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BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Number 98.1, January 1998


Combating Illicit Light Weapons Trafficking:
Developments and Opportunities

By Susannah L. Dyer and Geraldine O'Callaghan

 

Executive Summary

Fuelled by both unrestrained supply and fervent demand, the proliferation of light weapons has a devastating impact on international peace and stability. These weapons are destabilising states and imperilling the lives and livelihoods of many, including civilians and peacekeepers. Unchecked, these weapons fuel crime, prolong conflicts and foster a culture of violence. While nuclear weapons and major conventional weapons have been addressed as central issues in international relations, until recently, light weapons proliferation was largely overlooked or regarded as a solely domestic issue. However, the explosion of research and analysis in this area has propelled light weapons to the top of the international agenda. In particular, illicit weapons trafficking has received considerable attention from governments and multilateral institutions. Illicit weapons transfers, which make up a vast proportion of all light weapons transfers, are carried out by circumventing traditional national, regional and international controls. For example, according to a UN estimate, nearly 60 percent of the weaponry flowing into Afghanistan enters the country by illicit means. In response, states have begun tackling this problem, often within the context of larger efforts on terrorism, drug trafficking and crime control.

This report provides a comparative analysis of the ongoing efforts to control illicit light weapons trafficking being pursued at the regional level by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU) and internationally by the United Nations (UN) and the Group of Eight Industrialised States (G-8). These intergovernmental initiatives supplement efforts undertaken by individual governments and also complement other efforts to control licit light weapons transfers.

Policy recommendations
The report also recommends policies to integrate the various initiatives and provide a more coherent and comprehensive approach to light weapons proliferation. The complex dynamics of light weapons flows provide many avenues of control. Recommendations for directly stemming the "recycling" of weapons from one conflict to the next, as well as controlling overall trafficking include:

  • Prioritising destruction of weaponry, including surplus weapons and weapons collected during peace processes.
  • Improving national enforcement of existing laws.
  • Adopting codes of conduct to establish stricter criteria for weapons transfers.
  • Improving domestic legislation in post-conflict societies and strengthening overall domestic gun control.

The report suggests that these direct control efforts be supplemented by eliminating the "grey area" between legal and illegal transfers. Potential options to pursue include:

  • Registering and marking weapons.
  • Improving record-keeping.

In addition, the report argues that any policy proposals designed to stem light weapons trafficking must be pursued within an overall context of post-conflict reconstruction and long term development. Governments should provide states in conflict regions with practical security assistance by:

  • Developing a "security first" approach.
  • Supporting capacity building.

Finally, the report recommends increased involvement of other sub-regional, regional and international institutions that are particularly well-placed to implement controls on light weapons. Possible avenues to pursue include:

  • Involving NATO in controlling illicit weapons trafficking.
  • Developing international legal mechanisms.

Test of political will
The governmental initiatives to target "underground" trafficking examined in this report are a welcome development, but they require improvement and must be matched by efforts of equal vigilance on the licit side. While governments may gain popularity points by battling the "evils" of "illegal" weapons trafficking, their credibility and determination will be tested by their active support for controlling both illicit and licit weapons transfers. Ultimately, it is the presence of light weapons in situations of potential violence or instability, and not the legal or illegal means by which they arrived at their destination, which is at issue. The international community cannot allow governments to use controls on illicit trafficking as a smokescreen to divert attention away from their commitments and responsibilities as producers, suppliers and recipients of light weapons. Only by adopting a comprehensive approach to conflict, including exercising restraint on their own weapons transfers, can long term peace and sustainable development be achieved.

In addition, the term "illicit" usually refers to transfers which violate specific national trade regulations. However, this term should be broadened to include certain principles defined in international law, especially human rights and humanitarian law. This issue, which is not fully explored in this report, requires further study and attention.

While some skeptics argue that the very "underground" nature of illicit weapons transfers renders them beyond individual governmental or international control, this oversimplifies a very complex equation. In reality, the extensive interconnections that exist between licit and illicit light weapons transfers mean that the illicit side will rarely, if ever, operate entirely independently of national or international control mechanisms or wholly outside any legal framework. Thus, in most cases, governments have a point of leverage somewhere in the chain of events that makes up a weapon’s history -- be it the point of production, the original transfer, subsequent transfers, transport, or collection during disarmament. In response to these pressure points, there are numerous avenues for control. Initiating stronger border controls and developing better detection and interdiction technologies can have a direct impact on the cross-border flow of weapons. Other policies, such as strengthening import/export controls and eradicating covert transfers will help stem the flow indirectly by clarifying the lines between legal and illegal. Efforts such as restraining licit transfers and implementing destruction of weaponry can have a vital impact on the overall number of weapons in circulation.

Developing effective control policies
Much like the war on drugs, government rhetoric in favour of eradicating illicit weapons trafficking has developed much more rapidly than the practical measures that will actually constitute control. While some progress is being made by governments to co-operatively develop more effective controls, these must be improved and implemented effectively. With policy proposals being developed at a rapid pace in this relatively new field, it is also important to avoid duplication. Increased dialogue and information-sharing among governments and institutions offers an opportunity to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of various initiatives while also highlighting the need for co-ordination.

There is also an urgent need for financial resources and expertise to be invested in these efforts. While the development of a comprehensive set of control policies depends first and foremost on the political will of governments, they will be rendered meaningless without the commitment of sufficient resources for their implementation.

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For the full text of Combating Illicit Light Weapons Trafficking: Developments and Opportunities, you may download the PDF file, contact BASIC or order a copy from here.

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