Disease by Design

Appendix 2: Biological weapons resource list [169]

The Acronym Institute
Disarmament Diplomacy, the monthly journal of the Institute, contains excellent ongoing coverage of the Protocol negotiations in Geneva and related BW developments.

All the Virology on the WWW
A reference page with links to both independent and governmental BW sites.

The BTWC and its Protocol Website
Administered by Bradford University at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, this site gives accurate, up-to-date information on the BTWC Protocol.

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
A non-profit corporation established to promote the goals of arms control and non-proliferation, with a special focus on the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. Contains information on current events, a wide variety of publications from research to industry reports as well as information about CBACI’s research programmes.

Chemical and Biological Warfare Project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIRPI)
Contains the history of the CBW project, information on project publications, the BTWC text, papers and fact sheets, and some links. Good on-line educational module on CBW.

Center for Defense Information’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Site
Contains overviews of the BWC and CWC as well as relevant articles and position papers on certain topics.

Center for Disease Control and Prevention
A searchable site with many articles relating to biological weapon health issues, information on specific diseases, current news and information on publications.

Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies
Chemical and biological weapons resources including research reports, regional analyses, current news and position papers.

Centers for Civilian Bio-defense Studies at Johns Hopkins University
Seeks to educate about the medical and public health aspects of a bio-attack.

Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Program on Biological and Toxin Weapons Verification
Contains working and briefing papers, the BTWC text, information on current BW negotiations, an archive of project papers and a number of links.

GeneWatch UK
An independent non-governmental organisation concerned with the ethics and risks of genetic engineering. Has fact-sheets and reports on BW related issues.

The Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW (Chemical and Biological Warfare) Armament and Arms Limitation
Contains a link to back issues of the CBW Conventions Bulletin and a basic description of the programme and its goals.

The Henry L. Stimson Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Project
Contains a great deal of country- and area-specific information, relevant conventions, information on BW agents, and publications.

Joint University of Bradford/SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project
Great source for following the BTWC negotiations as well as good links.

PBS Frontline
Contains interviews with BW specialists, regional reports of BW stockpiles and accidents around the world, further readings and a discussion board.

Sunshine Project
A non-governmental organization specializing in analysis of developments in biotechnology. Has fact-sheets, press releases, backgrounders and reports on the BTWC, the Protocol negotiations and biological weapon research.

United States Department of State
The tasks of the former United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have been absorbed into the State Department, which has created three bureaus: The Bureau of Arms Control, The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and The Bureau of Verification and Compliance.

VERTIC
The Verification Research, Training & Information Centre, an independent, non-governmental organisation specialising in verification procedures around international agreements including those relating to BW.

Appendix 3: Anthrax attacks in US cities

3.1 The disease
Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by the spore-forming bacterium Bacilus anthracis. It occurs most frequently as an epizootic or enzootic disease of herbivores such as cattle, goats or sheep that acquire spores from direct contact with contaminated soil. Humans usually become infected through direct contact with B.anthracis spores from infected animals or their products resulting in cutaneous anthrax. The fatality rate from such cutaneous anthrax is 20 per cent without antibiotic treatment, though this declines to less than one per cent with prompt medical attention.[170]

Humans can also ingest anthrax spores usually by eating raw or undercooked contaminated meat and the resulting gastrointestinal form of the disease is fatal in 25-60 per cent of cases. The third and most lethal form of the disease is inhalational anthrax and results in the inspiration of some 8,000-50,000 B.anthracis spores. Case fatality estimates for inhalation anthrax are extremely high, even with all possible supportive care including appropriate antibiotics.[171]

Anthrax has been a favoured bio-weapon of states as it is less difficult to grow than other agents, and forms highly stable spores that can be stored as a powder or liquid sludge for years without degradation. Furthermore, anthrax cannot be spread from person to person and could therefore be used in a military campaign where soldiers would eventually have to occupy contaminated land. The weaponisation of anthrax has also been attempted by a number of terrorist groups.

3.2 The attacks
On 4 October 2001, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and state and local public health authorities reported a case of inhalation anthrax in Florida. The victim, a picture editor for a tabloid newspaper, later died in hospital. The anthrax seems to have come from a letter sent to the newspaper’s offices. Following screenings of co-workers and associates further cases of anthrax exposure were subsequently confirmed. Similar letters containing anthrax appear to have been sent to New York based news media and to the Washington office of Senator Daschle, the Democratic majority leader in the US Senate. Following the discovery of anthrax spores news media offices, Senate and government buildings were evacuated, Congress was suspended and thousands of people were screened for exposure to the anthrax spores.

At the time of writing there have been:

Four confirmed deaths of inhalation anthrax - the Florida picture editor, two other fatal cases involving postal workers handling government mail and a nurse in New York;
Three other cases of inhalation anthrax, two postal workers in Virginia and a newspaper mailroom employee in Florida;
Six confirmed cases of the less dangerous cutaneous anthrax – two New York postal workers and four victims connected to national news media based in New York; and
31 confirmed cases of anthrax exposure in the Capitol complex.

Federal, state and local health departments have been working with the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention to treat victims, undertake epidemiological investigations and environmental sampling and monitoring. The latest CDC report indicated "that four confirmed cases of anthrax had resulted from intentional delivery of B.anthracis spores through mailed letters or packages. These are the first confirmed cases of anthrax associated with intentional exposure in the United States and represent a new public health threat."[172]

An intensive FBI investigation is now underway to find the perpetrators of the anthrax attacks. On 18 October 2001 the FBI Director, Robert Mueller, offered a one million dollar reward for information concerning the perpetrators of the attacks, and he called on the public "to assist us in this fight against terrorism."[173]

No one has as yet admitted responsibility for the attacks and to date no one has been arrested or charged with these offences. Suspects however abound. They range from Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network and sympathisers to US right wing extremists. Furthermore, much of the speculation has been built on conjecture that the anthrax was so-called ‘weapons-grade’ – of high purity, optimal particle size and containing a chemical additive designed to aid aerosolisation and dispersal. If this turns out to be the case, it would indicate a more sophisticated production facility and point towards some form of state involvement – either knowingly through sponsoring the terrorist act, or unknowingly as a result of ‘leakage’ of biological agents or expertise from government run projects. To date, however, there has been no definitive confirmation as to the origin of the anthrax.

3.3 Public response
On 25 October 2001, Robert Mueller, director of the FBI, told an emergency meeting of US mayors that his agency was "deeply concerned about the growing waves of anthrax attacks and related issues. It is not clear if the few confirmed anthrax exposures were motivated by organized terrorism, but these attacks were clearly meant to terrorise a country already on the edge."[174]

On the same day the US Postmaster General John Potter announced the approval of a $175 million federal grant for irradiation equipment commonly used in food sterilization to be installed throughout the mail system. However, "there are no guarantees our mail is safe" he said, warning people to handle deliveries with care and wash their hands afterwards.

Public fear in the United States deepened following the discovery of anthrax spores in part of the mail system handling letters to the White House, leading President Bush to appear on national television to reassure US citizens that he did not have anthrax.

Although the anthrax attacks hit targets in the United States, hoaxes, threats and false alarms are now occurring worldwide, including Israel, China, Pakistan, Kenya and Hungary.[175] In New York, hoax letters containing powder were sent to the United Nations, in Australia hoaxes closed down the National Parliament buildings, and in Hong Kong a plane was grounded over the discovery of suspect powder later found to be coffee whitener. In the United Kingdom, the London Stock Exchange was temporarily closed down and workers screened after a letter containing white powder was discovered and subsequently at least 100 anthrax false alarms have been reported every day to the police in London alone.[176] Such incidents have drained public resources and have in turn fed further public fear. Danny Defenbaugh, special agent in charge of the FBI bureau in Dallas, Texas, said that in 72 hours his office alone had responded to 180 anthrax related calls.[177]

In the United States and elsewhere sales of gas masks, biohazard suits and pharmaceutical prophalactics have outstripped supply. Use of antibiotics has itself become a serious potential health danger. The World Health Organisation (WHO) stated that officials were "deeply alarmed" at reports that people in the United States were buying up stocks of Ciprofloxacin (or Cipro), an antibiotic used to treat anthrax: "Our advice to them is: Please don’t." Cipro is one of a family of antibiotics that could be used to treat a range of diseases other than anthrax and to use it too readily will compromise its effectiveness by developing drug-resistant pathogens. Diseases that were once easily treatable, such as malaria, tuberculosis and gonorrhea, are again becoming killers because they have developed resistance to most common antibiotics.[178]

3.4 Governmental response
Governments are trying to calm their citizens’ fears and develop comprehensive and integrated strategies and infrastructure to combat bio-terrorism. Such strategies include measures to tighten security, especially of the postal systems and strategic sites, and development of emergency response teams. Germany, for example, has set up a satellite based early warning system linking the Interior Ministry with civil protection headquarters in federal states and with broadcasting centres; France has adopted a programme called Biotox to protect water supplies, chemical plants and other sensitive sites; while South Korea has allocated $53.7 million toward creating an anti-bioterrorism task force.

In the wake of the 11 September attacks the US administration established the Office of Homeland Security to "develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks". The Secretary for Homeland Security Governor Tom Ridge stated that combating bioterrorism was the number one priority this week and for the weeks ahead. "I think one of the reasons the president called me to action was that we have a new world, a much more complex world. We have enemies that would use bioterrorism".[179]

At the heart of the national and international responses has been the strengthening of national public health planning, disease detection and emergency medical response preparedness. National health departments and institutes have been sending detailed instructions on how to diagnose and treat anthrax to doctors, most of whom would rarely have come across this disease other than in textbooks. Once again in this response the United States leads the way.

At the heart of the US response is the work of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In order to accelerate HHS bio-terrorism preparedness an extra $1.5 billion has been requested from Congress to complement HHS’ regular fiscal year 2002 budget request of $345 million.[180] The total request of $1.9 billion represents more than a six-fold increase above the $297 million Congress appropriated in fiscal year 2001 for HHS’ bio-terrorism preparedness efforts. The emergency request includes:

$643 million to expand the national pharmaceutical and antibiotic stockpile to ensure that up to 12 million people would be protected from anthrax exposure;
$509 million to speed development and purchase of smallpox vaccine. Currently more than 15 million doses of smallpox vaccine are available. The additional funds will allow the production and stockpiling of up to 300 million doses – enough for to inoculate every US citizen;
$175 million to boost state and local preparedness for bio-terrorism, including money for locally based testing labs, early disease detection, and increased numbers of trained scientists. This includes $50 million to help hospitals prepare for bio-terrorism; and
$61 million to employ an extra 410 Food and Drug Administration inspectors. A recent report from the General Accounting Office warned that the FDA currently inspects only 1 per cent of all food under its jurisdiction that is entering the United States.

There has also been a strengthening of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to combat bio-terrorism and develop international disease monitoring and response initiatives. For example, on 10 October 2001 the HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson and the UK Minister of Health Alan Milburn MP, signed an agreement to collaborate on fighting bio-terrorism.[181] Under the agreement the two countries will carry out mutual efforts in emergency planning, including enhanced capacities for detection of biological incidents, prevention

of mass casualties from any such event, and effective treatment for any disease inflicted deliberately. Specific areas for collaboration included joint scenario planning, disease sur-veillance and early diagnosis, treatment for novel diseases and appropriate vaccine capacity.

In addition, on 21 September 2001 a Plan of Action was adopted at an Extraordinary European Council meeting to bring forward a new Civil Protection Mechanism for combating terrorist attacks which includes:[182]

The creation of a group of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) experts, available 24 hours a day to assist any country which requests help;
Reinforcement of the current network of 24-hour contact points for dealing with requests for, or offers of assistance; and
Enhanced cooperation on information sharing concerning antidotes, vaccines, antibiotics, and access to hospital treatment for any victims of such attacks.

The Commission and the Member States are also finalising a surveillance and control network for transmissible diseases including an early warning and rapid response system.

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Endnotes

[1] For elements of the history of biowarfare see: ‘Biological Warfare’, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, SIPRI, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).

[2] Block, ‘The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons’, American Scientist Vol. 89, no. 1 (January/February 2001); Harris, ‘The Japanese biological warfare programme: an overview’, in Geissler and Van Courtland Moon, eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons, op.cit.

[3] Mangold & Goldberg, Plague Wars, The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999). Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelsman, Biohazard: the chilling true story of the largest covert biological weapons program in the world – told from the inside by the man who ran it, (New York: Random House, 1999)

[4] Matthew Meselson, Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology, Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Bulletin (CBWCB), No.48, June 2000

[5] Leitenberg, ‘An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States’, Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, July 2000; and Leitenberg, ‘Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform US House of Representatives, 12th October 1999’, available at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/oct12tes.htm.

[6] See ‘Biological Weapons Primer’, Federation of American Scientists, available at http://fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/index.html; and Pearson, The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century, Henry L.Stimson Centre Report No.24, available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/disease.htm; Medical Microbiology, Dr Samuel Brown, ed., http://www.gsbs.utmb.edu/microbook; ‘Biological Weapons Technology Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies’ available at http://www.dtic.mil/mctl; NATO handbook on the medical aspects of NBC defensive operations part II – biological.

[7] Robinson, Heden and von Schreeb, ‘The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare’, CB Weapons Today, Vol II, 1973.

[8] Leitenberg, ‘An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States’, Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, July 2000

[9] Ibid.

[10] It should be noted that certain organisms such as anthrax can survive for years in the environment

[11] Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson, 1996). p93–4. See also US Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 104th Cong., 1st sess., S. Hrg.104–422, Part I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996) as cited in ‘The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century’, Graham Pearson, Henry L.Stimson Centre Report No.24, ‘Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action’, January 1998

[12] Pearson, op. cit., Federation of American Scientists, op. cit.

[13] Pearson, ‘The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century’, op. cit.

[14] US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, ‘Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks’, OTA-ISC-559, August 1993; Report of the Secretary General, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use’, A/7575/Rev.1, S/9292/Rev.1, 1969.

[15] On 2 April 1979, there was an unusual anthrax outbreak which affected 94 people and killed at least 64 of them in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg). The Soviet government claimed the deaths were caused by intestinal anthrax from tainted meat. In 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged that the outbreak was caused by an accidental release of anthrax spores from a Soviet military microbiological facility. See: ‘The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979’, Meselson, Guillemin, Hugh-Jones, Langmuir, Popova, Shelokov and Yampolskaya, Science, 18 November 1994; ‘Sverdlovsk Outbreak: A Portent of Disaster, Venter’, Janes Intelligence Review, 1 May 1998; Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, Guillemin, (University of California Press, 1999);

[16] Zanders, Karlsson, Melin, Näslund and Tahning, ‘Risk Assessment of terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[17] Testimony of Gen Colin Powell, ‘Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act FYI 1994 – HR 2401’, 103rd Cong.1st sess, H201-33.

[18] For an in-depth discussion of asymmetric warfare see: Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century, (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

[19] US Department of Defense, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001. Available at http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhc263.html. Report available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/

[20] US Department of Defense, William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997. Available at http://www.defencelink.mil/pubs/qdr/

[21] US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 1st October 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf

[22] Summarised from: Carina Dennis, ‘The Bugs of War’, Nature, 17 May 2001; Whitby, Millet and Dando, ‘The Potential for Abuse of Genetics in Militarily Significant Biological Weapons’, paper presented at Genewatch conference: ‘Biological Weapons and the New Genetics – Avoiding the Threat’, London, 18 May 2001; Wheelis and Dando, ‘New technology and future developments in biological warfare’, Disarmament Forum No.4 2000; Genewatch ‘Biological weapons and genetic technologies’, briefing 1, September 2000; Matthew Meselson, ‘Averting the exploitation of biotechnology’, Harvard-Sussex Program, http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/junemesel.htm

[23] As cited in ‘New Technology and Future Developments in Biological Warfare’, Wheelis and Dando, Disarmament Forum, Four, 2000.

[24] See Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard, (Random House, 1999); Alibek ‘Behind the Mask: Biological Warfare’, Perspective Vol. 9, no. 1 (September /October 1998).

[25] Carina Dennis, ‘The Bugs of War’, Nature, 17 May 2001

[26] Bartfai, Ludin and Rybeck, ‘Benefits and threats of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering’, SIPRI Yearbook 1993; Dando, ‘Benefits and threats of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000.

[27] The Royal Society, ‘Measures for controlling the threat from biological weapons’, 2000.

[28] Summarised from: Zanders, French and Pauwels, ‘Chemical and biological developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 1999. For more information, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, 29 October 1998, http://www.truth.org.za/report/index.htm

[29] See Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) for latest information on the Basson Trial. CCR are monitoring the trial until its expected conclusion in Spring 2002. http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/cbw/cbw_index.html

[30] These included the use of Anthrax in cigarettes and bolinum in milk and paraoxon in whiskey, many of which were developed at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, a front company, whose head researcher was Dr Immelman. Dr Immelman described the development of these assassination tools in an affidavit provided to the TRC. For more info see Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, 29 October 1998, http://www.truth.org.za/report/index.htm

[31] Summarised from Whitby, Millet and Dando, op. cit; and Millet and Whitby, ‘State agro-biological warfare programmes’, unpublished paper; Cameron, Pate & Vogel, ‘Planting Fear, how real is the threat of agricultural terrorism?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2001, http://www.thebulletin.org

[32] Dr Ken Alibek, as former first deputy director of Biopreparat, was a high ranking official in the Soviet BW programme. He defected to the United States in 1992.

[33] Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: the chilling true story of the largest covert biological weapons program in the world – told from the inside by the man who ran it, (Random House, 1999), pp37-38, 301; Ken Alibek, ‘The Soviet Union’s anti-agricultural biological weapons’, Food and Agricultural Security, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol 894, 1999; Jonathan Ban, ‘Agricultural biological warfare: an overview’, The Arena, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, no. 9, June 2000.

[34] Geissler and Van Courtland Moon, op. cit.

[35] Harris in Geissler and Van Courtland Moon, op. cit.

[36] During the decontamination programme the 520 acre island was soaked in 280 tonnes of formaldehyde diluted in 2000 tonnes of seawater. Topsoil was also removed in sealed containers. See BBC News Online, 25th July, http://news.bbc.co.uk; Bioweapons tests tainted sites around the globe. Choffnes, Germs on the loose, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001, Vol 57, No. 2, http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ma01choffnes.html

[37] Mayer, ‘Biological Weapons – A Poor Man’s Nuke’, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1995.

[38] Block, op. cit.; Meselson, ‘Averting the Exploitation of Biotechnology’, CBW Conventions Bulletin, June 2000.

[39] Remarks announcing decisions on chemical and biological defense policies and programs, 25th November 1969, http://www.nixonfoundation.org

[40] Meselson, op. cit

[41] Meselson, op. cit

[42] See Alibek & Handelman, Biohazard, (Random House, 1999); Alibek ‘Behind the Mask: Biological Warfare’, Perspective Vol. 9, no. 1 (September /October 1998).

[43] See Block, op. cit.; ‘Bioterrorism Concerns Spark First Smallpox Vaccine Production in 30 Years’, CBW Chronicle, Vol. 3, no. 2, December 2000.

[44] Fyodorov, L., ‘Death from the test tube’, New Times, September 1998, pp.22-36; Miller, J. and Broad, W.J., ‘Germ weapons: in Soviet Past or in the new Russia’s future’, New York Times, 28 December 1998. As cited in SIPRI Yearbook 1999.

[45] Dahlburg, ‘Russian admits it violated pact on biological warfare’, Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1992.

[46] George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security, 21 March 2000. Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2000/dci_speech_032100.html

[47] See: ‘Central Intelligence Agency Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 31 Dec 2000’, September 2001, http:www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm; Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’, January 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf; ‘Biological Weapons Proliferation’, 9 June 2000, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/200005_e.html

[48] Ibid.

[49] Judith Miller, ‘Afghan Plant Has Potential Worrying Bush’, New York Times, 28 September 2001.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Taylor, ‘All fall down’, The New Scientist, 11 May 1996.

[52] Sharon Begley, ‘Unmasking Bioterror’, Newsweek, 8 October 2001.

[53] Information compiled from press reports and: Lewis, ‘From UNSCOM to UNMOVIC: The United Nations and Iraq’, Disarmament Forum, volume two, 2001; Pearson, ‘The Threat of Deliberate Disease’, op.cit.; Wahlberg, Leitenberg and Zanders, ‘The future of chemical and biological disarmament in Iraq: from UNSCOM to UNMOVIC’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2000); Smithson, ‘Man Versus Microbe. The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention’, http://www.stimson.org/pubs/cwc/cbwb.pdf; Zanders, ‘The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: A Threat Assessment’, op. cit.

[54] Presentation by Dr Kelly at Genewatch conference: ‘Biological Weapons and the New Genetics – Avoiding the Threat’, London, 18 May 2001.

[55] UN Security Council Resolution 687, 1991.

[56] Letter to UN Secretary General from Ambassador Abdul Amir Al-Anabari of Iraq, dated 18 April 1991, as quoted in Black, ‘The UN Special Commission and CBW Verification’, Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, no 32, June 1996; and Pearson, op. cit.

[57] United Nations, ‘Inspection team reports on Iraq’s BW capacity’, UN press release, 14 August 1991 as quoted in Pearson, op. cit

[58] First Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, S/23165, 25 October 1991

[59] United Nations, document 214-S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, 771 as cited in Pearson, op. cit.

[60] See Raymond A. Zilinskas, ‘Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 278, no. 5, 6 August 1997, pp418-421; Smith, ‘Iraq’s Drive for a Biological Arsenal,’ as cited by Amy Smithson, op. cit.

[61] United Nations, document 214-S/1995/864, 11 October 1995, 771 as cited in Pearson, op. cit

[62] ‘UN agency revives Iraq arms fears’, Financial Times, 2 March 2001; ‘Missiles and viruses still troubling UN’, Financial Times, 2 March 2001.

[63] UN Still Fears Lethal Iraqi Arsenal, Financial Times, 2 March 2001

[64] Ibid.

[65] Information compiled from Pearson, ‘The Threat of Deliberate Disease’; Zanders, Hersh, Simon and Wahlberg, ‘Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2001; Zanders and Wahlberg, ‘Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000; Zanders, ‘The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: A Threat Assessment’, op. cit.; Meselson, op. cit; and SIPRI Yearbook 1999.

[66] Lilja, Petra; Roffey, Roger and Westerdahl, Kristina S., Disarmament or retention: is the Soviet biological weapons programme continuing in Russia?, FOA:Umea, Dec 1999.

[67] See ‘News Section’, Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.52, http://fas-www.Harvard.edu/~hsp/

[68] Eland, ‘Protecting the Homeland: The Best Defense is to Give no Offence’, Policy Analysis no.306, Cato Institute, May 1998.

[69] Amy Smithson interviews with US government officials, conducted 19 May and 4 October 1999, Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes, (Washington, DC: Henry L Stimson Center, December 1999).

[70] Leitenberg, ‘An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States’, Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, July 2000

[71] Zanders, French and Pauwels, ‘Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control’, SIPRI Yearbook 1999.

[72] Alibek, ‘Behind the Mask: Biological Warfare’, op. cit.

[73] For a discussion of the ‘new terrorism’ see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Colombia University Press, September 1999); Bruce Hoffman, ‘Change and continuity in terrorism’, presented at Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT, 17 April 2000, www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.html

[74] See Zanders, Karlsson, Melin, Naslund and Thaning, ‘Risk assessment of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons’, SIPRI Yearbook 2000.

[75] Ibid.; Roberts, US Institute for Defence Analyses, cited in Michael Mates, ‘Biological Weapon: The Threat of the new Century?’, United Kingdom Rapporteur, Nato Parliamentary Assembly, Sub-Committee on the Proliferation of Military Technology, October 1999.

[76] Research by Macintyre has shown that the majority of the 5,000 plus "casualties" were in fact suffering from shock, emotional upset or showed some psychosomatic symptom, rather than the direct effects of poisoning . Macintyre, ‘Weapons of mass destruction: events with contaminated casualties – planning for health care facilities’, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 283, no. 2, January 2000.

[77] As well as its biological weapons programme, Aum Shinrikyo had amassed enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million people. In addition, Aum had either already produced or had plans to develop other powerful nerve agents such as VX, tabun and soman, and chemical weapons such as mustard gas and sodium cyanide. They had even purchased a 500,000 acre sheep station in a remote part of Western Australia in the hope of mining Uranium in order to develop a nuclear capability.

[78] ‘BCW in Attack Scenario’ in Drell, Sofaer, Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons 1991, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999).

[79] Leitenberg notes that Aum Shinryko had: (i) virtually unlimited funds - $10 million - to procure appropriate equipment, which they did through front companies; (ii) adequate facilities, and four years in which to work undisturbed; (iii) a dozen people with graduate training, not all in the appropriate disciplines, but with the kind of academic training which in theory should have been sufficient; and (iv) attempted to buy assistance and technology in the former Soviet Union to aid their efforts to produce both chemical and biological weapons. However, despite the expenditure of several million dollars, they appear to have come away empty-handed, certainly in so far as obtaining information concerning biological weapons. Leitenberg, ‘An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States’, Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, July 2000; and Leitenberg, ‘Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform US House of Representatives, 12th October 1999’, available at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/oct12tes.htm

[80] According to Leitenberg (op. cit.), all attempts at producing anthrax failed as the group had obtained a culture of a non-virulent, denatured vaccine strain of the organism.

[81]Zanders, ‘The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: A Threat Assessment’, Disarmament Forum, No.4, 2000.

[82] See Centre for Non Proliferation Studies web site, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/

[83] See for example: ‘Anthrax threat closes Ala.clinic’, 3 Jan 2000, ‘More threats to abortion clinics’, 4 Jan 2000, ‘Anthrax threat closes Ohio clinic’, 4 Jan 2000, Associated Press - all cited in Zanders, Karlsson, Melin, Naslund and Thaning, op. cit

[84] Information supplied to author by Jason Pate, Centre for Non Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

[85] Smithson and Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response, (Washington, DC: Henry Stimson Centre, October 2000). See also the web site at the centre for non proliferation studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/

[86] See for example Zanders Karlsson, Melin, Naslund and Thaning, op. cit.

[87] Smithson and Levy, op. cit.

[88] Leitenberg, ‘Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform US House of Representatives, 12th October 1999’, available at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/oct12tes.htm

[89] Leitenberg, ‘Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform US House of Representatives, 12th October 1999’, available at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/oct12tes.htm

[90] Leitenberg, ‘An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States’, Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, July 2000

[91] Gilmore Panel Report, 1999, cited in Smithson and Levy, op. cit.

[92] Leitenberg, ‘An Assessment of the Biological Weapons Threat to the United States’, Conference on Emerging Threats Assessment: Biological Terrorism, Institute for Security Technology Studies, July 2000.

[93] See, for example, Zanders, Karlsson, Melin, Naslund and Thanning, op. cit.

[94] Leitenberg, ‘Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform US House of Representatives, 12th October 1999’, available at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/oct12tes.htm

[95] ‘The threat of Bioterrorism’, Strategic Forum, no: 127:1, September 1997 as cited by Seth Carus in ‘Protecting the Homeland’, Policy Analysis, May 1998.

[96] See: Pearson, ‘Why Biological Weapons Present the Greatest Danger’, paper presented at 7th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Stockholm, 15-19 June 2001, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc

[97] Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925, available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/keytext/genprot.htm

[98] Ibid.

[99] Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), available at the SIPRI website, http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-text.html. The Soviet Union/ Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States are the three depositories of the Convention.

[100] See Appendix 1 for states that have signed, ratified, and for non signatories.

[101] Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan,Cameroon, Chad,Comoros, Cook Islands, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Holy See, Israel, Kazakstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federal States of), Moldova (Republic of), Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, (Western),Sudan ,Tajikistan,Trinidad and Tobago,Tuvalu, Zambia.

[102] Information taken from Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW Verification, ‘Gradual Phase-in of Protocol Measures, Revised October 2000’.

[103] See SIPRI web site for the full text of declarations and reservations by signatories to the Convention at http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc.

[104] See Nicholas Sims, ‘Verifying Nuclear Disarmament: towards a protocol and organisation’ in Trevor Findlay, ed., Verification Yearbook 2000, (London: The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), December 2000), pp. 87-97.

[105] For more information see: Australia Group web site at http://www.australiagroup.net and ‘Federation of American Scientists Fact sheet’, 28 October 1997; SIPRI Yearbook 2000.

[106] As of 1-4 October 2001 AG meeting, the following states participate in the AG: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Community Commission (Observer).

[107] United Nations, letter dated 5 July 1996 from the Permament Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, A/51/208, S/1996/543, 12 July 1996.

[108] United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/164, 15 December 1997.

[109] SIPRI Yearbook 1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[110] Ibid.

[111] Zanders, Hersh, Simon and Wahlberg, ‘Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control’, SPIRI Yearbook 2001.

[112] The Daily Telegraph, 10 December 1999.

[113] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. Pursuant to FY 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 105-85), 18 May 2000, pp47-51, 58-65 (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/terfund.htm).

[114] Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response: Recommendations of the CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup, 21 April 2000, pp1-14. (http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4904a1.htm).

[115] ‘Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities’, General Accounting Office, GAO-01-915, 28 September 2001 (http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?gao-01-915).

[116] See, for example, ‘NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and the Way Ahead’, NATO Press Release (95) 124, 29 November 1995.

[117] Cohen, US Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997.

[118] Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. Pursuant to FY 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 105-85), 18 May 2000, pp47-51, 58-65 (http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/terfund.htm).

[119] ‘Bioterrorism Concerns Spark First Smallpox Vaccine Production in 30 Years, CBW Chronicle, Vol. 3, no. 2, December 2000.

[120] Laurie McGinley, Wall Street Journal, 1 October 2001.

[121] Summarised from Chyba, ‘Biological Terrorism and Public Health’, Survival, Vol. 43, no.1, Spring 2001.

[122] See: ‘Responding to the deliberate use of biological agents and chemicals as weapons, Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response’, World Health Organisation, http://www.who.int/emc/deliberate_epi.html

[123] According to the CDC plan, the following outcomes are expected by 2004: (i) US public health agencies and health-care providers will be prepared to mitigate illness and injuries that result from acts of biological and chemical terrorism; (ii) Public health surveillance for infectious diseases and injuries – including events that might indicate terrorist activity – will be timely and complete, and reporting of suspected terrorist events will be integrated with the evolving, comprehensive networks of the national public health surveillance system; (iii) The national laboratory response network for bioterrorism will be extended to include facilities in all 50 states. The network will include CDC’s environmental health laboratory for chemical terrorism and four regional facilities; (iv) State and federal public health departments will be equipped with state-of-the-art tools for rapid epidemiological investigation and control of suspected or confirmed acts of biological or chemical terrorism, and a designated stock of terrorism-related medical supplies will be available through a national pharmaceutical stockpile; and (v) A cadre of well-trained health-care and public health workers will be available in every state. Their terrorism-related activities will be coordinated through a rapid and efficient communication system that links U.S. public health agencies and their partners.

[124] Sheryl Stolberg, ‘Some see US as Vulnerable in Germ Attack’, New York Times, 30 September 2001.

[125] Article 1, Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention

[126] United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, BWC/CONF.III/23, Geneva 1992.

[127] BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9, Geneva 1993.

[128] Final Declaration of the Final Report, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 19-30 September 1994

[129] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp 8, article 6

[130] Provision is also made in the draft Protocol for voluntary assistance visits where states request a visit for the purposes of receiving technical advice or assistance.

[131] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp 8, article 6.a

[132] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp 8, article 6.b, clause 30 (a)

[133] Oliver Meier, Vertic, ‘Comments on the Verification Provisions in the ‘Composite Text’ for a Compliance Protocol to the BWC’, Presented at the meeting of EU delegations and NGOs, 25 April 2001, Palais des Nations, Geneva, http://www.vertic.org

[134] See for example ‘Summary of PhRMA’s position on a compliance protocol to the biological weapons convention’, 24 September 1998.

[135] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Cr8, article 9.a

[136] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Cr8, article 9

[137] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Cr8, article 9.d & f

[138] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp.8, article 9.g

[139] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp 8, article 16

[140] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp.8, article 13

[141] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp.8, article 14

[142] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp.8, article 14.c

[143] BWC/Ad Hoc Group/Crp.8, article 14.d

[144] Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties, Geneva, Switzerland, 25 July 2001.

[145] Philip Reeker, US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 25 July 2001. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/index.cfm?docid=4288

[146] For a full forensic analysis of the US statement see: Graham Pearson, Malcolm Dando & Nicholas Sims, ‘The US rejection of the composite Protocol: a huge mistake based on illogical assessments’, University of Bradford (http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc).

[147] Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, interview with CNN, 28 July 2001, 1730.

[148] ‘Germ Warfare Talks Fold in Wake of US Withdrawal’, Chicago Tribune, 5 August 2001.

[149] Statement by Avis Bohlen, US Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, First Committee, UN General Assembly, 10 October 2001, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org

[150] Statement by the President, Strengthening the International Regime against Biological Weapons, 1 November 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011101.html

[151] Graham Pearson, Malcolm Dando & Nicholas Sims, ‘The US rejection of the composite Protocol: a huge mistake based on illogical assessments’, University of Bradford, (http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc).

[152] ‘Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, what next for the Ad Hoc Group?’, CBWCB, No.53, September 2001 (http://fas-www.harvard.edu/~hsp).

[153] See: Miller, Broad and Engelberg, Germs: Biological Weapons and Americas Secret War (Simon and Schuster, 2001); Miller, Engleberg and Broad, ‘In Secretly Fighting Germ Warfare, US Tests Limits of a 1972 Treaty’, New York Times, 4 September 2001; Judith Miller, ‘When Is A Bomb Not A Bomb? Germ Experts Confront US’, New York Times, 5 September 2001; ‘US Anthrax Plan Worries Russians’, Associated Press, 5 September 2001; ‘International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted’, Arms Control Today, October 2001 (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/bwoct01.asp).

[154] See: Miller, Broad and Engelberg, Germs: Biological Weapons and Americas Secret War (Simon and Schuster, 2001); Miller, Engleberg and Broad, ‘In Secretly Fighting Germ Warfare, US Tests Limits of a 1972 Treaty’, New York Times, 4 September 2001;

[155] ‘International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted’, Arms Control Today, October 2001

[156] Ibid.

[157] ‘When Is A Bomb Not A Bomb? Germ Experts Confront US’, New York Times, 5 September 2001

[158] ‘International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted’, Arms Control Today, October 2001 ( http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/bwoct01.asp).

[159] Summarised from Pearson, ‘The Fifth BTWC Review Conference: Opportunities and Challenges’, in Pearson and Dando, eds., ‘Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Review Conference Paper’, No.20, April 2001 available at http:///www/brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/rcp1.pdf; Sims, ‘The functions of the BTWC review conferences: maximizing the benefits from the Fifth Review Conference’, in Pearson and Dando, eds., ‘Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Review Conference Paper’, No.2, March 2001; ‘Opportunities for the Fifth Review Conference’, Disarmament Forum no.4 2000; ‘Closing loopholes in the Bioweapons Convention’, Backgrounder 5, Sunshine Project, April 2001.

[160] Backgrounder 5, Sunshine Project April 2001; See also JR Campbell, US Naval Research laboratory, ‘Defense Against Biodegradation of Military Material’, presentation at the 3rd Non-Lethal Defense Symposium at the John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Feb 1998 (http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/NLD3/camp.pdf).

[161' See: Non-lethal weapons research in the US: calmatives and malodorants, Backgrounder 8, Sunshine Project, July 2001; Alternative anti-personnel mines: the next generations, Landmine Action, March 2001, http://www.landmine.de/fix/english_report.pdf

[162] Zanders, Hersh, Simon and Wahlberg, ‘Anti-drug crop biological agent development, Chemical and Biological Arms Control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2001; ‘Risks of Using Biological Agents in Drug Eradication’, Sunshine Project, February 2001; Genewatch, ‘Biological Weapon and the New Genetics’, Briefing 1, September 2000.

[163] Ibid.

[164] See Graham Pearson, ‘Opportunities for the Fifth Review Conference’, Disarmament Forum, Four, 2001.

[165] See: Nicholas Sims, ‘Nuturing the BWC: Agenda For The Fifth Review Conference and Beyond, CBW Conventions Bulletin, no 53, September 2001; Disarmament Diplomacy, no 58, June 2001; ‘Interim supportive institutions for the Biological Weapons convention’, paper presented by Nicholas Sims at the 14th workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the implementation of the Chemical and Biological Conventions, Geneva, 18 November 2000.

[166] Testimony to Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, 10 July 2001 (http:/www.house.gov/reform/ns/web_resources/shays_pr_july_10.htm).

[167] See: Matthew Meselson, ‘Averting the exploitation of biotechnology’, Harvard-Sussex Program, (http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/junemesel.htm); and ‘Strengthening the biological weapons convention’, CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 42, December 1998 (http://www.fas.harvard.edu).

[168] Table compiled from: BTWC and Protocol website, www.opbw.org; BTWC non signatories, SIPRI, http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-nonsig.html

[169] Based on resource list compiled by Joshua Margolin, Disarmament Forum No. 4 2000.

[170] Brachman and Kaufmann, ‘Anthrax’, in Evans and Brachman, eds., Bacterial infections of humans, (Plenum Medical Book Company, 1998); Brachman, ‘Inhalation anthrax’, Annal of NY Academy of Science 1980, p353.

[171] Ibid.

[172] ‘Update: Investigation of anthrax associated with intentional exposure and interim public health guidelines’, October 2001, CDC, 19 October 2001 (http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm504a1/htm).

[173] Buncombe and Smith, ‘US offers $1m reward over anthrax mailings’, The Independent, 19 October 2001.

[174] Fenton, ‘Mail alert as anthrax hits six more workers’, Daily Telegraph, 25 October 2001.

[175] For more information see: ‘Anthrax alerts around the world’, The Guardian, 19 October 2001; ‘Nations rush to meet germ war threat’, International Herald Tribune, 19 October 2001; ‘Anthrax letter spreads panic around world’, Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2001.

[176] ‘London has 100 false alarms each day, claim police’, The Independent, 26 October 2001.

[177] ‘Anthrax letter spreads panic around world’, Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2001.

[178] ‘World Health Organisation stresses need for continued public vigilance in responding to deliberate infections’, 18 October 2001 ( http://www.who.int/inf-pr-2001/en/pr2001-44.html).

[179] Tom Ridge interview with Tom Brokaw, NBC News, 16 October 2001.

[180] US Department of Health and Human Services Press Release, 17 October 2001.

[181] ‘US and UK sign agreements to collaborate on health care quality and fighting bioterrorism’, HHS News, US Department of Health and Human Services, 10 October 2001 (http://www.hhs.gov/news).

[182] ‘Action by the European Union following the attacks on 11th September’, European Commission, Memo/01/327, 15 October 2001 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/me01_327.htm).

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