A27.
119. "Tests rule out suspect bio-labs," CNN, April 15,
2003
120. Grant McCool, "UN Arms Inspector Blix Criticizes U.S." Over
Iraq," Reuters, June 23, 2003.
121. "PM interviewed on Iraq, WMD, Europe and the Euro," May 31,
2003, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3797.asp.
122. 'Ultimate Penalty': Excerpts From Interview With President
Bush - Part 2
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/primetime/US/bush_sawyer_excerpts_2_031216.html.
123. President Bush's State of The Union Address, January 20,
2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
124. "The Kay Report to Congress on the Activities of the Iraq
Survey Group: Former Bioweapons Inspectors Comment," Biosecurity
and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science,
Vol. 1, No. 4, 2003, p.240, http://www.biosecurityjournal.com/PDFs/v1n403/p239_s.pdf.
125. David Corn, Capital Games column, "More Evidence Bush
Misled Nation," The Nation, July 7, 2003,
http://www.thenation.com/capitalgames/index.mhtml?bid=3&pid=800.
See also James Risen, "C.I.A. Studying Prewar Reports On Iraqi
Threat," New York Times, May 22, 2003; Dana Priest and
Walter Pincus, "CIA To Review Iraq Intelligence: Questions of
Accuracy, Bias Spur Studies," Washington Post, May 23, 2003,
p. 13.
126. "The Defector's Secrets", Newsweek, March 3,
2003.
127. Bob Drogin, "After The War: Iraqi Weapons Expert Insists
Search Is Futile," Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2003.
128. "Iraqi scientist: Sanctions killed germ war program,"
CNN, April 28, 2003.
129. Colum Lynch, "Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment Of Iraqi
Weapons," Washington Post, June 22, 2003, p. 20.
130. Transcript of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discussion
on the report "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq: evidence and
implications, " Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington,
D.C., January 8, 2004.
131. "Blix Questions Coalition's Expectations for WMD
Discovery," Global Security Newswire, June 18, 2003, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2003_6_19.html#1.
132. Walter Pincus, "U.N. Inspector: Little New in U.S. Probe
for Iraq Arms," Washington Post, December 14, 2003, p.
A27.
133. Walter Pincus, "Basis for Arms Claims Affirmed,"
Washington Post, July 4, 2003; p. A20.
134. "Ex-Centcom head questions Iraq intelligence,"
Reuters, September 26, 2003.
135. Sonni Efron and Greg Miller, "Intelligence Veteran Faults
Iraq Arms Data," Los Angeles Times, October 29, 2003, p.
1.
136. Andrew Gumbel "Case for war confected, say top US
officials," Independent, 09 November 2003.
137. Richard Norton-Taylor and Julian Borger, "New theory for
Iraq's missing WMD: Saddam was fooled into thinking he had them,"
The Guardian, December 24, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1112467,00.html.
138. Francis Fukuyama, "The Real Intelligence Failure?" Wall
Street Journal, August 5, 2003.
139. Andrew F. Tully, "Iraq: U.S. Says Tractor-Trailers Prove
Hussein Had Weapons Program," Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, May 30, 2003.
140. "From Watergate To Weaponsgate: Interview with Watergate
Conspirator John Dean," BuzzFlash.com, June 17, 2003, http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/8128.
142. Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went
Wrong," The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004,
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/media-preview/pollack.htm.
142. For example, President Bush said "Last month, the leader of
Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all of his
regime's weapons of mass destruction programs, including a uranium
enrichment project for nuclear weapons. Colonel Qadhafi correctly
judged that his country would be better off and far more secure
without weapons of mass murder." Note. 124
143. "Wielders Of Mass Deception? There was a good case for
deposing Saddam Hussein, but Britain and America stretched it," and
"The More Deceived?: Tony Blair and George Bush exaggerated the
threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons," Economist, October
4-10, 2003.
144. Spencer Ackerman, "Spooked: The CIA gives up," New
Republic, December 29, 2003 - January 5/12, 2004, p. 15.Cohen's
statement is "Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft
Myths" is posted on the CIA website at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr11282003.html.
See also the transcript of "The Analyst," a question of national
intelligence," NIGHTLINE, ABC TV JANUARY 6, 2004, on which
Cohen appeared; and Mark Huband, "US Intelligence Chiefs To Defend
WMD Assessments," London Financial Times, January 9,
2004.
145. Peter Slevin, "Analysts: New Strategy Courts Unseen
Dangers," Washington Post, September 22, 2002, p. 1.
146. James Harding, "Albright laments 'rash exuberance' over
Iraq," Financial Times (U.S. Edition), September 27, 2002,
p. 2.
147. Daalder, "The Use of Force in a Changing World - U.S. and
European Perspectives," p. 9.
148. Jeremy Manier, "Gullibility: Why did most Americans accept
Iraq weapons charges? Chicago Tribune, June 15, 2003.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
151. Carl M. Cannon, "What Bush Said: Taken together, his
statements during the run-up to war reveal what drove his
decisions," National Journal, July 26, 2003.
152. Ibid.
153. Carl M. Cannon, "What Bush Said: Taken together, his
statements during the run-up to war reveal what drove his
decisions," National Journal, July 26, 2003.
154. NBC News Transcripts, Meet the Press (10:00 AM ET) - NBC
March 16, 2003.
155. Carl M. Cannon, "What Bush Said: Taken together, his
statements during the run-up to war reveal what drove his
decisions," National Journal, July 26, 2003.
156. David Wise, "If Bush Is Lying, He's Not The First,"
Washington Post, June 15, 2003, Pg. B1.
157. John McCarthy, "Senators were told Iraqi weapons could hit
U.S.: Nelson said claim made during classified briefing,"
FLORIDA TODAY, December 15, 2003, http://www.floridatoday.com/!NEWSROOM/localstoryN1216NELSON.htm.
This was actually previously mentioned by President Bush in a
speech on October 7, 2002. See "President Bush Outlines Iraqi
Threat," Remarks by the President on Iraq, Cincinnati Museum Center
- Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/iraq/20021007-8.html.
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