BASIC Publications

BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Number 99.2, April 1999

One Size Fits All?
Prospects for a Global Convention on
Illicit Trafficking by 2000

By Susannah L. Dyer and Geraldine O'Callaghan
with research assistance from Tom McDonald

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Executive Summary

Chapter 1: Governments Jump into Action

Chapter 2: A Closer Examination of the OAS Prototype

Chapter 3: Developing the UN Firearms Protocol

Chapter 4: Recommendations

Conclusion

About the authors, acknowledgements

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Endnotes

Executive Summary
The campaign to control small arms and light weapons has gone global. Over the past twelve months, officials in Vienna have been busy hammering out the "Draft Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials" (hereafter referred to as the Firearms Protocol). If agreed, the Firearms Protocol will be the first global measure regulating international transfers of small arms and light weapons.¹

The origins of this historic international effort are rooted in an existing regional agreement. In November 1997, the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed the "Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials" (hereafter referred to as the OAS Convention).² In just over a year, it was transformed from a drawing board concept into a regionally agreed convention.

Soon after its signing in November 1997, the OAS Convention was pushed to center stage as states both inside and outside the hemisphere began consultations on using it as a prototype for global control. The agreement is now being used as the template for the Firearms Protocol. This global agreement is being negotiated under the auspices of the UN Crime Commission as part of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) (hereafter referred to as the Crime Convention). It is expected that the Crime Convention will be signed in the year 2000.

Many governments are eager to conclude agreement at the earliest possible date. This "full speed ahead" approach may result in new proposals being overlooked and preclude changes of course necessitated by problems emerging in the untested "template" of the OAS convention.

Although leading advocates such as Canada and the United States champion the OAS model internationally, they have yet to ratify or implement the OAS agreement domestically. As one official from the US State Department observed, OAS countries such as the United States and Canada will lack the "moral authority" to push for globalization of the OAS Convention if they are unable to demonstrate that they are making progress on its implementation at the regional level.³

Objectives of This Report
With the unusual prospect of rapid diplomatic action it is critical that governments and NGOs are aware of the policy choices that need to be made. This report is designed to:

assess the potential strengths and weaknesses that the Firearms Protocol will inherit as the result of using the regional OAS Convention as a model for a global instrument; (see pp. 11-16 ) and
propose practical recommendations to increase the relevance and effectiveness of the Firearms Protocol in the international arena. (see pp. 29-36)

OAS Convention as Prototype
The introduction highlights the problems posed by illicit trafficking and provides some historical background on current control efforts. The second chapter attempts to shed some light on the strengths and weaknesses of the OAS Convention. Such analysis is necessary to understand how it works and gauge its suitability as the prototype for an international instrument.

The OAS Convention's most positive elements include:

inclusion of both supplier and recipient states; (see p. 8)
legally binding status, though likely not for the model regulations; (see pp. 10-11) and
broad definitions of firearms and explosives and model regulations. (see p. 11)

However, by following the conceptual framework of the OAS Convention, the Firearms Protocol is also in danger of inheriting its main weaknesses, which include:

a narrow scope restricted to commercial transfers, leaving government transfers untouched although it is well-known that government involvement in arming non-state actors in other states and in authorizing transfers deemed illegal by international law is central to the problems under discussion; (see p. 11)
limited mandate focusing on crime control while ignoring the causal relationship between illicit trafficking, organized crime and armed conflict; (see pp. 12-13) and
failure to accord legally binding status to the important practical measures outlined in the model regulations. (see p. 12)

The findings in this section also illustrate that although the principles of the OAS Convention appear strong on paper, the implementation and ratification of particular elements such as weapons marking are problematic.

Firearms Protocol Negotiations
The third chapter of the report analyzes the key issues of debate in the current Firearms Protocol negotiations. Inspired by the OAS Convention, the Firearms Protocol reflects many of the same positive elements. In particular, it emphasizes:

common standards for the import, export and in-transit international movements of firearms;
international cooperation and information exchange on issues such as firearms identification, tracking and tracing; and
an international regime for the management of commercial shipments of firearms.

However, in a number of areas of the draft text, governments - both individually and collectively - have chosen to adopt narrow interpretations of the scope of the Firearms Protocol, thereby missing the chance to make it most effective. The report argues that the draft Firearms Protocol:

draws misleading distinctions between legal and illegal transfers so as to preclude its application to transfers deemed to be in contravention of international law; (see pp. 18-19)
fails to address state-to-state transfers, providing governments with an "escape clause" for avoiding the question of their own responsibility for the production, supply, demand, use and misuse of these weapons; (see p. 19)
embraces the "drugs and thugs" bias inherited from the OAS Convention, thereby disregarding the critical conflict and development aspects of light weapons proliferation; (see p. 18) and
makes no reference to destruction or safe storage of weapons. (see pp. 22-23)

Policy Recommendations
The fourth chapter of the report offers detailed recommendations for the revision, elaboration and implementation of the Firearms Protocol. Divided into four categories, these policy prescriptions include:

changes and additions to existing draft Firearms Protocol text; (see pp. 29-32)
associated measures to be pursued in concert with the Firearms Protocol; (see p. 33) and
cooperative efforts, including making sufficient funds available to facilitate effective implementation of the agreed commitments. (see pp. 34-36)

BASIC calls on governments to, at a minimum:

pursue parallel controls on legal supplies through measures such as national, regional and international codes of conduct; (see p. 33)
broaden the Firearms Protocol's scope to address state-to-state transfers; (see p. 30)
adopt the UN definition of illicit trafficking which incorporates both domestic legislation and international law; (see pp. 29-30)
incorporate model regulations as part of the legally binding mechanism; (see p. 31)
support proposed clauses to regulate arms brokers and shipping agents; (see p. 32)
adopt a comprehensive definition of firearms and extend it to include explosives; (see p. 29)
extend the context of the agreement to address conflict; (see pp. 30-31) and
include a detailed action plan for generating adequate funds necessary for full and effective implementation of the Firearms Protocol's commitments. (see pp. 35-36)

Go to Chapter 1

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