BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Research Report 2000.4, October 2000

NATO and Small Arms:
From Words to Deeds

By Geraldine O'Callaghan, Michael Crowley and Kathleen Miller

Support
This report was made possible with the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Chapter 1:  Introduction
NATO currently is engaged in a process of developing new policies for arms control and disarmament, under a mandate given by the heads of state and government of the 19 member nations during the Alliance’s April 1999 summit.  At their May 2000 meeting in Florence, allied foreign ministers stated that they were expecting to receive a “substantive report” on a “comprehensive and integrated review” in December 2000.[1]

NATO has been involved in developing arms control and disarmament strategies for more than 30 years.  In agreeing to “The Future Tasks of the Alliance” in 1967, NATO stated for the first time that “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complimentary,” and further outlined that the “allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures.”[2]  The most recent arms control strategy agreed by the Alliance was in 1989, when the allies agreed to build a “comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament.”[3]  They laid out an “ambitious arms control agenda for the coming years in the nuclear, conventional and chemical fields.”  Since that time, there has been progress in all these areas. 

Today, however, the arms control agenda designed during the East-West confrontation is exhausted and outdated.  The question arises as to what actions the Alliance now should take to implement the remit laid down by the 1999 summit.  Among other factors, progress in other international fora on the issue of small arms and light weapons make it a matter of urgency that NATO adopt an ambitious new arms control agenda that includes new measures to address this critical problem.

At the end of NATO’s 50^th anniversary summit in Washington, the heads of state and government issued a summit communiqué, “An Alliance for the 21^st Century.”  One of the issues addressed was the plan for an arms control policy review.  Paragraph 32 of this April 24, 199, communiqué states:

“Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives.  NATO has a long-standing commitment in this area.  Allied forces, both conventional and nuclear, have been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War as part of the changed security environment.  All Allies are States Parties to the central treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and are committed to the full implementation of these treaties.  NATO is a defensive Alliance seeking to enhance security and stability at the minimum level of forces consistent with the requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.  As part of its broad approach to security, NATO actively supports arms control and disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and pursues its approach against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means.  In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.  The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options.  The responsible NATO bodies would accomplish this.  We support deepening consultations with Russia in these and other areas in the Permanent Joint Council as well as with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and with other Partners in the [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council].”[4]

The above declaration reflects NATO’s continued concerns about the proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as the dubious health of international arms control regimes.  It is also a hopeful sign that NATO members will commit themselves to making NATO arms control policies more compatible with other bilateral and multilateral developments in the post-Cold War security environment.  Still, much work remains to be done.  A recent BASIC paper, NATO and Arms Control: A Blueprint for Action, addresses how NATO could improve global security through new initiatives in the nuclear and heavy conventional arms control arenas.  This paper is aimed at fleshing out how NATO as a body, the individual allies and NATO’s partner nations in Central and Eastern Europe can contribute to the growing international effort to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

1.1  Small Arms[5]
Even prior to the current ‘paragraph 32’ review process, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons had been attracting attention at NATO.  The wide availability of these weapons throughout the Balkan region during NATO’s operations in Southeastern Europe has shown allied leaders the destabilizing potential they possess. Through the NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Work Program, announced in July 1999, NATO has expressed its commitment to helping aspirant members combat the problems associated with small arms proliferation and misuse.  Despite the interest in the topic, NATO nonetheless has begun to take the position that prevention of small arms proliferation is an activity that must be carried out by national governments.  This is most likely the result of the existence of extremely varying policies throughout the Alliance.  However, NATO cannot shirk responsibility for combating flows of small arms, especially within its partner countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

Chapter 2:  NATO action in context
NATO made a late entry into the international effort to control small arms proliferation and misuse with the announcement of the NATO/EAPC Work Program in July 1999.[6] Although non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as BASIC and Human Rights Watch, have been calling for NATO to play an active role in this area for years, the Alliance long had been skeptical of small arms control initiatives, insisting that responsibility for stockpile security, export controls and transparency lie with member  governments.[7]  However, by the time of the April 1999 Washington summit, NATO had extended its traditional roles from defense and deterrence to include a range of responsibilities from conflict prevention to crisis management.[8]  Thus, as the Alliance enters the 21^st century, it is both within NATO’s interest and its remit to address the problems associated with small arms.

In many respects, NATO is well placed to address small arms control and has the potential to make a significant impact on the problem – in both political and practical terms. Politically, the 19 members of NATO and the 27 states of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program include many of the world’s most important suppliers of small arms and light weapons to regions of conflict, several of which are not parties to the arms control regimes of the European Union or Wassenaar Arrangement.[9]  NATO therefore can play a key role by agreeing high common standards on arms control and reduction measures with the PfP countries – especially those which are seeking to join the Alliance.  In practical terms, NATO is a well-resourced organization, equipped with established military structures and technical expertise that outstrips other multilateral organizations working on small arms control.  In addition, NATO has a critical role to play in drawing on the perspectives and expertise of military officers and defense officials – who have experience in managing weapons and working with the arms industry – into an area of policy that has thus far been dominated by officials working in foreign affairs, development and justice departments.

NATO is not the only regional organization that has turned its attention to small arms proliferation and misuse.  In the European context alone, the European Union has developed a comprehensive package of initiatives on small arms that dates back to 1997. In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has plans to develop its own small arms related activities by November 2000. Therefore, it is critical that NATO works in cooperation with other organizations in developing its work program and puts priority upon initiatives that add value to the global effort to control small arms.  Emphasis should be placed on avoiding duplication and identifying NATO’s core competencies.

2.1 The NATO/EAPC Work Program
Under the leadership of Canada, Norway and the United States, NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council began to discuss the issue of small arms control in March 1999.[10] One month later, the EAPC formed an ad hoc working group on small arms charged with setting a work program for the Council.  The program was drafted by July 1999.[11]

The subsequent NATO/EAPC program aims to “identify ways in which EAPC/PfP might contribute to the challenge of small arms and light weapons.” Emphasis is placed on reinforcing existing initiatives rather than duplicating them. In addition, the program aims to take advantage of NATO/EAPC’s specific political-military knowledge and expertise. Following a series of workshops in September 1999, the working group identified the following “three broad areas where there is significant potential for an enhanced contribution” to small arms control:

• Generic training: The development dialogue and training in ‘best practice’ on stockpile management and security of storage sites, disposal and destruction of weaponry, and reintegration of former combatants in Peace Support Operations.

• Tailored assistance and co-operation: Support for individual nations in areas such as border controls, the development of export control regulations, and customs and police enforcement.

• Best practice: Further information exchange and consultation on export control, transparency and weapon-marking regimes.

The proposed activities outlined in the NATO/EAPC Work Program include many of the control and reduction policies being covered by other regional and international organizations, raising concerns that the program could be duplicative. However, it is worth noting that the approach taken by NATO, in contrast to other organizations such as the OSCE, is on developing tailored assistance to individual nations facing a variety of small arms problems. Thus, the NATO program seeks to build on existing consensus relating to the measures needed to control small arms, but focuses efforts on implementation.

In an attempt to move from words into action, a Partnership Work Program (PWP) Chapter, "The Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons" was agreed in February 2000.  By elaborating detailed practical proposals for implementing the work program, the Chapter aims to initiate a response from EAPC countries on small arms and light weapons issues through dialogue on 'best practice', generic training and technical assistance.  Unfortunately, eight months on from the publication of the PWP Chapter, the response to the initiative from the candidate countries remains cautious. To date, few countries have accepted NATO’s offer.  Although many of the candidate countries acknowledge the potential importance of the PWP Chapter, only Lithuania and Romania have indicated that they intend to accept NATO’s assistance.[12]

There are a number of possible reasons for this reticence to apply for assistance to control and reduce small arms.  Feedback from the candidate countries suggests that small arms control policy is a relatively new area, and states are still identifying their needs against other competing priorities outlined within the Partnership Work Program.  Many countries also are pursuing small arms control work on a bilateral basis.  For instance, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania are working closely with the United States to develop methods to control the flow of small arms and light weapons into their territories.  In addition, NATO’s work program overlaps with many of the initiatives pursued within dialogue between the European Union and its associate countries, the OSCE and the United Nations.

Given the cautious response thus far to NATO’s PWP Chapter, it will be critical for NATO and the OSCE to increase dialogue on a proposed division of roles and responsibilities.  Offering different but complementary capabilities, NATO and the OSCE should develop a cooperative program to address the main aspects of proliferation.  For example, while NATO could take the lead in developing programs to increase the security of stockpiles, the OSCE could play a role in monitoring and verifying inventories and destruction of weaponry which, in turn, could enhance the organization’s ongoing work to improve transparency.

Chapter 3:  Implementing NATO’s Work Program
NATO’s involvement in the small arms/light weapons control agenda will be essential to the international effort to combat this global problem.  It is critical, therefore, that every effort be made to implement the NATO/EAPC Work Program.  The 19 members of the Alliance must take the lead in adopting the extensive range of control and reduction measures outlined in the program, thus spurring action from the EAPC countries.  A series of detailed recommendations are outlined below.  Emphasis is placed on collective responsibility and action by all NATO/EAPC countries.  Allied or EAPC states that lack adequate technical or other resources to implement the measures recommended below should request the assistance of NATO partners, as outlined in the February 2000 PWP Chapter.

3.1  Stockpile Management and Control

Current practice/policy: The Alliance plans to develop dialogue on best practice, training and tailored assistance to EAPC nations in the field of stockpile management and security of storage sites.

Recommendations:

• Review current practice.  As a first step NATO/EAPC should work towards securing commitments from all member states and partners to conduct a comprehensive and transparent review of current stockpile management, security systems, and policies of the military, police and other bodies authorized to maintain small arms stocks. The aim of such reviews would be to ensure the adequacy of current systems, and to identify problems and opportunities for establishing best practice on stockpile security.

• Agree common standards.  Following the review process, NATO and the EAPC countries should agree common standards relating to appropriate locations for stockpiles; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security of transport of small arms; and procedures and sanctions in the event of theft or loss.

• Ensure good record-keeping and regular stock-taking.  All allied and EAPC states should ensure that accurate and transparent records are maintained of the numbers, types and locations of all small arms/light weapons under the control of armed forces, police, other state agencies, and any non-governmental group authorized to hold such weapons (such as manufacturers, dealers or security companies).  Regular stock-taking processes should be instituted to ensure that any losses or other stockpile security problems are identified rapidly.

• Establish responsibility chain.  All states should ensure that the armed forces, police and any other body authorized to hold small arms have clearly established officials and offices responsible for the management and security of their weapon stocks, with sufficient resources and authority to meet their responsibilities adequately.[13]

• Support the development of international norms and standards.  The issue of stockpile management and security is expected to feature high on the agenda of the U.N. 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects. NATO/EAPC consensus on the standards of stockpile management required would contribute significantly to the efforts to develop international standards.

3.2  Disposal and destruction of surplus stocks

Current policy/practice: The Alliance aims to develop dialogue on ‘best practice’ and training, and tailored assistance on the disposal and destruction of surplus stocks and old stocks of small arms and light weapons, including munitions.

Recommendations:

• The destruction of surplus small arms should be established as the norm.  All states should normally destroy surplus small arms, using internationally accepted,  effective and safe procedures.  While it is critical that all NATO members adopt this norm, candidate countries, in particular, should be required to provide pre-membership plans for destruction of surplus arms to avoid the selling of obsolete weaponry as a means of raising money for newer model, NATO-standard equipment.  Surplus weapons retained for other purposes (such as museum exhibits or collectors’ items) should be permanently disabled and decommissioned.

• There should be a presumption of denial regarding transfers or exports of surplus small arms.  In cases where states judge there are compelling reasons for transferring rather than destroying surplus, strict criteria and regulations should be in place. These should include a prohibition against exporting such equipment to human rights abusers or regions of conflict, and a requirement for end-use certification to help ensure against the diversion of transferred weaponry to such end-users or into the illicit marketplace.

• All states should conduct regular reviews of stocks.  All NATO and EAPC states should regularly review the stocks of small arms held by armed forces, police and other authorized bodies.  Those stocks of small arms that are surplus to requirements should be identified, and programs for responsible and swift disposal of such stocks should be established and implemented.  Stocks identified as surplus must be adequately safeguarded pending disposal.

• NATO and EAPC countries should promote transparency in surplus destruction practices.  This should  include  sharing information on numbers and types of small arms to be destroyed (or that have been destroyed), and the location and timing of such destruction (subject to security concerns).  NATO should encourage its members and partners to invite observers to monitor the process, in the interests of awareness raising and confidence building.

• Destroy all confiscated, collected or inadequately marked small arms.  Allied and partner nations should put in place laws and procedures to ensure that unauthorized small arms caches, shipments found to be illegal, and/or supplies of inadequately marked weapons are destroyed (subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions).[14]

3.3  Weapons collection and destruction

Current policy/practice:  NATO has pledged to develop dialogue and training with EAPC members on small arms and light weapons collection and destruction, and, as appropriate, reintegration of former combatants, including in the context of Peace Support Operations.  The goal is to provide tangible assistance to international peacekeeping missions.

Recommendations:

          Prioritize collection and destruction in Peace Support Operations.  Allies and partner nations should insist that collection and destruction of small arms take priority in conflict prevention efforts, peacekeeping mandates and post-conflict operations.  NATO forces should further consider public destruction of weapons collected as part of amnesties or confiscated as illegal weapons.  NATO and partner countries participating in such operations should insist that weapon collection and any subsequent destruction is tracked through verifiable record-keeping.  Weapon collection and destruction within the context of Peace Support Operations can be seen as one of NATO’s distinctive competencies in the field of small arms control in Euro-Atlantic area.

3.4  Export control

Current policy/practice: The NATO/EAPC Work Program encourages practical assistance in the development of small arms and light weapons export control regulations and mechanisms.  It further identifies the development of ‘best practice’ on export control regulation through information exchange and consultation on national export control regimes, including legislation, procedures and enforcement mechanisms aimed at promoting transparency, and common approaches towards the principles and mechanisms of export control.

Recommendations:  A NATO commitment to increasing restraint and responsibility governing arms exports is seen as one of the central contributions the Alliance could make to international arms control writ large.  NATO/EAPC contains some of the world’s major arms suppliers, but export control standards vary widely.  In particular, Alliance members and partners from Central and Eastern Europe have been identified as key suppliers of weapons to regions of conflict and human rights abusers.[15]  It is thus imperative that NATO work to establish common export regulations and procedures governing small arms and light weapons, as well as heavy weaponry.  In addition, NATO and its partners should seek to:

• Raise the level of current standards. It is critical that allied efforts to establish common standards on export controls include more than simply bringing EAPC countries in line with current EU or U.S. practice.  The 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports should not be considered as ‘best practice’ in this context.  The EU Code contains some major loopholes, such as the failure to control arms brokers or licensed production, and therefore should only be regarded as the absolute minimum standard.  Moreover, despite the agreement of the Code, members of the European Union continue to supply weapons to regions of conflict and to human rights violators.  While NATO/EAPC should seek to draw upon the EU Code, the discussion about standards among allied and partner states also offers an excellent opportunity to strengthen existing criteria set in other fora, and close the following major loopholes: 

                      Licensed Production.  Licensed production, the system where one company enables a company in another country to manufacture its products under license, is increasingly supplementing, or even taking the place of, direct exports of military, security and police equipment and weapons.  In many NATO countries, such licensed production agreements are inadequately controlled.  NATO countries should not allow the licensed production of small arms and associated equipment where there is a risk that this equipment will be transferred to sensitive and/or proscribed end-users.  Re-export of such technology, transferred as part of licensed production, should be prohibited without the originating NATO government’s consent.

                      Brokering.  A major weakness in the arms controls of many NATO nations is the omission of effective controls on the activities of arms brokers and shipping agents.  These are companies or individuals who organize or are involved in the transfer of arms from third countries to their customers, without the weapons touching NATO soil.  Although some NATO members, such as the United States and Germany, have regulations which control the activities of arms brokers, the majority of NATO member states do not have effective controls, leaving the brokers free to ply their trade virtually as they please.

The buying, selling and promotion of all arms and related military and security equipment must be stringently controlled by NATO states, as should the organization of such transfers – with all such brokering transactions requiring the licensed approval of governments. To be effective, NATO-wide controls on brokers should apply to any company or individual registered or resident in a NATO country, and to all passport holders of NATO countries, wherever they live.  Such measures would help to ensure that brokers are unable to escape regulation simply by stepping outside NATO territory.

In addition, all NATO member states should require nationals who are arms brokering agents to register as such and to publish their audited accounts relating to arms trading.  Agents who break laws regulating arms exports or deliberately supply misleading information about their arms transactions should be prosecuted and banned from any further arms brokering.

            End-Use Monitoring.  Current procedures for establishing and monitoring the end use of small arms and light weapons and associated equipment transfers from many NATO member states are woefully inadequate.  The use of false end-use certificates has been reported, and there is little in the current certification requirements of several NATO members that would prevent irresponsible end-users from using small arms for proscribed purposes.

End-use agreements should have the status of a legally binding contract.  Such contracts should include a clause which would result in termination if the goods are found to be used for proscribed purposes (such as the violation of human rights) as set out in the agreement.  A comprehensive system of follow-up checks should also be provided for within the contract to ensure that exported goods are not misused by their stated end-user, or are not being diverted or re-exported.

• Legislate export control standards. While the establishment of politically binding agreements governing export controls is a valuable starting point, it is not enough.  The experience of the EU Code of Conduct suggests that any such government-to-government agreement is open to widely differing interpretations.  These differences are likely to be exacerbated if applied to the 46 NATO/EAPC states  rather than the 15 EU states.  Therefore, NATO/EAPC countries should work to convert agreed standards on export control into national legislation.

At the heart of such controls must be stringently applied criteria which would prohibit the transfer of small arms to countries where they are likely to facilitate human rights abuses or breaches of international humanitarian law.  In addition, it is critical that these standards apply to the export of all major conventional weaponry rather than focusing solely on small arms and light weapons.  While the commitment to introduce such legislation should be a criterion of NATO membership, existing Alliance members must also adopt this policy.

• Transparency and accountability: To ensure that all NATO and EAPC states are enforcing arms control regimes responsibly and consistently, systematic information exchange among NATO and EAPC states is required.  This information sharing should be coupled with ‘best practice’ accountability and transparency procedures at the national level.  At the national level, all NATO member governments should provide their parliaments and the public with clear, detailed, regular and comprehensive information about all prospective and completed transfers of small arms, and associated military and security equipment and weaponry, by both private companies and government agencies.  At the regional level, NATO/EAPC states actively should support the proposal to develop a register of small arms and light weapons holdings, imports and exports within the framework of the OSCE.  NATO members also should press for the evolution of the existing U.N. Register of Conventional Arms to incorporate small arms and light weapons transfers.
  
  

• Actively support common international standards.  As noted above, the U.N. 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects offers an excellent opportunity to develop international norms and standards governing small arms control.  Given the NATO/EAPC commitment to develop best practice on export regulations, the Alliance and its partners should call for discussion on international export controls, in the form of an International Code of Conduct, to be high on the agenda of this important conference.[16]

3.5  Embargoes

Current policy/practice: NATO/EAPC states have pledged to facilitate information exchange and transparency on issues relating to compliance with international arms embargoes.

Recommendations:

• All NATO members and prospective members must take explicit action to ensure compliance with U.N. and regional arms embargoes.  Such compliance should incorporate effective and integrated national enforcement measures.  These may require amendments to national policy and legislation to ensure stringent enforcement of embargoes.  Such legislation should be matched with adequate resources for police and customs officials to ensure compliance, for example by undertaking follow-up checks to track end-use of exports.  NATO and its partners should also consider measures for prosecuting and, where appropriate, publicly identifying those who violate embargoes.

3.6  Combating illicit trafficking 

Current policy/practice:  The NATO/EAPC Work Program offers tailored assistance for individual nations, and cooperation with customs and police enforcement authorities in the implementation of preventive/reactive measures on illicit trafficking.  This activity may take the form of visits by expert teams, formal training, or the loan of technical equipment.

Recommendations:

• Building consensus among NATO/EAPC countries on the norms and standards required to combat trafficking. While it is recognized that attempts to combat illicit trafficking will require cooperation among all nations and regional organizations, BASIC questions whether a focus on illicit trafficking would be the best use of the technical and military expertise of the Alliance.  The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is already the focus of much international attention, most notably in the United Nations where ECOSOC is currently concluding a legally binding protocol on firearms trafficking as part of the July 2000 Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, and through the U.N. 2001 Conference process.  However, the powerful alliance of states which make up NATO/EAPC have a critical role in developing and influencing the agenda of the U.N. 2001 Conference.  NATO/EAPC countries therefore should work to build consensus on the principles of cooperation and control, which are the foundation of international efforts to combat trafficking, prior to the U.N. 2001 Conference – with the aim of securing concrete practical outcomes at the U.N. level.  Areas that could be considered are: control on brokers, a universal standard of end use certification, harmonizing license procedures, and increased border control.

·        Cooperation with and support for INTERPOL.  It is critical that NATO, does not re-invent the wheel by developing complex weapons tracking systems that are not transferable or applicable on a wider international scale.  Rather, allied countries and partners should increase efforts to cooperate with and support the efforts of INTERPOL.  With 179 Member States, INTERPOL is second only to the United Nations in terms of membership.  Its mandate has included illicit trafficking for decades.  Moreover, the INTERPOL Weapons and Explosives Tracking System, covering weapons from small arms to anti-tank missiles, is the only existing international database for stolen and recovered weapons.  However, currently INTERPOL has just one analyst working on firearms trafficking, and its field offices and staff are under-funded and overstretched.  Therefore NATO/EAPC should consider strengthening the work of INTERPOL both at the headquarters and in the field.  Given proper funding, INTERPOL is well placed to serve a variety of functions, including: assisting states with training through its international network of regional offices; providing developing countries with computers, software packages and training; and developing safeguards against corruption and misuse of police equipment and powers.

• Provide financial and technical assistance to EAPC countries working to combat trafficking.  Controlling borders, intercepting weapons traffickers and tracing weapons is a costly, complex and time-consuming pursuit.  NATO should consider providing financial and technical support to those EAPC nations that have made a clear commitment to combat this problem.  Cooperative strategies should be developed among local border personnel in close consultation with intelligence and military units from NATO, the European Police Organization (EUROPOL), INTEPOL and the OSCE.

3.7  Weapon marking

Current policy/practice: The NATO/EAPC program calls for practical assistance and information exchange in order to promote transparency and common approaches to and a standard methodology for weapon marking. 

Recommendations: 

• Ensure that work on weapons marking is consistent with the provision agreed in the UN Firearms Protocol.  As outlined in the section on illicit trafficking, it is essential that NATO’s work on weapons marking does not duplicate, or worse undermine, other initiatives to establish common standards on the marking of weapons.  The U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is expected to conclude the negotiations of the draft Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in October 2000.  This protocol is expected to contain detailed provisions which commit states to mark weapons at the point of manufacture and at every point of import thereafter.  Therefore, any NATO/EAPC initiatives to develop controls on marking should be consistent with the standards adopted in this legally binding instrument.

__________________

Endnotes

[1]    http://www.NATO.INT/docu/pr/2000/p00-052e.htm

[3]    The Alliance's comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, Brussels, 29-30 May 1989

[4] Paragraph 32 of NATO’s Washington Communiqué, issued on 24 April 1999.  For full text of the document see NATO's web site.

[5] There are many working definitions for small arms and light weapons, ranging from technical definitions to descriptive definitions of small arms and light weapons as those which can be operated by one or two persons, and can be carried by one or two persons or by a pack animal or light vehicle. A 1997 report published by the United Nations provided the following definitions: small arms includes revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; light weapons includes heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles (sometimes mounted), portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (sometimes mounted) and mortars of calibers less than 100mm; ammunition and explosives includes cartridges (rounds) from small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines and explosives. From “Report of Governmental Experts on Small Arms”, A/52/298, United Nations, 27 August 1997. For the purpose of this report, the term “small arms” is used as a general term referring to all of the aforementioned weapons and ammunition.

[6] EAPC/PFP and the Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Draft Report, NATO/EAPC, July 1999.

[7] With respect to NATO, see the testimony of Daniel Plesch, director, BASIC, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 5 November 1997, and Joost R. Hilterman,  Executive Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch, “NATO as Weapons Proliferator”, International Herald Tribune, 11 June 1998. With respect to the OSCE, see text, infra (November 1998 workshop).

[8] See Washington Summit Communiqué, NATO summit, NAC-S(99) 64, 24 April 1999.

[9] Analysis of weapons transfers to regions in conflict, primarily in Africa, already indicates that countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have become a primary source of cheap weapons.  See Abdel-Fatau Musah and Robert Castle, “Eastern Europe’s Arsenal on the Loose: Managing Light Weapons Flows to Conflict Zones”, BASIC Paper 26, May 1998, and “Arsenals on the Cheap: NATO Expansion and the Arms Cascade”, Human Rights Watch, April 1999.

[10]   See Loretta Bondi, “NATO Ambassadors Tackle Small Arms Problem,” BASIC Reports #69, 29 March 1999.

[11] EAPC/PFP and the Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons, EAPC(PC)(SALW)WP(1)(Final), 9 July 1999.

[12] Correspondence with BASIC from Amb. Lazar Comnescu of the Romanian Mission to NATO, April 2000 and from Vaclovas Semakevicius of the Lithuanian Weapons Fund, 15 May 2000.

[13] These recommendations are drawn directly from “Stockpile Security and Reducing Surplus Weapons,” Owen Greene, September 2000, Briefing 3 in the Biting the Bullet Project, BASIC, International Alert and Saferworld.

[14] Ibid.

[15] See for example: “Eastern Europe’s arsenal on the loose: managing light weapons flows to conflict zones,”  BASIC Papers, May 1998; “Arsenals on the cheap: NATO expansion and the arms cascade,” Human Rights Watch, April 1999; “Bulgaria: Money Talks, arms dealing with human rights abusers,”  Human Rights Watch, April 1999; “The Arms Fixers – controlling the brokers and shipping agents,” BASIC, NISAT, PRIO March 1999; “The Terror Trade Times,” Amnesty International, October 1999.

[16]Dr. Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica, is leading an initiative to develop an International Code of Conduct in conjunction with a Commission of Nobel Laureates. For additional information on this effort, see the Arias Foundation web page. 

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