BASIC Publications

BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

One Size Fits All?
Prospects for a Global Convention on
Illicit Trafficking by 2000

Chapter 1: Governments Jump into Action

All of us whose nations sell such weapons, or through whose nations the traffic flows, bear some responsibility for turning a blind eye to the destruction they cause. And all of us have it in our power to do something in response.
Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State⁴

The last few years have seen an upsurge of interest in the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.⁵ Until recently, the media and national governments overlooked the problems associated with light weapons proliferation. UN diplomats, humanitarian aid workers and arms control advocates persistently highlighted the devastation and instability being wrought by these weapons but their concerns fell largely on deaf ears. In a few cases, states grappling with crime and drug problems were beginning to make connections between these concerns and the unchecked proliferation of weapons.

However, in the wake of the "Ottawa Treaty" banning anti-personnel landmines, governments began to concentrate on light weapons proliferation.⁶ Some sought to build upon its success, others feared being overrun by another global campaign. In the space of just a few years, international attention to the issue has grown so rapidly that diplomatic speeches and policy statements now commonly include references to the devastating impact of light weapons on conflicts and civil society. Many governments have clearly incorporated "light weapons" and "small arms" into their lexicons; more importantly, some have embraced control of light weapons as a crucial element in their political agendas.

One Piece in an Intricate Puzzle
While the wave of governmental enthusiasm and the corresponding mushrooming of control initiatives are a welcome development, the scope and focus of governmental action on the issue remains in question. Of particular concern is that governmental efforts focus predominantly on illicit weapons trafficking. These controls fail to address the part of the equation government transfers to both state and non-state actors play and consequently they are inadequate. While illegal transfers play a significant role in light weapons proliferation, transfers undertaken wholly or in part through authorized channels continue to be the main problem. In addition, evidence clearly shows that vast numbers of weapons transferred by authorized means end up being transferred or used illegally, be it days, years or decades after the original transfer.⁷

The new battle against the evils of illicit weapons trafficking has won support from producer, supplier and recipient states alike. Although supporters of the OAS Convention and draft Firearms Protocol assert that these efforts will have a profound effect on criminal violence, states conveniently gloss over the fact that these mechanisms do not address state-to-state or state-to-non-state transfers. As a result, governments conveniently avoid the question of their own responsibility for the production, supply, demand, use and misuse of these weapons.

Global Trend Develops
As governments have started acknowledging the illicit weapons trafficking problem, a number of regional and international groupings have begun to take action. For example, significant progress has been undertaken in the European Union. In June 1997, member states of the European Union signed the "EU Programme on Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms." Whereas light weapons trafficking previously had been viewed solely in the context of arms control, this agreement linked weapons trafficking to conflict and long-term development.⁸ The mandate of the EU Programme is far-reaching: it covers efforts to combat trafficking from and through EU territories, provides assistance for capacity-building to countries affected by light weapons and establishes measures to reduce the number of weapons in circulation.

In June 1998, the EU matched its controls on illegal flows with stricter controls on legal transfers by agreeing an "EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports."⁹ The EU added more practical measures to its work on light weapons by developing a Joint Action on Small Arms. This December 1998 agreement commits EU states to provide financial and technical assistance for efforts to combat trafficking. These include national controls (such as efficient border and customs mechanisms), regional and international cooperation and enhanced information exchange.¹⁰

Weapons Trafficking on the US-Mexico Border

The 2000-mile border between Mexico and the United States is a well-documented corridor for illicit arms smuggling.^a These weapons flows both increase crime and the use of guns in crime. Official reports and anecdotal evidence indicate that border patrols and law enforcement officials on both sides of the border are increasingly being put at risk by the proliferation of light weapons in their area of jurisdiction. Innocent civilians are also losing their lives as victims of this deadly gun violence.

According to statistics from Mexico's Foreign Relations Ministry, officials seized over 1,000 weapons per month from illicit trafficking operations between 1995 and mid-1997; up to 40 percent of those weapons were reportedly linked to drug-trafficking cartels.^b As a source from the Mexican Attorney General's office observed, "What we've seen is that all the drug cartels are involved in the importation of illegal arms. It is obvious that these criminal organizations arm themselves with smuggled guns to carry out their wars. And once these guns arrive, they filter into regular street-crime gangs."^c

Much of the cross-border light weapons trade is connected to the larger illegal operations involving narcotics smuggling and illegal immigration. Their arsenals are now being supplemented with grenade launchers as well as semi- and fully automatic weapons. Particular instances have involved AK-47 and AR-15 automatic rifles, the latter being a "civilian" version of the US Army's M-16 assault weapon.

In spite of harsh new Mexican laws such as the introduction of penalties of up to 30 years for the smuggling of small amounts of ammunition, thousands of weapons are purchased or stolen in the United States each year and then transported across the border to Mexico. The most common method of smuggling is the "hormiga" or "ant" run, in which very small quantities of weapons are bought by "straw" buyers in the United States and taken across the border by individuals on foot or by car.^d However, US authorities have been reluctant to acknowledge any direct linkages between the easy availability of weapons in the United States and the criminal use of firearms south of the border.^e

Mexico Clamps Down
While the Mexican government found the Clinton Administration virtually unresponsive to its requests for bilateral gun control measures, both Mexican and US officials are optimistic that the OAS Convention may pave the way for future progress in this area.^f A strong leader in the OAS negotiations, Mexico also boosted its credibility and visibility of weapons control by pursuing concrete measures on the domestic front. Mexican authorities are keen to show that they are aware of the connections between weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and rising crime and are clamping down on anyone bringing weapons across the border. According to Juan Manuel Rodriguez Cid, Head of Mexican Customs, "Our weapons law is a severe one. The reason is because there are lots of gangs who commit crimes with guns. Every arm that passes illegally can get into the hands of delinquents."^g

As a result of Mexico's strengthened conviction and new legislative measures, more than a hundred US citizens who were either unaware of Mexican gun control laws or did not realize that they were carrying weapons in their vehicles have been detained and many have been handed stiff sentences.^h

^a See: Howard LaFranchi, "Mexicans Too Have a Problem Border: Awash in US Guns", Christian Science Monitor, April 11,1997, p. 7; Lumpe, "The US Arms Both Sides of Mexico's Drug War", Covert Action Quarterly, Number 61, Summer 1997, pp. 39-46; "Mexico Asks US to Track Guns Being Imported by Drug Cartels", Washington Post, 5 November 1996, p. A13.

^b "Controlling Small Arms at Home and Abroad," Arms Sales Monitor, Federation of American Scientists, November 1998.

^c "Mexico Takes Aim at Illegal Guns from US," Los Angeles Times, September 6, 1998.

^d George Kourous and Lora Lumpe, "Loose US Laws Fuel Cross-Border Smuggling," Borderlines, No. 41, December 1997.

^e As the Mexican ambassador to Washington Jesús Silva-Herzog described it, "When we talk about drugs they say it [the problem] is supply, and when we bring up arms they respond that it's the demand. In other words, we can never win." LaFranchi, p. 7.

^f Geraldine O'Callaghan interviews with Mexican and US officials, October 1998 and February/April 1999.

^g "Americans Caught in Hairs of Mexico's Gun Laws", Holland Sentinel, 8 October 1998.

^h "Mexico Takes Aim at Illegal Guns from US," Los Angeles Times, September 6, 1998.

OAS in the Spotlight
Although efforts such as the EU Programme are equally significant, many governments have singled out the OAS initiative for praise, endorsing it and promoting it as the model for an international instrument.¹¹ The OAS Convention is generally regarded as a remarkable success story and has been described as "pathbreaking," "groundbreaking" and "unprecedented." In many respects, this praise is merited. On a practical level, the OAS Convention is the only legally binding agreement on controlling light weapons in existence. At the political level, the fact that the agreement covers both supplier and recipient states adds a great deal of credibility.

The OAS Convention is now influencing policy debates and decisions beyond the Americas. With strong leadership from Canada, Mexico and the United States, the so-called "OAS approach" to illicit trafficking based on common regional concerns of narcotics trafficking and organized crime has gained widespread support in other fora, including the Group of Eight Industrialized States (G-8) and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.¹² Efforts to globalize the OAS Convention developed rapidly. In the latter half of 1998 an international consensus emerged that it should be used as the basis for a legally binding international instrument. As a result, negotiations are now underway to develop the Firearms Protocol to be attached to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime expected to be signed in 2000.

While the OAS Convention is a useful model with some far-reaching controls, it confines the international response to illicit weapons trafficking to selective law enforcement measures and more rigorous implementation of existing export and import controls. Furthermore, it addresses only commercial sales and therefore only private misuse of weapons as opposed to government transfers, violations, abuses and crimes. Thus the OAS Convention fails to scrutinize governments who transfer and use weapons to commit acts of terror and human rights abuses that are deemed illegal according to international human rights and humanitarian law.

Government Motives Questioned
Widespread enthusiasm for controls on illicit transfers often eclipses the reality that the convention approach is in no way a panacea for the problems posed by light weapons proliferation. The OAS Convention focuses solely on illicit weapons, placing the blame for endangering security and human lives wholly on those weapons manufactured or transferred without government authority. It is the illicit nature of these light weapons transfers - not the weapons themselves - that are seen as a shared regional problem.

This seemingly technocratic approach to light weapons control masks a more sophisticated political agenda. Dominant Western governments are fully aware that the complexities of controlling weapons transfers require a more far-reaching approach. They understand that the realities of effective controls demand changes in attitudes, as well as procedures and systems. They also realize that, as a result, this approach is likely to impinge on their own traditional freedom to arm whoever they want, whenever and wherever they wish.

Go to Chapter 2

.
Back to Weapons Trade home page