BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO

8. NATO's "MISSING DOCUMENTS"

"Missing Document" 2: A Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament

There is no conventional military threat to NATO or to Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, enormous numbers of conventional weapons remain in Europe while thousands of nuclear weapons on hair trigger alert could destroy the industrialized world in an hour. There is a need to progressively reduce and eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction in those countries that are acknowledged to possess them, while also making strenuous efforts to prevent their spread to those who wish to attain WMD. These measures should be accompanied by progressive reductions in conventional weapons and forces.

Fortunately, there is a great tradition of disarmament to be pursued. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has near universal adherence and sets the legally binding objective of the abolition of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and START Treaties which have made real reductions in nuclear weapons. These are complemented by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines, the 1986 Stockholm Confidence and Security Building Measures accord and others. Conventional wisdom at the time regarded all these treaties as impossible to achieve.

The new Comprehensive Concept should cover WMD and conventional weapons - both heavy and small arms.

Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament
NATO should help develop a verifiable international regime to control and eliminate all WMD, contribute to the costs of disarmament, and address security needs through cooperative arrangements rather than military force. Where military force is still needed, NATO's overwhelming conventional superiority offers more than enough capability to meet any challenge.

There are six essential steps that NATO needs to take to reduce and eliminate the risks posed by nuclear weapons to Europe. The following steps begin that process:

1. Commit to and take programmatic action toward the rapid global elimination of nuclear weapons;

2. Reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons;

3. Halt NATO's first-use policy;

4. Store or eliminate all non-strategic nuclear weapons and relinquish the option of nuclear weapons use by non-nuclear-weapon states;

5. Initiate a European Co-operative Threat Reduction Program;

6. Issue a declaration reaffirming, as an Alliance, the commitments its members have made in other international treaties and texts.

These steps outline a comprehensive nuclear risk reduction strategy for NATO. The list begins with the most important and broadest steps, and proceeds to less far-reaching initiatives. Most importantly, the last five steps would all follow from a sincere undertaking of the first.

1. Commit To and Take Programmatic Action Toward the Rapid Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

The five nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT legally committed themselves to nuclear disarmament by joining the Treaty, Article VI of which states

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.⁷⁹

Treaty parties strengthened that commitment at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. That document called for a "programme of action" that included the "determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."⁸⁰ In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice reconfirmed this commitment. The Court unanimously found that there is an "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international controls."⁸¹

The Importance of the Commitment

The need for a commitment to complete elimination is clear. The high-level Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, convened by the Australian government, emphasized the importance of this step:

This commitment would change instantly the tenor of debate, the thrust of war planning, and the timing or indeed the necessity for modernization programs. It would transform the nuclear weapons paradigm from the indefinite management of a world fraught with the twin risks of the use of nuclear weapons and further proliferation, to one of nuclear weapons elimination.⁸²

More recently, eight nations led by Ireland issued a call for rapid progress on nuclear disarmament. The eight nations - Ireland, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, and Sweden - sought "a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability" from both the nuclear-weapon states and the nuclear-weapon-capable states.

The June declaration led to a UN First Committee and General Assembly resolution. Despite heavy pressure from France, the UK and the US to vote against the resolution, every non-nuclear-weapon state in NATO except Turkey abstained. The first operative paragraph of the resolution called on the nuclear-weapon states to make an "unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination" of their nuclear arsenals. The resolution originally contained a call to consider "undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons."⁸³ In a successful effort to gain support from NATO members, it was changed to call for consideration of "measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines."⁸⁴

A Study on Elimination

NATO, in line with those commitments, and the commitments already made by the nuclear-weapon states in the Alliance, should undertake studies on elimination. Such a study was recommended by a Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly chaired by British Conservative Sir Peter Emery. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) should begin a comprehensive examination of the steps and requirements to reach elimination. This should consider a broad range of options for reaching zero, as well as verification measures needed to maintain that status indefinitely.

Discussions on Elimination in the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council

Together or in parallel with the NPG, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) should conduct a study examining the requirements and steps needed to reach the elimination of nuclear weapons, highlighting contributions that each Alliance member and Russia can make. Important topics that need to be researched include: the transition from low numbers of weapons to zero, permanent maintenance of the verification regime; storage and/or destruction of nuclear materials, and how to handle break-out if it occurs.

The PJC already has a working group on nuclear weapons that has three items on its agenda. Two of these items - tactical nuclear weapons and President Yeltsin's statement on de-alerting nuclear weapons - should be included among the next steps in the disarmament process as a whole. Adding a fourth item on elimination of nuclear weapons provides a comprehensive and necessary overview.

The mere existence of this working group as it is currently set up demonstrates that Nuclear-Weapon States are willing to discuss disarmament issues in a multilateral forum, even one that includes non-nuclear-weapon states. The same states object to discussions in the UN or other fora that include Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

2. Reduce the Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons

NATO has already taken steps to reduce the alert status of some nuclear systems, particularly for tactical weapons. Thousands of warheads have been completely withdrawn and are being destroyed or stored in the United States. Aircraft no longer sit on Quick Reaction Alert, with their electronics preheated and loaded with nuclear weapons, ready for immediate take-off.

The UK Strategic Defence Review announced that Trident submarines will now be "routinely at a 'notice to fire' measured in days rather than the few minutes' quick reaction alert sustained throughout the Cold War."⁸⁵ Details are not available on how this 'notice to fire' status was implemented. Comments from UK officials indicate this is an operational or procedural change, rather than a technical one. Crews will not constantly be on stand-by alert, and there will be less emphasis on being in constant communication. As a safety measure to reduce the likelihood of accident or miscalculation, this step is praiseworthy.

To expand this step, NATO should declare that there is no requirement for maintaining its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force on high alert. Up until the UK announcement of this policy, both British and US nuclear submarine forces were maintained at the same level of alert as they were during the Cold War. Given the lack of threat of massive attack, the US should join the UK in de-alerting its submarine-based forces. NATO should then endorse and promote this as a step to reduce the risks associated with maintaining a high level of alert. The 1995 incident, when Russian officials mistook the launch of a US weather rocket off Norway for a SLBM launch, demonstrated those risks all too well.

However, according to UK officials, its new policy is not a de-alerting measure. The UK views it as a confidence-building measure, similar to the agreements to detarget nuclear missiles reached with Russia. Both the UK 'notice to fire' status and the agreements on de-targeting are unverifiable at present.

Because the "notice to fire" status is not verifiable, its benefits are limited. It cannot be ascertained if it was abandoned for a higher level of alert. Russian officials have stated that they will not place their nuclear forces on reduced alert status unless it can be confirmed that British, French, and Chinese forces are de-alerted.⁸⁶

As France and the UK rely primarily on a single submarine at sea at any time, verifying the status and location of the submarine is complicated, as this could make the submarine vulnerable to attack. For the United States, it is feasible to reveal the location and status of one submarine at a time in a force of four to six at sea.

Fortunately, there are solutions to this dilemma. For example, US submarines en route to their launch stations are on a modified alert status from which it takes approximately 18 hours to move to full alert, ready for launch within minutes.⁸⁷ All NATO submarines could maintain this status indefinitely, and it is possible to verify this status externally without revealing the location of the submarine. Under modified alert, flood plates block missile launch tubes. By placing an electronic seal on the flood plate, it is possible to verify it has not been removed. This seal would communicate with a buoy that submarine crew would release. After a sufficient time delay to mask the location of the submarine, the buoy would broadcast information confirming that the seals are still in place.⁸⁸

Other verifiable steps include removing guidance systems from missiles or shutting down power to the missiles. These would increase the amount of time required to launch missiles by hours or days.

Further steps

More far reaching steps are also possible, including removing warheads from delivery vehicles and ending the permanent patrol of submarines. The US has already committed, with Russia, to early deactivation of weapons that both countries will destroy under START II. Deactivation steps can also serve as de-alerting steps. All three NATO states should take steps to reduce the alert status of their nuclear weapons, and develop ways to make that status verifiable.

However, de-alerting should not be seen as a substitute for further disarmament. It is merely one step to reduce the immediate danger of accidental, inadvertent or mistaken nuclear launch. The ultimate goal must remain the elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Store or Eliminate All Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Relinquish the Option of Nuclear Weapons Use by Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

NATO is extremely concerned about Russian tactical weapons. The number, location, and status of the Russian tactical weapons are unknown; Russia's ability to maintain command and control of its arsenal is, by most accounts, deteriorating; and a sharp downturn in Russian stability is still possible. These concerns, combined with Russian awareness that its tactical forces are deteriorating even faster than its strategic arsenal, were the driving factors in the language on tactical nuclear systems in the 1997 Helsinki agreements outlining a framework for START III. The deterioration of its conventional forces drove Russian doctrinal changes and increased reliance on forward basing of tactical nuclear forces. NATO enlargement exacerbated this concern. NATO should make strenuous efforts in the CFE process to reduce Russian concerns by cutting the Alliance's conventional forces, and enhancing related confidence-building measures.

Current talks in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

The PJC has begun discussions on non-strategic arsenals. However, Western countries are dissatisfied with the initial exchanges. In June 1998, NATO's Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group called "upon Russia to further review its tactical nuclear weapons stockpile with a view toward making additional significant reductions."⁸⁹

At the same time, Russia continues to object to NATO expansion and links its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to NATO's enlargement. Russia's demand that NATO's statements that it will not deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new Alliance members be put in a legally-binding form has not been met. NATO has also scorned Russian proposals for the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons to national territory. Only US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe do not already meet that objective.

NATO should support two separate options for reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons: include tactical nuclear weapons in START III, and take reciprocal unilateral steps by Russia and the US to reduce nuclear weapons. Both options need to be considered and pursued as appropriate.

Ending the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would also end the most provocative aspect of NATO's nuclear sharing: the preparations for and the possible use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states during times of war.

End nuclear training programs and remove infrastructure

Thus, along with withdrawing US nuclear weapons, NATO should stop training pilots from non-nuclear-weapon states for nuclear missions and remove all associated infrastructures for those states' territories. As NATO recently made clear, nuclear weapons' "fundamental purpose is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war."⁹⁰ The military role for US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe is absolutely minimal. There is no need for forward deployment, and the political costs far outweigh the benefits. The withdrawal of such weapons would neither weaken US commitment to Europe, nor encourage Russian military adventurism.

4. Halt NATO's First-Use Policies

As the UK stated in its Strategic Defence Review:

[T]he collapse of Communism and the emergence of democratic states throughout Eastern Europe and in Russia means that there is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of such a threat.⁹¹

NATO conventional forces in Europe are vastly superior to any conceivable threat, including the slim possibility of a reconstituted Russian army. For these reasons, the two nuclear-weapon states in Europe and NATO should declare no-first-use policies.

In practice, any state which used nuclear weapons would gravely damage its national interests and position, generating massive international and public opposition. The political and economic cost of being the first to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state would be particularly high. In the present environment, any NATO state that did so would become a pariah, shunned by the international community.

NATO needs to translate its 1990 commitment only to use nuclear weapons as a last resort into a military doctrine that precludes first-use. It is inconceivable, in all but the most extreme circumstances, that a non-nuclear-weapon state could mount a conventional attack that would threaten the existence of a nuclear-weapon state.

Furthermore, any use of nuclear weapons, especially first-use, would damage the international non-proliferation regime permanently. Further use of nuclear weapons would be seen as an option, and dozens of states would reconsider their non-nuclear status.

Militarily, there is increasing recognition that nuclear weapons are ineffective in achieving strategic objectives. US General Colin Powell revealed that although the military considered nuclear use, no viable option could be found during the 1991 Gulf War.⁹²

It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which it would be in NATO's interest to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The question would put extreme pressure on the Alliance, as member states would have differing ideas about whether nuclear use was appropriate or not.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

One scenario frequently suggested for using nuclear weapons is to respond, or even pre-empt, the use of chemical or biological weapons. Former Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command, General Lee Butler, describes using nuclear weapons as a solution to chemical or biological attack as an "outmoded idea." According to Butler: "Conventional retaliation would be far more proportionate, less damaging to neighboring states and less horrific for innocent civilians."⁹³

Following reports of the recent German initiative on first use, General Butler sent a letter to NATO Defense Ministers. In it, he wrote:

[W]hatever the utility of a First Use policy during the Cold War, it is entirely inappropriate to the new global security environment; worse, it is counterproductive to the goal of nonproliferation and antithetical to the values of democratic societies.⁹⁴

In addition, planning for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states undermines the security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon states signatories to the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. The discussion on security assurances at the 1998 NPT PrepCom highlighted the continued importance placed on this issue by non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to provide any additional guarantees.

Finally, as noted before, relying on nuclear weapons is to rely on a weak instrument. The dangers of scenarios "requiring" nuclear use pale in comparison to scenarios where political issues preclude that option. These latter, true worst case scenarios should encourage risk reduction strategies and non-nuclear responses.

5. Initiate a NATO Co-operative Threat Reduction Program

NATO should create an integrated Co-operative Threat Reduction Program, designed to parallel and add to the US Nunn-Lugar program. The program could assist in:

safeguarding nuclear weapons-capable materials and knowledge;
strengthening Russian export control regimes;
strengthening safety and security at nuclear facilities;
handling and converting of excess nuclear weapons materials; and,
contributing to disarmament.

Its budget should equal or exceed the US Co-operative Threat Reduction Program. Such a program would be a logical development of existing co-operation in the non-proliferation field. They would find themselves supported by the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon states throughout the world. The creation of such a program would also give great depth and substance to the NATO-Russia partnership.

6. Issue a Declaration Reaffirming, as an Alliance, the Commitments its Members Have Made in Other International Treaties and Texts

NATO member states are parties to an impressive array of international treaties and conventions. On the nuclear front, the most important of these is the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT are committed not to obtain nuclear weapons; nuclear-weapon states are committed to not provide nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, to nuclear disarmament, and to provide access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

In 1995, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, those commitments were strengthened, particularly the pledge to disarmament. Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament sets out a program of action for nuclear disarmament. The 1996 agreement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was an important achievement from that program. However, NATO has not outlined its program for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally," as called for in Principles and Objectives.⁹⁵

To strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, to reassure other states of the sincerity of their commitments, and to reflect the new security order, NATO member states should, as an Alliance, issue a declaration reaffirming their NPT commitments.

This declaration need only include language from agreed documents, especially the NPT and Principles and Objectives. The document should also review disarmament and non-proliferation accomplishments to date. NATO should also consider outlining its next steps to fulfill members' commitments.

The following are some of the essential paragraphs in Principles and Objectives:

Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

1. Affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

...

Nuclear Disarmament

(3) .the nuclear weapons States reaffirm their commitment, stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

(4) The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below:

...

(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.⁹⁶

NATO should also adopt a policy concerning nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, based on the resolution adopted by the NPT Review and Renewal Conference in 1995.

Arms Control Policy for Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Both Chemical and Biological Weapons are prohibited by international conventions, which Alliance states have helped shaped. Both of these conventions should be fully implemented and the Alliance should seek to have them universally supported. In particular, a strict verification regime should form part of the Biological Weapons Convention. The major gap in policy relates to nuclear weapons.⁹⁷

Conventional Arms Control Elements

Heavy Weapons and CFE
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright laid out the NATO vision for the CFE negotiation in 1999 speaking in Brussels in December:

We must also move ahead with completion of CFE adaptation by the time of the OSCE Summit next year, a goal we all share. This issue relates directly to the character of NATO's partnerships and capabilities.

An adapted CFE Treaty must have enough flexibility built in to ensure that NATO can respond effectively to future crises without breaching it. It must be constructed so that it does not inhibit the political evolution of Europe or the Alliance. And it must not harm the military capabilities of our Alliance. ⁹⁸

The original CFE regime was intended to create military stability in Europe, thus excluding the option of a conventional Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) (commonly known Warsaw Pact) surprise attack on NATO. With the dissolution of the WTO and the Soviet Union, and NATO becoming conventionally superior to Russia, the CFE adaptation talks have become dominated by the question: whether stability should continue to be the guiding principle for the adapted treaty or whether military flexibility should be reintroduced to strengthen crisis management capabilities and reflect the changing tasks of NATO. Here the dispute divides NATO. The US with Poland as its strongest European supporter on the one side and Germany with other European Allies such as France on the other, represent the different positions. The US seeks maximum flexibility to reinforce Poland, Hungary and other countries such as Azerbaijan that might border a crisis area. Conversely, Germany and France are interested in limiting reinforcements and binding larger troop movements to additional consultations among, and to approval by, CFE members. Russia's position is biased. While Moscow on the one hand would like to limit NATO's flexibility to reinforce in Central Europe, the Kremlin at the same time shows some interest in trading NATO flexibility in Central Europe against greater flexibility for Russia at her Southern flank. Moscow has already announced that it will not meet its limits according to the CFE flank agreement by the end of May 1999.

NATO should propose a package of heavy weapons reductions to the OSCE Summit in November 1999, along with a compatible program of internal NATO initiatives.

Since the end of the Cold War many NATO countries unilaterally reduced their armed forces. In addition, under the Conventional Armed forces in Europe treaty (CFE) more than 50,000 pieces of military equipment have been destroyed. However, despite these positive developments, Europe is still excessively militarized.

CFE Adaptation
CFE states are currently negotiating the adaptation of the CFE treaty. The revised CFE Treaty is scheduled to be ready for adoption at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. According to the Draft decision adopted in June 1997 on the Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation, "there will be no increase in total numbers of TLE [Treaty Limited Equipment] permitted in each category within the Treaty's area of application." Furthermore States parties to the Treaty preliminary agreed to aim at "achieving a significant lowering of the total amount of TLE permitted in the area of application." Although this seems a positive step forward, it does not necessarily mean further reductions in the current military holdings of CFE States. Almost all of them are currently below their permitted upper limits.

Recommendations
NATO should propose that current TLE holdings be adopted as new CFE upper limits. The geographical enlargement of the Treaty should include countries from southeast Europe. A broader mandate for future negotiations should include an arms control regime for new categories of weapons, including light weapons. NATO should assist in the development and strengthening of the current CFE verification and notification regime. Towards that end NATO's VERITY database on CFE TLE should be made available to all CFE participating States.

NATO countries should continue to demonstrate restraint in delivering modern military equipment to the three new members and other aspirant countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In its revised strategy, NATO should make the commitment to refrain from selling, cascading and co-producing conventional weapons to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE). These weapons should include all categories of TLE under the CFE Treaty and new categories including new technologies and light weapons.

NATO should examine and debate internally the proposals of the Global Action to Prevent War Project.⁹⁹ This project is headed by Jonathan Dean, former US Ambassador to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks. The project combines proposals for stepped up conflict prevention, improved peacekeeping, and a series of inter-inked treaties for drastic cutbacks in conventional forces and defense budgets. This project should also be debated in the OSCE.

Additional Measures to Control Transfers of Conventional Weapons
The CFE Treaty regulates only the levels of heavy conventional weapons in Europe. NATO countries should also exercise restraint over the conventional arms trade both within the Alliance and from arms exporting states outside the organization. Although these initiatives are aimed at the entire arms trade, some are particularly appropriate for regulating the use and transfer of small arms and light weapons.

Controlling Legal Transfers
Codes of Conduct on arms transfers seek to govern the transfer of military equipment and training according to certain criteria and consultation mechanisms. They prevent states from undercutting each other's refusals to export arms by holding all countries accountable to the same high standards.

National, regional and ultimately global Codes of Conduct require exporting states to implement effective regulations to prevent the supply of arms, ammunition, components and technology where they might be used to violate international human rights standards, whether in law enforcement or armed conflict situations; breach international humanitarian law applicable to international and internal armed conflict; fuel international aggression and regional instability, and prevent adequate social spending or thwart sustainable development programs.

In June 1998 the European Union adopted a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that provides detailed export criteria guiding decisions on arms export licenses. The Code also establishes a mechanism whereby EU Member States consult with each other on the issuing and denying of arms export licenses; requires Member States to submit annual reports on arms exports and the Code's implementation; and, crucially, establishes a process of annual review intended to lead to a strengthening of the Code.¹⁰⁰ Since its agreement, the Code has been endorsed by the 13 associated countries of the EU.¹⁰¹ Endorsement of the Code of Conduct is likely to be a condition of future membership of the EU.

As major arms suppliers, NATO member states should develop new laws and more stringent criteria to govern weapons exports, ideally through these multilateral efforts. Member states should work with the countries of the European Union to strengthen the EU Code of Conduct. All NATO members and PfP states should at least adopt, and work to strengthen, the EU Code of Conduct criteria governing arms transfers. NATO member states should work towards the establishment of a common interpretation of the Code's operative provisions. An important example is multilateral information exchange of denial notifications.

Although the Code is an important first step towards arms transfer restraint, NATO should design and implement additional measures to control conventional arms. As a priority, NATO should establish a uniform and effective system harmonisation of end-use certification to control and monitor the final destination and use of exported conventional arms and ammunition applicable throughout PfP States.

NATO can also play an important role in developing controls over the activities of international arms brokering agents and shippers. Legislation should be enacted requiring all arms brokering agents and arms shipping agents domiciled or registered in NATO member states to be registered as legitimate operators. Any agents found to have provided false or seriously misleading information, or to have broken the law of any country regarding arms transfers, should not be registered. The register should be made available to the public so that public scrutiny is possible. All registered brokers should submit copies of arms export licences and import and transit documents to the regulating authorities of their home government prior to delivery so that the legitimacy of the transaction can be verified. All agents who do not comply with the law in this regard should be subject to strict legal sanctions. Such measures, while particularly applicable to small arms, should be enforced for all conventional arms brokering arrangements.

NATO should also promote an obligation on all governments to rigorously enforce UN and other international arms embargoes. NATO peacekeepers in Macedonia and Albania, for example, have attempted to check illegal weapons flows into Kosovo.

Transparency and Accountability
Rigorous arms export control policies will ultimately fail if they are not accompanied by overarching principles of increased transparency and accountability. These principles should include annual reporting of arms transfers to all member states governments, national parliaments and the public. NATO member states should ensure that regular submissions to the UN Register on Conventional Arms include voluntary information provision on national procurement and small arms transfers. Further, the exchange of information within NATO on levels of armaments would not only encourage restraint, but would also create a common understanding of the appropriate level of armaments required for national self-defense.

Controlling the Proliferation and Misuse of Small Arms
NATO's decision in December 1998 to identify small arms trafficking and the control of small arms transfers as a priority in the Action Plan of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is a positive development. Light weapons flows are a particular problem for NATO member states and PfP states. Legal and illegal transfers of small arms and light weapons from NATO countries are fueling actual and potential conflicts in South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and creating instability in other regions as well.

The Alliance should now ensure that the EAPC takes concrete steps to develop the capacity to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the EAPC area and beyond. A comprehensive strategy aimed at controlling small arms would minimize the security risks resulting from the unregulated stocks of small arms and ammunition within the Alliance and among PfP states. NATO should use existing internal structures to initiate a small arms strategy, while developing new mechanisms to consolidate the process.

Transparency and Small Arms
Little is known about the stockpiles of small arms and ammunition among NATO and PfP states, and, as a result, there is little common understanding of the scale of the surplus weapons problem. Increased transparency on stockpiles and arsenals would help NATO develop a common formula to calculate what should be defined as surplus to national defense requirements across the entire region. In order to guarantee accountability, information on national inventories should not only be shared among governments, but should also be made public through national parliaments.

An important first step would be the creation of a regional register of small arms transfers and holdings among NATO and PfP states. In additional, NATO should circulate a Defense Planning Questionnaire to all member states, including an audit of complete national inventories of arms and ammunition and related equipment held by police and security forces and other state bodies. Furthermore, the VERITY database should be developed and expanded to include small arms and ammunition.

Incorporating Small Arms into Arms Control Regimes
Small arms must be incorporated into existing arms control arrangements, notably the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Control strategies should also form an integral part of arms control regimes among states bordering post conflict areas. For example, regional and sub-regional arms control agreements were developed for Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These cover a wider range of Treaty Limited Equipment than CFE.¹⁰² NATO should ensure that following this precedent, future disarmament programs and post-conflict arms control regimes include small arms as well as heavy weapons. Peace agreements should include an upper limit on the number of weapons allowed per soldier. All excess weapons should then be destroyed. ¹⁰³

Managing Surplus Small Arms Stockpiles
Light weapons often become surplus after conflicts end and are recycled to other conflict zones. Incorporating comprehensive light weapons collection and destruction in all NATO peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates would help curb the spread of these weapons both inside and outside the NATO area. A well-developed strategy to manage surplus stockpiles of small arms and ammunition, and ensure their removal from circulation is a longer-term solution to this problem.

Such a strategy should involve the systematic destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition accumulated as a result of arms control agreements and disarmament treaties, and the destruction of weapons and ammunition made surplus by national equipment replacement programs.

Furthermore, NATO member states should provide technical assistance for weapons destruction for all NATO and Partnership for Peace members. NATO member states should commit resources and expertise to a program that would collect and destroy surplus weapons and ammunition, and purchase equipment for destruction of weapons.¹⁰⁴ As part of such a program, NATO should create a "Small Arms Light Weapons Destruction Verification Capability" similar to that which exists for the CFE Treaty. Various countries would provide the requisite personnel and equipment.¹⁰⁵

Small arms are susceptible to theft and diversion, even when apparently well-guarded. Where destruction is impossible, weapons arsenals should be securely stored so that they cannot be stolen. Exercises in weapon security, including random quartermaster inspections should form a part of multilateral training programs. Finally, participation in small arms training programs should become a condition of NATO and PfP membership.

Preventing and Combating Illicit Transfers
Light weapons are attractive to smugglers and lend themselves well to illicit trafficking for a number of reasons. They are lightweight and easy to conceal, are easy to operate and have a low rate of obsolescence. Unlike most conventional weapons, the lines of supply can be very long, and a single weapons often passes through many hands as it is recycled from one conflict to the next. As a result, the illegal market in light weapons is extensive and difficult to track.¹⁰⁶

Regional and international agreements that enhance cooperation between efforts to prevent illicit weapons trafficking are gaining widespread support. In November 1997, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted an Inter-American Convention against illicit firearms trafficking, the first instrument of its kind.¹⁰⁷ NATO should consider the adoption of a similar agreement as the basis for a NATO/EAPC agreement to combat the illicit light weapons trade. Such an agreement would require, inter alia, strengthened police and customs cooperation and improved border controls; the coordination of exports and imports through licenses and authorizations; information exchange to promote law enforcement and detection, and the marking of weapons at the point of manufacture, export and import.

Such an agreement would add considerable impetus to the negotiation of a strong Firearms Protocol to a Transnational Organized Crime Convention through the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The Protocol should include the widest possible definitions of illicit, to include human rights and humanitarian law, and the widest definition of firearms.

Regional and international agreements will succeed only if they are accompanied by adequate resources for implementation and verification. As donor countries, NATO member states should provide assistance to help develop capacity for the above.

A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO Endnotes

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