BASIC Publications

BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Questions of Command and Control:
NATO Nuclear Sharing and NPT

Annex 5: Concerns Prompted by NATO Expansion

NATO’s extended deterrence now covers new members and they are eligible to participate in NATO nuclear sharing. Both Russia and critics of NATO nuclear sharing have expressed concern about this aspect of enlargement. Russia fears that NATO could retain the option to threaten its territory with nuclear weapons deployed closer to Russian borders. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon states have noted that expansion will increase the number of countries dependent on nuclear deterrence.[97]

NATO frequently reiterates that it has “no plan, no reason and no intention” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of its new members. However, it has been unwilling to make this commitment legally binding. Russian nervousness on this point has been increased by the attitude of some NATO members. For example, in late October 1999, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban told journalists that there was no question that NATO needed nuclear weapons because of uncertainties over Russia. Furthermore, he said that despite NATO policy, Hungary is ready to accept NATO nuclear deployments in a crisis. NATO spokespeople would only say that at present this was unnecessary. A spokesman for President Yeltsin criticized the Hungarian statement as a direct violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. [98]

Negotiations between NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov led to the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation”. During the negotiations, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright set out the US position on its nuclear weapons in Europe for the US Senate Armed Services Committee:

As you know, Russia would also like us to make absolute commitments in the charter about the deployment of nuclear and conventional forces on the territory of new members. But we will not compromise on this issue.

All we have done, and all we will do, is to restate unilaterally existing NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently stationing substantial combat forces.[99]

However, Russian concerns continued to focus on the possibility of infrastructure preparations for crisis and wartime deployments of nuclear weapons. As a result, within the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO elaborated slightly on its position. The Alliance stated “it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities”.[100]

During Senate hearings on ratification of NATO enlargement, Albright and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen added some additional “no’s” to the first three. Both confirmed that there are no plans to:

train new members states’ pilots in nuclear missions during peacetime,
nuclear certify these countries’ aircraft, or
transfer equipment or infrastructure to support these countries’ dual-capable aircraft in a nuclear role.[101]

Furthermore, they stated that the US does not intend to conclude bilateral Programs of Co-operation with the new member states.[102] Finally, Albright and Cohen made clear that new members would not be required to buy nuclear-capable aircraft.[103] Practically speaking, these two points mean that whatever NATO nations might wish to do, the current policy cannot be easily reversed. In total, these politically binding commitments provide Russia with some reassurance that NATO has no option for a quick breakout from the self-constraints entered under the Founding Act.

However, the new members to NATO will

contribute to the development and implementation of NATO’s strategy, including its nuclear component. New members will also be eligible to join the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and its subordinate bodies (NPG Staff Group, High Level Group, and the Senior-Level Weapons Protection Group), and to participate in nuclear consultations during exercises and crisis.[104]

In addition, NATO has made it clear that “new members will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance’s strategy of war prevention as set forth in the Strategic Concept.”[105] It is therefore not surprising that the candidates for NATO membership have been some of the most determined opponents of proposals for a Central European Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

– MB, ON, TP

The Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN) is a network of research and disarmament organizations from many European countries. PENN members research and analyze European nuclear weapons, proliferation and non-proliferation questions. PENN organizes seminars and meetings, and publishes papers and a regular newsletter.

PENN
c/o BITS
Rykestrasse 13
D-10405 Berlin
Germany

Telephone: + 49 30 442 6042
Fax: +49 30 441 0221
Email: bits@bits.de

Endnotes

[1] Otfried Nassauer, Oliver Meier, Nicola Butler, and Stephen Young, US-NATO Nuclear Arsenals, BASIC-BITS Research Note, February 1997, and Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer and Stephen Young, Nuclear Futures: Western European Options For Risk Reduction, BASIC Research Report 98.5, December 1998.

[2] For a more complete description of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, see Section 2.0 below.

[3] See, inter alia, Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO, Brussels, 8 December 1998, M-NAC-2(98)140.

[4] NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1,9qua.

[5] Contemporaneous Notes taken by BASIC staff during the Third Session, Main Committee I, 21 April 1995.

[6] The Non-Aligned Movement is a group of some 110 nations, mostly from the developing world, who defined themselves as non-aligned during the Cold War, being part neither of the Western nor Soviet blocs.

[7] NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I, op. cit.

[8] NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1,9

[9] NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/1,9bis.

[10] NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/1,9. See also Rebecca Johnson, “Substantive Debate Concludes”. 1997 NPT Briefing 5, Disarmament Intelligence Review, April 1997.

[11] NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, pp. 81 and 95.

[12] “Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Ambassador K. J. Jele, to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the Year 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 8 April 1997, New York.

[13] Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic were formally admitted as NATO members on 12 March 1999.

[14] NATO/Russia, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation”, Paris, 27 May 1997, p.8.

[15] “Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary Albright”, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, 21 October 1997. See also, “Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of Defense Cohen”, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington , 21 October 1997.

[16] Working Paper Presented by the Members of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, Parties to the Treaty, 1998 Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 28 April 1998.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Statement by Dr. Mahmoud Karem at the 1998 Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, cited in Rebecca Johnson, “Reviewing the NPT: Problems and Processes”. Acronym Report #12, September 1998.

[19] Statement by Ambassador Baali of Algeria to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 12 May 1999.

[20] New Agenda Statement, para. 11, Ambassador Luiz Tupy Caldas de Moura of Brazil, 12 May 1999

[21] New Agenda Statement, para. 13, Ambassador Luiz Tupy Caldas de Moura of Brazil, 12 May 1999.

[22] Statement by Ambassador Zahran, before the Third Session of the PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, New York, 12 May 1999.

[23] Statement by the Republic of South Africa at the 1999 Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference on Cluster I Issues, New York, 12 May 1999.

[24] Chairman's Working Paper, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 14 May 1999.

[25] Resolution 54/54G, Towards a Nuclear-Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda, 1 December 1999.

[26] “Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of Defense Cohen”, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, 21 October 1997. See also, “Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Ambassador K.J. Jele”, op cit.

[27] “Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of Defense Cohen”, op. cit.

[28] Ibid.

[29] “Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of State Albright”, op. cit.

[30] Jan Prawitz, communications with the authors, 20 February 1999. Mr. Prawitz was a member of the Swedish delegation to the 1985 NPT Conference.

[31] This argument is elaborated upon in section 2 below.

[32] Charles E. Johnson, “U.S. Policies on Nuclear Weapons”, Washington, 12 December 1964, partially declassified in 1991 (Lyndon B. Johnson Library).

[33] Martin Butcher et al. op. cit., p.33.

[34] “Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, 91-2, 27 and 28 February 1969, p.23.

[35] “Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together With Answers Given by the United States”, cited in: NPT Hearings, US Senate, 90-2, p.262.

[36] Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., “The Non-Proliferation Treaty”, 24 December 1968, Original Classification: Top Secret.

[37] For example, Canada was forbidden by the US from discussing the basing of nuclear weapons at Canadian bases in the Federal Republic of Germany, and also from discussing arrangements for authorization of use. These were details Canada would have been prepared to share, but for the US ban. For greater detail on this issue, see John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons, p. 44, Dundurn Press, Toronto, 1998. This book is a detailed treatment of Canada’s nuclear weapons relationship with the US in NATO and NORAD.

[38] Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., op. cit., pp.74-75.

[39] Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., op. cit., p.80.

[40] Evans Gerakas, David S. Patterson, and Carolyn B. Yee (eds.) “Arms Control and Disarmament”, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Volume X. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1997, p.573.

[41] “Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together With Answers Given by the United States”, op. cit.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Question four dealt with the legality of a European nuclear force, coming to the conclusion that a multilateral European force would contravene the Treaty, but that a future federated European state could become a NWS, assuming the NWS obligations of the UK and France. This is not the subject of this report. The full text of the answer is found in Annex 1.

[44]Ibid.

[45] Jan Prawitz, communications with the authors, 20 February 1999. Mr. Prawitz was a member of the Swedish delegation to the 1985 NPT Conference.

[46] Leonard Meeker, “Proposed Revised Articles of US Non-Proliferation Treaty, Memorandum”, US Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 6 July 1966, original classification: confidential.

[47] “Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p.340.

[48] Ibid., p.262.

[49] Evans Gerakas, et. al. op. cit., p.574.

[50] “Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p.340.

[51] Ibid., p.364.

[52] US-Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington 1966, p.77.

[53] Authors of this paper from BASIC and BITS have spoken with several former US officials involved with the negotiation of the NPT. None disagreed with the line of reasoning as expressed here, but none felt able to publicly criticize this policy.

[54] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, preambular paragraph 3, 1968.

[55] Statement by Uladzimir Syanko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus at the NPT Review and Extension Conference Plenary Meeting, New York, 18 April 1995.

[56] “Questions on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Asked by U.S. Allies Together With Answers Given by the United States” op.cit., p.262

[57] Ibid.

[58] Adrian Fisher, “Memorandum for Mr. Bill Moyers, Subject: Working Group Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Relationship to Existing and Possible Allied Nuclear Arrangements”, 30 September 1966. Original classification: Secret - Exdis, pp.4-5.

[59] Leonard Meeker, “Proposed Revised Articles of US Non-Proliferation Treaty, Memorandum”, US Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 6 July 1966, original classification: confidential.

[60] “Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 10, 11, 12 and 17 July 1968, p.27.

[61] “Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, Executive H, 90-2, 18 and 20 February 1969, p.424.

[62] MC14/3 (Final), Paragraph 11, 12 December 1967.

[63] US Department of Defense Manual JP 1-02

[64] MC14/3 (Final) Paragraph 35 b., 12 December 1967.

[65] NATO, “The Alliance's New Strategic Concept”, Rome, 7 November 1991, S-1(91)85.

[66] Adrian Fisher, op.cit.

[67] NATO, op. cit.

[68] Ibid

[69] For background on the evolution of NATO’s strategy since the end of the Cold War, see Rob de Wijk, “NATO at the Brink of the New Millennium”, Brassey’s, London/Washington, 1997 and Otfried Nassauer “Neue NATO-Strategie” in Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and Jo Angerer (eds), Siegermacht NATO, Berg am See, 1993, pp. 37-115.

[70] Otfried Nassauer, et al., op. cit.

[71] For an examination of US policy, see Hans Kristensen, op. cit.

[72]For a description of this policy see below, and for more detailed treatment of the topic, see Hans Kristensen, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, BASIC Research Report 98.2, March 1998.

[73] NATO: The Alliance Strategic Concept, Paragraph 64, April 1999.

[74] Paragraph 18, London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London, 5-6 July 1990.

[75] NATO: The Alliance Strategic Concept, April 1999.

[76] NATO: The Alliance Strategic Concept, Para. 41, April 1999.

[77] Paul Taylor, Analysis – NATO Accused of Widening Nuclear Role, Reuters News Service, 14 March 2000.

[78] Interview with Senior NATO Diplomat, 14 March 2000.

[79] Interview with Senior NATO Diplomat, 14 March 2000.

[80] Answer to Question 39, asked by Senator Harkin during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 11 May 1999.

[81] For a discussion of developments in NATO strategy up to ‘Flexible Response’, see NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, edited by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, Chief, Historical Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in collaboration with NATO International Staff Central Archives, published May 1999 on the internet at www.nato.int.

[82] Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, Washington, September 1997.

[83] The White House, National Security Strategy, Washington, 1995, pp 14-15.

[84] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, JP 3-12, Washington, 18 December 1995, p. v.

[85] For a more detailed description of these developments in US nuclear doctrine see Hans Kristensen, op. cit.

[86] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, JP 3-12.1, Washington, 9 February 1996, p. III-8.

[87] First reported in R. Jeffrey Smith, “Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms”, Washington Post, 7 December 1997, p.1.

[88] See for example: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Nuclear Operations, JP 3-12, Washington, 18 December 1995; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Washington, May 1997; Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Washington, May 1997.

[89] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, op. cit., pp. VIII, III-6, III-7.After BASIC and BITS published this fact in August 1998, a DoD spokesperson noted that “we are confident that we can mount an effective response to terrorism without using nuclear weapons” but added “Nevertheless, we do not rule out in advance any capability available to us. I stress that these policies have to do with a situation in which the US our allies or our forces have been attacked with chemical or biological weapons” (See DoD Spokesperson Fax to B. Bender, 26 August 1998).

[90] The first official U.S. declaration of negative security assurance was in 1978 at the UN. These assurances were reaffirmed by the five declared nuclear-weapons states in April 1995 and taken note of in UN Security Council Resolution 984. In addition, as a signatory of the Protocols, the U.S. has pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state Party to the treaties of Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone), Tlateloco (Latin America NWFZ) and Pelindaba (Africa NWFZ).

[91] Interview with Walter Slocombe, under secretary of defense for policy, December 11, 1998. This sentence clearly shows that undersecretary Slocombe sees no difference between US national policy and NATO policy, although the two are not identical.

[92] Jack Mendelsohn, NATO’s Nuclear Weapons: the Rational for No First Use, Arms Control Today, July-August 1999 at www.armscontrol.org.

[93] NATO: The Alliance Strategic Concept, para. 42, April 1999.

[94] NATO: The Alliance Strategic Concept, Paragraph 63, April 1999.

[95] Quoted in Elaine Grossman, “STRATCOM Chief Calls for START III Limit on Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, in Inside the Pentagon, 9 April 1998, p.6.

[96] General Eugene Habiger, in The Missiliers, CBS 60 Minutes II, January 2000. Further detail at www.cbs.com.

[97] See, for example, “Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa, Ambassador K.J. Jele, to the First Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 8 May 1998.

[98] Hungarian Prime Minster Says Hungary Would Consider NATO Nukes, and Russia Unnerved by Hungary Remarks, Reuters Newswire, 30 October 1999. Further details can be found at www.nautilus.org in their NATO Nuclear Flash section.

[99] Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, “Prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject: NATO Enlargement”, US Department of State, Washington, D.C., 23 April 1997

[100] NATO-Russia, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation”, Paris, 27 May 1997, p.8.

[101] “Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of State Albright”, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, 21 October 1997. See also, “Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of Defense Cohen”, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, 21 October 1997.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid

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