Secrecy and Dependence

Contents | Executive Summary | Acronyms | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3
  Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8 | Appendix 1 | Appendix 2
 Endnotes

Chapter 7:
The Future of Trident

7.1 Introduction
The United States is currently engaged in a number of programmes designed to extend, improve or, in some cases, radically alter the capabilities of its Trident fleet. In particular the United States is taking steps to enhance the capabilities of the Trident missile, improve the effectiveness of the Trident warhead, and extend the lifespan of the system as a whole while also beginning work on converting at least two of its submarines to conventional use. Given the close cooperation between the US and UK Governments on all aspects of the Trident programme, it is highly likely that the UK Government could also choose to become involved in any, or all, of these programmes.

7.2 Trident warhead development
The United States uses two different warhead types to arm its Trident fleet; the W76 (of which it has approximately 3,200) and the higher yield W88 (of which it has around 400). In contrast, the United Kingdom has only one type of warhead in its nuclear arsenal, which is believed to have been closely modelled on the W76.

With an estimated yield of 475 kilotons – in comparison with the 100 kiloton yield of the W76 – it would be a sizeable, and unlikely, step for the UK Government to contemplate procuring the W88 warhead. However, any improvements that the United States is making to the W76 warhead would presumably be of interest to the UK nuclear weapons establishment.

The US weapons labs have been actively engaged in a range of programmes involving the W76 warhead for a number of years. According to the US Department of Energy the W76 is currently "undergoing development engineering to extend warhead life, refurbish the primary and secondary, add new arming, fuzing and firing system, and add the next generation of advanced reservoir technology".¹⁵¹ In addition, the Department of Energy intends to "work with the Department of Defense to determine a schedule and possibly revised scopes for the W76 refurbishment, pending completion of the Strategic Defense Review".¹⁵²  According to the UK’s AWE, preparations for "refurbishment" of Trident are the subject of "focused exchanges" with the United States. The design of the UK Trident warhead is "always under review".¹⁵³ 

There are a number of US programmes in which the United Kingdom may have an interest. For example, the US weapons labs have been working on "refurbishment of the nuclear package and the AF&F [arming, fuzing and firing]".¹⁵⁴  This upgrade will give the W76 warhead a "near-ground-burst capability", making them lethal against hardened targets.¹⁵⁵ Unless another upgrade is chosen or the programme delayed, the new fuze is slated to begin entering the stockpile in late fiscal 2004.¹⁵⁶  Sandia National Laboratory provides the AF&F mechanism used in the British Trident warhead, so US developments in this area would also be of great interest to the UK AWE. Sandia is also involved in a W76-1 development programme.¹⁵⁷ 

All three US weapons laboratories are also engaged in a Stockpile Life Extension Programme (SLEP) for the W76 warhead. The UK’s AWE also favours extending the life of its Trident warhead. As the 2000 AWE Annual Report states: "life extension could offer cost savings by reducing the number of times a warhead is rebuilt within its required full-service life. Continued production of Trident – although only at trickle rates – will enable us to replace the oldest warheads, while exercising and maintaining our assembly capability".¹⁵⁸ 

In addition, the United States has an ongoing Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead Protection Programme (SWPP) intended to support the current U.S. Navy nuclear weapons stockpile and provide a variety of "future replacement options". The SWPP is described as:

A collaborative Navy/DOE effort to maintain the capability to jointly develop replacement nuclear warheads for the W76/Mk4 and W88/Mk5 should new warheads be needed in the future…. SWPP is con-centrating on two designs, one near-term and the other long-term. Replacement warheads reflect no new weapon requirements but the desirable replacement characteristics include decreased sensitivity to ageing, increased design margins, increased ability for surveillance by above-ground testing, and the ability to be certified without an underground nuclear test. SWPP may include flight testing of design elements but does not encompass production.¹⁵⁹ 

AWE Aldermaston is also interested in maintaining the capability to develop a "new weapon should it ever be required".¹⁶⁰ 

7.3 Missiles and re-entry vehicles
The United States is also engaged in efforts to extend the service life, and improve the capabilities of the Trident submarine’s warhead delivery system: the D5 missile and the Mk-4 re-entry vehicle.

Originally scheduled to begin retiring in 2019, the existing Trident missile is being upgraded to extend its service life. The upgraded missile, which is considered a "variant" of the existing D5, rather than a new missile, will be designated the "D5A". Funding is expected to begin in 2005, purchase of motors is planned for 2010-2012, and production is expected to start in 2015. Approximately 300 Trident II D5A missiles are planned, enough to arm 10 submarines – a substantial proportion of the US Trident fleet. ¹⁶¹ 

In addition, a service life extension programme is planned through 2020 for the Mk-4 re-entry body, the system that carries the warheads on both the US and UK Trident systems. The extension programme is designed to ensure that the system can continue to support Trident operations until 2040.¹⁶² 

UK Trident missiles are identical to the US Trident II D5 missiles. The United Kingdom does not actually own the missiles, but as discussed in section 2.4, has access to a pool of Trident II D5 missiles. A similar situation exists for the Mk-4 re-entry vehicles. Lockheed Martin’s Missile and Space Operations has manufactured more than 5,000 Mk-4 re-entry body assembly kits for the US and British navies since 1976. ¹⁶³ 

As the UK shares the US Trident II D5 missile pool, if a significant proportion or possibly eventually all US Trident submarines are armed with D5A missiles, this may have implications for the UK Trident missiles.

7.4 Trident submarines
In addition to the upgrades to the missile and warhead systems, the US Government is also engaged in an overarching programme to extend the service life of the ships themselves by approximately 12 years. Originally designed to last 30 years, US Trident submarines are now expected to last 42 years. This lifespan will consist of:

two 20-year operating cycles separated by a two-year refueling overhaul. This unprecedented increase in the hull life of a whole submarine class has been made possible by Trident’s unique maintenance plan, which includes the regular replacement and overhaul of key components and an intense 35-day refit period following each patrol.¹⁶⁴ 

In addition to extending the lifespan of its Trident system, the US Navy hopes to deploy a new missile submarine class by 2025. Although no submarine class is currently planned, the Navy has called for funding to begin by 2014.¹⁶⁵ 

The UK Government continues to assert that its Trident programme is intended to have a service life of approximately 30 years. However, if Aldermaston is already considering the future of the Trident warhead, any US initiated programme to extend the service life of submarines would be of great interest, as would plans for an eventual replacement.

Initial British Government thinking on a replacement for Trident may already be underway. AWE states that it is maintaining a "capability to design a new weapon should it ever be required". Another possibility is implementation of a UK Trident life extension programme, similar to the US Stockpile Life Extension Programme.

The close collaboration between the US and UK nuclear weapons laboratories indicates a high level of UK interest in current US weapons programmes, especially those concerning the W76 warhead. Given the potential costs involved with life extension, refurbishment and replacement programmes for nuclear weapons, and the UK Government’s past record in concealing these developments from democratic scrutiny, the Defence Select Committee’s request for a restatement of Government policy on nuclear weapons is extremely timely.

7.5 New roles for Trident: Towards a US sub-strategic Trident
Paul Robinson of Sandia National Laboratories suggests in a recent White Paper that the United States should work to develop a second level of deterrence. This second layer of deterrence – which he terms "Capability Two" deterrence – would consist of lower-yield nuclear weapons and would be used to target and deter what he terms "the non-Russian world". ¹⁶⁶ 

These lower-yield warheads could be used against: "Any nation or (targetable) sub-national entity which, if not otherwise deterred, might be tempted to employ nuclear weapons (or other weapons of mass destruction) against the United States, our forces, or our allies". Robinson asserts that such weapons could be acquired quickly, and without the need for testing, by using "dummy secondaries" to replace the active thermonuclear component in weapons, leaving the weapons’ primary, or fission, component as the sole explosive yield.¹⁶⁷  In his paper, Robinson pays particular attention to the possible role that Trident submarines might play in fulfilling this "Capability Two" role:

I think we must contemplate placing some number of single reentry vehicles carrying low-yield weapons on submarine-launched missiles. These, along with cruise missiles from both bombers and submarines, are likely to be the most important weapons in Capability Two because they also allow us to have "forward-basing" in a crisis, again without encountering major overflight difficulties.¹⁶⁸ 

If the US Trident system does adopt a more overt sub-strategic role, this would bring into focus debates over the UK’s own sub-strategic capability. Indeed, the developments that Robinson talks about do bear some resemblance to possible options for the United Kingdom to achieve its own sub-strategic capability. However, any comparison between UK Trident’s sub-strategic capability and the what Robinson terms "Capability Two" deterrence, with its open talk of targeting non-nuclear weapon states, would be uncomfortable for the UK Government.

7.6 Conventionally armed Trident
The future of the US Navy’s nuclear-armed submarine (SSBN) fleet is based on the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The review determined that 14 Trident II D5 SSBNs in two oceans would provide the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) portion of the deterrent for the foreseeable future. To comply with the 1994 NPR, the Navy has removed its four oldest submarines – the Ohio, Michigan, Florida, and Georgia – from nuclear duty.

Since the decision was made to reduce the US Trident fleet to 14 submarines, interest has grown in the possibility of converting the four SSBNs planned for removal from strategic service into cruise missile submarines (SSGNs). One possibility would involve the submarines carrying six or seven conventional Tomahawk missiles inside 22 of the 24 tubes (the remaining two tubes would be used to support sea-air-land systems (SEALS)). As one expert on naval affairs wrote recently: "The ships have considerable operating life left, and the value of Tomahawk in both small contingency strikes and large-scale campaigns is widely accepted".¹⁶⁹ 

The Bush administration’s 2002 defence budget included funding to begin converting two Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles. The total cost of the work is estimated at $1.4 billion. The high cost of the conversion is partly due to the restrictions created by the START process. The START Treaty requires that the four potential SSGNs continue to count against strategic arms totals unless all existing launch tubes are removed. Such removal would double the cost of the SSGN conversion.¹⁷⁰ 

If the United States does successfully press ahead with converting part of its Trident fleet to conventional use, the implications for the UK nuclear deterrent are stark. Former Royal Navy Commander Robert Green raised the point recently in an article for Disarmament Diplomacy. Growing US interest in a conventionally armed Trident capability is predicated on a number of factors. Among them is a growing feeling, expressed publicly by President Bush, that nuclear deterrence will not work against what is seen as the greatest threat to Americans: "extremists armed with WMD warheads intent on blackmailing the US".¹⁷¹ 

In addition, Green argues that the Pentagon’s ongoing debate over how to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets is increasingly focussing on conventional, as opposed to nuclear capabilities, an area where the United States continues to enjoy capabilities unrivalled by the rest of the world: "For example, the US GBU-37 guided bomb is already thought to be capable of disabling a silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile – a target formerly thought vulnerable only to nuclear attack".¹⁷² 

Growing doubts about the utility of large nuclear arsenals and a desire to maintain Washington’s superiority in the field of conventional weaponry are leading the Pentagon to utilise the Trident system’s stealth, invulnerability and autonomy for cruise missile use. The potential benefits are illustrated by the fact that a single converted SSBN could fire almost as many Tomahawk missiles as were fired by the US Navy during the Kosovo crisis.

Three of the Royal Navy’s Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN), or Fleet Submarines, are armed with the US built Tomahawk cruise missile. It was first used during the Kosovo campaign of 1999 and was also used during the US coordinated attacks on Afghanistan on the night of the 7/8 October 2001. Apart from the United States, the United Kingdom is the only country to have access to the Tomahawk cruise missile and is proud of the operational flexibility it provides. The Ministry of Defence boasts that: "The weapon system is highly accurate, capable of delivering a warhead with pinpoint precision and lethality to a carefully selected target hundreds of miles away".¹⁷³  According to current thinking within the Royal Navy, deploying Tomahawk cruise missiles on its Trident fleet would give it an unparalleled level of flexibility to pursue the kind of missions that it considers are likely to lie at the heart of most future military operations.

In the face of ongoing challenges to the legality of the Trident system, and its essential impotence in the face of the new security threats of the 21st Century, the possibility of converting some or all of the Trident fleet to conventional use seems, at first glance, to offer the Royal Navy a unique opportunity to adopt a new and more flexible approach. As Robert Green argues:

If the (Royal Navy) wants to stay in the same league as the US Navy, it cannot afford to ignore the option of converting UK Trident to conventional armament – especially as, like the Trident system itself, the research, development and production of the modular systems would be done in by the US.¹⁷⁴ 

However, while the replacement of nuclear weapons with more conventional weapons may appeal to many former and current military officers, the decision to convert to conventional-armed submarines must be based on a clear definition of Britain’s real security needs. There is an increasing tendency to seek rationales for offensive military roles for UK armed forces outside of Europe, even to the extent of assuming a partial return to ‘East of Suez’ roles abandoned in the 1960s.

While the UK has a strategic and economic interest in maintaining international order and preventing aggression in any part of the globe, the most appropriate responses will increasingly be non-military in nature. There may be times when Britain will want to contribute forces to UN-sanctioned war-fighting forces outside of Europe, as indeed it did in 1950-53 and 1990-91, and most recently in Afghanistan. However, the possibility of such operations should not be used to determine long-term force requirements. In short, the cost and military utility of converting British nuclear submarines to conventional use must be balanced against resources earmarked for ‘core’ defence missions. In addition to contributing to collective defence within NATO, such core missions will increasingly include election monitoring, peacekeeping, arms control verification and humanitarian relief. There is a strong case for such missions being given a higher priority than seeking to enhance Britain’s sea-launched cruise-missile capabilities.

It should now be obvious to everyone that people who have the fanaticism and capability to fly an airliner laden with passengers and fuel into a skyscraper will not be deterred by human decency from deploying chemical or biological weapons, missiles or nuclear weapons or other forms of mass destruction if these are available to them. We must therefore redouble our efforts to stop the proliferation and the availability of such weapons.

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons, 14 September 2001

The 2001 Labour Party Manifesto states:

Although Britain has rarely been more secure from foreign invasion, there are new threats to our people from crime and terrorism. Instability around the world can affect us directly and we have a global responsibility to play our part in reducing international conflict, controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and contributing to international peace-keeping and peace-making operations.¹⁷⁵ 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, Britain’s global responsibility to contribute to efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems has never been more pressing.

In recent months, Britain’s non-proliferation efforts have been seriously undermined by the Bush Administration’s rejection of key aspects of international arms control. In particular the US rejection of the verification protocol to the BTWC, refusal to ratify the CTBT, and the emerging arms race with China, triggered by US missile defence plans, cannot be in Britain’s security interests.

The Labour Party Manifesto also stated that:

Britain needs a government ready to stand up for our interests and values. We have a ten-year vision for British foreign policy: a leading player in Europe, our alliance with the USA strengthened, using our global connections to help Britain and tackle global problems…We face a choice between an inward-looking chauvinism that leads to isolation and a modern patriotism where the British national interest is pursued through international engagement.¹⁷⁶ 

If Britain is to redouble its efforts to stop the proliferation and availability of weapons of mass destruction, it must now use its special relationship with the United States to impress upon the Bush Administration the need for international engagement in efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear deterrence could not have prevented the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York. As Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, John Bolton has confirmed that: "These horrible events demonstrated the validity of our concern, that there were people in the world who didn’t adhere to classic notions of deterrence and whose value systems and respect for human life didn’t match Western standards".¹⁷⁷  Although some commentators have suggested that the United States could initiate "low-level, tactical nuclear strikes in the Afghanistan desert", it is hard to see how nuclear weapons could achieve any practical effect in combating an internationally dispersed terrorist network such as Al-Qaeda . The role of a relatively high yield nuclear warhead such as that used in the Trident system in deterring so-called ’rogue states’ is particularly dubious. As Paul Robinson of Sandia National Laboratories states:

Today, we are threatened not only by nuclear weapons in the arsenal of peer com-petitors…but increasingly by biological, chemical, and radiological weapons that could kill huge numbers of people in a flash. Yet it’s pretty incredible to think that the United States would respond to such an attack by vaporizing 11 million people in a rogue state just because they were poorly led. Where the hell are we going to use missiles with four to eight warheads, or half-megaton yields? Even the few "tactical" nuclear weapons that we have have high yields of above 100 kilotons. I would hope the US President would think it was crazy to use such weapons in response to a rogue-state attack.¹⁷⁸ 

In practice the use of nuclear weapons would be questionable legally, and likely to prompt a strong international public backlash. As US nuclear doctrine warns, "the nation that initiates the use of nuclear weapons… may find itself the target of world condemnation".¹⁷⁹ 

Trident, a system originally designed for the Cold War, looks increasingly irrelevant to the types of military conflict Britain is likely to face in future. As the US prepares to make deep cuts to its nuclear arsenal, the UK Government will come increased pressure to make further progress on nuclear disarmament.

Labour’s second term in office will see key policy challenges in the field of preventing proliferation. As the next NPT review conference will be held in 2005, the period between now and the next General Election (in 2005 or 2006) will be the key time during which the parties to the NPT must make progress on implementing the 2000 Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, if it is not to fall by the wayside.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the current moratoria on nuclear testing also risk being eroded in the next five years, if action is not taken to rule out further nuclear tests and to bring the treaty into force.

At the same time, Britain faces important choices concerning the future of its own nuclear weapons programme in the coming years, not least of which is the challenge to Trident’s legality, which is being actively pursued through the courts and through non-violent protest. In the coming years, the UK Government will have to address the questions of whether to replace Trident, embark on a programme to extend the life of the system, or phase Trident out, by engaging in international disarmament negotiations or, perhaps by converting the submarines to conventional use.

Given the weight of these decisions, parliamentary scrutiny of British nuclear weapons policy and British policy on weapons of mass destruction will be crucial, if the United Kingdom is not to repeat the mistakes of the Chevaline programme.

1. The Government should implement the 2000 NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action

"The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits us to work for the global elimination of nuclear weapons." (Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party Manifesto 2001)

Successive British governments have regarded the NPT as the ‘cornerstone’ of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Contrary to President Bush’s assessment that the risk of nuclear proliferation is growing, since the end of the Cold War the NPT has had many successes. France and China have ratified the Treaty, along with countries once regarded as a nuclear proliferation threats, such as Argentina and Brazil. In addition, South Africa has unilaterally eliminated its nuclear weapons altogether. Currently only four countries – India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba – remain non-signatories and outside the treaty’s constraints.

However, in recent years, the NPT has been under increasing strain. India and Pakistan have joined the nuclear club by testing nuclear devices, and dissatisfaction amongst many non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty appears to be growing with the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament. Disappointingly few countries have ratified the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, designed to strengthen verification of the Treaty, following the discovery of the extent of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme.

However, whilst the treaty is not perfect, it still stands as the international community’s greatest barrier to nuclear proliferation and as such it must be strengthened, not eroded.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the British Government played an important role in achieving agreement of the NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, under which the five nuclear weapon states made an "unequivocal commitment" to eliminate their nuclear arsenals along with a series of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty.

If the UK Government is to redouble its efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, then a programme of practical steps to achieve full implementation of the NPT is a good place to start. The annual Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which commence in April 2002 in New York will address substantive issues as well as make the procedural preparations for the Review Conference.

As one of the three depositary nations for the NPT (the others are the United States and Russia), Britain has played an important role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime since the Treaty’s inception and negotiation in the 1960s. Since 1997, the UK has used NPT PrepComs as an opportunity to report on its progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Britain should now move a step further, taking the initiative to strengthen the NPT by preparing its own programme of action to implement the 2000 NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan. Such a programme of action would be a timely response to increased public awareness of the risks posed by proliferation and could be presented to the NPT PrepCom in 2002.

2. Britain should lead international efforts to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force.

"We are enthusiastic signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, whose coming into force will impede nuclear proliferation…" (Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party Manifesto 2001)

A Bill to ratify the CTBT was among the pieces of legislation passed through the UK Parliament during the first parliamentary session following Labour’s election in 1997. All the British political parties represented at Westminster supported it and in April 1998, Britain and France became the first nuclear-weapon states to ratify the CTBT.

The CTBT commands overwhelming support from British parliamentarians. In November 1999, Early Day Motion 929 on the US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT sponsored by Malcolm Savidge, MP, attracted 359 signatories including representatives of all the major political parties.

The CTBT was opened for signature in 1996 but has yet to enter into force. During the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the treaty, some nuclear weapon states (including the former UK Conservative Government) indicated that they would be unwilling to be constrained by such a treaty unless all five nuclear weapon states and the three de facto nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan and Israel) became parties to the treaty. As a result the CTBT stipulates that it will not enter into force until it has been ratified by all 44 of the nuclear capable states (defined as those with civil nuclear reactors) identified in the treaty. To date, 31 of these countries have signed and ratified the treaty, but 13 "CTBT hold-outs" have yet to ratify, thereby blocking the treaty’s entry into force.¹⁸⁰ 

In its report Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2000, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee recommended:

By preventing any explosive nuclear testing world-wide the CTBT represents a crucial component of the non-proliferation regime because it seeks to impose qualitative constraints on nuclear weapons development. Thus its early entry into force is vital to this country’s security. We urge the Government to co-operate with the US Administration and encourage the new US President to re-submit the CTBT to the Senate for ratification as an urgent priority, to encourage China and Israel to ratify the treaty and also to impress upon India and Pakistan, in particular, the importance of their becoming parties to the CTBT.¹⁸¹ 

Since taking office the Bush administration has reiterated its opposition to the CTBT and has refused to support ratification. The US weapons laboratories, supported by some members of Congress, are pushing to develop new nuclear weapons, such as low-yield, mini-nukes intended to give the US the capacity to attack deeply buried targets. Against this background, the US Department of Energy is currently undertaking a study on how the United States could reduce the notice required (currently 12-36 months) to resume nuclear testing.

The CTBT also risks becoming a casualty of the Bush administration’s drive to develop missile defences. Far from encouraging China to ratify, recent media reports suggest that the Bush administration might seek to overcome Chinese opposition to missile defence by acquiescing with China’s plans to build up its nuclear missile force. The possibility also exists that the United States and China might discuss resuming underground nuclear tests, despite being signatories to the CTBT.¹⁸²  The Bush administration has also made its opposition to the CTBT clear on the diplomatic front, as discussed in section 5.2.

In the effort to build an international coalition against terrorism, the United States has waived sanctions against India and Pakistan, originally imposed following the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998.Tony Blair has also announced that Britain is to restart defence collaboration with Pakistan. In short, General Musharref’s regime in Pakistan is now regarded as a core US and British ally.

However, the risk that instability might lead to the overthrow of the Musharref regime or result in the Pakistan Government losing control of its nuclear weapons, highlights the importance of continued international pressure on Pakistan and India to renounce nuclear weapons and join both the NPT and the CTBT.¹⁸³  It is vital that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is not ignored in the effort to secure the international coalition against terrorism. Any loss of control over these weapons would be counterproductive to the future stability of the region.

In this context, the international community should also redouble its efforts to find a solution to the conflict in Kashmir, which lies at the heart of nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan. Although this is far easier said than done, the current international climate might prove favourable to a new regional initiative. The United States and United Kingdom should use the anti-terrorism coalition as a means of bringing the key parties in South Asia (China, India and Pakistan) to the negotiating table to address their regional concerns. Unless their regional security needs are met, there is little prospect of nuclear disarmament in South Asia.

Every year that goes by without the CTBT entering into force, the danger increases that some states may resume nuclear testing.

Britain must now work to implement the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In particular, it must use its special relationship with the United States to impress upon the Bush administration the importance of ratifying the CTBT and that any deal with China to resume nuclear testing would be unacceptable to the international community.

3. Britain should respond positively to President Putin’s proposal for five-power talks on nuclear disarmament.

"We will encourage the US to consult closely with NATO allies on its ideas for missile defence, and to pursue dialogue with Russia on a new framework for strategic arms control that will encourage further cuts in nuclear weapons." (Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party Manifesto 2001)

Although Article VI of the NPT places an obligation on all its states parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control", to date Britain has not been prepared to enter its nuclear weapons systems into any multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. Instead, as discussed in section 1.1, most British nuclear disarmament initiatives have been unilateral and fairly limited in scope. Even the decision taken by the current Labour government in the SDR to reduce the number of warheads deployed on Trident, although heavily spun, has in practice resulted in a reduction by only 12 warheads deployed per Trident submarine, and did not result in the dismantlement of any warheads.

When the Thatcher Government originally set out the case for Trident, it argued that: "The scale of our new capability will in no way disturb existing and prospective East/West relativities... when the force was fully operational in the mid-1990s it would represent in relation to Soviet strategic forces at that time... about the same proportion of delivery systems as – and a rather lower proportion of warheads than – the Polaris force did in relation to Soviet forces when it was completed in 1970".¹⁸⁴  Following the large reductions in Soviet nuclear forces, this is clearly no longer the case.

Throughout the 1990s, Conservative and Labour governments have argued that the priority is for reductions in US and Russian nuclear forces.¹⁸⁵  The previous Conservative foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, stated that "a world in which US and Russian nuclear forces were counted in hundreds, rather than thousands, would be one in which Britain would respond to the challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms".¹⁸⁶  Similarly, the Labour Government in the SDR argued that:

Our own arsenal… is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the foreseeable future and very much smaller than those of the major nuclear powers. Considerable further reductions in the latter would be needed before further British reductions could become feasible.¹⁸⁷ 

Britain’s failure to enter into international disarmament negotiations is appearing legally unsound. The 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control," de-linked the NPT’s legal obligation on its parties to achieve nuclear disarmament from the longer term goal of general and complete disarmament.¹⁸⁸ This removed one of the UK Government’s previous excuses that nuclear disarmament negotiations might not be possible unless carried out in the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament. Whilst the US and Russia can point to some degree of progress through the negotiation of the START nuclear disarmament treaties, Britain has yet to enter any negotiating process.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the UK did finally recognize that the smaller nuclear-weapon states would need to accept that "in due course they will need to join the larger nuclear-weapon States in negotiations about their nuclear weapons".¹⁸⁹ 

President Putin’s current proposal for five-power nuclear disarmament talks do not appear to be very challenging for the United Kingdom, as they do not aim for any specific reductions in British nuclear forces. They would, however, provide an opportunity for the UK Government to begin the process of engaging with the United States and Russia in multilateral disarmament talks.

The possibility for the UK Government to participate as an equal partner in such talks and to address issues such as development of a new strategic security framework, confidence and security building measures between the nuclear-weapon states, and the possibility of nuclear cuts and reductions in alert status, would be very much in Britain’s long-term security interests and would enhance the country’s status on the world stage. P5 talks could also provide a forum for the UK Government to express concerns about the weaponisation of space. President Chirac has already responded positively to Putin’s proposal. The UK Government should do likewise.

4. The Government should review the option of converting the UK Trident submarines to conventional use.

"We support Trident, Britain’s minimum deterrent. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits us to work for the global elimination of nuclear weapons." (Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party Manifesto 2001)

Successive British governments, including Labour governments, have ruled out the possibility of unilaterally abandoning the UK nuclear capability. The argument is put forward that British nuclear weapons increase the United Kingdom’s standing in international affairs, cement the special relationship with the United States, and in the case of Trident, that the money has already been spent.

Since the end of the Cold War, British armed forces have been involved heavily in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the war over Kosovo, and now the US-led coalition against terrorism. But while conventionally armed submarines played an active role in the Kosovo operation (acting in coordination with US submarines) and have also participated in cruise-missile attacks against targets in Afghanistan, the role for a Trident system originally designed to deter (and, if necessary, destroy) Moscow seems increasingly out of date.

The Labour Government has consistently argued that no further review of British nuclear policy or progress on nuclear disarmament is necessary following the SDR. As the former secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, Robin Cook, told the Foreign Affairs Committee, concerning reductions in the UK nuclear arsenal, "further progress must depend on progress by other nuclear weapon states".¹⁹⁰  Similarly, in June 2000, the current secretary of state for defence, Geoff Hoon, attempted to justify the lack of progress on British nuclear disarmament on the basis that "nothing has changed" since the SDR in 1998.

However, there have been many changes in the nuclear arena since the SDR. The US Government is moving towards a radically different nuclear posture, based on much lower numbers of deployed nuclear weapons combined with missile defences. Russia’s dwindling nuclear capability is steadily eroding due to lack of resources. In addition, the need to address the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been highlighted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The role and mission of British military forces is having to change to address the new international situation following 11 September, but it seems unlikely that Trident could ever fulfil any meaningful role in deterring dispersed terrorist networks.

All these factors have major implications for the UK Trident force both in terms of how many nuclear weapons Britain should deploy, what UK nuclear force posture and alert status should look like and ultimately what role, if any, Trident should play in future.

Although the SDR was presented as a wide-ranging review of British defence policy, it was predicated on the political assumption that Trident must be retained for the foreseeable future. The US Government is now radically revising its nuclear posture. It is also converting a number of its Trident submarines to fulfil a conventional role (something that British governments have previously claimed was prohibitively expensive and unfeasible).

As former Royal Navy Commander Rob Green argues:

Nuclear-armed UK Trident is a major impediment to the Royal Navy role because its armament is militarily useless, and its use – and therefore any threatened use - would be unlawful. A UK decision, exploiting a current US Navy proposal, to convert its four Vanguard class Trident submarines to carry a mix of precision-guided conventional armaments would solve this problem.¹⁹¹ 

The UK Government should now seriously consider the future role of Trident, including the possibility that it could be converted to conventional use, although, as discussed in section 7.6, any potential conversion should be considered in the context of a wide-ranging review of British defence needs. Given also the context of 11 September and its aftermath, the 1998 SDR is itself looking rather dated, and consideration should be given to undertaking a new SDR at the earliest opportunity. Such a review should be transparent, open-ended and subject to detailed parliamentary scrutiny.

5. Government policy and decision making on nuclear weapons should be subject to detailed parliamentary scrutiny.

"We sought, as far back as our inquiry on the SDR, a restatement of the government’s strategic nuclear policy. We have been offered some dribs and drabs, including a speech made by the former Secretary of State at Aberdeen University. We consider that the government, now rightly thinking (if not yet forming policy) for the period of 30 years ahead, needs to address this issue more squarely." (Defence Select Committee, 9 May 2001)

Although Labour came to government with a commitment to increased transparency in the nuclear field, there has been a marked reduction in parliamentary scrutiny of the UK nuclear programme in the last five years. Although the Government has been more willing to engage with some academics and non-governmental organizations than its predecessor, the process of annual Government statements on nuclear policy to the Defence Select Committee inquiries on Progress of the Trident programme and in the annual Statements on the Defence Estimates, has been replaced by sporadic and less detailed information being presented to Parliament and to the public.

Many key questions concerning the current status of British nuclear policy remain unanswered: What is the Government’s position on replacement of Trident? Are there any plans to develop a new UK nuclear warhead? Has authorization been given to Aldermaston to pursue life extension programmes for Trident? What is the nature and extent of current British nuclear cooperation with the US nuclear weapons laboratories? What are the implications of changes in US nuclear strategy and posture for UK and NATO nuclear policy? Has the UK Government studied US proposals to convert Trident submarines to conventional use?

There are also questions concerning the UK’s non-proliferation policy: What steps are envisaged to implement the 2000 NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan? How does the UK Government intend to respond to President Putin’s proposal for disarmament talks?

Many of these issues go well beyond the scope of written parliamentary questions. Fuller discussion, scrutiny and public debate on the future of British nuclear policy is required. Previous governments have been reluctant to come forward with information concerning nuclear policy and have even gone to great lengths to conceal major decisions from the public.

The British Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and decide policy is significantly more limited than that of the US Congress, which has the power to amend the annual legislation governing procurement of weapon systems. In contrast, British defence debates have been limited to "take it or leave it" votes on unamendable defence policy documents, whilst many of the costs associated with particular military programmes remain hidden in a complex system of interlinked "Votes".

Britain is unlikely to achieve levels of transparency and parliamentary accountability similar to the Uni-ted States without radical change to its parliamentary system, but more could be done by the existing departmental select committees to ensure maximum scrutiny of Government policy in this area.

As a first step, a process for regular inquiries into British non-proliferation policy and nuclear policy should be instituted, perhaps along the lines of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiries into Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the previous Defence Committee’s annual inquires into Progress of the Trident programme. Such inquiries should include the opportunity for oral questioning of the relevant secretaries of state.

Similarly the system of parliamentary defence debates should be regularised to allow government defence debates to take place on an annual cycle, at similar stages in the parliamentary session each year, rather than the current system where debates often come up erratically and at short notice. In addition, greater opportunity needs to be given to back bench MPs and opposition parties to initiate debate in this area, rather than being dependent on the government to come forward with parliamentary statements.

Finally, the Ministry of Defence’s implementation of Government Policy on Open Government should be reviewed. British nuclear policy requires expenditure of large sums of tax-payers money and remains a controversial area of policy to this day, but important parliamentary questions concerning nuclear policy (including questions concerning cost) are frequently not answered by government under exemptions provided in the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information. Without better access for Parliament to information concerning nuclear policy, fuller scrutiny of and accountability for the UK’s nuclear programme will be impossible.

The following is excerpted from the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

• Further efforts by the nuclear weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

• Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

• The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

• Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

• A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

• The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon free world.

For the full text of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/finaldoc.html

The following is excerpted from the ‘Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Press Release’, DC28/20, 13 November 2001:

When it concludes today, the Conference will issue its Final Declaration (document CTBT-ART.XIV/2001/WP.1). In the Declaration, delegations reaffirm their strong determination to promote international peace and security and stress the importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Member States of the Conference reiterate that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, and constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is, thus, a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament. The delegates renew their commitment to work for universal ratification of the Treaty and its early entry into force.

Despite the progress made and strong support for the Treaty, delegations note with concern that the Treaty has not entered into force five years after opening for signature. Member States of the Conference, therefore, stress their determination to strengthen efforts aimed at promoting the Treaty’s entry into force at the earliest possible date. Delega-tions affirm that the conduct of a nuclear-weapon-test explosion or any other nuclear explosion constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Member States of the Conference call upon all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and underline the importance of signature and ratification of the Treaty. Delegations welcome the progress in building the global infrastructure for Treaty verification, including the International Monitoring System, with a view to ensuring that the verification regime will be capable of meeting the requirements of the Treaty at entry into force. Convinced of the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, delegations welcome the ratifications of all States that have done so since the 1999 Conference, stressing in particular the steps required to achieve its early entry into force.

Member States of the Conference:

— Call upon all States that have not yet ratified the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile;

— Call upon States that have signed but not ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to early successful conclusion;

— Recall that two States out of three whose ratification is needed for the Treaty’s entry into force, but have not yet signed it, have expressed their willingness not to delay the entry into force of the Treaty, and call upon them to ratify it as soon as possible;

— Note the fact that one State out of three whose ratification is needed for the Treaty’s entry into force and which have not yet signed it, had not expressed its intention towards the Treaty, and call upon this State to sign and ratify it as soon as possible;

— Note the ratification of the Treaty by three nuclear-weapon States and call the other two to accelerate their ratification processes;

— Agree that ratifying States will select one of their number to promote cooperation to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty, through informal consultations with all interested countries; and

— Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO to continue its international cooperation activities to promote understanding of the Treaty, including by demonstrating the benefits of the application of verification technologies for peaceful purposes.

Continue to Endnotes

Contents | Executive Summary | Acronyms | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3
  Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8 | Appendix 1 | Appendix 2
 Endnotes

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