Executive Summary

Acronyms and abbreviations

Introduction

Chapter 1: British nuclear policy under Labour (1997-2001)

Chapter 2: British nuclear policy: secrecy and dependency on the 
United States

Chapter 3: Courting trouble: legality of the UK Trident programme

Chapter 4: The impact of Bush Administration policies on UK nuclear policy

Chapter 5: The disintegration of multilateral arms control

Chapter 6: Towards a more aggressive US nuclear posture

Chapter 7: The Future of Trident

Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations

Appendix 1: The "Programme of Action" Agreed at the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference

Appendix 2: Outcome of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 11-13 November 2001

Endnotes

Executive Summary

It should now be obvious to everyone that people who have the fanaticism and capability to fly an airliner laden with passengers and fuel into a skyscraper will not be deterred by human decency from deploying chemical or biological weapons, missiles or nuclear weapons or other forms of mass destruction if these are available to them. We must there-fore redouble our efforts to stop the proli-feration and the availability of such weapons.

Secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, speaking in the House of Commons, 14 September 2001

Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September, urgent action is needed to renew international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Tackling the threat posed by transnational terrorism will require a fresh review of UK defence and foreign policy.  In the past the UK and its NATO allies have viewed nuclear weapons as providing the ‘ultimate guarantee’ of security.  

However, the terrorists who carried out the attacks on the United States were clearly undeterred by Western nuclear forces, and it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons could be used in the current (or any) war against terrorism.

Labour’s second term in office will cover a critical period for the future of the international regimes controlling nuclear weapons.  The next nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference will be held in 2005.  The UK Government is strongly committed to the NPT, but if the nuclear non-proliferation regime is to be made more robust, progress must be made over the next four years to implement the commitments to move toward disarmament made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.  This report highlights some of the key nuclear policy questions that will need to be addressed during Labour’s second term. What is the likely impact of the Bush Administration’s nuclear policies on Britain’s highly US-dependent nuclear forces?  Should Trident be replaced in the future or entered into multilateral disarmament negotiations?  Should the service life of Trident be extended, or could Trident submarines be converted to become conventionally armed submarines in the future?  Can nuclear weapons be used as a deterrent to proliferators?  In light of recent challenges in the courts, is British nuclear policy legal?

British nuclear policy under Labour (1997-2001)
Trident is now the UK’s only nuclear weapon system and is expected to remain in service for approximately 30 years. Following the 1997 election, the new Labour government conducted a Strategic Defence Review (SDR), based on the premise that circumstances had changed dramatically since Trident was ordered. However, changes to Britain’s nuclear policy and posture since 1997 have been fairly cautious: the number of Trident warheads deployed has been reduced from 60 to 48 warheads per submarine; and the number of Trident II missiles procured has been reduced from 65 to 58 missiles.  The biggest change in Labour Party thinking on nuclear policy has been the abandonment of a ‘No-first-use’ policy.  This was discussed before Labour came into power, but was quietly dropped after the 1997 election.  Similarly, although committed to strengthening security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states while in opposition, the Labour Government has signalled that the use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological threats has not been ruled out, following the US policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’. The so-called ‘sub-strategic’ role for Trident has been mainly  linked with deterrence of chemical and biological threats.  

In addition, access to information and parliamentary scrutiny of nuclear policy is now more difficult than it was under the Major and Thatcher governments. Abandoning the annual defence estimates in 1997, the UK Government now publishes a limited range of less comprehensive and ad hoc documents. With major changes now taking place in US nuclear policy, and significant developments at Aldermaston concerning the future of the UK’s nuclear force,  it is imperative that regular and detailed Government reporting to Parliament, together with effective parliamentary scrutiny, are restored.

British nuclear policy:  secrecy and dependence
British nuclear policy is closely intertwined with that of the United States on many levels.  For example, there is a high level of co-operation between the US nuclear weapons laboratories and Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment on stockpile stewardship and management of the Trident warhead.  This is seen as essential for maintaining the ability to replace Trident in the future. 

Moreover, in recent years, contact between personnel working on the respective UK and US nuclear weapons programmes appears to have increased dramatically.  In addition, Britain’s Trident submarines use US Trident II D5 missiles produced and serviced in the United States, and held at the Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia.  The British Trident submarines also conduct missile test firings at the US Eastern Test Range, off the coast of Florida. In operational terms, British Trident submarine patrols are closely coordinated with US Trident patrols.

Courting trouble
In July 1996, in a landmark ruling the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” following a request from the UN General Assembly.  The Court was unanimous that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”. The Court also ruled that any use of nuclear weapons would “generally contravene” the principles and rules of humanitarian law.  Following the ICJ Ruling, the legality of British nuclear policy has been challenged in the British courts and through non-violent actions against the Trident programme.  

The impact of Bush Administration policies 
The current Republican administration is planning to radically alter the size, composition and the role of its nuclear arsenal, a shift that it likely to impact heavily on UK nuclear policy.  Some of these emerging strategies, including projected deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal, offer the UK Government an opportunity to dramatically advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.  Radical cuts in the US arsenal announced by President George W. Bush in November 2001 are likely to place pressure on the UK Government – which has long argued that it maintains the minimum nuclear arsenal concurrent with its own defence needs – to re-evaluate its own force composition.  It would also present the UK Government with an ideal opportunity to broaden and institutionalise the process, possibly endorsing five power nuclear disarmament talks suggested by Russia and supported by France.

The disintegration of multilateral arms control
In the wake of Bush’s presidential victory, a unilateralist, ‘America First’ ideology has taken hold in the White House, which is shaped by two dominant themes:  a strong opposition to international treaties and a desire to maintain the US position as the dominant world superpower. These two pressures are driving US arms control policy in a way that indicates a direct collision course with UK priorities. The deep-seated opposition to international agreements, a hallmark of Republican thinking in the past, has become even more entrenched in recent years.  The Bush administration has repeatedly either refused to join international agreements, or watered them down to fit its own purpose. 

These policies challenge the existing ‘treaty-based’ framework of international arms control and conflict directly with the Labour Government’s stated policy commitments.  Ongoing speculation that Washington may attempt to precipitate the collapse of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), along with a lack of movement in the commitments made at the 2000 NPT review conference, pose grave threats to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.  If Britain is to ensure the survival of these hard won treaties and fulfil its own disarmament commitments, the UK Government should exert its influence and urge the United States to adopt a more progressive line.

A more aggressive US nuclear posture
The US nuclear posture includes both the option of nuclear first use and the targeting of non-nuclear weapon states.  A number of recent reports indicate that the United States is considering options designed to expand the range of missions for its nuclear arsenal.  In particular, influential planners are advocating the use of nuclear warheads for tackling hardened, deeply buried targets, and widely dispersed mobile missile launchers.  A range of new, low-yield ‘mini-nukes’ are being discussed as the best means of fulfilling these roles, and their development could involve a resumption of nuclear testing.  In addition, the debate regarding the response to the 11 September terrorist attacks has highlighted the question of whether the Pentagon would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to threats or attacks from terrorists or ‘rogue states’ using chemical or biological weapons.  Washington has long maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity over the targeting of non-nuclear weapons states.  An open declaration that it reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in such circumstances would signify a significant change in policy.

In the past, NATO and the United Kingdom have generally replicated changes in US posture in their own nuclear policies.  At a time when the legality of its nuclear deterrent is being increasingly questioned, the Labour Government can ill-afford to be forced into signing up to a more aggressive targeting posture.

The future of Trident
The United States is currently engaged in a number of programmes designed to extend, improve or, in some cases, radically alter the capabilities of its Trident fleet. These programmes include enhancing the capabilities of the Trident missile, improving the effectiveness of the Trident warhead, extending the lifespan of the system as a whole and beginning work on converting at least two submarines to conventional use.  Given the close cooperation between the US and UK Governments on all aspects of the Trident programme, it is highly likely that the UK Government could also choose to become involved in any, or all, of these programmes.  The UK Government continues to assert that its Trident programme is intended to have a service life of approximately 30 years.  However, if Aldermaston is already considering the future of the Trident warhead, any US initiated programme to extend the service life of submarines would be of great interest, as would plans for an eventual replacement. Initial British Government thinking on a replacement for Trident may already be underway. Given the potential costs involved with life extension, refurbishment and replacement programmes for nuclear weapons, and the UK Government’s past record in concealing these developments from democratic scrutiny, the Defence Select Committee’s request for a restatement of Government policy on nuclear weapons is extremely timely.

Conclusions
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, Britain’s global responsibility to contribute to efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems has never been more pressing. In recent months, Britain’s non-proliferation efforts have been seriously undermined by the Bush Administration’s rejection of key aspects of international arms control.   If Britain is to redouble its efforts to stop the proliferation and availability of weapons of mass destruction, it must now use its special relationship with the United States to impress upon the Bush Administration the need for international engagement on these issues.

In the coming years, the UK Government will have to address the questions of whether to replace Trident, embark on a programme to extend the life of the system, or phase Trident out, either by engaging in international disarmament negotiations or, perhaps by converting the submarines to conventional use. Given the weight of these decisions, parliamentary scrutiny of British nuclear weapons policy and British policy on weapons of mass destruction will be crucial.

Recommendations

1.   The UK Government should implement the 2000 NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action.

Successive British governments have regarded the NPT as the ‘cornerstone’ of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.  Since 1997, the UK Government has used NPT PrepComs as an opportunity to report on its progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Britain should now take the initiative to strengthen the NPT by preparing its own programme of action to implement the 2000 NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan.

2.   Britain should lead international efforts to bring the CTBT into force.

Britain must keep up the pressure on all 13 countries that have failed to sign and/or ratify the CTBT.  In particular, it must use its special relationship with the United States to impress upon the Bush administration the importance of ratifying the CTBT and that any deal with China to resume nuclear testing would be unacceptable to the international community.

3.   Britain should respond positively to President Putin’s proposal for five-power talks on nuclear disarmament.

Whilst the US and Russia can point to some degree of progress through the negotiation of the START nuclear disarmament treaties, Britain has yet to enter any negotiating process. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal for five-power nuclear disarmament talks provide an opportunity for the UK Government to begin the process of engaging with the United States and Russia in multilateral disarmament talks.

4.   The Government should review the option of converting the UK Trident submarines to conventional use.

The Labour Government has consistently argued that no further review of British nuclear policy or progress on nuclear disarmament is necessary following the SDR, which was predicated on the assumption that Trident must be retained for the foreseeable future.   The US Government is now radically revising its nuclear posture. It is also converting a number of its Trident submarines to fulfil a conventional role. The UK Government should now seriously consider the future role of Trident, including the possibility that it could be converted to conventional use in the context of a wide-ranging review of British defence needs.

5.   Government policy and decision making on nuclear weapons should be subject to detailed parliamentary scrutiny. 

There has been a marked reduction in parliamentary scrutiny of the UK nuclear programme in the last five years. Many key questions concerning the current status of British nuclear policy remain unanswered: What is the Government’s position on replacement of Trident?  Are there any plans to develop a new UK nuclear warhead?  Has authorization been given to Aldermaston to pursue life extension programmes for Trident?  What is the nature and extent of current British nuclear cooperation with the US nuclear weapons laboratories?  What are the implications of changes in US nuclear strategy and posture for UK and NATO nuclear policy?  Has the UK Government studied US proposals to convert Trident submarines to conventional use?

There are also questions concerning the UK’s non-proliferation policy: What steps are envisaged to implement the 2000 NPT Nuclear Disarmament Plan?  How does the UK Government intend to respond to President Putin’s proposal for disarmament talks?

Without fuller access for Parliament to information concerning nuclear policy, proper scrutiny of and accountability for the UK’s nuclear programme will be impossible.

Acronyms and abbreviations

AWE: Atomic Weapons Establishment
BTWC: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EIVR: Exchange of Information and Visit Report
ICJ: International Court of Justice
JOWOG: Joint Working Groups
LLNL: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIF: National Ignition Facility
NIPP: National Institute for Public Policy
NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration
NPR: Nuclear Posture Review
NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty
RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs
SACEUR: Supreme Allied Command Europe
SDR: Strategic Defence Review
SEAL: Sea-Air-Land
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLEP: Stockpile Life Extension Programme
SSBN: Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear
SSN: Ship Submersible Nuclear
TASM: Tactical Air-To-Surface Missile
UN: United Nations

Making progress in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is more important than ever in the aftermath of last week’s appalling terrorist attack on the United States. The states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed last year that this challenge could not be overcome by halfway measures. Indeed, they concluded that ‘the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons’. Regrettably, several important treaties aimed at nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament or nuclear reductions still await entry into force. It is vitally important for the world community to continue its efforts to implement the commitments already made, and to further identify the ways and means of achieving nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.

United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, addressing the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, 17 September 2001

In its second term in office, Tony Blair’s Labour Government faces unique challenges in the field of international security. Following the massive terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, urgent action is needed for renewed international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Tackling the threat posed by trans-national terrorism will require a fresh review of UK defence and foreign policy. In the past the UK and its NATO allies have viewed nuclear weapons as providing the ‘ultimate guarantee’ of security. However, the terrorists who carried out the attacks on the United States were clearly undeterred by Western nuclear forces, and it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons could be used in the current (or any) war against terrorism without risking massive civilian casualties and the fracture of the fragile international coalition that has been put together.

The strategies employed during the Cold War era are no longer relevant to the new international order that is emerging from the aftermath of 11 September. Between now and the next General Election in 2004-2005, the UK Government will need to reappraise key aspects of its defence policy in the light of a rapidly changing international environment, including the future of the Trident nuclear force.

Labour’s second term in office will cover a critical period for the future of the international regimes controlling nuclear weapons. The next nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference will be held in 2005. The UK Government is strongly committed to the NPT, but if the nuclear non-proliferation regime is to be made more robust, progress must be made over the next four years to implement the treaty’s commitments on moving towards disarmament.

As the UK Government prepares to re-examine British defence policy requirements in the wake of 11 September, including ways to redouble efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, this report highlights some of the key nuclear policy questions that will need to be addressed during Labour’s second term. What is the likely impact of the Bush Administration’s nuclear policies on the UK’s highly US-dependent nuclear forces? Should Trident be replaced in the future or entered into multilateral disarmament negotiations? Should the service life of Trident be extended, or could Trident submarines be converted to become conventionally armed submarines in the future? Can nuclear weapons be used as a deterrent to proliferators? In the light of recent challenges in the courts, is British nuclear policy legal?

The first half of the report examines the current state of UK nuclear weapons policy and the scope of UK-US nuclear relations. Chapter 1 looks at the history of the UK nuclear capability along with the ongoing debates over ‘No-first-use’, negative security assurances, and the sub-strategic role for Trident. Chapter 2 describes the close relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States on nuclear weapons policy, and in particular, the UK’s reliance on the United States for technical, scientific and structural assistance in keeping the Trident system operational. Chapter 3 highlights the ongoing debate over the legality of the UK Trident system and the work of civil society groups, especially the Trident Ploughshares group, in opposing UK nuclear doctrine.

The second half of the report examines the forthcoming changes in US nuclear doctrine and how these expected developments will impact upon UK nuclear policy. Chapter 4 examines how deep unilateral cuts in the US nuclear arsenal might impact on UK nuclear policy, and raises the possibility that London might favourably act upon proposals for P5 talks put forward by President Putin. Chapter 5 looks at how US challenges to the existing framework of arms control and disarmament will impact on a UK foreign policy that has traditionally favoured ‘treaty based’ forms of security. Chapter 6 examines how a possible shift towards a more aggressive US nuclear posture might impact upon UK nuclear weapons policy. Chapter 7 details the various efforts by the United States to upgrade its own Trident system, including partial conversion to conventional use, and asks whether the UK Government should follow suit. The final section sets out a number of practical recommendations as to how the United Kingdom could develop its nuclear policy in line with its disarmament commitments without compromising national security.

Chapter 1:
British nuclear policy under Labour (1997-2001)

A new Labour government will retain Trident. We will press for multilateral negotiations towards mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons. When satisfied with verified progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations. .
Labour Party Manifesto, ‘New Labour: Because Britain deserves better’, 1997

1.1 The history of British nuclear policy
Britain’s nuclear weapons programme dates back to the second world war, when the Churchill Government established the MAUD Committee to guide British research on atomic energy and the feasibility of developing a ‘super-bomb’. The MAUD Committee’s report in 1941 was instrumental in driving forward the US Manhattan project to develop the atomic bomb, in which many British scientists participated.

Although British collaboration with the United States on nuclear weapons was severely curtailed after the war by the US Congress, Britain proceeded to test its first nuclear bomb in 1952 and to manufacture nuclear weapons for deployment on its V bombers. Nuclear co-operation with the United States was resumed in the late 1950s with the signing of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, and in 1963 the Polaris Sales agreement was signed. The 1958 Agreement provides the basis for ongoing co-operation between the UK’s nuclear weapons establishment and the US nuclear weapons laboratories to this day, while the current agreement for the United Kingdom to procure the US Trident missile system is based on the Polaris Sales Agreement.

Most British nuclear disarmament initiatives have been unilateral and fairly limited in scope, for example: the decision in 1993 to cancel the nuclear armed Tactical Air-Surface Missile (TASM) before it could enter production; and the decision to withdraw the WE177 "free fall" bombs (which had been deployed by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force) from service ahead of schedule. Other withdrawals of nuclear forces have been imposed on the United Kingdom by the United States, such as the removal of the nuclear Lance missile and the nuclear artillery role, which were carried out using US nuclear weapons held under "dual-key" arrangements. These weapons were withdrawn following the unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons announced by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991.

Trident is now the UK’s only nuclear weapon system. The ‘system’ consists of:

• four British-built Trident submarines – HMS Vanguard, HMS Victorious, HMS Vigilant, and HMS Vengeance (the first of which entered service in 1994, and the last in 1999);

• US Trident II D5 missiles (each submarine is capable of carrying up 16 of these missiles); and

• nuclear warheads, built and serviced by the UK’s atomic weapons establishments, although the warhead design is believed to be closely based on the US Trident warhead, W76, with a yield of approximately 100 kilotons. The British nuclear arsenal is based on a stockpile of "less than 200 operationally available warheads".² 

The Trident system is expected to remain in service for approximately 30 years.

Following the 1997 election, the new UK Government conducted a Strategic Defence Review (SDR), setting out its policy on the full spectrum of defence policy including nuclear weapons. Although the SDR is based on the premise that there has been a "relaxation of tension and vast improvement in current strategic conditions since the end of the Cold War"³ , changes to Britain’s nuclear policy and posture since 1997 have been fairly cautious, and there have been few changes since the review was published in 1998.

1.2 Nuclear force reductions under Labour
Labour’s only pre-election policy document on international affairs, A Fresh Start for Britain, promised: "Labour in government will work for: a freeze on warhead numbers. As a first step, we will ensure that Trident carries no more warheads than Polaris".⁴  When Polaris first entered service in 1968 it carried 48 warheads per submarine. This was reduced to 32 warheads following the Polaris Chevaline modernisation programme. A Fresh Start for Britain gave the impression that Trident warhead numbers could be cut to as low as 32 per submarine. (Previous Conservative government policy had been that the Trident submarines would deploy with "no more than 96 warheads, and possibly significantly fewer" ).⁵

When the SDR was published a less radical reduction was announced: 48 warheads per submarine, the number carried by Polaris submarines when they originally entered service in 1968. The Labour Government’s argument was that it had made a reduction of "more than 70% in the potential explosive power of the deterrent since the end of the Cold War" and that Trident submarines would "have an explosive power one third less than the 32 Chevaline warheads which were eventually deployed on each Polaris submarine".⁶ 

Subsequent parliamentary questions have confirmed that the actual number of Trident warheads deployed has been reduced from 60 warheads per submarine under the Conservatives to 48 warheads under Labour. According to the Labour Government, implementation of the SDR meant that: "12 warheads are to be removed from each of the three Trident submarines currently in service during their next programmed docking in the warhead fitting facility at Coulport… Production of warheads to meet previous plans had not been completed and we do not need to decommission any warheads to implement Strategic Defence Review changes".⁷  Despite the end of the Cold War, Trident warhead deployments remain at a similar, if not higher level than Polaris in the 1970s and 1980s (see table 1).

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 16 July 1998, col. 237; 30 July 1998, col. 452 and The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, The Stationery Office, July 1998 p 5-2

The SDR also decided that the policy of continuous deterrent patrols, dating back to the introduction of Polaris in 1968, should be continued: "one Trident submarine should be maintained on deterrent patrol at any time". It rejected other proposals for de-alerting such as removing warheads from missiles and storing them separately on shore. Instead, the Government announced that Trident would "normally be at several days ‘notice to fire’".⁸  Suggestions that the fourth Trident submarine, HMS Vengeance, could be ‘mothballed’ were also ruled out as the SDR argued that the fourth Trident submarine was needed to retain "an effective deterrent for up to 30 years".⁹ 

Trident is also significantly more advanced than Polaris. The D5 missile has a longer range, greater speed and higher level of accuracy than the Polaris missile. In particular, Trident’s multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles allow warheads deployed on a single missile to hit separate targets, thereby greatly increasing the number of targets that Trident can reach.

1.3 Trident missile procurement
The Strategic Defence Review also announced a reduction in the number of Trident II missiles that it planned to procure from 65 to 58. Not all of these missiles will be deployed: 14 are expected to be test fired during the lifetime of the UK Trident force, while four will be held as a processing margin (see table 2).

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 30 July 1998, Column: 449.

All four UK Trident submarines have now collected a payload of missiles from the United States. The number of missiles deployed on British Trident submarines is classified; however, as table 3 indicates, the submarines probably do not always deploy with a full payload of missiles.

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 9 May 1995, col. 405; 1 December 1997, col. 27; and 30 July 1998, cols. 448-449.

1.4 Nuclear posture: the ‘No-first-use’ debate
The biggest change in Labour Party thinking on nuclear policy after it was elected to government in 1997 was the abandonment of any policy on ‘No-first-use’ of nuclear weapons. While in opposition, Labour Party policy was that a Labour government would work for "a negotiated, multilateral no first use agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states and strengthened security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states in the form of an international legally-binding treaty".¹⁰ 

Although there was no mention of ‘No-first-use’ in the SDR, in response to parliamentary questions, government defence spokesperson, Lord Hoyle revealed: "We considered No-first-use in the Strategic Defence Review but saw no reason to change our and NATO’s current nuclear policy".¹¹ 

Since the 1960s, NATO has refused to rule out the option of being the first to use a nuclear weapon in a conflict situation. In the euphoria following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance’s 1990 London Declaration announced that nuclear weapons were now weapons of "last resort",¹²  but in NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1991, the question of ‘No-first-use’ of nuclear weapons was not mentioned. NATO’s military commanders have always interpreted the absence of any political statement ruling out first-use of nuclear weapons as meaning that the option of using nuclear weapons first is not prohibited, and that therefore Alliance nuclear planning can include this option.¹³ 

US nuclear posture also includes the option of nuclear first use. In late 1997, during the same period that the UK Government was conducting its SDR, President Clinton issued a new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 60), giving guidelines to the US military on targeting of nuclear weapons. Far from ruling out ‘first-use’, PDD 60 reportedly extended the role of US nuclear weapons to include deterring potential proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁴ 

Against this background, and amidst rumours of pressure from the Pentagon to drop the issue, the publication of the SDR, followed NATO’s strategy to the letter by avoiding any mention of ‘No-first-use’.

Only six months later at the December 1998 meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council, Chancellor Schröder’s newly elected German Government attempted to raise the possibility that NATO’s Strategic Concept could be changed to include a policy of ‘No-first-use’. In April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government finally agreed on a new formulation of its nuclear posture in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. The German Government’s suggestion of a ‘No-first-use’ policy met with stiff opposition from the nuclear weapon states.¹⁵  Even an earlier form of words, dating back to the 1990 London Declaration describing nuclear weapons as weapons of "last resort" was ruled out by the US as too strong a commitment. Instead the use of NATO nuclear weapons was described as "extremely remote",¹⁶  allowing NATO, US and British nuclear posture to remain largely unchanged on this issue.

1.5 Negative security assurances
Negative security assurances were first issued by the United States, Britain and the former Soviet Union in 1978 at the third UN Special Session on Disarmament. In essence the UK Government pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime unless they were to attack the United Kingdom in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. Negative security assurances remain an important element of the NPT. The importance of these statements is emphasised by Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr, former head of the US delegation to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:

Numerous non-nuclear weapon states made their decision to join the NPT after this commitment was announced. This commitment (referred to as a negative security assurance) was reaffirmed in April 1995 by the nuclear weapon states in the context of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Without it, the indefinite extension of the NPT might not have taken place… state parties to the NPT agreed to its indefinite extension relying on this reaffirmation.¹⁷ 

Although A Fresh Start for Britain had proposed, "strengthened security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states in the form of an international legally-binding treaty", instead Labour in government has followed the US policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ on this issue. In 1997, the then UK minister of state for the Armed Forces, Dr John Reid, described the new Government’s approach to the threat of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation as follows:

The role of deterrence... must not be overlooked. Even if a potential aggressor has developed missiles with the range to strike at the United Kingdom, and nuclear, biological or chemical warheads to be delivered by those means, he would have to consider – he would do well to consider – the possible consequences of such an attack... It seems unlikely that a dictator who was willing to strike another country with weapons of mass destruction would be so trusting as to feel entirely sure that that country would not respond with the power at its disposal.¹⁸ 

Despite Labour’s pre-election commitment to a legally binding treaty on security assurances, in the SDR the UK Government simply restated its existing negative security assurance that: "Britain has repeatedly made it clear that we will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state not in material breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, unless it attacks us, our Allies or a state to which we have a security commitment, in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state".¹⁹  The UK Government also welcomed and supported the "re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Security Assurances at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva",²⁰  but as yet no progress has been made towards negotiation of a legally binding negative security assurance.

Immediately after the release of the SDR, in response to written questions in the House of Lords concerning nuclear retaliation in the case of "aggressor states contemplating the use of chemical and biological weapons", Lord Hoyle confirmed that:

The use of chemical or biological weapons by any state would be a grave breach of international law. A state which chose to use chemical or biological weapons against the United Kingdom should expect us to exercise our right of self defence and to make a proportionate response.²¹ 

Phrases such as ‘proportionate response’ are deliberately ambiguous, intended to convey the message that potential nuclear use has not been ruled out. For example, a UK Ministry of Defence report, Defending Against the Risk: Chemical and Biological Weapons, concluded:

To date [1999] neither arms control nor export controls have been sufficient to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We must therefore also seek to deter the use of biological and chemical weapons by assuring a potential aggressor of three related outcomes, namely that: their use will not be allowed to secure political or military advantage; it will, on the contrary, invite a proportionately serious response; and that those, at every level, responsible for any breach of international law relating to the use of such weapons, will be held personally accountable.²² 

By using language usually associated with nuclear weapons such as the reference to deterring a ‘potential aggressor’ and using a ‘proportionately serious response’, the UK Government signalled that the use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological threats has not been ruled out.

Far from providing "strengthened security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states in the form of an international legally-binding treaty" as Labour’s pre-election policy documents had suggested, these subsequent statements concerning the possible use of nuclear weapons against biological and chemical weapons proliferators weaken the UK’s previous negative security assurances. As Ambassador Graham writes:

Suggestions that nuclear weapons should be used to explicitly deter chemical or biological attacks should not be allowed to justify failure to adopt a no first use policy. Not only would such a strategy be inappropriate and disproportionate, it would endanger the NPT regime… There is no exception in this commitment [the negative security assurances] for chemical or biological weapons.²³

1.6 A new sub-strategic role for Trident
Trident was originally intended to provide the UK with an ‘independent’ strategic nuclear capability aimed at deterring the large nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union/Russia. It is now also intended to provide a sub-strategic nuclear capability, described as the option to perform a more "limited nuclear strike that would not automatically lead to a full scale nuclear exchange".²⁴  The so-called ‘sub-strategic’ role for Trident has been particularly linked with deterrence of chemical and biological threats.

In the early 1990s, the then Conservative Government planned to develop a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) to implement the sub-strategic nuclear role. However, when TASM was cancelled in 1993 following the end of the Cold War, the then secretary of state for defence, Malcolm Rifkind, announced that the United Kingdom would "exploit the flexibility and capability of Trident to provide the vehicle for both sub-strategic and strategic aspects of deterrence".²⁵ 

How exactly Trident would carry out this sub-strategic role has never been entirely clear. In 1993, the Ministry of Defence told the Defence Select Committee that Trident would use the same missile and warheads to fulfil the sub-strategic role as it used for the strategic role.²⁶  The only changes to Trident noted by the Defence Committee were "minor enhancements to the hardware and software of the UK shore-based target planning system".²⁷  This suggested that one of the principal differences between the strategic and sub-strategic roles were the kind of targets that sub-strategic weapons were to be used against.

Following the SDR, the Defence Select Committee again addressed the question of Trident’s sub-strategic role. According to the MoD director of policy, Richard Hatfield: "[The sub-strategic role] is a form of deterrence, not necessarily a specific weapon".²⁸  However, the UK’s Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), which is responsible for design and manufacture of the UK’s nuclear warheads, states in its 2000 Annual Report that the UK Trident programme has the "option of two warhead yields",²⁹  suggesting that the lower yield might be used to provide the sub-strategic role.

The secretary of state for defence, George Robertson, also told the Defence Committee that the sub-strategic option was "an option available that is other than guaranteed to lead to full scale nuclear exchange". He envisaged that a nuclear-armed country might wish to "…use a sub-strategic weapon making it clear that it is sub-strategic in order to show that ... if the attack continues [the country] would then go to the full strategic strike," and that this would give a chance to "stop the escalation on the lower point of the ladder".³⁰ 

This scenario raises more questions than answers and it is difficult to see how it could work in practice. With identical Trident missiles providing both the strategic and sub-strategic role, it is difficult to see how the UK Government would be able in practice to make it ‘clear’ that the use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack was strategic or sub-strategic. Even the use of a lower yield nuclear warhead against another country would be highly controversial, probably illegal and likely to prompt a severe response if targeted against another nuclear weapon state. As the Defence Committee concluded:

We regret that there has been no restatement of nuclear policy since the speech of the then Secretary of State in 1993; the SDR does not provide a new statement of the government’s nuclear deterrent posture in the present strategic situation within which the sub-strategic role of Trident could be clarified. We recommend the clarification of both the UK’s strategic and sub-strategic nuclear policy.³¹ 

1.7 Transparency, democratic accountability and parliamentary scrutiny
One of the most welcome aspects of the SDR was increased transparency concerning the UK’s stocks of fissile material and the UK Government’s initiative to develop expertise in verification of nuclear arms reductions. This latter commitment has already been followed up with an AWE Study Report, Confidence, Security and Verification and a number of studies on past defence fissile material production.³² 

The Defence Select Committee has welcomed "all the steps taken in the SDR to provide more transparent information about our nuclear deterrent posture, and look[ed] forward to hearing more about the government’s progress towards its aim to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world".³³  However, access to information and parliamentary scrutiny of nuclear policy has, if anything, become more difficult under Tony Blair’s Government than under the Major and Thatcher Governments. Until 1995, the UK Trident programme was subjected to detailed scrutiny by the Defence Select Committee’s annual inquiries on ‘Progress of the Trident Programme’. These annual inquiries were introduced following the misleading of Parliament over the Chevaline programme to upgra-de Polaris (see box 1).

Since the 1997 election, the UK Government has also abandoned the publication of the annual Statements on the Defence Estimates, which during the 1980s and early 1990s provided regular information on nuclear policy. Instead, a range of documents are published as part of the Ministry of Defence reporting cycle, including MoD performance reports, MoD investment strategies, and occasionally a Defence White Paper. Collectively these documents contain a lot less information on nuclear policy than the previous Statements. In describing the 1999 Defence White Paper, for example, the Defence Select Committee said: "What is notable is the comparison between the major policy statements or restatements in previous Statements on the Defence Estimates and the 1999 White Paper. The former attempted to be a comprehensive statement of defence policy but the latter is much shorter, more glossily presented, and makes no claim to be comprehensive". The Committee concluded:

Despite the public consultation surrounding the Strategic Defence Review, the attitude of the MoD towards making its thought processes publicly accessible is far from radically transformed from the bunker mentality of the Cold War era. A small example is the series of questions we posed to the Secretary of State about the UK’s nuclear posture. The Policy Director informed us that a thorough restatement had been made by the previous Secretary of State [for Defence] at the University of Aberdeen in March last year. A very quick straw poll revealed that even amongst an expert circle this speech was largely unknown – though we did discover it on the MoD’s website. To rely on the MoD to judge when any change of policy is worthy of public announcement would be rather like having left the late Greta Garbo in charge of her own publicity.³⁴ 

The most recent Defence White Paper was published in 1999. Instead, in 2001, the Ministry of Defence published two short documents, Defence Policy 2001 and The Future Strategic Context for Defence. The documents were published just hours before the Defence Select Committee was due to take oral evidence from the Secretary of State for Defence, leaving minimal time for any detailed analysis or questioning on what they contained. As the Defence Committee later noted:

Producing separate documents to be read in conjunction is not as useful a policy exercise, either for the MoD or Parliament, as producing a single document which integrates different issues and timescales. ….Neither document contains much that could be construed as a statement of the government’s current nuclear policy. Defence Policy 2001 has one paragraph on the topic —

We assess that, for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that a direct threat to the UK could re-emerge on a scale sufficient to threaten our strategic security, whether through conventional means or weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, given the need to insure against the long term and the continued existence of nuclear arsenals, our own nuclear deterrent will continue to be the ultimate guarantor of our security.³⁵ 

This lack of transparency and accountability to Parliament on nuclear policy is reminiscent of the situation in the 1970s, when the lack of detail provided in the Defence White Papers were part of a secretive environment that allowed the Chevaline scandal to unfold. With major changes now taking place in US nuclear policy, and significant developments at Aldermaston concerning the future of the UK’s nuclear force, it is imperative that regular and detailed government reporting to Parliament, together with effective parliamentary scrutiny, are restored. This is necessary both in terms of UK strategic nuclear policy and the government’s policy to eliminate nuclear weapons in line with international commitments made under the NPT. As the Defence Select Committee concluded:

We sought, as far back as our inquiry on the SDR, a restatement of the government’s strategic nuclear policy. We have been offered some dribs and drabs, including a speech made by the former Secretary of State at Aberdeen University. We consider that the government, now rightly thinking (if not yet forming policy) for the period of 30 years ahead, needs to address this issue more squarely.³⁶ 

2.1 The special nuclear relationship
British nuclear policy is closely intertwined with that of the United States. As a result of the Labour Party’s damaging debates on unilateral nuclear disarmament in the 1970s and 1980s, Tony Blair has been keen to present his Government as ‘strong’ on defence and a key ally of the United States. This policy has manifested itself in a number of ways. For example, Britain has taken a leading role in NATO operations in Kosovo and is the only NATO ally that has been participating with the United States in enforcing the ‘no-fly zones’ inside Iraq. More recently, Tony Blair stood ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with President Bush in both the diplomatic and military response to the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States.

In addition, despite the contrary views of many colleagues in the Labour Party and opposition from many European allies, Tony Blair has lent support to controversial Bush administration policies on missile defence. In May 2001, NATO Foreign Ministers, led by France and Germany, refused to back US perceptions of a growing threat from missile proliferation. However, at his first summit meeting with President Bush, Tony Blair endorsed the Bush Administration’s view of a ‘common threat’ from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Despite the concerns of many Labour MPs, Blair and Bush agreed to "obstruct and deter these new threats with a strategy that encompasses both offensive and defensive systems,"³⁷  a statement widely interpreted as providing support for US missile defence plans.

The tacit support of senior British Government officials for missile defence has been linked with British dependence on the United States in the military sphere, especially in intelligence gathering, major military operations such as the NATO bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the UK Trident programme. Former special adviser to the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, David Clark, describes the UK-US relationship as a form of "vulgar atlanticism", in which many British officials are unwilling to question US policies.³⁸ 

As this chapter makes clear, in addition to this high level US-UK political cohesion, the UK nuclear programme is intertwined on many levels – including the technical, scientific and structural – with that of the United States. Any serious consideration of a more independent UK stance on a range of key international issues has to take the extent and effect of these interconnections into account. Chapters four and five explore these issues further, examining the possible impact on UK nuclear policy of the Bush administration’s uncompromising approaches to arms control and nuclear weapons.

2.2 Trident:  a US warhead design
The United Kingdom cooperates extensively with the United States on warhead design, development and ongoing stockpile stewardship for the Trident warhead. Cooperation takes place under the 1958 Agreement for Co-operation on the use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes and a range of related agreements, amendments and Memoranda of Understanding, many of which are still classified. The 1958 agreement provides for the exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons to improve "design, development and fabrication capability".³⁹ 

The UK Trident warhead is believed to be closely based on one of the US Trident warheads, W76, which has a yield of approximately 100 kilotons. Although this has never been officially confirmed, documents released under the US Freedom of Information Act indicate that in the early 1980s, when the UK was designing its Trident warhead, the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group⁴⁰ established communication channels to allow the US to pass to the UK "atomic information on the MK-4 Re-entry Body and W76 Warhead for the Trident Missile Systems".⁴¹  In addition, the British Trident warhead was tested at the US Nevada Test Site.

2.3 Stockpile stewardship:  continuing co-operation with the United States
There is a high level of ongoing co-operation between the US nuclear weapons laboratories and Britain’s AWE on stockpile stewardship and management of the Trident warhead. This is seen as essential for maintaining the ability to replace Trident in the future. The SDR, for example, stated that "for as long as Britain has nuclear forces, we will ensure that we have a robust capability at the Atomic Weapons Establishment to underwrite the safety and reliability of our nuclear warheads".⁴²  It also concluded that it would be "premature to abandon a minimum capability to design and produce a successor to Trident should this prove necessary".

Earlier in 1995 the UK Ministry of Defence stated that the UK’s stockpile stewardship would be "undertaken in continuing co-operation with the United States, which will contribute to the safe stewardship of Trident throughout its service life as well as sustaining capabilities to meet future requirements".⁴³ 

Britain participates in regular exchanges on a wide range of research and technology under the auspices of the 1958 agreement, involving all three US National Laboratories: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. Co-operation under the 1958 agreement is conducted through Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs) and Exchange of Information and Visit Reports (EIVRs). As of January 1998, there were US-UK Joint Working Groups on a wide range of nuclear-related topics, including all aspects of nuclear warhead development (see table 4).

In addition, under the 1998 ‘Polaris Sales Agreement as amended for Trident’, the United Kingdom is involved in a "Joint Steering Task Group, supported by the Trident Joint Re-Entry Systems Working Group and the Joint Systems Performance and Assessment Group". ⁴⁴ 

Under the Labour Government, the level of co-operation has continued to be extensive. For example, the UK Government has confirmed that Sandia National Laboratory in the United States carried out "development, evaluation, production and stockpile surveillance of the UK’s Trident re-entry body system" on its behalf at a cost of between £600,000 and 1.5 million in 1997.⁴⁵  The UK Government also continues to receive "briefings on the scope and outcome of US sub-critical experiments carried out at the Nevada Test Site".⁴⁶  The AWE is clearly interested in a number of ongoing US programmes concerning refurbishment, revalidation and life extension of the US Trident warheads, in particular W76. According to the 1998 AWE annual report:

AWE participated significantly, as an independent contributor, in the United States Dual Revalidation Programme, which reviewed the status of the American Trident warhead, the W76… Other more focussed exchanges, with the United States continued in support of the current Trident programme and in preparation for the refurbishment that will be required for Trident early in the next decade.⁴⁷ 

Furthermore, in its 2000 Annual Report, the AWE notes that:

Life extension [of the Trident programme] could offer cost savings by reducing the number of times a warhead is rebuilt within its required full-service life. Continued production of Trident – although only at trickle rates – will enable us to replace the oldest warheads, while exercising and maintaining our assembly capability.⁴⁸ 

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 12 January 1998, columns 139-140

A key aspect of AWE’s work is "maintaining capability through science". According to the 2000 Annual Report, "four major areas of research are central to AWE’s capabilities to maintain the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent – hydrodynamics, laser physics, high performance computing and materials science". ⁴⁹  Many of these areas of research are already covered by Joint Working Groups, or are areas where the AWE receives assistance from the United States:

Hydrodynamics and physics provide the basis for a broad range of collaborative work and experiments with scientists in the United States. One exciting example of this is the Billi-G project where experiments designed and fabricated by AWE are working to develop a more complete understanding of proton radiography at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Centre.⁵⁰ 

Similarly, with regard to laser physics, in June 1999, Britain announced that it intended to invest in the US National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for a 10 year period at a cost of £100 million. The investment in the NIF was described as "an affordable and cost-effective way of discharging the undertaking we gave in the Strategic Defence Review that we would ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons".⁵¹  However, there are concerns in the United States that the cost of the NIF is escalating and there are outstanding questions regarding the effectiveness of the facility.⁵²  In addition, AWE is working on a re-configuration of its existing HELEN laser at Aldermaston using "available components (worth approximately £2M) from LLNL through the United States Department of Energy".⁵³ 

In the area of high performance computing, AWE is also following the US lead and is acquiring a £15 million new supercomputer.⁵⁴  High performance computing is also a key aspect of the US stockpile stewardship programme, in particular the US National Nuclear Security Administration’s Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI), which aims "to develop the simulation capability needed for conducting stockpile stewardship and maintaining nuclear weapons reliability".⁵⁵ 

2.4 Increasing US-UK co-operation
In recent years, contact between personnel working on the respective UK and US nuclear weapons programmes appears to have increased dramatically. During the period 1 June 1998 to 31 May 1999, 235 visits were made by British personnel to US nuclear weapons facilities under the auspices of the 1958 agreement, nearly double the number of visits that were made during the early 1990s (see table 5).

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 30 June 1999, column 159

Between 1 January and 30 September 1999 (the last period for which official figures are available), 381 United States personnel visited AWE Aldermaston, including representatives of the US government, weapons laboratories and nuclear industry corporations (see table 6).

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 19 October 1999, column 423

In addition, as of 1998-99 there were five UK personnel stationed in the US as part of the 1958 Agreement, three AWE employees on short-term appointments at Los Alamos and Lawrence Liver-more national laboratories, and a further 15 British personnel in the United States as part of the ‘Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended for Trident’. In turn there were four US personnel based in the United Kingdom as part of this latter agreement, but no US personnel based in the United Kingdom under the terms of the 1958 agreement.⁵⁶ 

In October 2000, AWE hosted a meeting of Joint Working Group 32, under the terms of the 1958 agreement, covering "the more extreme end of weapon functioning, in terms of understanding the interaction and performance of nuclear components at high temperatures and pressures. The exchange attracted significant interest with 27 United States’ delegate attendees met by a comparable number of AWE personnel".⁵⁷  The involvement of US company Lockheed Martin, and the multinational Serco, alongside British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (which itself has extensive interests in the United States) in the running of AWE is likely to further cement the links between AWE and the US nuclear weapons industry.

Although the British government has always claimed that the UK Trident warhead is built to a British design, the extent of nuclear co-operation with the United States indicates that the United Kingdom is highly dependent on US assistance. This is particularly the case in terms of maintaining warhead safety and reliability in ‘service’ and in maintaining a capability to design replacements for Trident.

The United Kingdom is clearly engaged in co-operative programmes with all three major US nuclear weapons laboratories and is receiving information and assistance on all aspects of its stockpile stewardship programme. The United Kingdom has a par-ticular interest in US programmes relating to W76.

The UK Trident programme is intended to have a service life of approximately 30 years. However, a long timescale is required to develop new nuclear weapon systems. Initial studies on how to replace Polaris date back to the late 1970s, but it took a full 20 years until Trident entered full operational service in the late 1990s. These long timescales indicate that initial UK Government thinking on a replacement for Trident may already be underway. AWE states that it is maintaining a "capability to design a new weapon should it ever be required".⁵⁸  Another possibility is implementation of a UK Trident life extension program-me, similar to the US Stockpile Life Extension Programme. In this context, the Defence Select Committee’s recommendation – "that the government, now rightly thinking (if not yet forming policy) for the period of 30 years ahead, needs to address this issue more squarely"⁵⁹ – must be taken up by the Government.

2.5 Trident:  a US missile system
Since the 1960s Britain has procured strategic nuclear systems from the US rather than developing indigenous nuclear forces. This dependence was highlighted most spectacularly in the early 1960s, when the United States unilaterally cancelled the Skybolt missile, a nuclear-armed missile that MacMillan’s Conservative Government had intended to procure. Successive UK governments have been keen to avoid such a situation arising again, and have therefore sought to remain closely in step with US nuclear technology developments.

When the Thatcher Government originally decided to procure the Trident I C4 missile in the early 1980s, its objective was to achieve "maximum commonality with the United States". ⁶⁰  At that time, it also acknowledged that the United Kingdom last had a major capability in the field of ballistic missiles in the 1960s and that to re-acquire it "would be very expensive, take a long time and involve much uncertainty".⁶¹ 

Following the US Government’s announcement to proceed to full development of a Trident II D5 missile in 1981, the UK Government also switched to the D5 missile in order to avoid the "penalties of uniqueness" – that if the United Kingdom continued with the C4 missile it might have to cope "without the benefit of detailed United States advice".⁶²  As a result, Britain’s Trident submarines use US Trident II D5 missiles produced and serviced in the United States by Lockheed Martin. The United Kingdom does not actually own the missiles, but has access to a pool of Trident II D5 missiles held at the Strategic Weapons facility at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, in Georgia, US. The British Trident submarines conduct missile test firings at the US Eastern Test Range, off the coast of Florida (see table 7).

In operational terms, British Trident submarine patrols are closely coordinated with US Trident patrols. British Trident submarines routinely visit the US Kings Bay submarine base and US Trident submarines have visited the British Trident base at Faslane.

Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 30 Jul 1998, Column 448

As it shares the US Trident II D5 missile pool, Britain is completely dependent on the United States for its Trident ballistic missile procurement, testing and servicing. If it wishes to retain Trident, the UK Government therefore has little choice but to accept whatever developments the United States decides to pursue for the future of its Trident missile forces.

2.6 Britain and NATO/US nuclear doctrine
British nuclear policy is closely coordinated with the United States through NATO. Since the United States originally agreed to sell Polaris to the UK Government under the terms of the 1962 Nassau Agreement and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, Britain’s strategic nuclear force has been "committed to NATO and targeted in accordance with Alliance policy and strategic concepts under plans made by the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR)". ⁶³ 

These operational arrangements were re-stated in the 1980 and the 1982 exchanges of letters between the United States and Britain, which set out the terms for the UK Government purchase of Trident ballistic missiles and supporting components. According to the 1982 exchange of letters, for example, all British Trident submarines are assigned to NATO to be used for the defence of the Alliance "except where the UK government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake".⁶⁴ 

This situation of assigning Trident to NATO had been confirmed in an earlier UK MoD report, which stated that Britain "commits all its nuclear capability to NATO in conformity with concepts of collective deterrence worked out in the joint forum of the [NATO] Nuclear Planning Group".⁶⁵ 

Following the election of a Labour Government in 1997, it was reaffirmed again in the 1998 SDR: "Britain’s Trident force provides an operationally independent strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capability in support of NATO’s strategy of war prevention and as the ultimate guarantee of our national security".⁶⁶  Thus, British nuclear posture remains grounded in NATO’s concept of nuclear deterrence, which in turn is based predominantly on US nuclear doctrine.

NATO nuclear targeting strategy, for example, is carried out in accordance with US nuclear doctrine. NATO still maintains peacetime plans for the use of strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance, and coordination with US national targeting plans is the responsibility of SACEUR.⁶⁷ 

In the 1950s and 1960s, NATO doctrine was based on the US doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.⁶⁸  From 1967 to the early 1990s, NATO doctrine in line with US doctrine was changed to Flexible Response.⁶⁹  Since the end of the Cold War, as US nuclear doctrine has changed to emphasise deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction, NATO doctrine and British doctrine have also been adapted to give more emphasis to deterrence of weapons of mass destruction.

Most recently, in his February 2001 joint statement with President Bush, Tony Blair gave his backing to the Bush Administration’s policy of using "offensive systems", potentially including the use of nuclear weapons, to "deter" WMD threats. Both leaders also agreed to strengthen "counter-proliferation measures".⁷⁰  Taken together, these statements indicate that British nuclear thinking at the highest level remains closely linked with that of the United States.

Continue to Chapter 3

Contents | Executive Summary | Acronyms | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3
 Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8 | Appendix 1 | Appendix 2 
 Endnotes

Back to Nuclear and NMD home page