BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

Project on Light Weapons

Bridging the Gap:  Light and Major Conventional Weapons in Recent Conflicts

Dr. Natalie J. Goldring

With research assistance from:
Susannah L. Dyer, Joel Johnston, and Alexander Chloros

Prepared for the annual meeting of the
International Studies Association
Toronto, Ontario, 18-21 March 1997

BASIC gratefully acknowledges the Ford Foundation's
generous support for the Project on Light Weapons.

1. Introduction
   
   Recent Attention to Light Weapons Issues
   A Potential Policy Divide
   

2. Light and Major Conventional Weapons: Roles in Recent Conflicts
   

3. Key Factors in Weapons Transfers and Their Policy Implications

4. The Context
   
   Production
   Illustrative Policy Options for Addressing Production
   Domestic Demand
   Illustrative Policy Options for Addressing Domestic Demand
   Foreign Demand
   Illustrative Policy Options for Addressing Foreign Demand

I. Introduction

This paper examines the roles of light and major conventional weapons in recent conflicts, and stresses the importance of addressing the entire range of weapons used in such conflicts when formulating policy proposals. It seeks to help prevent a division of the analytic and activist community into one group that deals with light weapons and one that deals with major conventional weaponry.

The paper begins with an overview of light weapons issues, an analysis of the extent to which light and major conventional weapons transfers are related problems, and an assessment of the current debate over this issue. The second main section of the paper is comprised of several examples of light and major conventional weapons in use in current or recent conflicts.¹

The third section evaluates key characteristics of weapons transfers and related policy implications. The discussion is based on a diagram of light weapons flows which illustrates the dynamics of light weapons transfers, including types of supply and demand (both legal and illegal), and which recipients generally obtain weapons through each of these paths. The paper also considers differences between light and major conventional weapons transfers, including the types of suppliers and recipients, the types of weapons and transfers, and the financial aspects of the transactions. Understanding the relative role of these factors in different conflicts can aid the development of state- and non-state-based policies to limit light and/or major conventional weapons transfers. In this way, the paper can also be used as a framework for assessing proposals to limit light and major conventional weapons transfers.

Recent Attention to Light Weapons Issues
Until recently, there was no policy debate over how to limit light weapons transfers; the issue was given little attention by most analysts, academics, journalists, or government officials. Despite the fact that these weapons have been responsible for much of the killing in the nearly 160 conflicts since World War II, they were largely ignored. Some regional analysts documented the effects of light weapons, but the patterns of light weapons transfers were largely unexamined.

During the last few years, however, there has been a burgeoning literature on light weapons transfers.² At the same time, a number of analysts, academics, and activists have undertaken the study of light weapons transfers.³ An international network of individuals and organizations actively working on these issues now exists, and participants are increasingly engaged in cooperative research and information sharing.⁴ These analysts and advocates are working toward establishing a new global norm against transfers of light weapons, and are attempting to end the practice of weapons being "recycled" from one conflict to the next.

These recent activities help bring attention to light weapons issues and increase the likelihood of attaining policy change. Sharing information and strategies internationally and building coalitions are increasing public awareness of the destructiveness of light weapons, while also helping analysts and advocates to be more effective. For example, activists in the United Kingdom seeking stricter gun control measures after the Dunblane massacre learned from the experience of colleagues in Australia. Similarly, US activists counseled their British counterparts on legislative and policy strategies, and now hope to apply lessons learned during recent British legislative consideration to efforts to strengthen US laws.

Nonetheless, a new debate threatens to divide the community seeking more stringent controls over weapons transfers, and to limit its effectiveness. This debate is over the extent to which light and major conventional weapons transfers pose similar problems and can be controlled through common measures.

A Potential Policy Divide
In part, recent work on light weapons transfers is an outgrowth and an extension of traditional research and analysis of the transfer of major conventional weapons. Many of the analysts and academics examining the light weapons issue have also analyzed major conventional weapons transfers. Not surprisingly, these analysts use analytic frameworks developed during decades of work on conventional weapons. Some of these analytic frameworks may be directly applicable to light weapons, while others can obscure key differences between light and major conventional weapons transfers.

Recently, the analytic community has begun to debate the relationship between light and major conventional weapons. One perspective is that light weapons issues are quite separate from major conventional weapons issues. From this perspective, the differences between light weapons transfers and major conventional weapons greatly outweigh the similarities:

...the light weapons trade is not a facsimile of the major weapons trade, nor is it a single phenomenon -- rather, it is a problem all to itself, composed of several more-or-less autonomous phenomena. These include, but are not limited to:

1. Transfers (either as aid or sales) from one government to another.

2. Legal sales by companies to foreign governments or private dealers.

3. Covert transfers by governmental or quasi-governmental agencies to friendly insurgents in another country.

4. Black-market sales by illegal entities to insurgents, warlords, drug dealers, etc. (in some cases -- e.g. Bosnia, the contras, etc. -- such transactions are sanctioned by major governments).

5. Theft from government arsenals, or arms acquired through bribery of government soldiers, police, etc.

6. Transfers from one insurgent group to another, possibly in exchange for money, drugs, or whatever.⁵

In contrast, this paper argues that in many countries and many conflicts, light and major conventional weapons transfers are aspects of the same phenomenon. There is no dividing line on the battlefield between light and major conventional weapons; they are used in many of the same conflicts. The paper also contends that important aspects of the light weapons trade, such as covert transfers to governments or insurgents, illicit transfers, transfers to non-state actors, transfers in return for goods, direct government-to-government transfers, and legal sales by companies are also key factors in the trade in major conventional weapons.

Black-market sales, theft, and transfers from one insurgent group to another are probably much more significant factors with respect to light weapons than with major conventional weapons. By definition, light weapons are smaller and more portable, hence more easily smuggled. In addition, their low dollar value makes them more accessible to groups with limited financial resources, such as insurgents. The dominance of different types of transfers will vary depending upon the region, the type of conflict, and the stage of conflict. Nonetheless, there are important similarities in the transfer of light and major conventional weapons, and both types of weapons are regularly being used in most recent and current conflicts.

Trying to divide light and major conventional weapons transfers into two separate fields carries significant risks. Even if it were possible to control light weapons transfers in a specific area, country, or region, the conflict might not be halted unless major conventional weapons flows were also brought under control. Similarly, agreements that focus primarily or solely on major conventional weapons risk ignoring the weapons that are doing most of the killing.

II. Light and Major Conventional Weapons: Roles in Recent Conflicts

The following section demonstrates the significant role of both light weapons and major conventional weapons in current and recent conflicts. In these conflicts, light weapons have been responsible for most of the killing, but government forces have regularly been backed up by major conventional weapons, as have some insurgent forces. Confidence- and security-building efforts, as well as conflict prevention, conflict resolution, arms control, and disarmament measures must take into account the entire range of weapons in use. Otherwise, they will probably fail. The table below lists conflicts underway between 1990 and 1995. The text that follows includes information on many of these conflicts, as well as some conflicts that have begun more recently.

Recent Conflicts (1990-1995)

Source: "Wars and War-Related Deaths, 1900-1995," in Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1996, 16th ed., (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1996), pp. 18-19.

Afghanistan
"An hour later under pressure from the advancing infantry backed up tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) Hezb-e Eslami and their Uzbek allies were pushed out of the old Microrayan housing complex below Maranjan."
("Government-Opposition Military Clashes Continue -- More on Hekmatyar's 'Massive' Defeat," Hong Kong AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-NES-94-123, June 26, 1994.)

"Pakistan support for the offensive is understood to have involved the provision of armoured vehicles..."
(Anthony Davis, "Taking of Kabul raises regional tension as the fighting continues," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 October 1996.)

Albania
"In Sarande, what state radio characterized as 'terrorist gangs' seized 2,000 rifles and an army boat from a naval base and were shooting into the air, Reuter reported. State radio said gang members were also firing at the coast from the boat. The city library, prosecutor's office, courthouse and nine police cars were set ablaze.

In Girokaster, another southern city, tanks were spotted in the streets and automatic weapons fire could be heard."
(Christine Spolar, "Violence Continues in Albania Despite State of Emergency," Washington Post, March 4, 1997.)

Angola
"This evidence suggests that UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) is withholding guerrillas and heavy weapons in case the cease-fire collapses or the political aspects of the peace accord do not bear fruit."
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Angola: Things Fall Apart," Strategic Comments, v.2 #6, July 1996.)

"...on 15 October, 150 FAA soldiers armed with 82mm and 60mm mortars, RPG-7's, PKM submachine guns, and AK-47 rifles moved from Caconda and attacked the committee in the Pedro Macanga area, 16 km east of Caconda. They were backed by B-30 long-range artillery, killing four people and slightly wounding eight."
("FALA General Staff--Government's Military Violates Accord," Jamba Voz da Resistencia do Galo Negro in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-204, October 20, 1996.)

Armenia
"...Azerbaijan's military subunits fired on the defense positions around Verin-Chamaparak in Krasnoselskiy Rayon with howitzers, mortars, and large-caliber firearms..."
("Azerbaijan Reportedly Violates Cease-Fire," Yerevan Radio Yerevan in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-SOV-94-202, October 18, 1994.)

Bosnia-Herzegovina
"Moslem forces launched three heavy infantry attacks backed by artillery fire on the southern slope of Mt. Ozren in an effort to break through Serb defence lines....On the Teslic front, Moslems opened fire from mortars and howitzers on Serb positions and civilian targets in Vidovici and Premet.

Moslem forces also intensified fire from small arms, grenade launchers and anti-aircraft guns on Serb positions east and northeast of Doboj."
("Muslims Intensify Attacks in Northern Bosnia," Belgrade TANJUG in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-94-138 July 18, 1994.)

"Serb aggressors opened antiaircraft machine gun and small arms fire at defense lines of the Orasje-Samac battle front (northern Bosnia) overnight....A dozen 82-mm and 60-mm mortar rounds hit the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) positions in this crisis area on Thursday....Four Serb transporting helicopters were sighted at the same time landing at their stronghold of Loncari."
("Serbs Open Mortar Fire on Orasje-Samac Front," Zagreb HINA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EEU-94-158-A August 11, 1994.)

Burma
"Thai border authorities confirmed that since early December Slorc had been moving heavy weapons and reinforcements into its stronghold around Htee Par Wee Cho, or Sleeping Dog Hill, the frontline where the Burmese and Karen troops have confronted one another for the past few years....They said shelling was detected yesterday along the Karen-controlled border with Thailand."
("SLORC Breaks Cease-Fire Pledge With Karen Rebels," Bangkok THE NATION in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EAS-94-242 December 16, 1994.)

"The Burmese army sent in heavy weapons and deployed more troops early this month around Htee Par Wee Cho, or Sleeping Dog Mountain, where it confronted Karen forces and seized several frontline outposts after the KNU withdrew its fighters to settle an internal religious conflict with a group of Karen mutineers. "The frontline around Daunggwin was weakened after the Karen withdrawal and the Burmese army must have capitalized on the situation to launch an offensive against the students who possess only small and light arms," said one Thai authority who has been monitoring the border situation."
("Officials Alarmed at Burmese Border Fighting," Bangkok THE NATION in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EAS-94-243, December 17, 1994.)

"...the sound of gunfire came rolling up the misted mountainside with uncanny clarity, the rattle of small-arms fire clearly audible in the lulls between exploding artillery shells."
(Amitav Ghosh, "A Reporter at Large: Burma," The New Yorker, August 12, 1996.)

Burundi
"Fighting between Hutu rebels and the army is escalating outside Bujumbura and in the north of the country. A mortar shell was fired into the university campus of Bujumbura around 1300 today less than 100 meters from classrooms. There was no damage. Late this afternoon many mortar detonations and bursts of automatic gun fire could be heard on the hills above the capital."
("Many Casualties Reported as Fighting Escalates," Brussels La Une Radio Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-172, September 3, 1996.)

Cambodia
"The Khmer Rouge base at Phnum Voar (Vine Mountain), Kampot Province, is to be completely destroyed and all its Khmer Rouge elements killed or captured by first November this year....The base is now ringed by at least 2,000 RCAF men armed with heavy weapons such as vehicle mounted multiple rocket launchers, artillery and with anticipated air to ground rocket fire from helicopters...the Khmer Rouge...reportedly possess heavy weapons on the mountain top. These range from anti-aircraft battery to 155-mm artillery pieces."
("Government To Attack Khmer Rouge in Phnum Voar," Phnom Penh CAMBODIA TIMES in FBIS daily Report, FBIS-EAS-94-169 August 31, 1994.)

Central African Republic
"Mortar shelling from around 3:15 A.M. (0215 GMT) was accompanied by bursts of automatic weapons fire, including heavy machine-guns, from the direction of the Ngaragba district..."
("Rebel Fire Hits Bangui Hotel, French Troops Reply," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-235, December 5, 1996.)

"The French operation began at 0100 and ended at 0900 this morning. The Kasai camp was hit by fire from 20-mm guns placed on Puma helicopters....At precisely 0100, the parachutists of the 2nd Foreign Legion Airborne Regiment [REP], backed up by tanks, left Kilometer 5 [outlying area of Bangui] to descend the Avenue de l'UDEAC and enter Petevo [district of Bangui]."
("French Spokesman Defends French Attack on Mutineers," Paris Radio France International in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-97-003, January 5, 1997.)

Chechnya
"Dudayev's armed units struck at residential blocks in Argun and, breaking through Ruslan Labazanov's defense detachment, went into the town...grenade launchers and mortar fire were used in the street fighting. Yesterday two tanks and two armored personnel carriers escorted by 70 soldiers of the Interim Council home guard moved out of the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, location of the headquarters of Ruslan Khasbulatov's supporters, towards Argun..."
("Chechen City of Argun Captured by Dudayev's Men," Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-SOV-94-172 September 5, 1994.)

"Warplanes pounded the village of Komsomolskoye in southwest Chechnya for two days despite a peace accord signed by village elders earlier this week, witnesses said....Nearby Goyskoye was pounded by artillery Thursday. The village, like several others, is now no more than a battlefield where fighters armed with anti-tank rockets and assault rifles are holding off Russian armour."
("Chechen Officers Vow To Maintain War Effort," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-SOV-96-087, May 2, 1996.)

Colombia
"'They attacked us with everything -- mortars, grenades, the works. There was nothing we could do,' said Pvt. Norbey Villa..."
(Christopher Torchia, "Civil war remains a stalemate," Washington Times, September 3, 1996.)

"On 4 September, an armed front of the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] succeeded, with a mortar, in advancing as far as the vicinity of the Army Artillery School on the road to Usme, and, for several minutes, harassing the soldiers caught off guard."
("Guerrillas Seen Moving Closer to Capital," Santa Fe de Bogota SEMANA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-LAT-96-188, September 17, 1996.)

"This landing is carried out by AC-47 airplanes and Black Hawk and UH-1H helicopters, which have been giving support to land operations since Sunday," a military spokesman said."
("Army-Rebel Clashes in San Juanito Detailed," Santa Fe de Bogota El Tiempo (Internet version) in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-LAT-97-026 February 4, 1997.)

Croatia
"Croatian forces have launched two major campaigns against the so-called Republic of the Serbian Krajina (RSK), apparently aimed at reducing the military power of the RSK forces.

The initial attacks in the UN Protected Area, known as Sector West, included the first air strikes by Croatian Air Force MiG-21bis combat aircraft....Armoured formations began an assault on Pakrac on 1 May, encountering little resistance."
(Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995.)

Ethiopia
"Ethiopian forces supported by tanks, armoured vehicles and fighter planes have attacked and occupied the Somali border towns of Dolow, Luq, Bulohawo and Bohol Garas....reports indicated that the invasion was the result of fighting that has been going on for a long time in the border area between Ethiopian forces and Moslem fundamentalist guerrillas of the al-Itihad al-Islam group."
("Troops Attack Somalia, Occupy Border Towns," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-156, August 9, 1996.)

Georgia
"Abkhaz armed units bluntly violated the cease-fire agreement....They opened fire on positions of Georgian volunteer units defending the Kodori Gorge, using howitzers and Grad rocket launchers."
("Abkhaz Troops Accused of Violating Cease-Fire," Tbilisi IBERIA in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-SOV-94-126, June 30, 1994.)

Iraq
"The regime began an artillery attack on Chamchamal yesterday evening which is still continuing....In addition, a mosque was hit by the artillery fire. Meanwhile, armed helicopters from the regime were seen flying over the towns of Kifri and Klar."
("Opposition Forces Report Attacks on Army Units -- Attack on 2nd Division Forces Reported," London IRAQI BROADCASTING CORPORATION PRESS in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-NES-95-054, March 20, 1994.)

"The Turkish forces have again invaded the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan....on 6 July, a Turkish force estimated at two brigades, supported by artillery, warplanes, and helicopters, entered [word indistinct] in the Margasur district of Irbil Governorate."
("Turkish Troops Advance Inside Northern Border -- KDP Spokesman Appeals for Withdrawal," Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-NES-95-130, July 6, 1995.)

Kashmir
"Twenty-five persons were killed before the latest fighting between the two armies tapered off last week, including 20 who died when a rocket hit a mosque on the Pakistani side."
("Kashmir problem heats up again," Washington Times, February 10, 1996.)

Lebanon
"Al-Mansuri, neighboring villages in the central sector, the outskirts of Sujud and al-Rayhan, and the road leading to Bi'r Kallas came under 120-mm, 155-mm, and 175-mm artillery fire from the positions of the occupation forces in al-Zaffatah at noon today..."
("Fighting in South Intensifies; 2 IDF Soldiers Killed -- Air Raids, Shelling Reported," Beirut Radio Lebanon in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-NES-94-129, July 4, 1994.)

"It is a relentless war in which treason, booby traps, helicopter gunships and knives appear to play an equal role."
(Andrew Borowiec, "Hezbollah now sophisticated guerrilla force," Washington Times, April 19, 1996.)

Liberia
"For seven years, several militias have fought for power....An estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people have been killed and perhaps 1.5 million forced from their homes....Charles Taylor, leader of the largest faction, disbanded a 1,500-fighter-artillery unit Saturday, according to Reuter news service."
(James Rupert, "A Slim Change for Liberia," Washington Post, January 27, 1997.)

"Fighting between Liberia's rival factions has been escalating in recent days with machine-gun fire, mortars, heavy artillery and rocket-propelled grenades in use in Monrovia."
("UK, US Planning to Evacuate Europeans From Liberia," London Press Association in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-069, April 9, 1996.)

Niger
"The Dosso military detachment is the first security position in the Lake Chad region to be overrun by rebels and arms traffickers of various nationalities....on 9 July, several columns of armed men were observed in several places at the military garrison. A rocket was fired on the garrison, grenades were launched, and automatic weapons were fired. The Niger Army retaliated, and the attackers were repulsed."
("Armed Men Attack Dosso Military Garrison 9 Jul," Niamey Voix de Sahel Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-95-132, July 10, 1995.)

"A defence ministry statement earlier Wednesday said 11 rebels and one soldier died Tuesday afternoon when rebels of the Democratic Revival Front (FDR), an underground separatist movement formed by youths of Toubou, Arab and Kanouri ethnic groups, used artillery and mortars in an attack on the village of Dirkou, 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) northeast of the capital."
("Separatist Spokesman Says 34 Killed in Attack on Dirkou," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-027, February 7, 1996)

Nigeria
"For the third time this week, Cameroonian soldiers have attacked Nigerians in the Bakassi peninsula....The shelling of the Nigerian positions was combined by artillery and mortar fire supported by helicopter gunshots."
("Cameroonian Attack on Bakassi Reported," Lagos Radio Nigeria Network in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-083, April 26, 1996.)

Papua New Guinea
"Government troops led by mercenaries have begun their offensive in Papua New Guinea's island province of Bougainville with a mortar attack on its provincial capital of Arawa, rebel sources claimed Tuesday.

The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) made the claim here through its Australian spokesman Moses Havini as rebel leader Francis Ona told Australian television he would reject PNG's latest peace offer....Havini's statement said the mercenaries had begun an assault firing three mortar bombs towards Arawa, destroying a large area but causing no reported casualties."
("Mercenaries Reportedly Launch Attack on Bougainville," Hong Kong AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-EAS-97-063, March 4, 1997.)

The Philippines
"On 4 April, Abu Sayyaf attacked the village of Ipil, only 35 km from Tungawan. They were thought to have been retreating after follow-up operations by 102 Brigade, Philippines Army and air force light attack helicopters."
(Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995.)

Rwanda
"Rebel and Army gunners pounded Kigali overnight and sporadic fighting continued early Friday...as United Nations forces prepared to evacuate hundreds of displaced people from the airport, a UN spokesman said. "The fighting was very intense last night....There was a lot of heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. It's still going on this morning but it's sporadic."
("Heavy Fighting Reportedly Continues in Kigali," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-94-122, June 24, 1994.)

Sierra Leone
"The Sierra Leone army has been bombing rebel positions a mere 30 kilometres (20 miles) from the country's capital Freetown for five days....It was not known how many rebels have been killed since the start of the air and artillery operation Tuesday, but a local journalist reported seeing a pile of 80 bodies buried in a mass grave."
("Army Bombs Rebels 30 Kilometers From Capital," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-95-085, April 29, 1995.)

Somalia
"Heavy fighting has erupted in Somaliland between forces loyal to the breakaway Republic's leader Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and opposition militia in the region's second largest city of Buro....Tanks, heavy artillery and rocket propelled grenades were used during the battles, which left 12 people dead and a large number of wounded on both sides."
("Opposition Reports Heavy Fighting in Somaliland," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-95-061, March 29, 1995.)

Sri Lanka
"Tamil rebels launched a major assault on an army camp and destroyed an air force plane in attacks Thursday in eastern Sri Lanka which left more than 235 dead....Dozens of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) gunmen attacked the Vavunativu military camp in the district of Batticaloa after firing a massive shower of mortar bombs....Military authorities called in air force Mi-24 helicopter gunships to bomb suspected rebel positions after the guerrillas blasted a bridge..."
("Tamil Rebels Launch Major Assault on Army Camp; 235 Killed," Hong Kong AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-NES-97-065, March 6, 1997.)

Tajikistan
"A bomb attack in Dushanbe on 15 August, which killed a Russian soldier, was the third such attack in the capital this year."
("Hopes for peace in Tajikistan are fading," Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 September 1996.)

Turkey
"Turkish troops backed by U.S.-made Cobra helicopter gunships drove into northern Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish guerrillas, killing at least 15 rebels, security sources said today....Nine other rebels were killed in a separate operation in the remote Turkish province of Tunceli, following days of aerial reconnaissance and bombing runs against rebel positions, security sources said."
("Turkish Troops Pursue Guerrillas Into Iraq, Reuter news service report printed in the Washington Post, May 9, 1996.)

Uganda
"The WBNF (West Nile Bank Front) reportedly has bases in and help from both Zaire and Sudan, although Kinshasa and Khartoum deny this. The Ugandan press reported in late May that the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) was involved in supporting WBNF actions by shelling Ugandan troops....The government has pledged to create a rapid reaction force and make use of its helicopter gunships, believed to be four AB412s."
(Robert Lowry, "Uganda's three-sided war of attrition," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 September 1996.)

"In the army mop-up operations deep in the mountains, an 80 mm mortar was captured from the rebels, witnesses in the battlefield said yesterday....A number of guns were also captured from the rebel remnants. The army continued shelling rebel hide-outs in the mountains..."
("Army Says War 'About to End' in West, Takes Rebel Hide-Outs," Kampala THE NEW VISION in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-251, December 28, 1996.)

Yemen
"Northern troops, who have kept up a barrage of rockets and artillery fire on the southern stronghold for more than a week, advanced overnight into the town of Bi'r Ahmad....Fighting had died down earlier Friday but southern troops were massing armoured cars to launch a counter-offensive"
("Further Reportage on Fighting Around Aden -- North Troops Keep Up 'Blitz'," Paris AFP in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-NES-94-123, June 24, 1994.)

"Saudi Arabian and Yemeni forces clashed along their disputed border in early January for the second time in a month....Fighting involving APCs, heavy machine guns and rocket propelled grenades continued for three days....There were similar clashes along the remote and rugged frontier last month..."
(James Bruce, "Troops clash in Saudi-Yemen border dispute," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 January 1995.)

Zaire
"Heavy weapons fire was heard in the early evening in the area of the airport coming from close to the border, as Zairean army chiefs again accused Rwanda of stirring up unrest and aiding Tutsi rebels fighting the government forces....North Kivu military commander Ngwala Panzu told journalists at his headquarters in the city that his men had come under grenade and automatic weapon fire early Thursday by armed men from Rwanda.

They launched the attack a few hundred metres (yards) from the airport runway, he said adding that Zairean troops, who still remained in control of the airport, had fired back with mortars and machine guns."
("Artillery Barrage Booms Around Goma; Troops Out in Force." Paris AFP, in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-AFR-96-213, October 31, 1996.)

"Every morning, from an airport at the edge of this crumbling city, Yugoslav jets with Ukrainian pilots take off with a scream, headed east toward a huge, shifting war zone, bombing anything that moves in the impenetrable forest below."
(Howard W. French, "In Zaire's Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for Combat," New York Times, February 12, 1997.)

III. Key Factors in Weapons Transfers and Their Policy Implications

This section uses a diagram (see p. 15) of light weapons transfers as the basis for describing and analyzing the dynamics of conventional weapons transfers. The diagram is intended to provide an overview of light weapons transfers; it is not intended to represent every possible phase of the light weapons transfer process. In particular, it has limited representation of feedback loops, and only presents a few levels of transfers.

Because light weapons may last for decades, a single weapon may be transferred many more times than can be represented in the diagram. For example, an M-16 rifle could be transferred legally to a foreign government's military, and then stolen and diverted to an insurgent group in that country. It could be transferred many more times -- to other insurgent groups, to black market dealers, or to another country's military, among others. Only the original sale and the subsequent diversion would be represented on the existing diagram. The diagram could, of course, be extended to account for subsequent transfers. Although only the first two transfers are included in the existing diagram, policy proposals must take into account the full weapons life cycle if they are to be effective. Proposals to destroy surplus weapons or weapons remaining after conflict ends break the chain of transfers and the resulting cycle of violence. Proposals to stockpile surplus weapons or place them in armories (which are often poorly guarded) are less likely to be effective.

This section begins by describing some key factors that affect the context within which weapons transfers take place. This is followed by descriptions and analyses of production, domestic demand, and foreign demand. In each case, there is an explanation of the relevant portion of the diagram, followed by an assessment of how the diagram might differ for transfers of major conventional weapons, and illustrative policy proposals. These proposals include options for increasing the transparency and openness with which transfers take place, improving oversight over weapons transfer processes, and fostering restraint among various types of state- and non-state suppliers and recipients.

The Context
The diagram deals with sources of supply and demand for light weapons. Several other factors are important in understanding the framework within which light weapons flows and policy proposals are assessed. These include the causes of the conflict under examination, the current stage of that conflict, and the level of armaments available when conflict begins. These factors are not represented in the diagram, but are summarized below.

The causes of conflict may be quite varied, ranging from ethnic conflict to border disputes to disputes over resources such as water, food, and energy sources. Weapons flows often exacerbate conflict, but in many cases these flows are a symptom of conflict, rather than a cause.

While the cause of a conflict may influence what weapons are used, the preceding survey of recent conflicts shows that participants in most current conflicts employ both major and light conventional weaponry, regardless of cause. The financial resources of the involved parties and whether they are states or insurgent groups seem much more important in determining which types of weapons will be used.

Another important factor is the stage of conflict. A conflict might be classified as possible, probable, imminent, ongoing/increasing, ongoing/stable, ongoing/subsiding, or completed. The stage of conflict may affect which weapons are available to the combatants as a result of embargoes and the like. But it is not clear that the stage of conflict affects the choice of light versus major conventional weapons.

The stages of conflict may determine which policy proposals are most effective. Proposals that might be useful after fighting has halted, such as attempting to demobilize and disarm combatants, might be useless or even counterproductive before that time.

The level of weapons present when conflict begins is important in evaluating policy options. Participants in conflict may have independent sources of production, or may be partially or totally dependent on outside suppliers for weapons, spare parts, or maintenance assistance. They may also begin with significantly different levels of weapons stocks and access to replacements. In evaluating policy proposals, it will be important to know the level of armaments when conflict began, to help determine whether a particular measure would place one side at a disadvantage. For example, the effectiveness of policy proposals to block resupply will be markedly less effective if the recipient has independent sources of supply.

Production
This portion of the diagram deals with the production side of the equation. Suppliers of light weapons include governments, companies, insurgent groups, and individuals. In contrast, suppliers of major conventional weapons are most often governments and companies. Light weapons transfers often involve non-state actors, while major conventional weapons transfers are more often involve state actors. In part, the focus on non-state actors for light weapons transfers may result from financial constraints; insurgent groups are less likely than states to have the resources necessary to purchase large weapons. In addition, groups engaged in guerrilla operations can conceal light weapons much more readily than larger weapons.

Legal weapons production is generally carried out by government or private manufacturers. Illegal production is more often undertaken by individuals or small workshops. Some production may be undistributed, and may remain as stocks in the producing country.

While production of light weapons can take place in small workshops (despite safety hazards), production of major conventional weapons takes place predominantly in manufacturing plants. In addition, the portion of the diagram dealing with illegal production is much less relevant for major conventional weapons; that link is weak or non-existent in many countries.

Materiel produced may be used domestically (see domestic demand, below) or transferred to other countries (see foreign demand, below). Types of transfers may include: transfers of complete weapons, transfers of the technology necessary to develop weapons, transfers of the technology necessary to produce weapons, transfers of spare parts, and transfers of disassembled weapons.

Illustrative Policy Options for Addressing Production
In the short- to medium-term, the most feasible policy options with respect to production of both light and major conventional weapons involve increasing the transparency of production. Transparency measures requiring disclosure of production capacity and actual production may significantly increase understanding of legal transfers. Investigation of these data could highlight companies' gray-market and black-market transactions by indicating when the combination of stocks and sales is less than the quantity of weapons produced. It will not be possible to monitor illegal production in this manner. Measuring illegal production can be done on an ad hoc basis through in-country investigative work, albeit often at significant risk to the investigators.

Another way to increase information about production and weapons flows is to require each weapon manufactured (and perhaps even ammunition) to have a unique identifying mark. This would facilitate tracking weapons back to their producers. New weapons that were produced illegally would be distinguished by their lack of such markings. Unfortunately, such tags would not help trace the millions of light weapons already in circulation. Tagging new weapons would be useful for both light and major conventional weapons. Since there are many fewer major conventional weapons in circulation, it might also be possible to tag major conventional weapons that have already been deployed.

Controlling production of both light and major conventional weapons has historically been very difficult, because of lack of political will and economic pressures from manufacturers (especially with respect to major weapons). Nonetheless, controlling production is possible in certain specialized cases, such as anti-personnel landmines. Some governments have agreed to stop producing certain types of landmines, and a treaty to codify this arrangement is under negotiation.

It may also be possible to apply international conventions to domestic production. Governments have generally adhered to the 1899 Hague Declaration which bans the use of dum-dum bullets in combat; this convention reflected a consensus that such bullets caused unnecessary suffering. However, these bullets are still produced and used by civilians. By banning such ammunition entirely, decision-makers would be agreeing that civilians should not undergo such suffering either. While controlling production is generally a longer term approach, it can be very useful in establishing and enforcing global norms. This type of control will be difficult to accomplish with both light and major conventional weapons.

Domestic Demand
This refers to demand for light weapons within the producing country. The source of demand can be state armed forces or security agencies, or legal private owners, such as individuals or private dealers. Light weapons may also be diverted to illegal private owners, such as criminal organizations and black-market dealers.

While light weapons may be produced for all of these users, major conventional weapons tend to be produced for state forces, rather than legal private owners. Similarly, diversion to illegal private owners is much more difficult for major conventional weapons than for light weapons, so this portion of the diagram is less applicable to major conventional weapons.

Illustrative Policy Options for Addressing Domestic Demand
In dealing with domestic demand for light weapons, transparency, oversight, and control measures are all useful. Increasing the information available about the level of armaments available to the state armed forces may prompt calls for limitations on these weapons. Governments can also pursue more stringent regulation of gun purchases as a means of controlling private consumption of weapons. Improved tracking of weapons held by state armed forces and legal private owners could help prevent diversion to illegal private owners.

In general, all of these measures will probably be markedly more effective when applied to "legitimate" users such as state armed forces and private individuals who legally own weapons. However, some domestic gun control proposals may also help limit illegal purchases. For example, the national "one gun a month" legislation currently pending in the United States would prevent buyers from purchasing more than one gun per month. This would help prevent "straw purchases," whereby authorized purchasers buy multiple weapons on behalf of prohibited purchasers. This legislation could help limit illegal domestic purchases, and could affect illegal foreign transfers as well (see below).

Enforcement and strengthening of existing national legislation regulating or restricting domestic gun ownership can aid efforts to control light weapons. Another policy option is to examine different countries' laws, and to use the strongest and most effective provisions as models for other countries' efforts.

In contrast to demand for light weapons, domestic demand for major conventional weapons is primarily limited to state armed forces. Transparency efforts may be effective at the national level. However, because of the common argument that "if we don't sell, somebody else will," control efforts will probably be most successful if they are multilateral. One important option for leading suppliers such as the United States is unilateral initiation of restraint, with a commitment to continue if others make the effort multilateral within a specified period of time.

Foreign Demand
The term "foreign demand" covers demand in other countries that is met through legal or illegal means. Legal routes include transfers from countries, companies, and individuals. Those supplied through legal means may include state armed forces and security agencies, insurgent groups, and private owners and dealers.

Illegal routes for light and major conventional weapons transfers include covert transfers, black market sales, and transfers through theft and diversion. States, insurgent groups, criminal organizations (local, national, and transnational), and black market dealers may all be provided with weapons transfers through illegal means. While there have been many scandals involving covert transfers of major conventional weapons, the covert and black-market paths are even more prominent for light weapons transfers.

There are many types of financial arrangements for transfers of light and major conventional weapons. In general, light weapons transfers more often involve other financial arrangements such as cash purchases or barter for consumable items such as food, although there are significant exceptions.⁶ Major conventional weapons are obtained through leases, aid programs, and deferred payments more often than are light weapons. Major conventional weapons transfers more often feature offset, coproduction, and codevelopment arrangements, although coproduction arrangements for light weapons systems also seem to be increasing.

Illustrative Policy Options for Addressing Foreign Demand
Some of the measures suggested for controlling domestic demand are also relevant to foreign demand for light weapons. The proposed US one gun a month limit could reduce illegal trafficking in light weapons by affecting the sources of supply. Similarly, proposals to increase the transparency of transactions between supplier governments, companies, or military forces, and their foreign counterparts could foster restraint. Increasing the transparency of transfers can help indicate which countries and groups are supplying and receiving weapons and highlight destabilizing patterns or transfers. Many weapons transfers that could have proceeded in private have been stopped when exposed to public scrutiny.⁷

Policy options for increasing the transparency of foreign transfers also include various means of increasing the amount of information available through the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Options include expanding the register from its current seven categories of major conventional weapons, establishing a parallel global register or regional registers to cover light weapons, and requiring governments and companies to document all weapons transfers. Current controversy over the register suggests that it may be more effective to establish parallel regional registers on weapons not covered by the current global register than to expand the current register. These regional registers could be implemented under UN auspices, and could be consolidated into an annual global report on light weapons transfers.

Another useful step would be dealing more prominently with light weapons in the Wassenaar Arrangement, the successor to the COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) regime. More than 30 suppliers participate in this regime, which could provide a regular opportunity for consultation on light weapons transfers. These weapons are already included in the Wassenaar weapons lists, but they seem to have been omitted from most if not all of the group's discussions.

Confidence- and security-building measures can be useful means of decreasing demand, particularly among state armed forces and insurgent groups. Conflict-prevention measures can help prevent destabilizing buildups among state and non-state forces. Similarly, efforts to resolve conflicts at the local, national, or regional level can also decrease demand.

It may also be possible to distinguish among weapons featuring the most modern technology ("high-tech"), and those that are less capable technically ("low-tech"). High-tech light weapons include advanced portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, such as systems with "fire and forget" capability. Most light weapons are low-tech; they tend to require constant guidance to reach the target. Countries or companies that transfer high-tech weapons run the risk that their forces will eventually have to fight adversaries armed with similar weapons. In addition, many portable high-tech weapons can be used against civilian targets such as civilian aircraft. Global agreements to ban transfers of portable high-tech weaponry, while difficult to achieve, could help resolve this problem.

Two especially promising routes for controlling light weapons flows deal with destroying particular weapons and limiting flows of ammunition. By destroying surplus weapons and the weapons that remain after conflicts end, "recycling" of weapons from one conflict to another becomes impossible. As noted above, light weapons may last for decades, so destroying a single weapon may prevent a dozen or more transfers over the remaining life of that weapon. Destruction breaks the cycle of violence. Limiting flows of ammunition could also help reduce the killing. Ammunition tends to be high weight and low value, making it unattractive to smuggle. In addition, ammunition is a consumable, highly in demand during conflicts. Controlling ammunition flows could help increase pressure to end conflicts earlier, since participants could face a choice between reaching a settlement and running out of ammunition. These two proposals are mutually reinforcing; destroying surplus and excess weapons and limiting ammunition could significantly reduce both the likelihood of conflict and the consequences of conflict.

Many of these proposals could also help increase transparency, oversight, and control of major conventional weapons. Strengthening the UN Register and the Wassenaar arrangement, pursuing more effective confidence- and security-building measures, limiting high-tech transfers, and destroying surplus stocks could all be quite valuable in this regard. The light weapons policy options that "map" onto major conventional weapons least directly are those dealing with illicit trafficking and ammunition.

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Endnotes

1. Analysts have not yet reached consensus on a definition of light and major conventional weapons. For the purposes of this paper, light weapons include: pistols and revolvers, rifles, machine guns, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, mortars up to 100mm, and anti-personnel mines. Major conventional weapons include: tanks, airplanes, ships, helicopters, mortars 100mm or over, artillery, anti-armour mines, and armored personnel carriers.
   
   

2. Recent publications include: Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, Laura W. Reed, eds., Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995).

   Susannah L. Dyer and Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, "Controlling Global Light Weapons Transfers: Working Toward Policy Options," prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in San Diego, CA, April 1996.

   Michael Klare and David Andersen, A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America, (Washington, DC: Arms Sales Monitoring Project, Federation of American Scientists, 1996).

   Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security, (New Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and the British American Security Information Council, 1996).

   The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch has produced several publications based on field mission research on light weapons transfers and violations of the laws of war in countries such as Angola, Turkey and Rwanda. Their work also addresses particular light weapons such as landmines, blinding lasers, and cluster bombs.

   The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva has published a thirteen volume series on Managing Arms in Peace Processes. This series is an excellent source of country case study material, including Liberia, Haiti, Mozambique, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and the former Yugoslavia.

3. For descriptions of nearly 60 ongoing projects on light weapons in countries around the world, see Current Projects on Light Weapons, Project on Light Weapons Working Paper No. 1, (Washington, DC and London: British American Security Information Council, February 1996) and the February 1997 supplement.
   
   

4. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) coordinates the Project on Light Weapons, an international network of almost 250 academics, journalists, activists, and field researchers from nearly 40 countries. Over the past two years, members of this network have developed a research and policy agenda to assess the extent of light weapons transfers, as well as their political, military, sociological, and economic effects. The work of the Project covers a range of issues such as: the linkages between domestic gun control and international control of light weapons, light weapons destruction efforts, and the sociological consequences of the culture of violence worldwide.
   
   

5. Michael Klare, correspondence with Natalie Goldring and Susannah Dyer, 2 February 1997.
   
   

6. One recent example is Malaysia's purchase of 20 MiG-29 fighter aircraft from Russia, which is being paid for partially with nearly $100 million worth of palm oil. See Robert Karniol, "Malaysia signs to buy 20 MiG-29 fighters," Jane's Defence Weekly, 18 June 1994.
   
   

7. Such scrutiny has been especially effective when the potential recipients have been human rights abusers. Establishing national, regional, and international codes of conduct is one way to address this concern by denying weapons transfers to countries that repeatedly violate internationally recognized human rights standards.

BASIC's Project on Light Weapons is an international network of almost 240 academics, journalists, activists, and field researchers from nearly 40 countries. Members of this network are developing a research and policy agenda to assess the extent of light weapons transfers, as well as their political, military, sociological, and economic effects. BASIC gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Ford Foundation for the Project on Light Weapons. For more information, please see the Project on Light Weapons homepage.

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