|
BASIC RESEARCH REPORT
Number 98.2,
March 1998
Nuclear
Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US
Nuclear Strategy
By Hans Kristensen
Executive Summary
In November 1997, President Clinton
issued a highly classified Presidential Decision Directive (PDD),
giving new guidelines to the military on targeting nuclear
weapons. According to reports, the new PDD allows for the use of
nuclear weapons against "rogue" states – those
suspected of having access to weapons of mass destruction.
The use of nuclear weapons to deter
attack by weapons of mass destruction, other than nuclear weapons,
remains controversial. General Lee Butler, former
Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command, now describes using
nuclear weapons as a solution to chemical or biological attack as
an "outmoded idea." Conventional retaliation would be
far more proportionate, less damaging to neighboring states and
less horrific for innocent civilians, he says. "There are no
rogue nations, only rogue leaders."
In 1995, President Clinton issued a
"negative security assurance," pledging that the United
States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
states parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
However, the current US nuclear posture conflicts with that
pledge.
Non-nuclear-weapon states parties
to the NPT have long demanded legally binding "negative
security assurances," guaranteeing that nuclear weapons will
not be used against them. The issue is on the agenda for the 1998
NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Geneva in April 1998.
However, Special Assistant to the
President Robert Bell has already stated that negative
security assurances will not tie the hands of US decision-makers
faced with a chemical or biological attack. "It’s not
difficult to define a scenario in which a rogue state would use
chemical weapons or biological weapons and not be afforded
protection under our negative security assurance," he noted.
Documents obtained through the US
Freedom of Information Act also reveal criticism of the negative
security assurance from within the US military. These documents
show how US planning for the use of nuclear weapons against Third
World proliferators has developed in the 1990s. The concept of
targeting Third World proliferators is relatively new to US
nuclear doctrine. However, since the end of the Cold War the US
military has seen "increasingly capable Third World
threats" as a new justification for maintaining US strategic
and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
The extensive focus on
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has resulted in
"fewer but more widespread targets" for the remaining US
nuclear weapons. The US nuclear arsenal is in the middle of a
multi-billion dollar upgrade that will make it capable of quickly
shifting between a greater number of limited contingencies all
over the world.
Additionally, new modifications
of a number of US nuclear weapons are currently underway in order
to provide new capabilities suitable for targeting potential
proliferators. In 1996, the B61-11 modification was identified by
the Department of Defense as the "weapon of choice" for
targeting Libya’s alleged underground chemical weapons plant at
Tarhunah. Other weapons "modifications" are in the
pipeline.
However, given the overwhelming US
conventional capability, there is no need to draw up plans for
nuclear war in the Third World. Using nuclear weapons to deter
states armed with other weapons of mass destruction is
counterproductive, undermining the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
By using nuclear weapons in this
way, the United States is sending a message that nuclear weapons
are important for achieving prestige in world affairs and for
accomplishing military and political objectives. Pointing nuclear
weapons at regional troublemakers will provide them with a
justification to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. Encouraging
nuclear proliferation can only increase the risk to US security in
the long term.
A reaffirmation of the commitments
to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament by removing chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons and facilities from US war
planning would be a more fitting post-Cold War measure.
Nevertheless, as the
documents researched as the basis for this paper demonstrate,
planning for nuclear war in the Third World has progressed
virtually unopposed. With little informed opposition and public
debate, the result is a nuclear doctrine that borrows heavily from
Cold War nuclear thinking. President Clinton’s Decision
Directive of November 1997 permits this planning to continue.
***
For the full text of Nuclear
Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US
Nuclear Strategy, you may download the PDF
file, e-mail BASIC
or order a copy from here.
.
Back to Nuclear and WMD home
page |