BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Y2K and Nuclear Arsenals:
A Final Report

(Part 5)

Conclusion: Alternative Options for
Alleviating the Dangers of Y2K

In addition to the shared warning facility, the simplest options for reducing Y2K risks would bolster existing Russian remediation efforts. They include:

• Providing funds for the salaries of Russian computer scientists. Russia is believed to have a substantial pool of computing expertise, but simply lacks the finances to use their own talent effectively.
  
  
• Providing, free of charge, the most recent and effective versions of Y2K software assessment and repair tools.
  
  
• Providing additional advice on Y2K repair procedures and (more importantly) management techniques, to improve the efficiency and coherence of Russia’s program.
  
  
• Providing a combination of two or more of the above options. Without some US financial aid, it is doubtful that the other options would prove particularly effective.

Senator Richard Lugar advocated these very steps in a late September hearing on Y2K and Russia held by the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Problem. Lugar argued "In my opinion, an 'insurance policy' in this area is a good investment... The cost of efforts to address potential threats today will be miniscule in comparison to the costs of responding to a tragedy should an incident occur."⁹⁰

Such alternatives could build upon other programs that have already been instituted by both the US and other international organizations. For instance, the World Bank’s permanent Moscow representative has argued that Russia could benefit from World Bank experiences in solving its own Y2K glitches. To this end, the Bank held its second international Y2K conference at a hotel in Moscow, co-sponsored by the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Communications and Informatization (Goskomsvyaz).⁹¹ Also with the help of the World Bank, a network of 73 Competence Centers has been created in Russia for the training of technical specialists. These Centers coordinate Y2K efforts on a nationwide basis. However, it is unclear whether any of the World Bank financial assistance is geared towards helping the Russian Ministry responsible for nuclear weapons operations.

In a similar vein, the US has given $1.5 million to pay for programming to correct computers that are used to operate nuclear power plants and other hazardous substance facilities in Russia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. The money is being administered by the International Scientific and Technological Center (ISTC), an inter-governmental consortium created by the US, Japan, European Union and other countries with geographic proximity to Russia. The funds are being used for equipment, salaries for scientific and technical experts, and the distribution of urgent information through Y2K crisis centers. The program was launched by ISTC following consultation with some of the aforementioned Competence Centers in the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Power, the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and the Ministry of Extreme Situations.⁹² Conceivably, programs similar to those under the ISTC could be created for assistance in fixing Russia’s 74 vulnerable early warning facilities.

That said, Russia has repeatedly stated that it does not need technical help or financial aid for repairing systems involved in nuclear operations, and US officials have made it clear that no official Russian requests have been received or granted.⁹³ However, while Russia has consistently denied that Western help is necessary, these official statements are always accompanied by vague remarks that leave open the alternative of Western aid. For instance, in an interview between BASIC and the Russian delegation to the United Nations 1999 Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting, one official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Relations stated that "outside funds are not necessary, but if assistance is given by the West, it would not be refused."⁹⁴

There are, however, two fundamental weaknesses with the alternative of funding Russian Y2K programs and providing technical assistance. First, there is very little time for Russia to plan and implement the necessary "mission level" tests of system interfaces in nuclear operations. Given the complex nature of date dependencies in old software code, relying on Y2K repairs without testing and validation carries substantial risks. Second, most experienced computer scientists admit that dedicated testing programs will only reveal the presence of errors, not their complete absence. Moreover, computer failures rarely repeat themselves in exactly the same form, with the result that none of the documented Cold War near-accidents could have been predicted beforehand by the systems' designers. While the US can and should offer technical and monetary assistance as soon as possible (assuming Russian officials decide they want help), such measures should not be touted as a cure-all.

Potential assistance for Russian Y2K remediation programs and the plans for a shared early warning facility do nothing to address the more basic problem of US-Russian "hair trigger" force postures. Roughly 4,400 warheads in Russian and US arsenals are in "ready to launch" mode. For the US, the three required steps for launch can be implemented in one minute or less. Also, the US Strategic Command continues to emphasize offensive military options that incorporate quickly executed first strikes against the enemy's nuclear arsenal. Given that Russia's nuclear weapons are more vulnerable to first strikes (because the majority of their force consists of easier-to-target, stationary ICBMs), Russia has been forced to put increased emphasis on both first-use of nuclear weapons and quick retaliation in a crisis.

A more comprehensive and less risky means of avoiding accidents would be to reduce Russian and American dependence on continuous early warning information and 15-20 minute decision schedules for nuclear launch. This would require procedures to alleviate the threat of nuclear surprise attacks by both sides, because the fear of preemption of forces and decapitation of leadership circles in a "bolt from the blue" drives current alert rates. To engender trust, all attempts to slow the operational tempo or decrease the first-strike lethality of nuclear arsenals would have to be mutually-verifiable.

Unfortunately, there is very little time for a committed bilateral arms control program that would include dramatic de-alerting options. Russian Presidential action is constrained by lingering distrust over Kosovo and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a guarantor of Great Power status. Nonetheless, this does not mean that we are stuck with the weak options that the US has favored thus far. The US currently has a strong preponderance in precision-strike warheads, including an unchallenged Trident force operating stealthily beneath the ocean surface (unlike Russia, whose submarines are rusting in dock). Also, US systems and command chains are not crumbling due to economic shortfalls (as in Russia). The US therefore is dealing with Russia from a position of strength and can afford to make compromises for safety-related reasons without at the same time undermining the need for a credible retaliatory option. Unilateral measures could be undertaken in the short term that would increase security and still leave the US with an unquestioned advantage in strategic arms. Representative policy options include:

• Withdrawing forward-deployed Tridents from the North Atlantic and putting all Tridents on "modified alert." Currently, several Trident submarines are stationed close to Russian borders and are on "high alert" status, so that missiles can be launched almost as quickly as US ICBMs (within 10 minutes or less). It is these offensive Trident missile attacks that Russian early warning satellites cannot detect, and which could hit key Russian leadership and weapons sites within 15 minutes. Stationing Tridents farther away (for instance, in the Southern Hemisphere) and lengthening launch procedures would dramatically reduce Russian incentives for streamlining their own launch procedures. It would also help ensure that the main threat to Russia comes from US ICBMs, for which Russia has relatively better satellite and radar coverage, and which have 10 minutes more flight time to Russian targets.
  
  
• Removing to storage all MX/Peacekeeper warheads, which are geared towards preempting Russian retaliatory capabilities and destroying deep leadership bunkers. As with the previous option, this alternative would reduce incentives for cutting corners on launch authorization procedures, since it would give Russians much higher confidence in their ability to retaliate after a US first strike. (A similar step would be to leave warheads in place but cut the electronic connections between regional LCCs and the deployed MX missiles.)

Although these various measures would decrease the US ability to carry out all counterforce attack options outlined in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), it should be pointed out that providing Russians with continuous data on US launch activity is functionally equivalent, if the US were to faithfully supply such data even during extremely tense relations. In fact, there is an acute contradiction in policy aims embodied in the currently-favored option of sharing warning data. On the one hand, the US plans to gear its forces towards preemption of Russian targets by accurate first strikes; on the other hand, the US plans to undermine its ability to execute these selfsame offensive strike plans by telling the Russians when an attack is taking place. Presumably, the US could choose to withdraw all information during a heated crisis in order to preserve the integrity of SIOP attack options, but Russian fore-knowledge that the US could (and would) withdraw such information during a period of mistrust basically renders useless the proposal for data sharing. The above alternative options would simply end this paradox in US cooperative plans by rigorously instituting procedures that could not be selectively reversed by National Command Authorities at moments of their own choosing.

There is one last paradox in official STRATCOM policy that bears scrutiny. Many officials in both the US and Russia have downplayed the significance of Y2K for safety of daily nuclear operations. This minimization of the problem is not based on a belief that 100% of all Y2K problems have been found and corrected in both US and Russian systems. Officials still openly worry about screen blackouts, communications outages, and faulty early warning data.

Rather, it stems from the "common sense" belief that neither side will act on erroneous, incomplete, or ambiguous information, and also that neither side will infer the presence of nuclear detonations if Y2K errors cause the partial blackout of telecommunications networks for command posts and launch sites. According to this argument, the end of the Cold War will prominently figure in decision-maker’s calculations, as will the a priori expectation that Y2K could indeed cause information-based errors of various sorts. The ultimate result is that human operators will have a near-automatic, gut-level dismissal of any positive identification of attack for either side. Putting these vague intuitive thoughts into a coherent logical form, it is hypothesized that the data outputs of C4I systems will be believed if there is no electronic indication of a nuclear attack, but that these self-same systems will be seriously doubted if there is positive indication of an attack, however large or small that indication may be.

At the least, this mindset questions the entire relevance of launch-on-warning and the continuation of US-Russian dependence on early warning information systems in the post-Cold War world. If evidence of enemy launch will be largely ignored or suspected as false by the very people responsible for alerting the political leadership in both Russia and the US, what is the use of keeping weapons in a ready-to-launch mode? What is the utility of continued reliance on complex and expensive early warning sensors and supporting software systems? These questions need to be seriously addressed in the future by policymakers, whether or not Y2K ends up being anything more than a proverbial blip on the nuclear radar screen.

_________________

Endnotes

¹ Lt. Ellen Rasmussen, 1st Lieutenant, 5th Bomb Wing Public Affairs, “Minuteman weapons system passes Y2K operational evaluation,” Airforce Printed News (AFPN),  25 May, 1999.

²Theodore Postol, Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  Briefing Slides: The Nuclear Danger from Shortfalls in the Capabilities of Russian Early Warning Systems, presented at the Carnegie Endowment (Washington, DC), 26 February 1999.

³Colonel R. F. Smith, Vice Director of NORAD Combat Operations, “Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee - Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,” Briefing Slides on Thin Line Systems, Hearing: Year 2000 Threats to National Security, 24 February 1999. 

⁴John C. Toomay, “Warning and Assessment Sensors,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).

⁵There is also an alternate command post to carry out the functions of NORAD if Cheyenne Mountain is taken out in a first strike, as well as multiple smaller “forward” users of NORAD information that exist outside of both STRATCOM and the NMCC.  However, for brevity’s sake, these posts are left out of the present analysis.  This exclusion does not affect any of the arguments made in following sections. 

⁶John Pike, “Cheyenne Mountain Complex,” Federation of American Scientists, Updated 28 April, 1998, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/cmc.htm

⁷Walter Slocombe, “Pre-Planned Operations,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 121-141; Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 185-195. 

⁸Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 231-238.

⁹Bruce Blair, op cit., p. 189.

¹⁰General Accounting Office Accounting and Information Management Division (GAO AIMD), Attack Warning: Status of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program (Letter Report), GAO/AIMD-94-175, 1 September 1994.

¹¹Bernard Hickey, “Warning: Solar Flares May Cause More Havoc Than Y2K,”Reuters, March 1999.

¹²Satellite-based teleconferencing between these three command posts could also be shut down, although there do exist less vulnerable ground-based communications nodes within the continental United States to provide redundancy in command connections if satellite connections are faulty.

¹³Michael Kraig, Executive Summary, The Bug in the Bomb: the Year 2000 Problem and Nuclear Weapons, November 1998, p. 5. 

¹⁴Chief of Naval Operations, “Navy Support to Unified CINC Y2K Operational Evaluations,” Unclassified Memorandum N03120N09B, Department of the Navy (DON).

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), US Department of Defense (US DoD), 9th Quarterly Report to the OMB, 14 May, 1999, p. 26.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 2.  

¹⁸Pamela Hess, “Pentagon Pads Y2K Management Team with Six New Directors,” Defense Information and Electronics Report, Vol. 3 No. 46, 20 November 1998, pp. 1 and 8. 

¹⁹Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, DoD News Briefing, 14 January 1999, 1:30 p.m.

²⁰Staff Sgt. Beverly F. Isik, Standard Systems Group Public Affairs, “Y2K assistance: call the Air Force 'Fusion Center',” Air Force Print News, 25 June, 1999.

²¹9th Quarterly Report, op cit., p. 9.

²²Ibid., p. 21.  

²³Lt. Col. Warren Patterson, Chief of Operational Evaluations Branch, Joint Staff Year 2000 Task Force, DoD News Briefing (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 14 January, 1999);  John Donnelly (editor), interview with Brigadier General Robert Behler, US Air Force, “Nuclear Warriors Take on New Foe: Y2K,” Defense Week, 4 January, 1999; Colonel R. F. Smith, op cit.

²⁴John Donnelly, Ibid.  Additional evidence showing that the CMU passed the repair or “renovation” stage of the Y2K process in time for these integrated tests can be found in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) 7th Quarterly Report to OMB, Appendix G, 17 November 1998.

²⁵Director, DoD Operational Test and Evaluations Branch (DOT&E), “Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade (CMU),” FY 1998 Annual Report to Congress.

²⁶Lt. Col. William Patterson, op cit.; John Donnelly, op cit.; Col. R. F. Smith, op cit.

²⁷9th Quarterly Report, op cit., p. 1; United States Information Agency (USIA), “Text: Pentagon Release on Defense Department Y2K Compliance (Y2K problem being treated as a military readiness issue), USIS Washington File, 23 July, 1999.  

²⁸Colonel R. F. Smith, op cit.

²⁹Chief of Naval Operations, op cit.

³⁰Zachary Seldon, “Bracing for Impact: The National Security Consequences of the Y2K Problem,” BENS: Special Report, (Washington, DC: Business Executives for National Security, February 1999), pp. 3-4.

³¹Brigadier General Gary A. Ambrose, Director of Air Force Year 2000 Office,  “Commentary: Y2K preparations still on track,” Air Force Print News, 30 June, 1999.

³² Ibid; see also 9th Quarterly Report, op cit., p. 9.

³³9th Quarterly Report, op cit., p. 25; see also Appendix N, “Systems Implemented after March 31, 1999”, 8^th Quarterly Report to OMB, 19 February 1999.

³⁴Toomay, op cit.; Charles P. Vick, Sara D. Berman, and Christina Lindborg (1997 Scoville Fellow, FAS), “Nuclear Detection System,” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/ program/masint/nds.htm. Updated by John Pike, 20 April 1997. 

³⁵ Cmdr. Dave Veatch, Director for Submarine Combat Systems Engineering, Team Submarine (SEA 92C), “First two Navy submarines demonstrate Y2K compliance ,” Navy News Service,  10 February 1999.

³⁶George Robertson, Secretary of State, United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MOD), “Reply to Official Report cols 712-713, Alan Simpson Esq MP," Hansard, House of Commons, London, 16 December 1998. 

³⁷Director, Operational Tests and Evaluations (DOT&E), “The  Submarine Exterior Communications System (SubECS),” FY 1998 Report to Congress.

³⁸ Ashton B. Carter, “Communications Technologies and Vulnerabilities,” in Carter, John Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, ed., Managing Nuclear Operations, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987); Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 270-71.  According to Blair, Trident LF/VLF antennas can be up to 2000 feet in length, although at least 200 feet must skim the surface in order for reliable reception of shore-based or air-based transmissions.  Given the rigidity of the antenna (it does not float in a straight vertical position), this latter requirement severely limits the depth that can be achieved by SSBNs that are receiving in LF/VLF modes. 

³⁹ Ibid; Department of Navy Space Warfare Directorate (DON SPAWAR), “Appendix A: Shipboard Communications Equipment” Submarine Communications Master Plan, December 1995.  The entire Master Plan can be found on the Federation of American Scientists website, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/scmp/index.html.

⁴⁰ DON SPAWAR, Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid, “Appendix B: Submarine Communications Shore Infrastructure.”

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ John C. Toomay, op cit.; Bruce Blair, 1985, op cit., pp. 198-99 and 268. 

⁴⁴ John Pike, “E-6A Mercury (TACAMO),” Federation of American Scientists, 8 March 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/e-6.htm;  John Pike, “Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN),” Federation of American Scientists, 29 April 1998, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/meecn.htm; Bruce Blair, 1985, op cit., pp. 187 and 265. 

⁴⁵ Submarine Communications Master Plan, Appendix B, op cit.

⁴⁶ Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), 7th Quarterly Report to OMB, “Appendix I: Systems Implementing after March 1999,” 17 November 1998.

⁴⁷ 9th Quarterly Report, “Appendix B,” op cit.

⁴⁸ DON SPAWAR, “Shore to Ship Communications Systems,” Defense FY 1999 Appropriations, Research and Development Testing and Evaluation Budget Item Justification Sheet (RDT&N), Exhibit R-2, Unclassified, Project Number x1083, February 1998; DON SPAWAR, “EHL-U Programmable Embeddable Information Systems Security Produce (INFOSEC PEIP),” Project No. 33401N, updated 22 June 1999; DOT&E, op cit.

⁴⁹ 7^th Quarterly Report, Appendix I, op cit.

⁵⁰ Submarine Communications Master Plan, Appendix A, op cit.; Director, Operational Tests and Evaluation (DOT&E), “UHF Follow-on (UFO) Satellite System” FY 1998 Report to Congress; Blair, 1985, op cit., pp. 187 and 201-203; Ashton Carter, op cit. 

⁵¹ Submarine Communications Master Plan, Ibid.

⁵² DOT&E, “UHF Follow-on (UFO)” op cit.

⁵³ 7th and 8th Quarterly Reports, op cit.;  9th Quarterly Report, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁴ Bruce Blair, 1985, op cit., p. 187.  

⁵⁵ Ashton B. Carter, op cit. p. 251.  

⁵⁶ 9th Quarterly Report, op cit., p. 10.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 27.  

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

⁶⁰Ibid., “Appendix B,” p. 29.

⁶¹ Richard Lardner, “Pentagon Says Y2K Remediation Costs Have Increased by $600 Million,” Inside the Pentagon, 3 December 1998, vol. 14 no. 48, p. 17. 

⁶² Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Year 2000 Project Office, “COTS-GOTS Year 2000 Compliance Research: Products Declared Not Compliant by Vendors,” updated 26 July 1999,   http://www.cnoy2k.navy. mil/ny2k/document/cotsgots/no.htm.  For the CNO Y2K homepage, go to http://www.cnoy2k.navy.mil/ ny2k/ny2k.htm.

⁶³ DISA and JITC Networks, Transmissions, and Integration Division Strategic Switching Lab Homepage, updated 21 January 1999, http://jitc.fhu.disa.mil/it/ssl.htm.

⁶⁴ Bulletin News Network (BNN) "Frontrunner," Washington News, 4 February 1999.   Originally taken from the Associated Press Wire Service by BNN.

⁶⁵ Martin Nesirky, "Russian Military Upbeat on Y2K but not Complacent," Reuters Wire Service 3 February 1999.

⁶⁶ “Russians Sanguine about Y2K,” Reuters, 2 March 1999.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Itar-Tass News Agency, “Russia’s Nuclear Control not Prone to 2000 Bug Official,” Moscow, 3 March 1999.  

⁷⁰ Eugenia Volynkina, “Russia Estimates Y2K Fix Costs,” InfoArt Online News, Moscow, Russia, 4 February 1999.

⁷¹ Reuters, 2 March 1999, op cit.

⁷² Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, "Written Statement for the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem," National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC, 5 March 1999.

⁷³ Theodore Postol, op cit.; David Hoffman, "Russia's Myopic Missile Defense: Gaps in Early-Warning Satellite Coverage Raise Risk of Launch Error," Washington Post Foreign Service, 10 February 1999.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Bruce Blair, “Russia’s Doomsday Machine,” New York Times, 8 October 1993;   see also Bruce Blair, "Statement before the House National Security Subcommittee," US Senate (Washington, DC: 13 March   1997).

⁷⁷ United States Information Agency (USIA), "Fact Sheet: the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches (US, Russia strengthen strategic and regional stability)," USIS Washington File, 2 September 1998.

⁷⁸ Postol, op cit.; Toomay, op cit.; Dr. Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, DoD News Briefing, 25 February 1999, 2:10 PM.

⁷⁹ Telephone Interview with Theodore Postol, Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy, MIT, 1 March 1999; see also remarks by Moscow Times reporter Pavel Felgenhauer in Reuters Wire Service, “US Military Start Moscow Talks on Millennium Bug,” 18 February 1999.

⁸⁰Warner, op cit.

⁸¹ Reuters Wire Service, "Russia Calls off Y2K Cooperation with the US," 26 March 1999.

⁸² Personal interview with the Russian Delegation to the Nonproliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting, United Nations, New York, 13 May 1999; see also “Russia Still Cooperating on Y2K - Pentagon Official,” Reuters News Service, 29 April 1999.

⁸³ Discussion with Peter Tyler, Legislative Assistant to Senator Tom Harkin (Iowa), 8 April 1999.  Peter Tyler received notification of OSD plans from the Nuclear Forces and Ballistic Missile Defense Policy Office, Pentagon.

⁸⁴ E-mail communications with Spanky Kirsch, Y2K information officer, Office of Secretary of Defense for C4I, 1 July 1999.

⁸⁵ Personal discussion with Paul Nicholas, professional staffer for the US Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Problem, July 1999. 

⁸⁶ David McGuire, "Russians Return to Y2K Nuke Center", Newsbytes Daily News, 15 September 1999

⁸⁷Daniel Verton, "Russians agree to Y2K warning centre", Computerworld Today, 15 September 1999; see also David Johnson, ed., “US, Russia agree to share early warning info during Y2K rollover,” CDI Russia Weekly-#64, 3 September 1999.

⁸⁸“Warner Cites Y2K Problems with U.S.-Russian Hotlines (Cites establishment of joint Y2K center),” United States Information Agency (USIA), 29 September 1999, as reported by David Johnson, ed., CDI Russia Weekly-#68, Center for Defense Information, 1 October 1999.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰ David Johnson, ed., “Lugar: Fix Russian Y2K,” CDI Russia Weekly-#68, Center for Defense Information, 1 October 1999.

⁹¹ CNN World Financial News online, “World Bank To Support Russia's Y2K Fixes,” Moscow, Russia,  23 April 1999.

⁹² Eugenia Volynkina, “US Gives $1.5 Mil to Russia for Y2K Fixes,” IT InfoArt Online, Moscow, Russia, 29 April 1999. 

⁹³ Matt Hamblen, “US: no truth to Russia Y2K reports,” Computerworld Online News, 4 February 1999.

⁹⁴ Personal interview, 13 May 1999, op cit.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
BASIC British American Security Information Council
BCA Broadcast Command Authority
BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CINC Commander-in-Chief
COTS Commercial-off-the-Shelf
DEFCON Defense Condition
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
DoD Department of Defense
DoDIG Department of Defense Inspector General’s Office
DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
DSN Defense Switched Network
DSP Defense Support Program
EAM Emergency Action Message
EHF Extremely High Frequency
FLTSATCOM Navy Fleet Satellite Communications Program
GAO General Accounting Office
GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications System
GPS Global Positioning System
HF High Frequency
ICADS Integrated Correlation and Display System
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDNX Integrated Digital Network Exchange
INFOSEC PEIP Programmable Embeddable Information Systems Security Product
ISTC International Scientific and Technological Center
ISABPS Integrated Submarine Automated Broadcast Processing System
ISCS Integrated Satellite Control System
IVTT Integrated Verdin Transmit Terminal
JITC Joint Interoperability Test Center
LF Low Frequency
MEECN Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MM III Minuteman III
NDS Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) Detection System
NESP Navy Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite Program
NMCC National Military Command Center
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
OpEval(s) Operational Evaluation(s)
OSD Office of Secretary of Defense
PAVE PAWS Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry - Phase Array Warning System
PBX Private Branch Exchange
RAN Readiness Assessment Network
SCN Satellite Control Network
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SLVR Submarine LF/VLF Versa Module Eurocard Receiver System
SPACECOM US Space Command
SSBN Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine
STRATCOM Strategic Command
SubECS Submarine Exterior Communications System
TACAMO Take Charge and Move Out [Command and Control System]
UFO UHF Follow-on System
UHF Ultra High Frequency
USIA United States Information Agency
VLF Very Low Frequency
Y2K Year 2000

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