BASIC RESEARCH REPORT

April 1996, Research Report 96.1

Nuclear Futures:
The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Security Policy

Executive Summary
The end of the Cold War produced a new era for the five declared nuclear-weapon states. The stark US-Soviet nuclear confrontation abated, and for the first time arsenals began to shrink. A widespread public perception developed that the nuclear era itself had faded. That perception is incorrect.

All five nuclear-weapon states are committed to retaining their nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. For Western states, this commitment increasingly stems from concerns about the availability of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist groups.

Perhaps most significantly, the perceived threat from biological and chemical weapons now rivals that from nuclear arms. A new report by the US Department of Defense states for the first time that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as ballistic missiles is the preeminent threat to US security.

This perceived threat has led to the development of new nuclear doctrines and weapons systems. US policy now requires the capability to hit targets anywhere in the world. An earth-penetrating nuclear bomb, capable of hitting underground facilities, is being developed.

France and British doctrine now calls for sub-strategic use of nuclear weapons. A new British single-warhead missile expands the potential for first use of nuclear weapons. A planned new air-launched nuclear missile will offer the same potential to the French.

Russian policy now mirrors Western policy during the Cold War. It holds that nuclear weapons are needed to compensate for weak conventional forces. Russia s no-first-use policy has been abandoned as a consequence.

Chinese doctrine is developing the concepts of limited deterrence and flexible response , although it presently lacks the capability to undertake them. Continued Chinese nuclear testing is one result.

Outside of the five nuclear-weapon states, concerns about proliferation persist. India and Pakistan threaten to conduct nuclear tests. North Korea's nuclear endeavours appear curtailed. Iraq s nuclear ambitions have been thwarted for the present moment.

Meanwhile, US defense agencies report that many countries have chemical and biological weapon capabilities. The size of Iraq's chemical and biological programmes has shocked outside observers. These weapons are substantially easier to develop than nuclear arms; biological weapons are potentially as lethal.

The policies nuclear-weapon states are pursuing in response to these threats are counter-productive. The threat of use of nuclear weapons does not effectively deter attack with weapons of mass destruction. The most likely outcome of the actual use of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon state is eventual retaliatory attacks, perhaps with chemical or biological weapons.

There are countervailing trends that make any use of weapons of mass destruction less viable. These trends also indicate an alternative policy to current nuclear doctrine. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, like the one just put in place in Africa, place legal constraints on the use of nuclear weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans chemical weapons, should soon enter into force. A review conference on the Biological Weapons Convention this fall may iplement compliance and verification measures for that treaty. The 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference made the NPT permanent and established a set of Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Pursuing those principles will better address the security threats that will emerge in the coming century.

The most direct step would be for the nuclear-weapon states to undertake formal or informal discussions about how the reach the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Full text of Nuclear Futures:  The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Security Policy

Back to Nuclear and WMD