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BASIC RESEARCH REPORT
A Risk
Reduction Strategy for NATO
What will NATO's
position on ESDI be and how will NATO contribute to ESDI?
NATO decided to
establish the European Security and Defense Identity at the 1994
Summit in Brussels. The debate on a European defense policy between
European states is much older. The 1980s and 1990s saw increasing
defense cooperation between European states (especially the UK and
France). This cooperation took place on a bilateral or multilateral
basis, rather than through the WEU or the EU.59
The importance for ESDI
of the 1994 Summit was in the launch of the Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) concept. The US proposed the CJTF concept as a result
of a dispute following the 1991 Franco-German proposal to establish
a Eurocorps independent of NATO. The US insisted that Eurocorps be
integrated into NATO, while France and Germany resisted this effort.
The CJTF was the US proposal to allow limited autonomy to some
European forces.
CJTFs are designed to be
flexible commands which can be detached from NATO main forces for
use either by NATO, or by the WEU for European-only missions.
Current plans call for the establishment of one mobile command and
control headquarters, together with a planning facility. This HQ
would be able to call on NATO or WEU forces for any given mission.
These forces would be detached from NATO main forces and put under
the command of the CJTF HQ. This principle can be applied to NATO
missions including US forces, or to European-only missions. By
providing a simple, albeit US-dependent, solution to the
operationalization of ESDI, CJTF can be seen both as a US move to
block European autonomy and as a European recognition of the
weakness of their military assets.60
For the US, ESDI poses
something of a dilemma. On one hand, there is a desire to encourage
a greater defense effort from European NATO members, a new version
of the traditional burden sharing arguments. On the other, the US
does not wish to see Europe operating independently, particularly,
for example, in the Middle East.
For the Europeans, there
is the curious position that the Western European Union (the
Europeans' collective defense body) fills two roles. It is at the
same time the body nominated in the Maastricht and Amsterdam
Treaties as the body responsible for carrying out decisions of the
EU with defense implications, and also the vehicle for the ESDI in
NATO. This position makes autonomous action difficult, but also
provides European states with a convenient excuse for inaction.
Additional problems are posed as Turkey has the right to participate
as a NATO member, while it currently has no prospect of EU
membership.
For the short to medium
term, the European states need the support of the US to construct
ESDI. ESDI as currently proposed by NATO will lead to permanent US
control of European defense policy. However, Europe lacks vital
assets for a modern defense body, such as intelligence gathering,
collation and analysis facilities, strategic airlift, and even
(except within NATO) command and control. Some limited moves have
been made to acquire or lease assets from sources other than the US.
For example, for the 1997 CRISEX command post exercise, the WEU used
Russian Antonov transport aircraft. The Torrejon WEU Satellite
Centre is online, but the intelligence sources available to it are,
while improving, very limited. Thus, if European states wish to
carry out a military operation, US assets will be needed for the
forseeable future, leading to American political control.
Within the EU there were
further developments in the autumn of 1998. Having rejected moves
towards an EU-based defense policy of any kind at the conclusion of
the Amsterdam Treaty, the UK Labour government announced an
initiative for an EU defense policy to be made more concrete. These
proposals were first announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair at the
Edinburgh meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly.
Europe needs
genuine military operational capability - not least forces able to
react quickly and work together effectively - and genuine
political will. Without these, we will always be talking about an
empty shell. But we also need to check the institutions are right.
To decide how the EU, WEU and NATO can best mesh together. We have
no preconceptions. Rather we want a new debate. It would be good
to see some emerging conclusions by the Washington Summit.61
He also recognised that
such a development would not necessarily be welcomed by the US:
Europe has
always been the weaker of the two pillars of the Alliance, both in
its ability to decide rapidly and its capability to put those
decisions into action. Our US allies have often called for more
burden sharing. They have not always been keen to see a greater
European identity of view.62
This initiative was
followed up by an Anglo-French agreement on European Defense which
came from the Saint Malo UK-France Summit on 3-4 December 1998:
The Heads of State
and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:
1. The European
Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the
international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by
the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid
implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes
the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the
progressive framing of a common defense policy in the framework of
CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an
intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set
out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.
2. To this end,
the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and
a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.
In pursuing our objective, the collective defense commitments to
which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be
maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member
states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its
voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our
respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the
vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation
of the collective defense of its members. Europeans will operate
within the institutional framework of the European Union (European
Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defense
Ministers). The reinforcement of European solidarity must take
into account the various positions of European states. The
different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be
respected.
3. In order for
the European Union to take decisions and approve military action
where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be
given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of
situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant
strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking
account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its
relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will
also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European
capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or
national or multinational European means outside the NATO
framework).
4. Europe needs
strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks,
and which are supported by a strong and competitive European
defense industry and technology.
5. We are
determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to
give concrete expression to these objectives. 63
It is understood that
Foreign Office civil servants have been tasked with going back
through the recommendations for a European defense policy that were
rejected during the EU IGC in 1996/97 to see what might be
appropriate to implement now.
The likely format
appears to be the merger of the WEU into the EU as a 'fourth pillar'
of the Union.64 This would allow those EU member states
who wished to opt out of defense policy making to do so, while
clearing the way for much tighter cooperation directed by the
European Council among those states that wished to participate. From
the UK point of view this is clearly a way of allowing the UK to
take a lead in Europe - to project an image as a good European -
while maintaining a strong transatlantic link. The US, through NATO
and ESDI, would have a strong voice in EU defense policy.
Secretary of State
Albright expressed this view clearly when she told NATO ministers in
December 1998 that the US and Europe should work together to:
... develop
a European Security and Defense Identity, or ESDI, within the
Alliance, which the United States has strongly endorsed. We
enthusiastically support any such measures that enhance European
capabilities. The United States welcomes a more capable European
partner, with modern, flexible military forces capable of putting
out fires in Europe's own back yard and working with us through
the Alliance to defend our common interests. The key to a
successful initiative is to focus on practical military
capabilities. Any initiative must avoid preempting Alliance
decision-making by de-linking ESDI from NATO, avoid duplicating
existing efforts, and avoid discriminating against non-EU members.65
In other words, the only
role for ESDI would be to act in support of US initiatives, or on
occasions where the US wished action to be taken, but not to
participate itself. There would be no question of serious EU
security policy development for occasions when the US did not
support action being taken.
While this view might be
acceptable in the UK, it is anathema in France and unlikely to be
accepted through much of the EU. Furthermore, the reiteration of the
view that alliance interests should be defended and that forces
should be developed as capable rapid reaction and projection forces
is extremely controversial for states such as Germany.
Non-Military
Security Policy
Successful European intervention in security politics since the end
of the Cold War is not new. To date, the EU has concentrated on
non-military security, and this focus will continue not only to be
required, but to be the most important element of European security.
The EU has contributed
an enormous amount to security and stability in Europe since 1990,
arguably much more than NATO. The EU contribution is hardly known.
In US economic assistance programs such as PHARE and TACIS, while
flawed, have helped integrate Central and Eastern European economies
into the European mainstream. These moves have been strengthened by
the integration and development flowing from the association
agreements between the EU and the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
countries.
Perhaps most
importantly, from 1993 to 1995 the EU worked with the CEE countries
on the 'Stability Pact.' This is a package of some 125 agreements
between the states of the region designed to reduce potential
tensions and avert crises. The agreements covered such topics as
border disputes, minority rights, water rights, citizenship
requirements and other vital, but often overlooked, matters. Perhaps
the most important achievement under the pact was the conclusion of
a deal ending territorial and minorities disputes between Hungary
and Romania.
Economic integration and
the Stability Pact were pursued by the EU in the spirit of the
creation of the original European Community - the Coal and Steel
Community. This aimed to make war in western Europe impossible
through the promotion of economic and social integration between
France and Germany. These policies have been carried through more or
less successfully for fifty years, and should not now be
subordinated to the needs of military security policy. It is
sometimes argued in the US that the EU should have done more to
bring new states in more quickly. This criticism overlooks both the
complexity and expense of EU integration.
Recommendations
Europe needs a policy capability not just to manage crises, but to
prevent them. The EU has a good track record in this area, and
should build on it. Despite the cooperation with NATO in ESDI, as
the EU moves to establish a defense element to CFSP, this should be
done as part of the spectrum of current EU policy instruments - a
last resort in case of failure of all other options.
-
European states
should prepare an autonomous military capacity for European
controlled peace support operations.
-
The EU should
examine the possibility of renewing its Stability Pact concept,
and applying it to South Eastern Europe and Cyprus.
-
The crisis response
capability of the EU should include provision for Civilian
Intervention Units, and a full range of civilian crisis
management tools (see the following chapter).
A Risk
Reduction Strategy for NATO continued
Introduction
| Section 1 | Section
2 | Section 3 | Section
4 | Section 5
Section 6 | Section
7 | Section 8 | Endnotes
| Appendices
.
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