A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO

3. Document on NATO's Open Door and
Enlargement Policies

How far should enlargement continue? How can PfP and the EAPC be adapted and included to signal NATO's role in the projection of freedom and democracy as well as security and stability on the continent?

NATO Enlargement⁴⁵

We reaffirm that NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years...With regard to the aspiring members, we recognize with great interest and take account of the positive developments towards democracy and the rule of law in a number of southeastern European countries, especially Romania and Slovenia...[a]t the same time we recognize the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region who are also aspiring members.⁴⁶ - NATO final communique, July 1997

NATO leaders meeting in Madrid in July 1997 agreed that NATO should remain open to future members. This was a compromise formula for the European states which supported the entry of Slovenia and Romania in the first round of enlargement. Since Madrid prospective members, notably the Baltic States, have actively tried to persuade NATO to move swiftly to a next round of enlargement.

Increasingly, NATO diplomats, speaking under the condition of anonymity, have stated that there is a consensus emerging that NATO should adopt a "pause and think" policy on further enlargement. It would be imprudent for the Alliance to implement its declaratory policy on the "open door," before it assesses the impact of the first round of enlargement. To allay the fears of the countries that continue to demand NATO membership, the Alliance should develop a comprehensive package to strengthen PfP and the EAPC according to the recommendations of the next section and the "two missing documents."

The US has put forward ideas which would lead to the development of a policy called the 'Madrid Plus' package for potential new members. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, presented these ideas to the NAC in December 1998.

Our commitment to our Open Door strategy is central to our vision of a new and better NATO for the twenty-first century. Getting a robust and credible Open Door package is one of the key challenges we face for the Washington Summit. We must underscore our commitment to the enlargement process by agreeing on a Madrid-plus package that will keep NATO's door open. Both what we say and do as an Alliance is critical. We must agree on a robust Membership Action Plan to help aspiring partners, in practical and focused ways, to accelerate their efforts to become the strongest possible candidates. Without designating them in advance, we need to provide a road map that shows aspirants the way ahead.⁴⁷

The Madrid Plus package is aimed at preparing potential new members to enter the Alliance swiftly and integrating them as fully as possible into NATO military procedures. This strategy would involve drawing up plans to make new members forces interoperable with NATO, retraining officers (including English and French language training), adapting military doctrine, and ensuring democratic accountability of the military. This process has been applied to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. If the Madrid Plus package is approved in Washington, these preparations will form part of a pre-admission-decision package for future new members.

This shift of emphasis performs two functions for the Alliance. It will reduce the pressure to name the next wave of new members at the 1999 Washington Summit, as countries will be able to join the pre-accession package with the promise of swift entry at a later date. At the same time, NATO will in practice absorb several new countries without having to extend the full rights of membership to them.

Integrating the New Members
All NATO Parliaments had ratified the first round of NATO enlargement by late 1998. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will become fully integrated NATO members by April 1999, when NATO Heads of State and Government have the Summit in Washington. According to NATO officials, the current proposal is to have the new members join the Alliance at a low key ceremony in February or March 1999. Then, in Washington, they will simply join the other members at the table. This welcome gesture has been proposed as a way of softening the public relations blow to Russia, and to help ensure that Russia also attends the Washington Summit.

Despite the smooth political transition to membership, there are continuing problems with the three new members' military preparations. In July 1998 it was reported that the Polish Deputy Defense Minister was unhappy with Poland's defense budget because it was too restrictive on modernization of military equipment needed to integrate fully into NATO. Poland, in line with other two new members, is abandoning plans in the short term for the modernization of tanks and armored personnel carriers.⁴⁸ However, particularly in the area of communication, command and control systems, the three new members have made progress towards implementing the Target Force Goals to integrate with NATO's military, but the process is far from complete. ⁴⁹

Beyond the problems with integrating the new members, there is evidence that current NATO members are reluctant to extend all of the Alliance's privileges. Despite the creation of a nuclear policy group to bring the new members towards integration into the NATO nuclear planning process, the three newcomers will play a limited role in the Alliance's nuclear policy. According to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen, the three NATO newcomers will be eligible to participate in the political oversight of the Alliance's nuclear posture and in consultations on the use of nuclear weapons. However, the Clinton Administration confirmed that there are:

• No plans to conduct peacetime training of pilots from the new member states for nuclear missions;
  
  

• No requirements for the new member states to buy nuclear capable western aircraft;
  
  

• No plans to provide nuclear certification to any dual capable aircraft the new member states might buy;
  
  

• No plans to transfer equipment or infrastructure to support dual capable aircraft in a nuclear role; and,
  
  

• No plans to conclude bilateral agreements between the US and the new member states, allowing for the exchange of classified nuclear weapons information and hardware necessary to operate them.⁵⁰

A Real Commitment to Guaranteeing the Security of New Members?
The US Administration has been sending confusing signals concerning the security guarantee contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Clinton Administration speaks of guarantees for Eastern Europe when talking to Eastern Europeans but of loopholes when talking to Congress. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, speaking in the Czech Republic in 1997, said that NATO membership "means you will always be able to rely on us and we will always rely on you." If there is a threat to peace and security, she continued, "we will be bound by a solemn commitment to defeat it together."⁵¹ This serves to underline the self-interest of states in collective action expressed in the Atlantic Charter.

By contrast, President Clinton, in a letter to the Congress, offered a far less reassuring assessment of NATO's security guarantee. He said, "Article V does not define what actions would constitute an attack or prejudge what Alliance decisions might be made in such circumstances. Member states acting in accordance with established constitutional processes are required to exercise individual and collective judgement over this question."⁵²

It is unclear and consequently unlikely that Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic will receive the extent of an Article V commitment that they expect to get. Article V does not apply automatically; the members are obliged only to meet and consider what response is appropriate - in keeping with Article 51 of the UN Charter - in order to maintain the territorial integrity and security of the Atlantic area. If a NATO member becomes an aggressor, the other NATO members will consult on meeting the threat to international peace under Article IV of the NATO Treaty.

The new members have agreed to commit 80 percent of their armed forces to the NATO Integrated Command. This commitment is essential for minimizing the risks of mutual suspicion and conflict, preventing military planning for war against fellow members or against countries friendly to the Alliance, and for achieving transparency in military planning and training. If a new member fails to carry through in full on this commitment, or draws back later from it, it may forfeit any hope of Alliance wide commitment under Article V in the future.

The most likely scenario is that NATO expansion will proceed slowly. Neutral countries, such as Austria, Sweden and Finland may be invited to accede. However, these countries generally steer clear of articulating any desire to become NATO members. Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria may be invited to accede later. Although the Baltic states were officially mentioned as future candidate members, it is obvious from the substance of the debate on the issue, particularly in the US Senate, that NATO will be cautious about inviting them to join in the foreseeable future. This caution is driven by concerns about extending Article V guarantees to a region that, in NATO's traditional thinking, is indefensible without nuclear weapons. There is also concern about the extent to which Baltic membership will further threaten NATO-Russia relations.⁵³

Recommendations
NATO should adopt a "pause and think" policy on further enlargement. Priority should be given to pursuing arms reductions, conflict prevention, and EU enlargement and the consequent economic integration of Europe, regardless of the time frame required.

Partnership for Peace
Since its inception in 1994, PfP has been instrumental in strengthening military cooperation between NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. In military and defense-related terms, it has become an important framework for developing and implementing practical defense-related and military cooperation on three levels - Partner state with NATO, with individual or a group of NATO states, and with other Partners. Through PfP, NATO members, particularly the US, are establishing strong military ties with states as far as the Chinese border. PfP has gained a committed following among states, not least because it is perceived by many participants as a first step towards admission to the Alliance. PfP has the potential to be a major and enduring concept which can have a very significant role to play in any European-wide collective security system developing in the 21st Century.

The further development of PfP could reduce demands by Partner states to become NATO members. Indeed, the PfP Framework Document agreed in January 1994 states, "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security."⁵⁴ PfP states therefore are not in limbo as far as their security is concerned.

However, NATO members need to address a number of problematic areas in order to make PfP risk reducing in its own right.

Recommendations

• NATO members should refrain from increasing the combat power of its Partners. The PfP goal of establishing "inter-operability" of military structures and equipment may open the door for Western weapons transfers to PfP countries. There is clearly a need for "non-lethal" equipment which would improve the communications, command, control and intelligence (C3I) and air-defense of the partner armed forces. However, the absence of a credible threat to the security of almost all of the Partner states ought to convince NATO countries that improving the combat capability of Partners is unnecessary and probably counter-productive.
  
  Steps in the US Congress to increase the number of Partners receiving free-of-charge excess defense equipment do not strengthen security and stability in eastern Europe. According to the Security Assistance Act of 1998 [S.2463] sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms, American "hand-me-downs" could be send to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
  
  

• Bilateral military assistance programs to Partner States in the "spirit" of PfP should be better coordinated and monitored by NATO Headquarters. Although US bilateral assistance to almost all partner states through programs such as the Warsaw Initiative launched by President Clinton in July 1994 is by far the greatest, other NATO countries including Germany, the UK, France, Canada and Denmark are also assisting PfP states. NATO members should coordinate their bilateral efforts in a transparent fashion in order to avoid the danger that such bilateral arrangements result in either real or perceived spheres of influence.
  
  

• NATO should pursue its commitment to transparency and agree to make all PfP documents publicly available. If NATO maintains the present policy, in which the Partners decide on their agreements with NATO, a whole series of semi-secret agreements is being constructed with partner states in eastern Europe. This secrecy cannot benefit confidence-building in Europe and may create risks in the future.

A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO continued

 
Introduction | Section 1 | Section 2 | Section 3 | Section 4 | Section 5
Section 6 | Section 7 | Section 8 | Endnotes | Appendices

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