BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Y2K and Nuclear Arsenals:
A Final Report

(Part 4)

The Status of Russian Y2K Remediation Efforts

On January 21, 1999, a Russian governmental decree created the "State Committee of the Russian Federation for Communications and Information," a Y2K oversight committee with roughly the same functions as President Clinton’s Council. This body now oversees the Y2K readiness of the computer systems owned by ministries, departments and regions of the Russian Federation. Soon after the committee’s establishment, on February 3, 1999, Russia's telecommunications chief Alexander Krupnov summarized the results of an agency-by-agency assessment for Y2K vulnerabilities.⁶⁴ This was soon followed by a draft national Y2K plan on March 26, 1999, issued by the State Committee.

Each agency is now expected to find resources within its own budget for repairs and testing, but the military announced that it had only 85 million rubles ($3.7 million) for addressing nuclear weapons operations and Y2K.⁶⁵ According to Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin, head of the Ministry responsible for nuclear operations, "It's not a large amount, not a small amount. If we get some help of course it would be good." Dvorkin also noted that Russia had received lots of millennium advice from abroad, but little cash. Nonetheless, he stated that "If we don't get help, we'll manage ourselves."⁶⁶

Despite the late start, Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin assured reporters in early March 1999 that all necessary testing and validation of Y2K repairs would be done throughout October 1999. Taking a sarcastic tone in a Moscow press conference for Western journalists, Dvorkin said "I apologize in advance if I fail to justify the hopes that there may be amongst you for an apocalypse if we do not solve this problem."⁶⁷ Both Dvorkin and Major-General Valery Khalansky of the Russian General Staff maintained that "the calendar date does not exist" in the control and launch authorization process for weapons. According to Khalansky, "Nuclear weapons control systems are at the required level of reliability... We have not so far found any fatal mistakes in the systems responsible for nuclear weapons storage, nor in the systems controlling them."⁶⁸ Similarly, First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Mikhaylov has declared that "these automated systems have no calendar dates, as the countdown of time begins from the moment of a command for some operations." Furthermore, he stated that "in Russia the missile command systems are real-time systems. We have no Y2K problem in the on-board missile equipment, at launching sites, or at command centers."⁶⁹

Despite these assurances, Dvorkin and Khalansky also mentioned during the same March press conference that 74 of 134 sites associated with early warning are in "critical" condition because of Y2K vulnerabilities. The computer components to be fixed include systems for satellite management, missile attack early warning, and space control.⁷⁰ In fact, Dvorkin admitted that roughly a third of the nuclear Y2K budget is now being spent to reprogram existing software, with the rest being put towards replacement of embedded hardware modules at these vulnerable sites.⁷¹

On the face of it, these statements seem contradictory. However, there is an underlying logic to the arguments. The key is in the distinction between the dispersed network associated with early warning of US launch activities and the more direct, top-down command and control of Russian weapons.

Early warning networks constitute the first part of a nuclear alert. The data flows upward from the dispersed data receiving sites on the ground (which process satellite evidence), to mid-level command posts for interpretation of data, and finally to the political and military leaders who must actually make decisions about retaliation. In contrast, the command and control of nuclear weapons during the second half of a nuclear alert involves a top-down information flow, from political leaders and commanders at the apex of the chain of command down to the personnel manning the missile silos.

Russian officials are essentially arguing that the telecommunications connections between the General Staff, political leaders, and lower controllers of deployed ICBMs are impervious to Y2K problems, so that no gaps will develop in the authorization process for launch of weapons. However, this still leaves open the question of satellites, radars, ground-based data receiving stations, and the communications links between these various systems and top commanders for the early warning of missile attack, which occurs prior to the authorization-launch stage of the alert process. The US intelligence community has reached conclusions similar to those of General Dvorkin in regard to Russian early warning systems.⁷²

Existing non-Y2K Dangers in Russian Nuclear Operations
As the history of computer errors in nuclear operations has shown, redundancy in sensors and data processing nodes is essential to avoid accidents. Unfortunately, the integrity of Russian nuclear operations has steadily declined over the last decade due to severe shortfalls in military expenditures.

Russia has two types of satellite networks. The original Molniya network optimally consists of 7-9 satellites in elliptical orbits. Only three satellites out of this constellation remain operational. This degradation is part of normal system operations, and in the absence of 1-2 launches of replacement satellites per year, erosion of capabilities will continue. In the late 1980s, Russia attempted to support this original constellation by launching Prognoz, a second network of more advanced geosynchronous satellites (with a longer lifespan). However, only two of the necessary eight satellites are still operational.⁷³

In theory, Russian space assets can detect an American launch of ICBMs within a minute or two after launch. However, due to the deterioration of satellite networks, Russia is blind to ICBM launches from the continental United States for approximately three hours each day. Additionally, neither type of satellite network can spot any US attacks staged by Trident submarines stationed much closer to Russian territory in the North Atlantic and the Pacific.⁷⁴ Only the ground-based radar arrays stationed around Russia's perimeter can identify Trident launches, and then only after the missiles have completed about a third of their flight path. This gives Russian leaders very little time (6-10 minutes) to analyze the data, make a decision, and issue launch orders.

Exacerbating Russia’s incomplete satellite coverage is the poor state of its ground-based radar network. Its technology is outdated, and some key sites have been lost due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Because of these losses, there are two large gaps in coverage that would allow Trident submarines stationed in the Gulf of Alaska or the North Atlantic to attack with impunity.⁷⁵

These gaps in ground-based radars seriously weaken Russia's ability to track US ICBM attacks through time. The "temporal" element of early warning, in which each missile or warhead is identified at two separate points in the warning process, would be lost for some attack scenarios. This undermines redundancy in verification procedures for launches from the continental United States. This growing dependence on just one type of sensor in some alert scenarios increases the chances of a mistake if Y2K disturbances were to affect the systems still in operation.

The existing gaps in the early warning network may increase Russian reliance on streamlined command procedures with a greater chance of human-machine errors. Military and political leaders can now choose among a variety of alternatives for improving quick-launch capabilities during a crisis if needed. One such option would give the civilian political authorities "push-button" control of forces without the intervention of the military's General Staff in the authorization process. Another option is a back-up launch authorization system named "Perimeter," often called "The Dead Hand" by analysts. In the event that a US first strike would overwhelm the early warning capabilities and "decapitate" Russian leadership (as shown by ground-based nuclear detonation detectors and loss of communications), this system would automatically send up an ICBM with communications transceivers housed in the nose cone. Once at a sufficient height, this system would remotely transmit unlock codes and launch instructions to on-site human launch controllers for a large portion of the ICBM force.⁷⁶ Less dramatically, existing plans for pre-delegation of launch codes could allow lower commanders to act on their own during tense crises if it is believed that the General Staff has been taken out by an American first strike. In all of these cases, Y2K-related computer failures could be magnified by the loss of human checks and balances in the Russian command system, if military and civilian leaders were to pick one of the above options to ensure credible retaliatory capabilities in the face of a potential US first strike.

US Initiatives to Avoid Nuclear Accident

On September 2, 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issued the "Joint Statement on the Exchange of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning." As summarized by the United States Information Agency (USIA), "The US and Russia will develop arrangements for providing each other with continuous information on the launches of strategic and theater ballistic missiles...detected by their respective early warning systems."⁷⁷

Technically, data from US infrared Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites could provide Russia with coverage of all US missile launch activities, including both Trident submarine patrols and stationary ICBMs on American territory.⁷⁸ However, despite US technical capabilities, the Clinton-Yeltsin agreement has significant weaknesses that have hindered progress in bilateral discussions. First, many Russian military officials have regarded the prospect of data sharing as pertaining only to the activities of "third countries," such as the ballistic missile programs of Iran, North Korea, and China. Second, if Russia were to share its data on a real-time basis through the use of computer screens combining US and Russian coverage of the same missile events, US nuclear analysts could map the exact gaps in Russian operations. Third, given the extent of computer processing within just the first minute of data transmission by satellites to NORAD, the US could skew data in its own favor, making it impossible for Russian officials to verify the accuracy of the final product. This factor alone could sabotage the facility, since it is precisely during a crisis that mistrust develops, and it is during a crisis that confidence-building measures are needed the most. These factors have led many Russian senior military officials to conclude that the US proposal is an intelligence operation aimed at Russia.⁷⁹

To plan and implement the joint declaration, interagency teams held sessions in September 1998, December 1998, and February 1999. No concrete proposals on the timing, logistics, and scope of data sharing were generated or discussed during the first two meetings. To reinvigorate the talks for the third meeting, the US amended the original concept for a shared early warning facility in Moscow. A new track was to be created for Y2K specifically that would not require Russia to supply its own early warning data. Instead, the US would construct a smaller facility outside Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado, the "Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability," to which the Russians would be invited to monitor US data during the period December 15, 1999-January 15, 2000. In technical terms, the facility was to be constructed along the lines of the shared air traffic control systems in Berlin during the Cold War.⁸⁰

Russian officials agreed after the third bilateral meeting to visit the United States in March 1999 to address the technical parameters of the proposed structure. However, in reaction to events in Kosovo, Russia suspended all planned policy discussions on the Cheyenne Mountain facility.⁸¹ Although department-level cooperation between the two military establishments continued throughout the Kosovo crisis, representatives of the Russian Foreign Relations and Defense Ministries stated that the proposed facility would remain a low-level "initiative" rather than a high-level "agreement" as long as Kosovo remained unresolved.⁸²

NORAD and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) decided to proceed unilaterally with construction efforts in the hopes that Russia would eventually return to the bargaining table.⁸³ The facility has now been completed, and the only remaining technical step is the creation of direct communications channels between the Colorado facility and Russian command posts, an endeavor that will requires active participation by the Russian defense establishment.⁸⁴

To jump-start cooperation after the Kosovo crisis ended in June 1999, both the DoD and Senators Bennett and Dodd (heads of the US Senate Y2K Committee) sent letters to Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Ministry of Defense asking for Russian cooperation in the final steps of the process.⁸⁵ As of this paper's publication, no official statements have been given to Pentagon or Senatorial leaders about the possibility of a future renewal of high-level policy coordination. Both Pentagon officials and the US Congress seem to believe that Russian officials will eventually agree to the final step of installing the necessary secured communications lines between the Cheyenne facility and Russian nuclear command posts. On September 11, 1999, Russian authorities signaled to their US counterparts that they would renew full participation in the project.⁸⁶ US Defense Secretary Cohen and Russian Defence Minister Sergeyev signed an agreement establishing the centre later that same week in Moscow.

The Center will consist of two Russian officers sitting alongside a US military officer and a senior US civilian officer, who will be in voice communication with the US early warning command center, NORAD, inside nearby Cheyenne Mountain. Plans call for the Center to operate from December 27 to January 6. Russian facilities will be linked to the Center by voice networks.⁸⁷

However, the United States and Russia have since identified Y2K problems that wouldprevent the full operation of all but one of the existing seven direct communications links, or "hotlines," that guarantee immediate communications between U.S. and Russian leaders. These longstanding U.S.-Russia hotlines exist separately from the new early warning Center in Colorado. They provide numerous bilateral connections, including direct links between the two presidents, a link between the secretary of state and the foreign minister, and links connecting the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers on both sides. With the exception of the Risk Reduction Centers, which were created in the 1980s under Ronald Reagan’s administration, these hotlines were installed during the early 1960s to guarantee immediate communication when needed.⁸⁸

Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, has told the Senate Special Committee on Y2K that U.S. and Russian communications experts are working to correct the problem. The United States has agreed to provide Russia with Y2K compliant software and computer workstations "to correct program deficiencies in outage reporting, monitoring and channel reroute operations." According to Warner, "Procurement actions for this equipment have been initiated, and while the schedule is tight, we are confident that the fixes will be installed and tested by December."⁸⁹ Also, even if these corrections are not completely implemented by December 31, the telecommunications links for the shared early warning facility outside Cheyenne Mountain should be constructed in time for reliable crisis management. Of course, this assumes that another political crisis between the two sides over in Kosovo or other issues does not undermine further cooperation on the new shared facility.

Part 5: Conclusion:  Alternative Options for Alleviating the Dangers of Y2K

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