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BASIC RESEARCH REPORT
One Size Fits
All?
Prospects for a Global Convention on
Illicit Trafficking by 2000
Chapter 2: A
Closer Examination of the OAS Prototype (continued)
Lessons Learned
Must Be Applied to Firearms Protocol
Missed opportunities
There are number of
critical omissions in the text of the OAS Convention. Rather than
casting aside elements that may be controversial or technically
challenging, the negotiators of the Firearms Protocol should ensure
that they conclude an agreement which effectively serves both
national and international interests.
The OAS states did not
address the need to ensure the destruction of weaponry. Because OAS
states are not compelled to destroy weapons, there is a danger that
the weapons they seize in the course of carrying out the obligations
set out by the OAS Convention may simply fall back into the hands of
illicit traffickers. The continued recirculation of weapons from one
conflict to another and increasingly from political conflict to
individual criminals is one of the biggest challenges to
international control efforts. Although legal transfers of new
weapons continue to be a major problem, many of the weapons in
circulation are years or even decades old. The most effective and
least expensive way to prevent weapons from re-entering the illicit
market is to destroy all seized weapons immediately.
Those involved in field
operations endorse destruction of weaponry, noting that it is a
simple, common sense policy. As Robert Wall of INTERPOL's Firearms
and Explosives Unit remarked, "It is the only way to ensure
that these weapons are permanently taken out of circulation."34
However, the OAS Convention lacks any provisions whatsoever for the
destruction or safe storage of illicit weapons seized by customs,
law enforcement or other officials. It merely specifies that illegal
weapons will be confiscated and should not be resold to individuals
and businesses.35
Inheriting a US
"drugs and thugs" bias
By accepting the OAS
Convention without question or revision, the Firearms Protocol is in
danger of inheriting a US bias with regard to civilian possession of
weaponry. Given its vocal gun lobby and previous intransigence on
bilateral firearms issues, Washington's sudden embrace of the OAS
Convention came as a surprise. Previously, the United States had
either ignored or quietly refused persistent bilateral efforts to
address light weapons trafficking. However the Mexican-led OAS
proposal apparently struck a positive chord with the Clinton
Administration and the United States was soon among the states
actively promoting the OAS Convention.
While support from
Washington was critical to the agreeing of the OAS Convention, the
US gun lobby and its interpretation of the constitutional
"right to bear arms" had a negative impact on the
negotiations. In particular, the gun lobby's influence is reflected
in the fact that the OAS Convention explicitly states that the
agreement is purely a law enforcement measure and is not intended to
infringe on domestic legislation or to require any legislative
changes "pertaining to firearms ownership, possession, or trade
wholly of a domestic character."36
Although shared regional
concerns form the foundation of the OAS Convention, the agreement
clearly inherited a US bias in its characterization of the
proliferation and unlawful use of light weapons as a "drugs and
thugs" problem. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
described it, light weapons trafficking "is a trade carried out
by profiteers, abetted by corruption, creating a bottomless pit for
rogue militias, criminal empires and bands of thugs."37
Tom Mason, a lobbyist
for the NRA, said that the gun lobby was pleased with the influence
it had on the process. In particular, he pointed to the inclusion of
a paragraph in the preamble to the convention referencing the
"different cultural and historical uses for firearms" and
stating that the convention "is not intended to discourage or
diminish lawful leisure or recreational activities."38
While the gun lobby may
have been satisfied that its lobbying in Washington was ultimately
successful in weakening the OAS agreement, this politically
motivated limitation has already caused a stir in some OAS states.
One Jamaican official commented that although the OAS Convention was
an important achievement, "it had been stymied by US interests.
The NRA [National Rifle Association] is just too powerful."39
Challenges of
Ratification and Implementation
The OAS Convention is open for signature by all OAS member
states and is subject to ratification. It entered into force on 1
July 1998 in accordance with Article XV. To date, Belize, the
Bahamas, El Salvador and Mexico have ratified it.40
With regard to implementation, the next important step is the
creation of a consultative committee tasked with assessing progress
and enhancing regional cooperation. However, six more countries must
ratify the agreement before this process can proceed.
Although a handful of
countries were able to conclude ratification relatively quickly, it
is expected that legislative hurdles, insufficient resources and
limited infrastructure will slow region-wide ratification. In the
majority of OAS states, legislative changes are a necessary
prerequisite to ratification. Because such changes involve lengthy
bureaucratic processes and demand significant resources, they are
time-consuming. For example, although Canada is one of the leading
proponents of the OAS Convention and has more resources at its
disposal than most OAS states, ratification is not expected before
the year 2000 because the inclusion of ammunition and explosives
imposes necessary changes to Canadian legislation. Similarly,
although the OAS Convention was submitted to the Foreign Relations
Committee of the US Senate in June 1998, the matter has yet to be
considered. As one US official commented, "Ratification could
take months, even years."41
Furthermore, in OAS countries such as Venezuela where the military
rather than the police has final jurisdiction over the control of
firearms, ratification may require constitutional changes.42
Cooperation and
harmonization
By placing a premium on cooperation and harmonization, the
success of an OAS-style convention depends on countries with strong
controls reaching out to help other states with the technical and
administrative elements involved in developing a stronger, more
comprehensive system of controls. This obligation also implies the
need for wealthier countries to provide support for capacity
building if they want to see the convention work.
The OAS Convention
depends on strong national structures to ratify, implement and
coordinate policies. In failed or weak states lacking the
bureaucratic structures necessary for proper enforcement,
implementation would be difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, in
states in conflict or in the process of post-conflict
reconstruction, introducing new legislation or institutionalizing
provisions on record keeping, identification and information
exchange would demand a considerable investment of human and
financial resources. Such measures may not be a top priority when
allocating either new or existing funds.
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Prospects
for Curbing Illicit Weapons Trafficking in the Iguazú
Trianglea
Drugs flow
out of Paraguay, via Brazil - often using African couriers -
into Europe, Africa and Asia. In return, Africa and Asia
provide arms, most of which are the stocks left over from
the Cambodian peace operation, the Vietnam war, and the many
UN peace operations in Africa, such as that of Mozambique.b
The area where the
borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet, known as the
"Iguazú triangle", has become a hotbed of illicit
activity, including light weapons trafficking. Although
economic liberalization in the region has eased the movement
of people and goods across borders, these measures may be
inadvertently facilitating illicit trafficking of weapons and
narcotics.c
Fortunately, it appears that the new era of regional
integration embodied by the establishment of the Southern
Common Market (Mercado Commun del Sur or MERCOSUR) may also
provide a forum for developing increased border cooperation
and control efforts.d
Three
Cities, One Problem
In 1995, Brazil reported that 80 percent of the guns
confiscated from mafias in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
entered Brazil illegally through two Paraguayan cities in the
Iguazú triangle. The guns, AR-15 and AK-47 sub-machine guns,
were in the hands of drug smugglers operating in the favelas
of Rio de Janeiro.e
In addition, between July 1994 and April 1995, two Brazilian
companies exported more than 22,000 firearms of various types
to two stores in the Paraguayan city of Pedro Juan Caballero
and the nearby Brazilian city of Ponta Pora. Since the former
has a population of just 30,000, these figures clearly
indicate the existence of a weapons smuggling system.f
Within the 40
square-kilometer area of the Iguazú triangle, each of the
three countries has an airport and city. According to one
Argentine official, "This area harbors over 100
clandestine airstrips that nobody monitors, and at least
60,000 people cross the bridge [between Paraguay and Brazil]
per day without any kind of control."g
Geography, including rivers, adds to the challenges of
controlling smuggling.h
In addition, high crime rates fuel the local demand for light
weapons.
The three main
cities, with different levels of crime and border control, can
be characterized as follows:
-
Ciudad del
Este, Paraguay: a main conduit for illicit weapons and
home to many local and international criminal and
terrorist organizations who are attracted by the city's
thriving black market, lax controls and vast network of
banks that can be used for money laundering.i
Although this city of 250,000 is enjoying an economic
boom, it is plagued by high crime.
-
Foz do Iguazú,
Brazil: an affluent and busy but dangerous trading center
in which many of the 240,000 residents profit from legal
and illegal trade with Paraguay. Although the city police
have ample resources and infrastructure, the city has the
highest homicide rate per capita in Brazil; ninety-five
percent of these murders are committed with a firearm.j
-
Puerto Iguazú,
Argentina: this small city of 23,000 is relatively free of
crime and illicit trafficking. Argentina appears to have
played a lead role in developing better monitoring of
cross-border traffic, maintaining more stringent controls
and enforcing these controls through use of the border
police and coast guard.k
Dynamics
of the Trade
Weapons proliferation in this sub-region differs from
that in other areas of Central and South America weapons where
stocks left over from regional conflicts are the main source
of re-circulating weapons. In Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay,
weapons are often transferred to one country legally and then
re-transferred to other countries in the region by illicit
means.l
In addition, domestic weapons manufacturers are generally not
subject to stringent regulations.
Border patrols are
in place to intercept some of the vast numbers of individual
smugglers, or "ants," who transport illegal goods
across the borders. However, these are generally minor
trafficking operations; major smuggling operations transport
contraband on land or in containers by sea or air.m
A large percentage of foreign goods arrive at the Brazilian
port city of Paranagu , where Paraguay maintains a free
port.n
Yet many of the goods destined for Paraguay are diverted and
never reach their purported destination.
Paraguay tacitly
allows the underground economy to flourish, presumably in
hopes of generating tax revenue. Corruption and a lack of
resources and infrastructure in both Paraguay and Brazil
hamstring what little there is in the way of enforcement,
border control or police presence. As a result, weapons and
other illicit goods are stockpiled in Paraguay, sometimes with
the help of corrupt officials. Most often these goods are
transferred to Brazil, sometimes by way of Argentina, to feed
a booming demand in the major cities.
Impact of
Sub-Regional and Regional Controls
The situation in the Iguazú triangle illustrates the
permeability of borders and the dangers of lax controls and
weak enforcement. If one country fails to control weapons
flows, the whole sub-region will likely feel the effects.
While the OAS agreement has yet to make its impact felt,
observers and states should examine the progress being made by
the MERCOSUR countries at the sub-regional level. In 1994, the
three countries signed the Iguazú Act agreeing to build
cooperative mechanisms and increase information flow. In 1996,
they established a tripartite command designed to improve
border controls and stem illicit cross-border traffic.o
The strength of the Iguazú Act lies in its ability to address
the specific sub-regional dynamics and provide a structure
that fits naturally into existing political relationships.
More recently, at
a summit in Santiago de Chile in April 1998, the Presidents of
the MERCOSUR states agreed to:
-
work
expeditiously towards compliance with the constitutional
proceedings necessary to ratify the OAS Convention; and
-
develop a
joint registration mechanism for firearms, ammunition,
explosives and other related materials.p
The latter formed
the basis of a sub-regional agreement. Utilizing the CICAD
model regulations, the countries established national data
processing centers tasked with ensuring compliance with the
CICAD requirements. Although implementation is underway, the
process may reveal some additional complications. As Eduardo
Trench, a firearms legislation expert from Argentina observed,
"Special attention should be paid to the data-processing
systems because they will become controversial if not adjusted
to a standard system used internationally. For instance, the
UN's weapons classification system is rather complex and
confusing, and it shouldn't be considered a minor subject,
since legal responsibilities will derive from its
accuracy."q
Still in its
infancy, the OAS Convention has not yet had a discernible
effect on illicit trafficking in the Iguazú triangle.
However, it is important to consider the potential impact of
the program. While the Iguazú Act is flexible and relatively
straightforward to implement, the OAS Convention can address
the larger regional dynamics of the trade. However, all of the
MERCOSUR countries have yet to ratify the agreement.
Similarly, the Firearms Protocol would allow states to more
effectively address the unmistakable global aspects of the
trade through cooperative efforts.
a
For an in-depth examination of South American light weapons
proliferation, see Khatchik der Ghoughassian and Leandro
Piquet Carneiro, "Connecting Weapons with Violence: The
South American Experience," Monograph No. 25 (Midrand,
South Africa: Institute for Security Studies) May 1998. Posted
on the Institute for Security Studies web site at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/No.%2025/Contents.html.
b
der Ghoughassian and Carneiro.
c
"Summary Of Proceedings: First International Conference
On Comparative Regional Security", sponsored by the
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Midrand, South Africa,
1-3 July 1997.
d
While this case study addresses illicit trafficking in
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, it should be noted that
MERCOSUR also includes Uruguay; Bolivia and Chile are
associate members. With a population of approximately 200
million, it is the fourth largest trading group in the world.
e
"El tr fico de las armas en la mira," Diario
Popular (Argentina), 12 November 1995 cited in der
Ghoughassian and Carneiro.
f
Data from information provided to police authorities by the
Foreign Trade Department of the Bank of Brazil as cited in der
Ghoughassian and Carneiro.
g
Argentine Interior Minister Carlos Corach quoted in
"Argentina: Tri-Border Security Operation
Discussed," Buenos Aires Ambito Financiero, 9
December 1997 in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-LAT-97-349, 15
December 1997.
h
The Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este and the Brazilian city
of Foz do Iguacú are linked via the Friendship Bridge; the
Tancredo Neves bridge connects Foz do Iguacú and the
Argentinean city of Puerto Iguazú.
i
According to recent figures, eight billion dollars a year - or
more than 20 million dollars a day - of "dirty
money" is laundered through banks and financial
institutions in Ciudad del Este. See "Paraguay: Brazilian
Ambassador Explains Money Laundering Charges," Asuncion
ABC Color, 4 June 1998 in FBIS Daily Report FBIS-LAT-98-155, 4
June 1998.
j
der Ghoughassian and Carneiro.
k
der Ghoughassian and Carneiro.
l
"Summary of Proceedings: First International Conference
on Comparative Regional Security."
m
Franco Iacomini, "Brazil: Tri-Border Illegal Activities
Profiled," Sao Paulo Veja (Internet version), 8
April 1998 in FBIS Daily Report FBIS-LAT-98-103, 13 April
1998.
n
Paraguay retains the right to maintain this free port through
a treaty signed in 1940.
o
The command, composed of the international security ministries
in each state, maintains a headquarters that rotates among the
cities every four months. See "Summary of
Proceedings."
p
Tom McDonald correspondence with Dr. Eduardo Trench, firearms
legislation expert, Argentina, 12 February 1999.
q
Tom McDonald correspondence with Dr. Eduardo Trench, firearms
legislation expert, Argentina, 12 February 1999.
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In order to deal with
new requirements imposed by the OAS Convention, states must also
build the capacity of police and customs, a process that will likely
require a significant influx of technical and financial assistance.
To date, the provision of training and technical assistance has been
carried out in an ad hoc and piecemeal manner. For example, although
both Canada and the United States have undertaken efforts to provide
police and customs training, these activities remain uncoordinated.
Communication and coordination regarding such endeavors must be
carried out at the regional level to ensure that all relevant
parties - from law enforcement to lawmakers - in all of the involved
states are working in concert.
Put Your Money
Where Your Mouth Is
Although an agreement may set out lofty goals, resource
constraints can hamper implementation. In the case of the OAS
Convention, it appears that no comprehensive consideration of its
funding implications has taken place. Similarly, there is no system
in place to ensure that participating states have the capacity to
implement and enforce the agreement. Resource constraints are
already evident, both at the level of individual states and within
the OAS institution itself. In particular, the OAS Secretariat
clearly lacks the human and financial resources required to monitor
progress, anticipate obstacles and support implementation. Although
it was expected that funds would be earmarked for implementation of
the OAS Convention, these allocations were overtaken by the more
immediate financial crisis wrought by Hurricane Mitch. While the
allocation of funds to such an unexpected crisis is both appropriate
and understandable, the situation highlights the institution's
delicate financial balance. These financial limitations do not allow
the OAS the flexibility to respond to emergencies while also
carrying out agreed commitments.
These funding
limitations are not unique to the OAS; in fact, greater problems can
be expected in organizations that have even fewer resources, such as
the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Therefore, just as with any
new policy or procedure, it is critical that governments address the
financial implications of their commitments in the course of
negotiations. Failure to develop a concrete strategy for providing
the resources necessary for effective implementation renders such
agreements virtually meaningless. If states choose to disregard
critical resource issues during negotiations, the sincerity of their
commitment to the agreement's objectives must be called into
question.
Go
to Chapter 3
Executive
Summary | Chapter
1 | Chapter
2 | Chapter
3
Chapter
4 | Conclusion
| Endnotes
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