Executive Summary and Key Conclusions
BASIC RESEARCH REPORT 2004.2
September 2004
A Fistful of Contractors:
The Case for a Pragmatic Assessmentof Private Military Companies
in Iraq
By David Isenberg
The Executive Summary of A Fistful of Contractors is
reprinted in full below. Alternatively you can download the full
report or sections of the report in pdf format here:
- Part 1
- Acknowledgements
- Contents
- Executive Summary
- Control and accountability
- RECOMMENDATIONS
- Part 2
- Part 3
Executive Summary
Since the first civilian contractors started operating in Iraq
in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq there has been
growing public scrutiny of their activities. While most of the attention
has been paid to the activities of contractors doing reconstruction
work such as Halliburton, Parsons, Fluor, et cetera, growing attention
and concern has been paid to the operations of those private military
and security firms (herein referred as Private Military Companies,
or PMCs) who provide security for such firms, as well as for Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) workers, nongovernmental organizations,
and western media.
This BASIC Report provides an analysis of the PMC activities in
Iraq over the past year. To paraphrase the old Virginia Slims cigarette
commercial, PMCs have come a long way. Where as little as a decade
ago they were limited to African war zones they have now assumed
a leading role in the activities of the world's sole military superpower,
as well as being a front and center actor in the daily life of Iraq.
If there were an Oscar category for combat participants, PMCs would
certainly win the nomination for best supporting actor.
PMCs and their conduct are now out in the open, officially above
the horizon of public awareness, although concerns about transparency,
openness and regulatory oversight remain. An illustrative list of
PMCs operating in Iraq can be found in the Appendix. Their relative
numbers in the two Gulf Wars illustrate the increase in the use
of PMCs: during the first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor
there were 50 military personnel involved. In the 2003 conflict
the ratio was 1 to 10.
It seems likely that any proliferation of private security firms
will precede a period of consolidation as those companies that acquire
profitability absorb those that fail.
Scope of PMCs in Iraq
Nobody knows for certain how many PMCs are operating in Iraq. In
response to a request from Congress, a CPA-compiled report lists
60 PMCs with an aggregate total of 20,000 personnel (including U.S.
citizens, third-country nationals and Iraqis). But the CPA list
is incomplete. Missing, for example, are companies implicated in
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. Most of the armed personnel are the
14,000 Iraqi guards who work the oil field contract for Erinys.
Global Risk Strategies, said to be the largest PMC in Iraq, employs
1,000-1,200; Blackwater has about 600; SOC-SMG 300; Triple Canopy
about 350; Control Risks Group 750; Olive 265; DynCorp 175.
The total number of non-Iraqi PMC personnel is certainly less then
20,000. When the Erinys personnel are subtracted from the total,
the number is significantly less;perhaps as few as 6,000 security
contractors. And despite claims to the contrary, PMCs do not constitute
the second or third largest Army in Iraq, they are not coordinated
into one cohesive whole, nor do they engage in offensive operations.
PMCs provide three categories of services in Iraq: personal security
details for senior civilian officials, non-military site security
(buildings and infrastructure), and non-military convoy security.
Rather than working directly for the U.S. government or the CPA,
most PMCs are subcontracted to provide protection for prime contractor
employees, or are hired by other entities such as Iraqi companies
or private foreign companies seeking business opportunities in Iraq.
PMC operations tread the difficult line in providing protection
in a manner that meets the intricate demands of corporate, military
and government ethics, and come at significant cost. To date, at
least 58 non-Iraqi PMC personnel (excluding those who worked as
truck drivers and the like) have died. If one includes Iraqi PMC
personnel the toll is much larger. The PMC Erinys alone has had
about 21 killed and 26 wounded thus far.
Issues of concern
A drain on the regular armed services?
The lure of higher salaries is causing an exodus of U.S. and British
special forces to PMCs just as these military forces are being asked
to play an increasing role in combating terrorism and helping to
conduct nation-building operations worldwide. Competition over elite
troops from private companies is so intense that the U.S. and British
military commanders are formulating new pay, benefits, and educational
incentives to try to retain them.
Political influence
Political connections are important to PMCs when landing contracts.
Several companies, including Diligence LLC, The Steele Foundation
and CACI, have senior directors or advisors with high-level experience
or influence with current or former U.S. and British governments.
PMCs also extensively use political campaign donations and employ
lobbyists to influence government officials. In 2001, the ten leading
private military firms spent more than $32m on lobbying, while they
invested more than $12m in political campaign donations. Among the
leading donors were Halliburton, which gave more than $700,000 (during
1999-2002), 95 percent to Republicans, and DynCorp, which gave more
than $500,000, 72 percent to Republicans.
Control and accountability
U.S. government contracts with PMCs above $50m have to be reported
to Congress. Companies must comply with a set of arms transfer and
services rules called the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR). Accountability has been enough of a concern that members
of Congress wrote to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in April 2004 requesting
proper screening of security companies in Iraq. The CPA set some
initial minimum standards for regulating PMCs and new mandatory
guidelines are under consideration by the Iraqi Ministries of Interior
and Trade to vet and register PMCs. At the end of June 2004, Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz proposed guidelines for all U.S. Government contractors
working in Iraq and for US government offices supporting and coordinating
those contractors. It is intended to "provide an initial blueprint
for eventual adoption of common contractor coordination and security
rules for all nations providing contractors for the reconstruction
of Iraq."
Both the U.S. Congress and Senate are also directing the Pentagon
to develop new management guidelines for defense contractors in
Iraq and to provide a report on their activities. In Britain, where
pressure for public regulation is growing, the House of Commons
Defence Committee is to investigate the role of PMCs in Iraq.
The legal status of PMCs
PMCs have a somewhat ambiguous status under international law. While
PMC personnel are commonly and misleadingly referred to as mercenaries,
under definitions of international law (for example, Article 47,
Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention) they clearly
are not. Even with the new regulations under consideration by the
CPA, U.S. and British governments, it is likely that questions will
still remain over the combat status of PMC employees.
Inadequate vetting procedures can also be a problem. PMCs generally
subject potential employees to rigorous vetting, but such practice
is not universal, particularly in Iraq where demand for experienced
staff severely outruns supply.
Also, immunity provisions laid down by the CPA and carried forward
by the Iraqi interim government mean that PMCs enjoy protection
from local criminal prosecution. While new regulations are currently
under consideration, this immunity is set to continue possibly until
elections due in 2005. Finally, the arming of PMCs also raises a
number of accountability, small arms non-proliferation and safety
concerns. In Iraq, CPA rules restrict the weapons PMCs may use to
small arms with ammunition as large as 7.62mm and to some other
defensive weapons. However, some PMCs guarding foreign contractors
and sensitive installations are demanding the right to carry more
powerful weapons. U.S. Army regulations allow contractors performing
combat support services to carry weapons when required by their
combatant commander.
Lessons from Abu Ghraib
The torture and abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib horrified people around
the world and raised controversy over the role and activities of
PMC personnel in the intelligence and interrogation process. But
long before Abu Ghraib, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was preaching
the virtues of using contractors in prisons, citing the success
of private-run prisons in the United States. The number of PMC personnel
at Abu Ghraib is far from clear, but at least 37 interrogators from
private contractors were operating in the prison.
A whole series of mostly internal military investigations has been
conducted (some are still ongoing) in the United States as a result
of the revelations at Abu Ghraib. While much of the most relevant
material is still classified, at least two reports (The Taguba and
Jones-Fay Reports) implicate contractor personnel in the scandal.
A lack of proper vetting of PMC personnel has also been uncovered.
In the wake of the scandal a number of new laws and guidelines
have been proposed, including a new Contractor Accountability Bill
in the United States, a new oversight mechanism involving the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and new Pentagon rules regulating
contractors.
However, while over-reliance on private firms providing inadequately
trained personnel certainly contributed to the scandal at Abu Ghraib,
it is an issue that reflects broader policy failings. In short,
the Bush administration has tried to fight a war and nation-build
on the cheap. It has failed to commit the necessary number of trained
and qualified personnel and failed to supply the necessary resources
required for an occupation force under international law. In such
a scenario failure and criminal behavior by both private and public
actors was virtually inevitable.
Conclusions and recommendations
Overview of strengths and failings of PMCs in Iraq
PMCs have done reasonably well in fulfilling their contracts in
Iraq. They have performed difficult missions under trying circumstances.
Generally, their personnel have conducted themselves professionally
and are more in tune with the local culture than are regular U.S.
military forces. In several, little noted cases, they performed
above and beyond the call of duty.
But, with the advantage of hindsight it seems clear that a lack
of strategic planning has affected private sector operations in
Iraq in the same way it has affected the regular U.S. military.
Coordination of PMCs was deficient and they failed to be given sufficient
early warning before the war about how much their services would
be needed. The tendering process has been hasty with some contracts
awarded on the basis of lobbying or political influence. PMCs also
need a better understanding of the basic laws and regulations of
the country they operate in. When, as in the case of Iraq, they
are under contract to the U.S. government this becomes a governmental
responsibility.
Changes that need to be made in the light of experiences in Iraq
This report is premised on the belief that PMCs, whether we like
it or not, are here to stay for the foreseeable future. PMCs, like
regular military forces, are simply a means to an end, with advantages
and disadvantages. In Iraq, although they have not been error-free
they have generally performed better than they have been given credit
for. However, new or strengthened laws and regulations would benefit
all concerned: client states, hiring governments and companies,
as well as the PMCs themselves. Our recommendations fall within
two broad categories:
- Improved regulatory oversight; and
- Clarification of, and amendment to, international law in relation
to PMCs
Improved regulatory oversight in the United States
1. Congress should bring in auditors from other governmental agencies,
such as the inspector general offices of the various military services
or the Defense Contract Audit Agency, to handle the increased oversight
responsibilities.
2. The burden is not only on the PMC, but also on the client, in
this case mainly the U.S. government, to guard its own interests
and make sure the job is done right. Higher standards and greater
clarity need to be brought to bear on current and future U.S. military
outsourcing decisions.
3. Some of the provisions in the draft U.S. National Defense Authorization
bill are worthy and should be passed into law. In addition, PMCs
should take steps to ensure that the personnel recruited from third
countries receive the same notification and training as those recruited
from the PMC home country. And PMCs should pre-screen far more people
than they currently do, even if it means added expense. The role
of government in screening also needs to be reviewed and strengthened.
4. The loopholes in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA) need to be closed.
5. Industry-wide standards need to be established and enforced.
6. The U.S. government needs to:
- Increase the number of contracting officer deployments to a
theater where PMCs operate;
- Require competition rather than sole sourcing for future contracts;
- Punish former government contracting officers who violate regulations
on proper process; and
- Ban the hiring of firms that have been found to have overcharged
government in the past or have committed crimes in the contracting
process.
Clarification of international law in relation to PMCs
Currently, the status of PMCs under international law is, at best,
ambiguous. Most of their activities fall outside the mandate of
the 1989 U.N. Convention of Mercenaries, which was enacted to cover
such classic soldier-of-fortune activities as overthrowing a government.
Human rights laws, such as the Geneva Conventions, are more relevant,
but they are binding only on states, which reduce the formal legal
responsibilities of PMCs, as other private firms often hire them,
as well as states.
But the biggest obstacle to doing anything internationally is a
lack of political will. Most states find PMCs useful for implementing
their own foreign and military policies and oppose efforts to restrict,
let alone prohibit them. Thus, the most feasible legal changes that
can be expected are those that would enhance transparency in the
PMC sector and allow for greater regulation. Difficulties notwithstanding,
the following options should be considered:
- Extension of the International Court of Justice to PMC activities.
- Negotiation of a new 'Convention on the Use of Armed Non-Military
Contractors by an Occupying Force'; and
- Harmonization of national laws to create common standards and
to help the development of an eventual universal approach. The
harmonization process could begin among NATO member states.
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