BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

December 1998, BASIC/BITS Research Report 98.6

Nuclear Futures:
Western European Options for
Nuclear Risk Reduction

By Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer and Stephen Young

Published by the British American Security Information Council and the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS).

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Executive Summary

Chapter One: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Policy in Western Europe

Chapter Two: The United Kingdom

Chapter Three: France

Chapter Four: Nuclear Co-operation

Chapter Five: NATO Europe

Chapter Six: Nuclear Risk Reduction in Western Europe

Endnotes

About the authors
Martin Butcher is the Director of the Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD), a Brussels-based non-governmental organization. Currently, he is a Visiting Fellow at BASIC’s Washington office.

Otfried Nassauer is the Director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS).

Stephen Young is a Senior Analyst as BASIC. Previously, he worked for 20/20 Vision and for ACCESS: A Security Information Service. He has a Masters in International Affairs from Columbia University, and a BA from Carleton College.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the many people who pro-vided help of various kinds during the writing of this report. They include: Nicola Butler, for her inestimable assistance; Ambassador James Leonard, for his helpful comments on the report’s recommendations; Professors Paul Rogers and Patricia Chilton, for their comments on early drafts; Daniel Plesch, for his comments on the entire report; and Camille Grand, for his guidance and support in compiling the section on France. Special thanks to Lucy Amis and Tanya Padberg for excellent proofing and copy-editing work, and to Christine Kucia and Kate Joseph for advice and assistance on the layout and design of the report.

Support
This report was made possible by the generous support of W. Alton Jones Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New-Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AB Air Base
AFDRG Anglo-French Defence Research Group
ASMP Air-Sol Moyenne Portée
ASLP Air-Sol Longue Portée
CD Conference on Disarmament
CEA Commisariat a l’Énergie Atomique
CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DGA Delegation Generale de l’Armement
EIVRs Exchanges of Information by Visit and Report
EU European Union
HMS Her Majesty’s Ship
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICJ International Court of Justice
INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty
JAIEG Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group
JOWOGs Joint Working Groups
MIRV Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles
MOA Memorandum of Agreement
MoD UK Ministry of Defence
MP Member of Parliament (UK)
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM National Technical Means
NPG Nuclear Planning Group (a NATO body)
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSAs Negative Security Assurances
NWFZ Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PALEN Préparation a la Limitation des Expérimentations Nucléaires
PaSEN Programme de Simulation des Essais Nucléaires
PrepCom Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000 NPT Review Conference
RAF Royal Air Force (UK)
SNLE/NG Sous-marins Lanceurs d’Engins de la Nouvelle Génération
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
SWPP SLBM Warhead Protection Program
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (an EU programme)
TMS Thomson Marconi Sonar
TNN Tête Nucléaire Nouvelle
TNO Tête Nucléaire Océanique
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Executive Summary
The recent German-US debate over NATO's policy allowing first-use of nuclear weapons highlights a growing split between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states in the Alliance. Despite this split, the political value attached to nuclear weapons in European security remains high. NATO still describes nuclear weapons as the "supreme guarantee" of Alliance security. While the number of nuclear weapons in Europe has declined, the nuclear actors in Western Europe - France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO - have not yet changed their doctrines to reflect the new security environment. At the same time, there is no military threat to the continent and NATO's conventional military capabilities far outweigh any potential enemy. Western Europe nations should pursue a risk reduction approach, decreasing the political and military value attached to nuclear weapons.

Upcoming decision points - updating NATO's strategic concept, due to be completed in 1999, and the 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - are key in determining what path Western Europe will take. Germany and Canada have called for a renewed discussion on the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Germany announced that it will raise the issue in NATO Ministerial meetings.

Under the previous Conservative government, the UK reduced its arsenal to one nuclear system: the Trident missile deployed on Trident nuclear submarines. When it came to power, the Labour government undertook a Strategic Defence Review that made substantial but not dramatic changes in Britain's nuclear posture, including reducing the number of warheads on Trident missiles. However, Labour has abandoned its traditional support for unilateral disarmament, and seems unlikely to implement other positions it has recently endorsed, including no-first-use of nuclear weapons. To date, other than an increased transparency, Labour policies have shown little change from their Conservative predecessors. (See Chapter Two, p. 10.)

France is simultaneously reducing its nuclear arsenal and implementing major upgrades to its remaining systems. Strongly condemned for its 1995-1996 series of nuclear tests, France has endeavoured to improve its international standing. Its support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a positive sign; its proposal to create a European nuclear deterrent was less well received. (See Chapter Three, p. 17.)

Nuclear co-operation between France, the United States, and the United Kingdom is increasing. France and the UK initiated new bilateral working groups on nuclear issues, and France and the US recently signed an agreement increasing their co-operation. Without nuclear testing, stockpile stewardship will lead to even closer co-operation. (See Chapter Four, p. 24.)

NATO has sharply reduced the number of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. However, its doctrine is moving towards using nuclear weapons to counter the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. The US is pushing NATO to include out-of-area threats and "nonstate actors", such as terrorist groups, as targets for nuclear weapons. (See Chapter Five, p. 30.)

However, current policies are harmful to Western security in several ways. First, they are an incentive to proliferators to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As demonstrated by the Gulf War, Western conventional superiority provides the capability to overcome any potential threat. Second, rather than serving as a hedge against a Russian resurgence, reliance on nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of a renewed threat. Third, the status conferred to nuclear-weapon states was a major factor in the Indian decision to develop its arsenal; Pakistan felt compelled to follow suit. Fourth, the refusal to pursue nuclear disarmament, as agreed in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is leading more and more nations to question the value of that regime.

Western European nations should undertake six steps to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons and to preserve the NPT. These are:

1. Commit to and take programmatic action towards the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons;
   
   

2. Reduce the alert status of nuclear weapons;
   
   

3. End the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons and give up the option of wartime nuclear weapons use by non-nuclear-weapon states;
   
   

4. Halt first-use policies by France, the UK, and NATO;
   
   

5. Include commitments by France and the UK on the future of their nuclear arsenals in the START III context;
   
   

6. Initiate a European Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme.

These steps outline a comprehensive nuclear risk reduction strategy for Western Europe. They are also important to safeguard and strengthen the NPT. The list begins with the most important and broadest steps, and proceeds to less far-reaching initiatives. Most importantly, the last five steps would all follow from a sincere undertaking of the first. (See Chapter Six, p. 38.)

The six steps closely correspond to many of the crucial provisions in the New Agenda Coalition's June 1998 declaration and 1998 UN First Committee resolution. That resolution (see Chapter1.3, p. 8, for a description) exposed a growing debate in NATO over the Alliance's nuclear doctrine. That debate, between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states, may be exposed during the discussions over the Alliance's Strategic Concept (see Chapters 5.5-5.7, pp. 36-37).

Not included in the list are the traditional, yet important, items on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. These include further progress on the bilateral START process, ratification and entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and agreement on a fissile material production cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. Russian ratification of START II, which may take place as this report goes to press, could end the current impasse in bilateral disarmament. For the CTBT and the fissile cut-off, although the vast majority of states endorse both goals, each requires substantial progress before it is fully realised. Although each of these three steps is significant, none fully address the implications of the end of the Cold War. To strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and to revitalise the disarmament process, new steps must be taken.

The six steps discussed here focus on options for Western Europe, rather than for all states or all nuclear-weapon states. Because of the general international focus on US-Russian disarmament, too little attention is paid to the contribution Western Europe can make. That contribution could be substantial; through direct disarmament and non-proliferation measures by European states, through consultations with and lobbying of the US, and through initiatives to create a more sustainable security policy. The six steps described in this report are critical to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, advancing disarmament, and creating a new security environment that will allow further progress.

Go to Chapter 1

Executive Summary | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3
Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Endnotes