BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Number 99.1, January 1999

A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO

Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher
Editors

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For a copy of this report in French or German, email BASIC.

Content:

Preface

Introduction

1. The New Strategic Concept

2. Document on the Vision Statement on European Security

3. Document on NATO's Open Door and Enlargement Policies

4. Document on NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative

5. Document on Weapons of Mass Destruction

6. Document on European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

7. "Missing Document" 1: NATO Policy for Crisis Management and Security Sector Reform

8. "Missing Document" 2: A Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament

About the Editors

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Endnotes

Appendix A: Letter from Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., to NATO Heads of Government

Appendix B: Letter from Lee Butler, General, USAF (Retired), to NATO Defense Ministers

About the Editors

Martin Butcher is currently a Visiting Fellow with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC). Martin has been Director of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament, a Brussels-based NGO dealing with NATO and European Union security policy issues, for 7 years. Before that he was Associate for European Affairs of BASIC, working in the London office.

Julianne Smith works on BASIC's European Security desk as a Senior Analyst . Before joining BASIC in the fall of 1998, she worked for the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany. At CPN, Julianne managed policy studies for the European Commission and Parliament. Prior to this post, she worked in the German Parliament for Parliamentarian Rudolph Seiters as a Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow. Julianne holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University and a B.A. in Broadcast Journalism and French from Xavier University.

About the contributors

Robert Bullock is a Research Assistant at BASIC. He is currently studying at Georgetown University in Washington.

Katherine Joseph has worked as Analyst on BASIC's Weapons Trade desk since September 1997. She holds a MA from Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies with a specialization in Strategic Studies, and a BA from Oxford University.

Tasos Kokkinides, Senior Analyst, was a a volunteer and consultant for BASIC before joining the staff on a full-time basis in 1994. He holds an Masters in International Relations from Reading University.

Alistair Millar is Director, Washington Office of the Fourth Freedom Forum. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst at BASIC.

Otfried Nassauer is the Director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Securtiy (BITS).

Geraldine O'Callaghan, Senior Analyst, joined BASIC in July 1996. Previously she worked for Oxfam. She holds both a Masters in Comparative International Development Politics and her undergraduate degree from Bristol University.

Brian Wood joined BASIC as a Senior Fellow in September 1998. He is on sabbatical from Amnesty International, where he serves as a campaign coordinator at the International Secretariat based in London.

Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst as BASIC. Previously, he worked for 20/20 Vision and for ACCESS: A Security Information Service. He has a Masters in International Affairs from Columbia University, and a BA from Carleton College.

Support

This report was made possible by the generous support of Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Preface
The following analysis and proposals for reducing the risks to security in Europe was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, for which BASIC is most grateful. BASIC's research team would also like to thank the many officials from NATO nations who took the time to discuss issues with them.

I would like to thank BASIC Senior Analyst Julianne Smith and Visiting Fellow Martin Butcher of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament for both their editing work and contribution to the analysis in this report. Analysis was conducted by Robert Bullock, Kate Joseph, Tasos Kokkinides, Geraldine O'Callaghan, Alistair Millar (now with the Fourth Freedom Forum), Tanya Padberg, Brian Wood, Stephen Young, and myself of BASIC, and Otfried Nassauer of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security. Christine Kucia and Stephen Young produced the report. I would particularly like to thank Pat Chilton and Ambassador Jonathan Dean for their comments on the final draft.

The report will be updated online on BASIC's website at http://www.basicint.org. For further information on issues concerning European security, earlier BASIC publications can be found on BASIC's website as well. Previous work on NATO includes the Nuclear Futures series of research reports; the 1997 "A New Strategic Concept for NATO;" several joint studies with colleague organizations on the relationship of the NPT to NATO strategy; and testimony on NATO enlargement to the US Senate in 1997.

Dan Plesch
Director

Introduction
"NATO is more than a military Alliance."¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) holds itself to be founded on respect for the United Nations' Charter, and to help preserve and promote respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, NATO lacks adequate mechanisms and programs to enable it to achieve these goals.

It is the purpose of this paper to make suggestions for practical, collective measures that will reduce and prevent conflicts in Europe and beyond. NATO leaders meeting at the April 1999 Summit in Washington should actively address those issues. Today's problems of armed conflict between and within states range from terrorism and civil wars to the potential for nuclear, chemical and biological warfare. The analysis in this report indicates that the Alliance and the non-NATO states of Europe are developing a strategy and committing resources to deter and react to risks, but not to reduce and prevent them. An overwhelming amount of political will and financial resources are being devoted to military means while non-military means are either neglected or non-existent. This failure of prioritization requires governmental decisions to provide greater resources for preventive measures. These actions may require new funding or transfers from military spending.

A clear example of the need to create new policy tools came most recently in the Kosovo dispute. When US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke announced that thousands of "verifiers" would be sent to the region, no one in the public would have known that there was no "corps of verifiers" upon which to draw and that yet again an ad hoc contingent of retired officers, diplomats, volunteers, and an assortment of humanitarian personnel had to be assembled. Around the fringes of Europe, internal conflicts in North Africa, the Caucasus and Asia Minor continue unabated with even less external attention. The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and their means of delivery, add to the anxiety with which a relatively stable Europe looks South and East.

After a decade of debate, the powers of the Euro-Atlantic region have not created effective instruments for non-military means of conflict prevention either nationally or in any of the bewildering array of "security institutions:" NATO, OSCE,² UN, Western European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU), and the Council of Europe. From 1990 onwards, policies for conflict prevention and management in Europe have been proposed by state and non-state actors which, if supported by the major powers, could have greatly reduced conflicts and crises such as that in the Former Yugoslavia. The problem now is not so much NATO's failure to make the conceptual shift from conflict intervention to conflict prevention, but rather its inability to operationalize actual policies.

NATO must place a greater emphasis on conflict prevention, arms control, and disarmament. Any strategy intended to guide NATO for the next fifty years must look at the historically high levels of armaments on the continent and how to reduce them. NATO has produced no comprehensive survey of arms control and disarmament since its 1989 Comprehensive Concept, nor does it have any plans to do so. Currently the only plan to discuss armaments at the 1999 Washington Summit revolve around the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to modernize armories. This is inadequate at a time when NATO faces no major military threat, and is the predominant military power on the globe.

At the end of April 1999, the Alliance's 19 member states will decide on a new Strategic Concept. This Concept will provide the framework for the military, and political-military policies and actions that the Euro-Atlantic nations will follow in coming years. Such policies and actions will include cooperation between NATO and non-NATO nations, the restructuring of armed forces, military training, and preparations for the prevention or ending of conflicts, by force if necessary. The additional documents to be agreed at this Summit will set the scene for relations between NATO and its neighbors to the East and South, as well as outlining the Alliance's approach to the WMD threat.

In late 1998 NATO Ambassadors identified a series of topics which needed debate after numerous papers, which had been submitted over the summer, had been reviewed. The subsequent work completed before the Ministerial meetings in December focused these topics more sharply. Despite this, by the end of the Foreign Minister's meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 7/8, 1998, it became clear that intensive negotiating remained to be done.

NATO's Six Anticipated Documents
According to NATO officials, six documents are expected to be produced at the Summit. These documents are listed below along with associated questions which have been raised by NATO nations in the course of debates on the Strategic Concept.

1. The New Strategic Concept

Will NATO's core functions change to include "out of area" missions, and if so on what terms? Will NATO accept the authority of the UN? How will the nuclear strategy be reviewed?

2. A Vision Statement on the Future of European Security

How will NATO's position in the structure of European security organizations be described? How will NATO-Russia and NATO-Mediterranean relations be contained in the Concept?

3. Document on NATO's Open Door and Enlargement Policies

How far should enlargement continue? How can Partnership for Peace (PfP)³ and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)⁴ be adapted and included to signal NATO's role in the projection of freedom and democracy as well as security and stability throughout the continent?

4. Document on NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative

How will NATO's force structure be readjusted? How can the technological gap between the US and its Allies be narrowed, or at least not widened?

5. Document on Weapons of Mass Destruction

The US Administration has presented this item as a document on intelligence sharing, but will the role of nuclear weapons be redefined, and if so, how?

6. Document on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

What will NATO's position on ESDI be and how will NATO contribute to ESDI?

This paper has been structured around these six anticipated documents and those additional documents that are believed to be missing, namely:

1. NATO Policy for Crisis Management and Security Sector Reform

2. A Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament

The paper also outlines both the current international dynamics which have allowed security risks to grow in recent years and outlines a strategy for the reduction of risks. This Risk Reduction Strategy is aimed at the systematic, collective reduction and elimination of the use of military force in Europe and between NATO and its neighbors.

Recommendations
NATO should adopt a Risk Reduction Strategy. BASIC has created a series of recommendations for developing such a strategy. The recommendations are broken down into two sections. First, suggested additions and revisions to the current NATO proposals are made. Second, recommendations are provided for additional decisions, which should be taken at the 1999 Washington Summit to produce a comprehensive risk reduction strategy.

Recommendations concerning NATO's six anticipated documents:

• A clear mandate from the UN or the OSCE should accompany any NATO mission other than territorial defense of the Alliance.
  
  

• NATO should undertake a comprehensive review of the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy. That review should lead to a reduction in the significance of nuclear weapons for NATO's security.
  
  

• NATO member states must develop the Alliance's new roles on behalf of the international community. NATO should be prepared to make its resources available to the OSCE and the UN for the future peace support operations in Europe.
  
  

• NATO and Russia must act, as equal partners, to inject the required effort into making the Permanent Joint Council a truly effective forum for consultation and cooperation.
  
  

• NATO must take its Mediterranean dialogue more seriously. It must be extended to include countries such as Libya and Algeria which could pose threats such as WMD, ballistic missile attack or terrorism against NATO nations.
  
  

• NATO should adopt a "pause and think" policy on further enlargement. Priority should be given to pursuing arms reductions, conflict prevention, and EU enlargement and the consequent economic integration of Europe, regardless of the timeframe required.
  
  

• NATO should revisit Partnership for Peace in order to make it a tool for risk reduction in Europe. Bilateral military assistance programs to Partners in the "spirit" of PfP should be better coordinated and monitored by NATO Headquarters. NATO members should refrain from increasing the combat power of its Partners. NATO should pursue its commitment to transparency and agree to make all PfP documents publicly available.
  
  

• There is little or no need for the Defense Capabilities Initiative. NATO nations should be examining arms control and disarmament measures which can reduce the vast arsenals existing in Europe, and simultaneously, reduce any potential risk or threat to the Alliance.
  
  

• While increasing cooperation in the field of defense against WMD attacks, NATO should actively engage in a program of WMD risk reduction and elimination.
  
  

• European states should prepare an autonomous military capacity for European controlled peace support operations. The EU should examine the possibility of renewing its Stability Pact concept,⁵ and applying it to South Eastern Europe and Cyprus.

Recommendations regarding the "missing documents"

• Create new policies for conflict prevention and crisis management, including comprehensive concepts on civilian intervention units and security sector reform. Many more resources will have to be allocated to non-military security means. This will require either additional government spending or a reallocation of resources from military budgets.
  
  

• Develop a comprehensive concept for arms control and disarmament from nuclear arms to small arms. NATO should develop a package of unilateral and multilateral initiatives to promote stability in Europe through disarmament. The Alliance should make a commitment to use its diplomatic strength to support significant reductions in conventional weapons holdings and production, including light weapons and small arms.

These changes are essential for the continued credibility of international bodies including NATO, the UN, and the OSCE, which draw their legitimacy from the security they can provide to their members and their members' citizens. At present these organizations are failing to provide that security.

A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO continued

Introduction | Section 1 | Section 2 | Section 3 | Section 4 | Section 5
Section 6 | Section 7 | Section 8 | Endnotes | Appendices

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