BASIC RESEARCH REPORT
Nuclear
Futures:
Western
European Options for
Nuclear Risk Reduction
Chapter 1:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear
Policy in Western Europe
Western European nations
and institutions should undertake a comprehensive review of
how to reduce and eliminate the risks associated with nuclear
weapons. Elements of this review have already begun, with the
announcement by German officials that it would raise nuclear
strategy issues in NATO. The review should both strengthen the
non-proliferation regime and speed the disarmament process.
The May 1998 nuclear
tests by India and Pakistan returned nuclear weapons to the
forefront of international security concerns. The full impact
of the tests has not been realised by the international community.
Even before India tested, the changes in Europe's security structure
demanded a new look at nuclear weapons. The Cold War ended.
The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union dissolved. Russia now works
with NATO in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty substantially
reduced the level of heavy armaments spread across the continent,
while NATO's Partnership for Peace programme initiated military
co-operation and transparency throughout and beyond Europe.
The biggest exceptions to the generally improved security atmosphere
have been the minimal changes in nuclear doctrine, in both NATO
and Russia, and the continued Russian resentment over NATO expansion.
This paper will focus on the former issue.
The size of the nuclear
arsenal in Europe has decreased dramatically. On NATO's side,
the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons declined from
about 7,000 to 180 or less. Within the Alliance, the US withdrew
all its nuclear weapons from the army and from naval surface
forces, leaving only gravity bombs in Europe. Following the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, Russia
withdrew thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from Central
and Eastern Europe back to its own territory. Many of the weapons
are now stored centrally and await dismantlement. The UK retired
its air-based nuclear systems and relies only on nuclear missile
submarines. France dismantled its land-based nuclear-armed missiles.
These changes have substantially reduced the nuclear threat
to Europe, making deliberate all-out nuclear war almost inconceivable.
However, nuclear doctrine
has not changed to match the reduced arsenal. NATO, France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States still rely on a policy
allowing first-use of nuclear weapons. As part of its interim
military doctrine, in 1993 Russia adopted the same policy. It
later conducted the first exercise in which Russian forces relied
on the first-use of nuclear weapons. Western policy changes
have focused on increasing the flexibility of nuclear arsenals
and employment doctrine. The US plans to use nuclear weapons
to counter the perceived threat from chemical or biological
weapons, and considers using the atom bomb against "non-state
actors". (See Chapter 5.7 on p.36, below). It is also pushing
NATO to agree a similar policy. (See Chapter 5.6 on p.35). In
this context, NATO is discussing "out of area" nuclear
use.
Western Europe must
address the policy implications of the end of the Cold War and
the nuclear tests in South Asia. Changes are needed in NATO
policy, in the EU, and in individual governments, particularly
France and the United Kingdom. Changes in doctrine should reflect
or exceed the dramatic reductions in the size of Western Europe's
nuclear arsenal.
The basis of the changes
as Western Europe moves towards nuclear disarmament should be
a strategy of risk reduction. As stated by a growing number
of former military leaders, including General George Lee Butler,
USAF (Ret), head of US strategic nuclear forces from 1991-1994,
the risks of retaining nuclear weapons are greater than the
risks of eliminating them.
A vital component
of this risk reduction strategy must be a strategy for dealing
with obvious danger scenarios. Iraq provides a classic example.
It pursued nuclear weapons in a secret and massive program despite
international inspections. Yet, in the Gulf War, facing the
potential nuclear threat from Iraq, US General Colin Powell
made clear that the use of nuclear weapons was rejected because
no suitable role for them could be found.
Even further, scenarios
involving the use of nuclear weapons by the West to respond
to threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may exist,
but they do not constitute "worst cases". The worst
case scenario is one in which, for political, environmental,
economic, or humanitarian reasons, nuclear weapons cannot be
used to respond to a real threat. The West should consider how
its attachment to nuclear weapons hinders the development of
other military and especially political mechanisms that can
effectively limit the proliferation of WMD and reduce these
threats.
1.1 Outline
This report has two sections. The first provides an in-depth
description of the status of nuclear doctrine and arsenals in
France, the United Kingdom, and NATO. A detailed summary of
current nuclear co-operation between France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States is also provided. Changes since the end
of the Cold War, along with information on new governments'
future policies and plans, are highlighted.
The second section
focuses on recommendations for action. These recommendations
outline a comprehensive strategy of nuclear risk reduction for
Western Europe. Steps include committing to elimination, de-alerting
nuclear forces, ending deployment of tactical nuclear weapons,
undertaking no-first-use policies, British and French commitments
linked to START III, and initiating a European Co-operative
Threat Reduction programme.
1.2 Decision
Points
For Western Europe, NATO and the NPT are the two critical forums
for discussion and action on nuclear issues. Each arena is at
a critical stage. Following a commitment made in the NATO-Russia
Founding Act in 1996 and a decision taken at the 1997 Madrid
Summit, NATO is in the process of revising its Strategic Concept,
the guiding political vision for the Alliance. NATO is expected
to approve the new version at the Alliance's April 1999 Summit
in Washington. The 1995 decision to make the NPT permanent was
dependent on agreeing a new review process that is still developing.
The 2000 Review Conference will substantially determine the
success of the new process. Within these two processes, the
future role of nuclear weapons in European security will be
decided.
1.3 Cracks
in the Foundation?
The traditional Western consensus on nuclear issues has held
up well, even in the post-Cold War era. However, there are signs
that this consensus could be evolving or breaking up. The previous
Australian government mandated the prestigious Canberra Commission's
report on the elimination of nuclear weapons, which recommended
immediate steps towards elimination.1 The US National
Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and
Arms Control's report The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy
also called for dramatic reductions in nuclear posture.2
On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice released
an advisory opinion, which stated that the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons was generally illegal.3 Partly
because of that opinion, the Canadian parliament is undertaking
an in-depth evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in its
security policy.
There are changes
in Western Europe as well. After nearly two decades of Conservative
rule, the Labour Party took power in the UK in 1997. Although
the Labour Party abandoned its support for unilateral disarmament,
once in government it implemented a Strategic Defence Review
that recommended significant (but far from dramatic) changes
in British nuclear posture and policy. France eliminated its
small land-based nuclear arsenal, and together with the UK,
deposited its instruments of ratification to the CTBT, the first
nuclear-weapon states to do so.
Social Democrats and
Greens won the Federal elections in Germany in 1998, and Social
Democratic-led coalitions now govern the four biggest European
NATO members. The new German government has stated that it would
like to see a discussion of nuclear policy in NATO, including
the Alliance's doctrine allowing first-use of nuclear weapons.
(See Chapter 6.4 on p. 46 below.)
The EU recently circulated
a memorandum at the UN General Assembly, recommending further
nuclear disarmament steps. Within the EU, some states, in particular
Ireland, Sweden, and Austria, have been more pro-active in calling
for further steps to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
The New
Agenda Coalition
In June 1998, Ireland led a group of eight states, comprised
of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zeland, Slovenia, South Africa,
and Sweden, which issued a declaration calling for immediate
progress on nuclear disarmament.
At the 1998 UN General
Assembly's First Committee on disarmament, Ireland, Sweden,
and 32 other states, introduced a resolution following on from
the June 1998 eight-nation declaration. The resolution called
on the nuclear-weapon states
to demonstrate an
unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of
their respective nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their
obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).4
It also called for
the integration of all five nuclear-weapon states into the nuclear
disarmament process, for 'de-alerting' nuclear forces and for
a forum at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to "deal
with nuclear disarmament". (See Chapter 6.2 on p.42 below
on de-alerting, and Chapter 6.1 on p.39 on the CD.) Significantly,
the June declaration's call for an end to nuclear first-use
policies was replaced by a call for "measures to enhance
strategic stability", including a review of strategic doctrines.
This last point was a clear reference to NATO's review of its
Strategic Concept. Dropping the no-first-use call was an effort
to draw support from Alliance countries, as NATO policy still
retains the option of first-use. (See Chapter 4 on p.24 below.)
That effort was successful.
The three Western nuclear-weapon states lobbied heavily against
the resolution, pushing NATO members in particular to vote "no".
Despite this pressure, every non-nuclear-weapon state in NATO
except Turkey abstained. Most of the 19 states that voted against
the resolution were either nuclear-weapon states (except China,
which abstained), new NATO members, or states applying to become
NATO members. This vote clearly indicates a growing divide between
the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states within NATO on nuclear
disarmament.
These developments,
however, only begin to address the full implications of the
end of the Cold War. This report outlines a variety of steps
that Western European countries and institutions should take
to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons. As the
world approaches the new millennium, it is time to develop an
international security regime that does not rely on weapons
that can end the new era before it begins.
Go
to Chapter 2
Executive
Summary | Chapter
1 | Chapter
2 | Chapter
3
Chapter
4 | Chapter
5 | Chapter
6 | Endnotes
