Secrecy and Dependence

Contents | Executive Summary | Acronyms | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3
  Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8 | Appendix 1 | Appendix 2
 Endnotes

Chapter 3:
Courting trouble:  legality of the UK Trident programme

3.1 1996 International Court of Justice advisory ruling
In July 1996, in a landmark ruling the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons" following a request from the UN General Assembly. The Court was unanimous that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". The Court also ruled that any use of nuclear weapons would "generally contravene" the principles and rules of humanitarian law. The Judges were divided by seven votes to seven on the question of whether "in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake".⁷¹ 

While the then Conservative Government rejected the ICJ Ruling, the new Labour administration initially welcomed the Court’s ruling concerning the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith. However, the Labour Government also stated:

The ICJ opinion does not require a change in the United Kingdom’s entirely defensive deterrence policy. We would only ever consider the use of nuclear weapons in the extreme circumstance of self-defence which includes the defence of our NATO allies. The court was unable to conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of the state would be at stake.⁷² 

Furthermore, in May 2000, all NPT member states, including the United Kingdom, agreed to a Programme of Action on Nuclear Disarmament, including an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI" (see appendix 1).

3.2 The impact of ‘People’s Disarmament’
Following the ICJ Ruling, the legality of British nuclear policy has been challenged in the British courts and through non-violent actions against the Trident programme. In particular, the Trident Ploughshares campaign was established in 1998 with the aim of pushing "the British Government into abiding by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 that decided that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal under international law because of the unique, indiscriminate and long-lasting damage their use would inflict on civilians and the global environment".⁷³  By August 2001, 179 people signed the Trident Ploughshares pledge to "to disarm the UK Trident nuclear weapons system in a non-violent, open, peaceful, safe and fully accountable manner".⁷⁴ 

Trident Ploughshares has had some notable successes. In October 1999, for example, Sheriff Margaret Gimblet instructed the jury at Greenock (Scotland) Sheriff Court to acquit three women, Angie Zelter, Ellen Moxley and Ulla Roder, who had been charged with causing £80,000 worth of damage to Maytime, a Trident-related acoustic research barge in Loch Goil, during a Ploughshares 2000 disarmament action in June of that year. Addressing the jury, the Sheriff said:

I have to conclude that the three in company with others were justified in thinking that Great Britain in their use of Trident... could be construed as a threat and as such is an infringement of international and customary law. I have heard nothing which would make it seem to me that the accused acted with criminal intent.⁷⁵ 

As a result of this case, the Lord Advocate asked the Scottish High Court to examine some of the legal issues. Scotland, where Trident is based, has its own distinct legal system and, since 1999, a new parliament with increased control over Scottish affairs. Although the Opinion of the High Court was that it was "not persuaded that the facts of what the respondents did, or anything in the nature or purposes of the deployment of Trident, indicate any foundation at all, in Scots or in international law, for a defence of justification,"⁷⁶  Trident Ploughshares is attracting strong support from the Scottish public.

A recent opinion poll in Scotland, for example, showed that 51 per cent of those questioned supported the Trident Ploughshares blockade of the Trident base at Faslane on 12 February 2001. In addition, on 23 May 2001, the Church of Scotland debated Trident and re-affirmed "the sustained op-position of the Church to the possession, deployment and threatened use of nuclear weapons". The Church called "once more on HM Government to abandon the Trident Programme now", and encouraged "all those who, on conscientious grounds, seek to express their personal opposition to Trident through peaceful and non-violent means".⁷⁷ 

On 4 October 2001 Trident Ploughshares achieved its most notable success outside of Scotland at the trial of Trident disarmers Rosie James and Rachel Wenham at Manchester Crown Court. The two campaigners were standing trial for damaging testing equipment on HMS Vengeance in February 1999. However, the couple were discharged when the jury could not reach a verdict on the charge of criminal damage against them and the prosecutor confirmed that the Crown would not seek a retrial.⁷⁸ 

To date the UK government has never engaged in international negotiations to reduce its nuclear forces. As the next chapter reports, new opportunities have been presented in the last year, including the agreement of the Programme of Action for Nuclear Disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the proposal by President Putin for five-power talks on nuclear disarmament.

Since the ICJ ruling, the UK government now has a legal "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." Unless progress is made in the course of the next Parliament, the legal case of the Trident Ploughshares protestors can only be strengthened.

Chapter 4:
The impact of B ush Administration policies 
on the UK nuclear policy

4.1 Introduction
Ties between Washington and London run deep on a number of issues, but nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of nuclear policy. The UK’s Trident nuclear deterrent is a de facto US system and London relies upon the goodwill of Washington for its upkeep. For a number of decades this arrangement has served successive British governments well. As Washington’s strongest European ally, the United Kingdom was able to enjoy the benefits of technology and intelligence sharing with few negative consequences. However, the current Republican administration is showing clear signs that it plans to radically alter the size, composition and the role of its nuclear arsenal, a shift that it likely to impact heavily on UK nuclear policy.

Many of the nuclear-related policies that the United States are pursuing challenge the existing status quo between the two allies. Some of these emerging strategies, including deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal, offer the UK Government an opportunity to dramatically advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. Other policies, including those that challenge the existing ‘treaty-based’ framework of international arms control and a more aggressive nuclear posture, conflict directly with the Labour Government’s stated policy commitments. Finally, other planned or actual US programmes relate directly to the Trident system itself, and raise questions about the future of the UK deterrent.

4.2 A radical reduction to US nuclear forces?
Currently, the US strategic nuclear arsenal consists of 7,150 warheads spread across the air- land- and sea-based legs of its nuclear triad. In addition, the United States maintains around 1,600 inactive strategic warheads as both a "hedge" to permit a rapid increase in deployed weapons, and an arsenal of 1,670 sub-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons, designed for use in limited non-global conflicts.⁷⁹  The number of deployed warheads will have been reduced to 6,000 by the end of 2001 in compliance with START I. However, the Bush administration is committed to going beyond these levels; deep unilateral cuts in the US nuclear arsenal are a key component of its security policy. President Bush has stated that he is committed to "achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies".⁸⁰ 

Deep cuts to the US arsenal will earn the Bush administration a great deal of praise, in particular from European allies who have been raising strong criticisms of Washington’s unilateralist agenda. This will no doubt give Washington an easier ride as it attempts to sell other, more controversial aspects of its military policy, in particular missile defence and a shift of strategic emphasis from Europe to Asia.

In addition, certain US military planners feel that much of Washington’s vast nuclear arsenal has outlived its usefulness, and is diverting resources away from other technologies more suited to current security threats. In particular, many of the roles the nuclear arsenal was earmarked to perform either no longer exist, or can be carried out through Washington’s vastly superior conventional forces. In 1999 Paul H. Nitze, former special advisor to President Reagan, argued that the US military’s unrivalled ability to deliver conventional payloads to within "three feet from the expected point of impact" should lead Washington to contemplate complete, unilateral nuclear disarmament.⁸¹ 

The Air Force in particular is becoming increasingly resentful of its nuclear role, arguing that B-1, B-2, and B-52 heavy bombers, which they claim have shown their conventional military relevance in the Gulf War, Yugoslavia and most recently in Afghanistan, should be divorced from their current responsibilities as the airborne wing of the strategic nuclear triad.⁸²  A recent Air Force Academy research paper even suggested scrapping the entire ICBM force, calling the missiles "aging relics of the Cold War".⁸³ 

Various luminaries of the Cold War build-up have been lining up in recent months to show how far they are willing to go. Prior to returning to the Pentagon as an adviser for the new Bush administration, Richard Perle, former assistant defence secretary under President Reagan, said, "I see no reason why we can’t go well below 1,000. I want the lowest number possible, under the tightest control possible".⁸⁴ 

4.3 The Nuclear Posture Review
Shortly after entering office, Bush mandated that the secretary of defence conduct a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to clarify US nuclear policy for the next five to 10 years. Expected to be completed by 31 December 2001, the review will consider the role of nuclear forces in US military strategy and the requirements for the United States to maintain a safe nuclear deterrent. It is widely believed that the NPR will consider dramatically reducing the US arsenal while ensuring that the process can be halted or reversed at any time.

The first stage of the process is likely to involve the retirement of all 50 MX ’Peacekeeper’ missiles, each carrying 500 warheads. However, the warheads are likely to be redeployed on the Minuteman III ICBMs.⁸⁵  The Review is also likely to involve cutting the Trident nuclear submarine fleet from 18 to 14, in line with the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, thereby reducing the number of sea-based warheads from 1,680 to 1,300. This reduction would require no alteration to the 1997 PDD 60, which currently informs the US military on targeting of nuclear weapons.⁸⁶  The FY 2002 budget request included funding to begin retiring the 50 MX missiles and to begin converting two Trident submarines to carry conventionally armed cruise missiles.

On 13 November 2001, President Bush gave the clearest indication yet of the eventual size of the upcoming cuts in the US arsenal. During a press conference to mark the first day of President Putin’s visit to the United States, President Bush announced that Washington would unilaterally cut its nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next 10 years. President Putin stated that Russia "will try to respond in kind".⁸⁷  Some verification procedures are anticipated, possibly carried over from the on-site monitoring provisions under the START I Treaty.

However, the Bush administration has made clear its strong preference that no mutually binding agreement should be put in place. Critics have pointed out that neither party is compelled to fully carry out the cuts, and that they are reversible.⁸⁸  Differences between President Putin and President Bush over the necessary level of verification and question of ‘irreversibility’ were evident during the press conference. President Putin stated:

‘We … are prepared to present all our agreements in a treaty form, including the issues of verification and control’. In contrast, President Bush asserted: ‘we don’t need . . . arms control negotiations to reduce our weaponry in a significant way’.⁸⁹

4.4 P5 Talks: Opportunities for the UK
Radical cuts in the US arsenal are likely to place pressure on the UK government to re-evaluate its own force composition. The UK government has long argued that it maintains the minimum nuclear arsenal concurrent with its own defence needs. However, it has also stated that if significant steps were taken by the other nuclear powers, it would lead to a reappraisal of this assessment. According to the Strategic Defence Review: "Our own arsenal… is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the foreseeable future and very much smaller than those of the major nuclear powers. Considerable further reductions in the latter would be needed before further British reductions could become feasible" [emphasis added].⁹⁰ 

Deep unilateral cuts in the US arsenal, if reciprocated by Russia, could set in motion a chain of events that might lead to the ‘considerable further reductions’ mentioned in the Strategic Defence Review. This would present the UK Government with an ideal opportunity to broaden the process, possibly acting upon the suggestion for five-power nuclear disarmament talks recently made by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin.

On 13 November 2000, Putin reiterated Moscow’s proposal to undertake negotiations with the United States, with a view to "achieving radically reduced levels of 1,500 nuclear warheads for our countries, which is quite realisable by the year of 2008".⁹¹  In July 2001, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs again took up the issue and signalled Moscow’s intention to pursue consultations on the questions of deep strategic arms reductions through the UN Security Council (see box 2). The idea has also received the support of France. Speaking in August 2001, President Jacques Chirac, stated:

(G)oing beyond the efforts to prevent proliferation and maintain the role of deterrence I have already talked about, several aspects have to be taken into consideration. I am thinking particularly of the ABM treaty, the need for a greater effort on the nuclear disarmament front on the part of the United States and Russia, and preventing the militarization of space. … France… considers that the idea of launching consultations on these issues between the five nuclear powers is worth considering.⁹² 

It has long been assumed that when the time comes to expand the disarmament process beyond the United States and Russia, the United Kingdom would need to take a prominent place in the negotiations. In the run up to the 1995 NPT Review Conference, for example, rumours circulated that the United States was pressuring the United Kingdom to place its arsenal on the negotiating table in an effort to guarantee the indefinite extension of the treaty. At that time the Foreign Office stated "if there was a continuing reduction of strategic weaponry following treaties beyond the Start agreement, the point might come where we put ours into the equation".⁹³ 

Both Russia and the United States have indicated that the will significantly cut the size of their nuclear arsenals in the next ten years. As possibly the most progressive of the five nuclear powers in the field of arms control at present, the UK Government is uniquely placed to take a decisive role in widening and institutionalising this process. Support for the Russian proposals could put pressure on Washington to make some effort to formalise its reductions, and to set up some effective measures of transparency and irreversibility, even if a return to the START process seems unlikely.

Meanwhile, reciprocal cuts on the part of the United Kingdom could pave the way for simultaneous talks by all five declared nuclear powers.

Chapter 5:
The disintegration of multilateral arms control

5.1 The new Republican orthodoxy
In the wake of Bush’s presidential victory, a unilateralist, ‘America First’, ideology has taken hold in the White House. This approach to international affairs is shaped by two themes that dominate current Republican policy-making: a deep opposition to international treaties and a desire to maintain the US’s position as the dominant world superpower. These two pressures are driving US arms control policy in a way that indicates a direct collision course with UK priorities.

A deep-seated opposition to international treaties has long been a hallmark of Republican thinking. In recent years such opposition has become even more entrenched. For example, as Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1995 to 2001, Republican Senator Jesse Helms was able to block and delay US ratification of a long list of treaties. Passage of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Land Mines Convention, the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty were all hindered by Helms’ sizeable control over US foreign policy.⁹⁴ 

Helms’ belief that other countries cannot be trusted to uphold their commitments, and that Washington is better off guaranteeing its own best interests without recourse to mutually binding agreements, is shared by many in the current administration. A key example is the under secretary of state for arms control and international and security affairs, John Bolton. Prior to entering the Bush administration, Bolton stated that, "While treaties may be politically or even morally binding, they are not legally obligatory. They are just not law as we apprehend the term".⁹⁵ 

Since coming to power the Bush administration has repeatedly either refused to join international treaties, or watered them down to fit its own purpose. This approach was evident in the administration’s handling of the Kyoto Protocol and the UN Conference on Small Arms in July 2001, to give but two examples. The Bush administration has also rejected negotiations for a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.⁹⁶  According to Richard Butler, former Australian Ambassador to the UN, "The administration seems to believe that international agreements will increasingly pressure the United States to sacrifice its sovereignty and become subject to direction by international institutions".⁹⁷ 

The belief that the United States needs to maintain its pre-eminent position in the world can be seen in the work of the right-wing Project for a New American Century (PNAC). Founded in 1997, PNAC is a "non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership". The Project argues that the United States must do all it can to retain its position as the sole global superpower, and guard against the possible emergence of a future great power rival.⁹⁸  A recent report by the PNAC states: "At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible".⁹⁹  The defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, the deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, and the vice president, Dick Cheney are all signatories of the PNAC’s 1997 Statement of Principles.¹⁰⁰ 

One report that is believed to have played a decisive factor in shaping the Bush administration’s agenda on international arms control and other nuclear policy issues is the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) report, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, published in January 2001. The report argues that to ensure the ongoing value of its nuclear force the United States must "preserve its capability to adapt". This ability is said to be contrary to the fundamental principles of existing arms control agreements like START and the CTBT: "Further adjustment to the U.S. strategic forces must not be rendered practically or legally ‘irreversible’ via codification in the traditional arms control process".¹⁰¹  The report also recommends increasing the role of nuclear weapons in targeting hardened and deeply buried targets.

The NIPP report is believed to be particularly influential on thinking within the Bush administration, and several of its authors have gained key positions within the administration. Stephen J. Hadley, the deputy national security adviser; Stephen Cambone, a special assistant to Donald Rumsfeld; Robert Joseph, a National Security aide overseeing counter-proliferation; and William Schneider Jr., who informally advised Donald Rumsfeld during the transition all signed the main proposals of the report. During recent Senate testimony, Admiral Richard W. Mies, the then commander in chief of US Strategic Command, paid tribute to the findings of the NIPP Report, calling it "a good blueprint to adopt".¹⁰² 

Another worrying development is the extent to which the Bush administration, in particular the secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, is keen to pursue the weaponisation of space. On 2 May 2001, Rumsfeld stated: "There is no question but that the use of land and sea and air and space are all things that need to be considered if one is looking at the best way to provide the kind of security from ballistic missiles that is desirable for the United States and for our friends and allies" [emphasis added].¹⁰³  Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons) in space, there are many advisors within the US administration who are advocating that nuclear weapons be used as part of possible future missile defence systems.¹⁰⁴ 

Such a move would become easier for Washington to implement if it succeeds in removing the obstacle of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. US plans for the weaponisation of space have provoked opposition and concern, not just from countries such as Russia and China, but also from US allies including France.¹⁰⁵ 

In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks the United States may be forced to revise this unilateralist approach to international relations. Washington’s attempt to build a global alliance against the threat of world terrorism may lead advocates of a more multilateralist agenda within Congress and the White House to gain the upper hand. In spite of this, however, in the short-term at least there remains clear evidence that US nuclear arms control policy has been set on an inevitable collision course with that of the United Kingdom.

Key areas where the UK Government will have difficulty reconciling its own policy commitments and the priorities of its supporters and back-benchers, with its need to maintain close ties with Washington, include the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

5.2 Nuclear non-proliferation regime in jeopardy
In May 2000, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference developed a comprehensive document outlining general commitments to tighten controls on nuclear weapons and further disarmament. This agreement of a nuclear disarmament plan of action included the landmark goal of an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals". In particular the international delegations put together a package of 13 "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty" (for the full list of all 13 steps, see Appendix 1). Article VI of the NPT states:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.¹⁰⁶ 

Since taking office, the Bush administration has publicly stated its commitment to the NPT process. For example, the Final Communiqué of the May 2001 NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest stated: "We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference".¹⁰⁷  In addition, a joint communiqué issued by President Putin and President Bush on 13 November committed the US to take "efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty".¹⁰⁸  However, it seems that the Bush administration wants to pick and choose which NPT commitments it will uphold and which it will ignore. In spite of its promises, the activities of the Bush administration have brought into question Washington’s dedication to upholding its obligations. In particular, the US Government has been pursuing various policies that directly conflict with the 13 commitments made in New York. As the first PrepCom for the 2005 NPT review conference approaches in 2002, concern is growing that the consensus achieved at the 2000 review conference may be hard to reproduce. The US response to three commitments in particular illustrate the difficulties ahead:

Commitment: "The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions."

Implementation of START II is currently stalled due to complicating measures by the Russian Duma, which ratified the treaty in May 2000 but linked entry into force to US Senate approval of auxiliary ABM Treaty agreements drafted in 1997. However, the Bush administration has indicated it will not be pursuing the ratification of START II and is not seeking to continue the START process. While the Bush administration does intend to fulfil its obligations under START I, it wishes to pursue further reductions to the US arsenal without recourse to legally binding, bilateral treaties with Russia. The under secretary of defence for policy, Douglas Feith, noted in September 2001:

The kinds of agreements that we made with the Soviet Union in the Cold War are just not necessary, in our view, between the United States and Russia, which are countries that are not hostile to one another. We don’t need to try to preserve a balance of nuclear terror.¹⁰⁹ 

The chances of "preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty" are essentially non-existent at present. The Bush administration has made clear it intends to move beyond the Treaty’s constraints in order to press ahead with the rapid deployment of a missile defence system. Most telling is its current intention to begin work on a new test-bed facility in Alaska in Spring 2002. Some of the facilities being planned – particularly the missile silos at Fort Greely – appear to be designed specifically for a near-term deployment of a rudimentary missile defence system. These facilities would therefore violate the ABM Treaty.¹¹⁰ 

The important issue is whether the United States will manage to achieve an agreement with Moscow to mutually withdraw from the ABM Treaty. A successful agreement would go a long way towards undermining global opposition towards US missile defence plans, but would still bring into question Washington’s commitment to the NPT process.

Commitment: "The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures."

Weighing heavily in Washington’s current objection to continuing the START process is the extent to which it would render the US defensive posture "inflexible". START I set in place systems of mutual verification whereby the United States and Russia could check that the other side was fully and completely placing its weapons beyond use. While the United States is currently drawing up plans for deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal, it is also keen to ensure that it retains the ability to return to previous force levels should it need to do so in the future.

In recent testimony, Admiral Mies, made the link explicit, stating that:

Our forces structure needs to be robust, flexible, and credible enough to meet the worst threats we can reasonably postulate. These principles weigh heavily against continuing the traditional, bilateral, Cold War approach to arms control.¹¹¹ 

The Bush administration may use the proposed cuts in its arsenal to argue that it is living up to its disarmament commitments. Indeed, one of the other commitments agreed at the 2000 review conference was for nuclear weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally. However, in the absence of a recognised formula of verification and irreversibility, such as that laid out in the START process, the proposed cuts will have difficulty fitting in with the traditional concept of arms control and disarmament as viewed by the wider international community, and laid down in the text of the NPT.

Commitment: "The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

In 1999 the Republican controlled Senate rejected US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by a vote of 51 to 48 in what was a major defeat for President Clinton. Despite regaining control of the Senate, Democrat lawmakers continue to indicate that they lack the political strength to push the issue through. In order for the Treaty to be ratified it requires the approval of two thirds of the Senate.

Both during his election campaign and since entering office, President Bush and his administration have expressed little interest in pursuing treaty ratification. Prior to his election Bush asserted: "We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties".¹¹²  Moreover, during his confirmation hearing, secretary of defence, Rumsfeld argued that the treaty was essentially flawed, stating that it raised problems with regards to the ongoing reliability of the US nuclear stockpile, and that it was unverifiable. ¹¹³ 

Unable to withdraw the CTBT from the Senate, the Bush administration has instead opted to signal that it has no chance of ratification, thereby forcing others to find alternatives more to Washington’s liking.¹¹⁴ On 5 November 2001, for example, the US Government surprised the UN First Committee (Security and Disarmament) by forcing a vote on a simple procedural decision to retain the CTBT on the UN General Assembly agenda next year. Such decisions are usually treated as formalities and sent forward on the basis of consensus. After forcing the vote, the United States was the sole country to oppose it.¹¹⁵ A US representative stated that, "he had asked for a vote on the decision because his country did not support the CTBT".¹¹⁶ 

However, the clearest indication of US opposition on this issue was provided at the CTBT entry into force conference in mid November 2001.¹¹⁷  Prior to the conference, news reports were suggesting that the administration was divided between those in the Pentagon who favoured boycotting the conference completely, and those in the State Department who wanted "to send a ‘fairly junior’ U.S. diplomat to the conference to air U.S. objections to the treaty".¹¹⁸  In the end, the United States boycotted the conference, despite the presence of Secretary of State Colin Powell and other senior officials at other meetings in the UN over the same time period.¹¹⁹ 

Washington’s decision not to attend the Conference serves to further underline the Bush administration’s opposition to the CTBT and raises serious questions about the Treaty’s future health. Nonetheless the Conference was attended by 108 states signatories to the Treaty and concluded a final declaration in which member states of the Conference stressed their "determination to strengthen efforts aimed at promoting the Treaty’s entry into force at the earliest possible date" and affirmed that "the conduct of a nuclear-weapon-test explosion or any other nuclear explosion constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation".¹²⁰ (See appendix 2 for further details of the final declaration from the conference.)

The Bush administration has stated that it intends to uphold the testing moratorium put in place in 1992. However, the wider international community is unlikely to see this as a substitute for ratification of the Treaty. In his report on the issue, General John M. Shalikashvili (Ret.), made the point clear:

A prolonged moratorium would do less damage to U.S. non-proliferation objectives and diplomatic standing than would a resumption of nuclear testing, but most of the benefits that the Test Ban Treaty can provide would be lessened or lost without ratification.¹²¹ 

There are various indications that the current testing moratorium will not last forever. In June 2001, deputy defence secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, raised the possibility of circumstances in which the United States would contemplate resuming nuclear testing: "Well, there may be circumstances where particularly if we develop questions about the reliability or safety of our nuclear weapons where you would have to contemplate doing that".¹²² Meanwhile, General John Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) – a division of the Department of Energy – informed Congress that he is looking hard at "improving test site readiness".¹²³  The NNSA’s responsibilities include "(maintaining and enhancing) the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including the ability to design, produce, and test".¹²⁴ 

The Bush administration proposed in its FY 2002 budget request that the readiness period for the Nevada test site be shortened immediately to 18 months, but it was understood that this could be further reduced to six months. However, the House Appropriations Committee barred any funds "to increase the readiness for underground nuclear testing" in its energy and water appropriations bill. Currently the Energy Department needs two to three years to prepare for a nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site.

Another worrying indication of Washington’s disdain for test ban efforts were recent news reports suggesting that the US Government was privately telling China that it would not object to future increases in their arsenal should Beijing drop its opposition to missile defence. Despite official denials, it was hinted that the two countries might cooperate in an attempt to undermine the CTBT and resume nuclear testing.¹²⁵ 

The threat posed to the NPT by the Bush administration’s arms control policies was highlighted during the confirmation hearing of Under Secretary of State John Bolton in May 2001. Senator John Kerry made the link between Bolton’s opposition to arms control and the future health of the NPT:

His antagonism to arms control threatens the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), a cooperative, verifiable agreement that has effectively kept the nuclear weapons club to very low numbers for more than three decades span. But future international participation in the NPT is inextricably tied to the stability of treaties that Mr. Bolton has condemned.¹²⁶ 

The Bush administration may wish to preserve the NPT in some form, especially as it helps to maintain the existing status quo regarding the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in the world. However, failure on the part of the United States to make good on commitments made during the 2000 NPT review conference put the future survival of the treaty in jeopardy. As the first PrepCom for the 2005 re-view conference approaches, many countries will be asking themselves whether Washington is truly committed to living up to its disarmament obligations.

5.3 Implications for UK nuclear policy
The Labour Government clearly values the security provided by the NPT and the CTBT. A strong supporter of treaty-based forms of security, the Labour Government worked hard during its first term to achieve international consensus on the 2000 NPT Disarmament Plan of Action and to encourage ratification of the CTBT. This is reflected in the Labour Party’s 2001 election manifesto, which reads:

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits us to work for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. We are enthusiastic signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, whose coming into force will impede nuclear proliferation.¹²⁷ 

The UK Government is also widely credited with having played a positive role in ensuring the successful outcome of the 2000 NPT review conference. In July 2000 the UN under-secretary-general for disarmament affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, praised UK efforts stating:

I salute these achievements of the government and civil society of this great nation who are responsible for them. With this deep wellspring of support, Britain will undoubtedly continue to demonstrate its independence, its leadership, and its determination to ensure that the noble words of the NPT and the Final Document of its last Review Conference are translated into concrete deeds.¹²⁸ 

Along with France, the United Kingdom was the first of the nuclear-weapon states to ratify the CTBT on 6 April 1998. At that time the then UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, stated that ratification of the CTBT signalled Britain’s "commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons free world".¹²⁹  The UK Government has also made significant steps in working to convince other countries to sign and ratify the treaty. In 1999 Tony Blair wrote a joint article with French President, Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder urging US Senators to support ratification. The letter claimed that: "Failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a failure in our struggle against proliferation" and went so far as to state that "Rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence within NATO".¹³⁰ 

Moving ahead with multilateral disarmament measures is an issue that enjoys the broad support of both the UK Parliament and the general public. In October 1999 an Early Day Motion tabled by Malcolm Savidge, MP, urging the UK Government to put further pressure on the US Senate to ratify the CTBT was signed by 359 MPs. Signatories included both Labour and Conservative former Cabinet Ministers. The text of the motion read:

That this House expresses grave concern at the US Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; fears this could undermine nuclear non-proliferation; urges Her Majesty’s Government to make further representations to the UK’s American allies to this effect; and hopes that the Senate will reconsider this decision.¹³¹ 

An opinion poll carried out by MORI in February 1999 found that 68 per cent of the UK public either agreed or strongly agreed with the following statement: "I would think more highly of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, if he were to take a lead in negotiations to remove nuclear weapons worldwide".¹³² 

However, since President Bush entered the White House, the Labour Government has taken an increasingly passive line regarding Washington’s effort to live up to its disarmament commitments. The Labour Party manifesto for the 2001 election simply states: "We are enthusiastic signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, whose coming into force will impede nuclear proliferation" but makes no mention of its attitude towards US ratification.¹³³ 

Ongoing speculation that Washington may attempt to precipitate the collapse of the CTBT and a lack of movement in the commitments made at the 2000 NPT review conference pose grave threats to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. If the United Kingdom is to ensure the survival of these treaties, whose existence it fought so hard to achieve, it would be wise to make more use of what influence it does have to urge the United States to adopt a more progressive line.

Chapter 6:
Towards a more aggressive US nuclear posture

6.1 Introduction
US nuclear posture includes both the option of nuclear first use and the targeting of non-nuclear weapon states. In late 1997 President Clinton issued PDD 60, giving guidelines to the US military on targeting of nuclear weapons. PDD 60 reportedly extended the role of US nuclear weapons to include deterring potential proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.¹³⁴ Under pressure from the United Sta-tes, both the 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review and the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept appear to have fallen into line with the policies laid out in PDD 60.

A number of recent reports indicate that the United States is considering options designed to expand the range of missions for its nuclear arsenal. In particular, influential planners are advocating the use of nuclear warheads for tackling hardened, deeply buried targets, and widely dispersed mobile missile launchers. A growing chorus of planners, often closely tied to the nuclear weapons establishment, are talking up the possibility of developing a range of new, low-yield ‘mini-nukes’ designed to fulfil these roles. This could involve a resumption of nuclear testing.

In addition, the debate regarding the response to the 11 September terrorist attacks has highlighted the question of whether the Pentagon would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to threats or attacks from terrorists or ‘rogue states’ using chemical or biological weapons. Washington has long maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity over the targeting of non-nuclear weapons states. An open declaration that it reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in such circumstances would signify a significant change in policy.

Any shifts towards a more aggressive US nuclear posture will place the Labour Government in an uncomfortable position. In the past, NATO and the United Kingdom have generally replicated changes in US policy. At a time when the legality of its nuclear deterrent is being increasingly questioned, the Labour Government can ill-afford to be forced into signing up to a more aggressive targeting posture.

6.2 New targets, new weapons?
The National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) report, Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, makes a comprehensive set of recommendations concerning the need to expand the range of targets against which nuclear weapons could be used:

"Conventional weapons … might not be as effective or efficient in neutralizing hardened targets. For example, although conventional weapons could be used to attack the entrances, exits, or "umbilicals" – electrical power, air supply, and communications links – of a deeply buried facility, one or more nuclear weapons might be required to destroy the facility."¹³⁵ 

On the question of attacking dispersed mobile missile launchers, the report states:

"If the locations of dispersed mobile missile launchers cannot be determined with enough precision to permit pinpoint strikes, suspected deployment areas might be subjected to multiple nuclear strikes, driving up U.S. requirements."

The targeting of hardened facilities or mobile missile launchers is an example of what the report describes as a "counterforce" targeting strategy. In addition the report speaks of the need to maintain a "countervalue" targeting strategy, aimed at "deterring or coercing an opponent through the threat of punishment". "Countervalue attacks are conducted against societal targets of a hostile state – for example, its major industries, population centers, and elements of the governmental apparatus".

Other advocates of the need to develop new ‘low yield’ nuclear devices for attacking hardened and deeply buried targets include policy makers from within the US nuclear weapons establishment. Paul Robinson, director of the Sandia National Laboratories, argued in an interview in September 2001 that conventional weapons have proved deficient in handling hardened and mobile targets in recent conflicts. If the United States is to prevail in similar situations in the future, he argues that it will have to make use of low-yield nuclear warheads:

We’ve seen examples as recently as the [1999] air war with Serbia, when we attacked underground targets with conventional weapons with very little effect. It just takes too many aircraft sorties and conventional weapons to give you any confidence that you can take out underground bunkers. By putting a nuclear warhead on one of those weapons instead of high explosives, you would multiply the explosive power by more than a million.¹³⁶ 

Robinson is chairman of the policy subcommittee of the Strategic Advisory Group, a panel that advises the commander of US Strategic Command. Senior Bush administration officials have reportedly embraced many of Robinson’s ideas.¹³⁷ 

Former deputy director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Stephen Younger, is another strong advocate of developing new types of nuclear weapons. His paper, ‘Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century’, published in June 2000, argues that nuclear warheads provide the only reliable means of tackling hardened missile silos and deeply buried command bunkers. Younger also states that precision targeting could greatly reduce the nuclear yield required to destroy such targets whilst only relatively few targets require high nuclear yields.¹³⁸  Younger has since been named head of the Defence Threat Reduction Agency.

Both of these suggestions and those of other like-minded analysts have one goal in common: to overturn the 1994 legislation prohibiting research and development of precision nuclear weapons of less than five kilotons in order to open the way for research into a future generation of weapons.¹³⁹  Two Republican senators inserted a provision into the 2000 Defence Authorization Bill requiring the Defence and Energy Departments to work together to determine what kind of weapon should be developed to deal with hardened and deeply buried targets. The report will be submitted to Congress by the end of 2001, possibly as part of the Nuclear Posture Review.

6.3 Targeting non-nuclear-weapon states
The United States has long maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity over the question of whether it would retaliate with nuclear weapons to a chemical or biological weapons attack. On the one hand, Washington has made negative security assurances stating that it will not use nuclear weapons against those countries that do not have nuclear weapons and are not fighting with the support of those that do. Most recently, the US Government issued negative security assurances in the run up to the 1995 NPT review conference.

At the same time, past statements by US defence officials imply that the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapon attack. In 1996, for example, the then secretary of defence, William Perry, told Congress that Washington would use nuclear force if necessary to respond to a chemical weapons attack: "the whole range (of responses) should be considered – precision guided munitions, Tomahawk land-attack missiles – and then we have nuclear weapons".¹⁴⁰  Similarly, during the Gulf War President Bush wrote a letter to Saddam Hussein clearly implying that if Iraq were to use chemical or biological weapons against the forces of the US-led coalition, Washington would not refrain from unleashing a nuclear response.¹⁴¹ 

For some time influential policy makers have been arguing that the United States needs to move away from this policy of ambiguity and adopt a more explicit stance regarding this question. Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, argued that the increasing spread of biological weapons is a threat that can only be countered by adopting a clear policy of responding to any attack with nuclear weapons:

Making the possibility of such a response known in advance, as it did before Operation Desert Storm, could also have deterrent benefits. It could discourage a foe from the belief that by threatening to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces it could keep the casualty-averse United States from responding to its aggression.¹⁴² 

The 2001 NIPP Report goes one step further, advocating the use of nuclear weapons to deter "WMD or massive conventional aggression by an emerging global competitor".¹⁴³ 

In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, the question of whether nuclear weapons have a role to play in responding to chemical or biological weapons attacks has resurfaced. According to a recent Washington Post report, "Conservatives outside the administration have been calling on the administration to make an explicit threat to use nuclear weapons to respond to a biological or chemical attack". David Smith, a defence consultant and co-author of the NIPP report, stated:

September 11 really underscores the need to look at a full range of flexible options … What we were trying to get at there is we don’t believe the current arsenal of the United States is persuasively deterrent to all comers.¹⁴⁴ 

These arguments over targeting and responding to chemical and biological weapons represent one side of an ongoing debate concerning the future role of the US nuclear arsenal. Many other analysts have argued that Washington’s lead in the field of increasingly accurate conventional military munitions, the so-called ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), will mean the United States will have less need for nuclear weapons over the next few decades.¹⁴⁵  Partly in response to this RMA, there was a general de-emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy during the 1990s. The 1997 PDD, for example, reportedly concluded that, "nuclear weapons now play a smaller role in our nuclear security strategy than at any point during the nuclear era".¹⁴⁶ 

By advocating the need for nuclear weapons for tackling hardened and dispersed targets, or to deter or respond to chemical and biological weapons, military planners are seeking to reverse this trend, and place nuclear weapons back at the centre of US strategic thinking. With the upcoming NPR and the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, advocates of a more aggressive nuclear posture may have their opportunity.

When asked to comment on the possibility of nuclear weapons having a role to play in the military response to 11 September, secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld refused to be drawn, stating only:

(If) you think of the loss of human life on Tuesday, and then put in your head the reality that a number of countries today have other so-called asymmetrical threat capabilities – ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons, cyber warfare – these are the kinds of things that are used in this era of the 21st century. And a germ war-fare attack anywhere in the world would bring about losses of lives not in the thousands but in the millions.¹⁴⁷ 

6.4 Implications for UK nuclear policy
The strong indications that the Bush administration is undertaking a shift in nuclear policy that could dramatically lower the threshold for nuclear use suggests a probable collision course with UK policy priorities. While the UK Government remains ambiguous on the question of first use, and the targeting of non-nuclear weapon states in retaliation for attacks from biological or chemical weapons, it has long sought to distance itself from the idea of using low-yield warheads to target deeply buried and hardened targets. In his 1993 keynote speech on nuclear weapons policy after the Cold War the then secretary of state for defence, Malcolm Rifkind, laid out the UK government’s position:

There is sometimes speculation that more so-called "usable" nuclear weapons – very low-yield devices which could be used to carry out what are euphemistically called "surgical" strikes – would allow nuclear deterrence to effective in circumstances where existing weapons would be self-deterring. I am thoroughly opposed to this view. The implications of such a development of a new war-fighting role for nuclear weapons would be seriously damaging to our approach to maintaining stability in the European context, quite apart from the impact it would have on our efforts to encourage non-proliferation and greater confidence outside Europe. This is not a path that I would wish any nuclear power to go down.¹⁴⁸ 

Similarly, in its submission to the International Court of Justice in 1995, the UK Government argued that its nuclear weapons policy would not contravene international law on the grounds that:

Modern nuclear weapons are capable of far more precise targeting and can therefore be directed against specific military objectives without the indiscriminate effect on the civilian population which the older literature assumed to be inevitable. Moreover, the United Kingdom’s and NATO’s current doctrine emphasizes that nuclear weapons would only ever be used in a defensive role and that the threat posed by an aggressor which would invite a nuclear response would be of a scale which would make that nuclear response proportionate. …

So far as the principle of proportionality is concerned, it is often assumed both that any use of nuclear weapons would cause extensive civilian losses and that such losses would necessarily be excessive in relation to any military advantage which might result. These assumptions tend to be based on assessments of the likely effects of a nuclear attack on or near a city. The reality, however, is that nuclear weapons might be used in a wide variety of circumstance with very different results in terms of likely civilian casualties. In some cases, such as the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible to envisage a nuclear attack which caused comparatively few civilian casualties.¹⁴⁹ 

Protection of civilian populations, the need to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and non-targeting of civilians are important components of international humanitarian law. The
use of even a low-yield nuclear weapon against a sparsely populated area would be devastating in terms of the environment, human life, and wider non-proliferation efforts. A recent report from the Federation of American Scientists stated that:

No earth-burrowing missile can penetrate deep enough into the earth to contain an explosion with a nuclear yield even as small as 1 percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshima weapon. The explosion simply blows out a massive crater of radioactive dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense and deadly fallout.¹⁵⁰ 

The close ties that the United Kingdom retains with the United States, particularly via NATO, would make any shift towards a more aggressive nuclear posture on the part of Washington a very uncomfortable issue to deal with, and would further highlight the conflict between nuclear weapons and international law.

Continue to Chapter 7

Contents | Executive Summary | Acronyms | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3
 Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8 | Appendix 1 | Appendix 2 
 Endnotes

Back to Nuclear and WMD home page.