NATO ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1996 are expected to set the date for a special Summit of Alliance leaders. President Clinton proposed that the Summit should be held in the first half of 1997 and should focus on NATO enlargement. It is likely that NATO will issue invitations to at least three Central European countries to begin accession negotiations to join NATO. President Clinton has furthermore announced that "by 1999, NATO's 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO".¹

This paper argues that the planned expansion of the Alliance into the selected few in Central Europe is already causing tensions in Europe by:

alienating Russia;
exacerbating existing inter-state frictions between the new members and the countries that will be left out;
fuelling a new militarism in Europe by inflating defence budgets and introducing advanced weapons to new and potential new members who do not need them and cannot afford them.

There is still time for Western leaders to reconsider. NATO could take a number of steps which would reverse the deterioration in relations with Russia, promote security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and safeguard democratic accountability and transparency. A comprehensive package of measures could include:

Conducting a thorough cost-benefit analysis of expansion which should be made publicly available.
Strengthening cooperation with CEE countries through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and using the Baltic Action Plan as a model for Central Europe and the Balkans.
Making PfP documents and other bilateral military cooperation agreements publicly available. Transparency and openness will reduce suspicion and promote regional cooperation between partner countries.
Conceding that admission to the EU should be the priority for CEE countries. This will enhance security in Europe by building economic stability and integration. Prior to this, candidate countries should become more formally associated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Declaring NATO's intention not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states and giving serious consideration to the possibility of creating a Central European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CENWFZ).
Commiting NATO countries and other CFE signatories to adapt the CFE Treaty by adjusting NATO overall levels to accommodate new members and taking steps towards a progressive demilitarisation of Europe.

Chapter One: Baiting the Bear

"The wise way for the West to consolidate its victory in the Cold War is not to drive Russia into an aggrieved corner, but to try to engage it in a just and durable peace. If Moscow shows signs of again threatening its neighbours, there will be ample time to expand NATO. Until then, there is no reason to rush ahead".²

The paradox is that the planned expansion of the Alliance may diminish rather than increase security across Europe. Russian officials have sent mixed signals to the West, some have warned NATO that Moscow would re-assess its strategy in the event of expansion.

Although Russia currently lacks the means to counteract NATO's political, economic and military power, there is a risk that the region between Berlin and Moscow will be re-militarised and the security of existing NATO countries, let alone the security of the new members from CEE, will be compromised. Russia has enough bite to reverse the process of conventional arms control in Europe, to block the ratification of START II and to forge a countervailing alliance with former Soviet states, including Ukraine. The recent collapse of negotiations on the interpretation of the ABM Treaty shows the dangers. Internal political developments in Russia may also be adversely affected by NATO's expansion. Nationalist, anti-western sentiment may be galvanised, threatening a reverse in the democratic development in the country.

Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov said, "We are, of course, far from the idea that the widening [of] NATO is specially designed for a strike at Russia. But intention in politics is a variable whereas potential is a constant ... the moving of NATO's military infrastructure closer to Russia's territory worsens both the purely military and geopolitical situations".³

Since the publication of the Study on NATO Enlargement by NATO in September 1995, there has been a year of talks between NATO and Russia. NATO leaders had a series of meetings with Russian President Yeltsin, General Lebed, Foreign Minister Primakov and Defence Ministers Grachev and Rodionov where they continued to emphasise that NATO's expansion is not directed against Russia.

On 6 September 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher proposed that NATO and Russia sign a formal Charter which "should create standing arrangements for consultation and joint action between Russia and the Alliance ... [W]e share an interest in preventing armed conflict. We are equally threatened by proliferation, nuclear smuggling, and the spectre of disasters like Chernobyl. The Charter we seek should give us a permanent mechanism for crisis management so we can respond together immediately as these challenges arise".⁴ However, almost three months since the announcement of this initiative, NATO has made no concrete proposals on the content of the Charter. Rather, the relationship with Russia appears to have been placed on the backburner. Except in IFOR, practical contacts between NATO and Russia have been reduced during 1996. Russia has downgraded its cooperation with the Alliance. The Russian Individual Partnership Programme which expired in 1995 has not been renewed. If NATO leaders are serious about developing a formal relationship with Russia they should proceed quickly and openly. They should also consider a similar arrangement with the Ukraine.

Despite claims that NATO does not wish to see the redrawing of division lines in Europe, there is no evidence that it has seriously considered Russian concerns. NATO insists that the continued process of internal adaptation, announced during the NATO meeting in Berlin in June 1996, the development of its relations with Russia, and expansion are being pursued independently of one another. Indeed, NATO officials in background briefings have stated that the invitations to new members should go out next year even if there is no agreement on institutionalising relations with Russia. NATO is concerned that waiting for an agreement with Russia would postpone enlargement. Such an attitude clearly demonstrates that NATO has little interest in accommodating Russian security fears. Russian objections should be respected and not ignored.

By contrast, Russia argues that these processes should be linked. Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said: "There is a growing realisation of the three main problems [facing NATO]: the transformation of NATO, Russia's special relations with the Alliance, and its expansion. We believe that they should be given consecutive consideration".⁵ President Yeltsin said: "First a treaty with Russia [should be concluded], and then the issue of NATO enlargement should be decided. Not the other way around".⁶

This proposition is not as unreasonable as it might appear. Prior to the last expansion of NATO with the re-unification of Germany, then US President George Bush initiated the process of NATO's adaptation. At the London Summit of 1990, NATO announced initiatives to develop "political" rather than strictly military functions. The adaptation of NATO in the 1990-91 period was undertaken partly to appease Russian concerns for the first NATO expansion. Former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev accepted this, and the period which followed was characterised by unprecedented NATO-Russia cooperation.

President Clinton should take a leaf out of President Bush's book. He is on record praising President Bush in that he "helped to reunify Germany". If in 1990-91 the US accepted the necessity to implement changes in NATO and develop a broad consensus with Moscow prior to expansion to East Germany why not now? NATO's internal adaptation should be the absolute minimum requirement before NATO's second expansion.

NATO has not convinced Russia that it has fundamentally changed by adopting a more "political" rather than purely "military" outlook. Michael Portillo, UK's Secretary for Defence, reminded everyone that "hard defence must remain at NATO's core. This is not the time for NATO to go soft, and certainly not to convert itself into an organisation mainly capable of peacekeeping operations". Furthermore under a section of his speech titled, "The Threats to Peace" he argued that: "Russia's Armed Forces are not those that we faced during the Cold War. They clearly have grave problems. But they are very large, with a considerable quantity of sophisticated weapons - both conventional and nuclear. Russian capability in strategic nuclear missile submarines has not diminished".⁷

Such rhetoric, reminiscent of the Cold War era, can only further alienate Russia and crystallise fears among the politico-military circles in Moscow of the impending expansion of NATO surrounding Russia. Helmut Kohl is alerted to this danger, and as far back as 1994 he argued that, "In Russia there are deeply-rooted fears of encirclement and isolation, and not only in military circles. NATO must also take these fears seriously, based as they are on historical experience, if it wants to create a wide-ranging security order for the whole of Europe".⁸

CEE countries are keen to be included in NATO partly because this symbolises a break from the communist past. More importantly, however, they want insurance against the possibility of renewed Russian expansionism. Although it is never explicitly mentioned in diplomatic language, they still perceive NATO as an anti-Russian alliance.

Chapter Two: Dividing the New Democracies

"Bringing countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the NATO Alliance before the end of this decade risks making the United States and Europe less secure rather than more so ... NATO expansion would divide rather than unite Europe, creating new security frontiers that would initially exclude some of the new Eastern European nations, like the Baltic countries".⁹

Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and possibly Slovenia are the favourites for early admission to NATO. The remaining CEE countries would have to wait. This piecemeal expansion of NATO risks exacerbating existing inter-state tensions and creating new frictions between the new members and the countries that will be left out.

In 1994, Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued that: "Enduring stability in Eastern Europe can be achieved only if individual countries are not excluded. A public debate now on possible candidates or criteria for membership would merely have led to new divisions and thus new tensions in Europe".¹⁰ NATO leaders, including the German government, fail to explain why this policy is about to be reversed now.

CEE countries have recently made some important steps in normalising relations with each other. Hungary has signed bilateral treaties with Slovakia and Romania, which among other issues, deal with the status of the large Hungarian minorities in the other two countries. Leaders of these countries openly acknowledge that these bilateral treaties were agreed in order to improve their countries' prospect for admission to NATO.

Hungary's admission at the expense of Romania and Slovakia may increase tension in the region. The integration of Hungary into Western structures may encourage ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania to demand autonomy and eventual union with Hungary.

The Assembly of the Western European Union has expressed deep concern about this question. In a recent report on the Eastern Dimension of European Security, Rapporteur Mr. Antretter, wrote that "... It is to be hoped that [the Hungary-Romania treaty on arrangements governing relations and treatment of minorities] will work better than the treaty concluded earlier between Hungary and Slovakia.... About 600,000 ethnic Hungarians are living in Slovakia and want collective ethnic autonomy, which Slovakia is not ready to grant. But the Hungarian minority also accuses the Slovak authorities of passing legislation restricting their minority rights".¹¹ This situation clearly has the potential to provoke future conflict. It is difficult to see, therefore, how NATO membership for Hungary would enhance security in this region.

NATO expansion into the selected few in CEE threatens to unravel those bilateral treaties. In Hungary, Slovakia and Romania there is considerable domestic opposition to the treaties which may increase, at least in the countries which will be left out. The fear in Slovakia and Romania is that once Hungary becomes a member it could block their own admission to the Alliance.

The Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs recently warned NATO not to proceed with the selective approach to expansion. He said: "Decisions that might impair the compactness of the Central European space and that could lead in the future to different security policy positions of Central European states and different levels of security would be in my view counterproductive and strategically wrong, bearing potential destabilizing factors".¹²

Warnings have been issued by Romania that exclusion from NATO could provoke an overhaul of its defence strategy. Gheorghe Tinca, the Romanian Defence Minister said that if Hungary were admitted to NATO ahead of Romania, it would be, "detrimental to the region's balance and could even lead to an arms race."¹³

Chapter Three: NATO expansion fuels
military spending in Europe

The prospect of NATO membership has sent military developments in CEE countries spinning out of control. Defence budgets are on the increase at a time when there is no conceivable military threat to Europe, and when they are declining in the rest of Europe.

Hungary has just announced a 22% increase in defence expenditure for 1997. A Hungarian official responsible for defence industry matters, cited as the main reason for this rise the need to revamp the military to meet NATO expectations. The majority of the rise will go into defence procurement.¹⁴ While acknowledging that immediate increases in 1997 are not possible for economic reasons, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski has stated that by 2002 Poland should double its defence spending.¹⁵ The Czech Ministry of Defence aims to more than double its budget for weapons procurement until the turn of the century.¹⁶ Slovenia, another NATO hopeful, decided to speed up the modernisation programme of its armed forces. The Slovenian ministry of defence anticipates spending $493 million, originally allocated for defence expenditure over a ten-year period, by the end of 1998.¹⁷ Lithuania intends to increase defence spending from its current level of around 3.3% of the overall national budget to around 5-6% in 1997 and to maintain it at this level for at least the next ten years.¹⁸

Western governments are offering "state-of-the-art" weapons systems at knock-down prices in offset packages aimed at attracting buyers among the CEE. One Central European official commented that the weapons manufacturers marketing their products in CEE are "like drug dealers. First you give it to them for free".

Romania decided to purchase a small number of F-16 fighter aircraft, with a view to either buy more later on, or to co-produce them locally.¹⁹ Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have already expressed a keen interest in buying Western fighter aircraft. The Swedish government is offering Hungary a $1 billion financial and industrial offset package to induce Budapest to buy up to 60 Gripen combat aircraft.²⁰ The competitor, Lockheed Martin, offered Hungary F-16 fighter aircraft for $24 million each.²¹

Other advanced weapons systems, such as the Cobra attack helicopter, are also aggressively marketed in CEE. Romania announced that in cooperation with the US Bell Helicopter Fextron company, it will manufacture 96 Cobra helicopters.²²

The transfer of state-of-the-art weapons to CEE countries is a short-sighted policy, driven by both the suppliers' economic considerations and the desire to maximise political influence in these new democracies. The United States has assembled a foreign military aid subsidy package and is showing that it intends to use armaments as its principal means of foreign policy in the region. In 1997 Washington will provide $60 million for military assistance to selected CEE countries. This would subsidise the purchase of US second-hand F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft and help to install joint air traffic management systems through the Regional Airspace Initiative which has already been offered to the Central European countries and to the Baltics. Although the financial package offered by the US is relatively small, it sets the precedent for future, more extensive military assistance.

The qualitative military upgrading of CEE states is defended on the grounds that without NATO membership, CEE countries would spend even more for their defence, because they would not have the support of their allies. Although the improvement of the capabilities of CEE states in terms of air defence and compatibility with NATO and UN forces in peacekeeping operations is considered desirable, there is no justification for the upgrading of offensive capabilities.

The current climate in Europe does not warrant increased military spending. On the contrary, NATO should initiate steps towards the progressive demilitarisation of the continent. The Alliance already agreed that the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) should be adapted to reflect the new post Cold War reality in Europe. One idea that merits attention is to freeze current levels of holdings. All CFE signatories, with the exception of Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, possess fewer Treaty Limited Equipment than they are entitled to by the Treaty. This trend is likely to continue. Planning in CFE states envisages substantial future reductions in force structures. The security situation in Europe would be enhanced by codifying this in a CFE II, reducing current limits.

Chapter Four: NATO should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of expansion

The Study on NATO Enlargement issued by the Alliance in September 1995 failed to provide an estimate of the financial costs and how to meet them. NATO will not consider how much enlargement costs until after it issued invitations to new members to join.

NATO should conduct and publish a cost-benefit analysis of its policy on enlargement. A public debate on the financial costs of enlargement should be conducted prior to the Alliance inviting new members to join. NATO officials argue that conducting such a study now would mean identifying the countries that it will accept as new members. However, NATO could publish a study of the costs for all Partnership for Peace countries which have publicly declared their desire to join the Alliance.

In a letter to BASIC dated 14 May 1996, NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke confirmed that "NATO has not conducted any such calculations, nor associated itself with any of the existing research, which is based on speculative scenarios and assumptions regarding prospective new members ... Assessments of the financial costs involved will only be possible once the Alliance has identified specific prospective new members".

In addition, he committed the Alliance to conduct an open public debate on the financial costs associated with enlargement. He said: "I am sure that cost factors will receive due public and legislative attention, bearing in mind that parliaments will have to ratify accession to the North Atlantic Treaty". However, it would be politically difficult for national legislatures to discuss the financial implications of enlargement, once NATO has committed itself and issued invitations to new members.

In March 1996, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the costs of NATO enlargement for the first fifteen years will be between $60.6 billion and $124.7 billion. This estimate was based on the assumption of membership for the 4 Visegrad countries. It called upon the Alliance to make its own cost analysis arguing that "an estimate of the potential costs is critical to informed debate on whether the Alliance should expand. Those costs could be substantial and for this reason they deserve analysis".²³

Using this money to prepare CEE for EU accession would be a much better use of resources. Military aid to the 4 Visegrad countries could be better spent in helping Russia and the rest of CEE countries to modernize their economies and to strengthen their democratic institutions. A foreign aid programme would go a long way toward reducing insecurity and promoting stability throughout the region.

The Study on NATO Enlargement gives a clear warning to prospective candidates to be prepared to meet the costs: "It will be important to ensure that potential new members are fully aware that they face considerable financial obligations when joining the Alliance". [Para 67] It is hard to see how a proper assessment of each country's suitability for NATO membership can be conducted without a discussion of their economic capability. Equally, NATO must be able to withstand the financial cost of extending security guarantees to the 4 Visegrad countries.

Even the Visegrad countries, who are economically stronger than the rest of the CEE countries, will struggle to meet the costs of accession to NATO. The United States, in particular, as the most enthusiastic supporter of enlargement, may subsidise the military modernisation of the four countries to meet NATO standards by foreign military aid perhaps comparable to the one given to Israel and Egypt.

The CBO study estimated that existing NATO members will be asked to contribute between $18.6 billion and $72.9 billion, whereas the 4 Visegrad states will spend between $42 billion and $51.8 billion over the same period. Those states may be asked to increase their defence expenditure by at least 60% and possibly by over 80% to cope with the added costs of enlargement.

The Alliance's Study on NATO Enlargement says: "Financially, new members would be expected to contribute their share, as from the start, to all new programme activities, with a contribution level based, in a general way, on 'ability to pay'". Given that the "ability to pay" of the 4 Visegrad countries is limited, a different political assumption than that used by CBO would be for the US to contribute 50% the costs that the four countries are expected to meet. This would increase the US contribution to between $25.8 billion and $44.8 billion over a fifteen-year period.

According to current projections for the Polish economy of a yearly average growth of 5.5%, Poland's GNP will grow approximately 30% between 1995 and 2000. The decisive factor is not the military burden that the CBO report implies, but the capacity of the Polish economy to grow and maintain the current growth rates, argued a Polish defence economist.

Still, according to the CBO study, the 60% minimum increase in defence spending brought on by NATO expansion cannot be easily accommodated with these levels of economic growth. The Polish taxpayers should be aware of the financial sacrifices they would have to make in order to join NATO. According to a poll conducted by the US Information Service (USIS) in 1996 only 16% of the Polish public supports the idea of increased military spending at the expense of education or health care.

The USIS concludes that "A majority of Central and East Europeans favour their own countries' eventual NATO membership, although this sentiment has weakened somewhat. Many anticipate greater benefit in joining the EU than NATO ... Virtually no public supports the potential duties of NATO membership. This discrepancy reflects a lack of understanding of what NATO membership entails, or the expectation that once accepted, these new NATO members will be exempt from certain responsibilities".²⁴

Chapter Five: Strengthening PfP and proposing regional security plans as an alternative to expansion

The enhancement of the network of cooperative activities developed through PfP should reduce the sense of insecurity amongst CEE countries. In addition, NATO should develop and make publicly available packages of regional security cooperation with Central European and Balkan states similar to the Baltic Action Plan developed by the US Administration.

NATO is keen to upgrade PfP in order to reassure CEE countries left out of the first round of expansion. Among the ideas under discussion are giving partner countries more say in the range of activities they want to pursue, decentralising its decision-making process and merging the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP. NACC still covers subjects such as democratic control of the military, proliferation, economic and scientific cooperation, arms control and good neighbourliness. It is likely that these could be brought into the PfP framework. These meetings would be prepared in advance by open-ended working groups. Having talks based on a pre-agreed and fixed agenda would be much more useful than a simple roundtable, as goals could be set beforehand. Another idea is for more regular security consultations with Partners. This is becoming known as "PfP plus" at NATO Headquarters and has been described by NATO officials as a kind of advanced course in NATO Studies. It will give access to advanced defence planning, greater Partner participation in determining plans and activities, as well as participation in Combined Joint Task Forces.

Partners have already been given a far greater input in the preparation for the Follow-on-Force to IFOR than was the case for IFOR. They have been consulted on the SACEUR Options for the IFOR paper, and have been given the same rights to make input as NATO members. This involvement in the planning process will continue and spread to other bodies involved in work such as air traffic management, armaments procurement and standardisation and environmental cleanup.

Most of what NATO membership entails will be on offer through "PfP plus" in 1997-98. The significant omission will be the Article 5 guarantee. Since there is no threat of military action against candidate members it would seem sensible that NATO should not offer more than "PfP plus" for the next few years, allowing the situation in the CEE countries more time to stabilise economically and to reduce ethnic tension. Stopping short of full NATO membership will send a signal to those who would be otherwise excluded, particularly to Russia, that they are not seen as a threat or threatened themselves.

NATO has signalled to the three Baltic states they will not be considered for early NATO membership. In response, the US administration in spring 1996 developed the Baltic Action Plan for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This plan attempts to solve the problem of integrating the three Baltic countries into Europe without offering them NATO membership and assuring them that the West is not neglecting them. The plan is composed of three sections. The first section deals with multilateral relations between the Baltic countries and other organisations such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE, with the aim of improving coordination between them. Section Two calls for the improvement of Baltic relations with Russia, giving particular emphasis to the Russian minority in the region. Part Three explores bilateral US-Baltic relations, proposing an increase in US economic and military assistance, joint military exercises between US troops and the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) and the exchange of symbolic, high-level meetings between Washington and the Baltic states. The three Baltic countries were briefed in September 1996 and the US Congress on 22 October by US State Department officials. The plan, which has not been made public, is being continually updated.

The Baltic Action Plan could become a model for regional cooperation in other parts of Europe, integrating new members without formal treaty commitments. NATO leaders should consider a Central European Action Plan and a Balkan Action Plan along the lines of the Baltic Action Plan. The experience and expertise of other organisations such as the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe should also be sought in developing those plans.

Chapter Six: Implement transparency
in NATO-CEE relations

Confidence-building in CEE countries would be greatly enhanced if NATO pursues its commitment to transparency and agrees to make all PfP documentation publicly available. Currently, the Presentation Document and Individual Partnership Programmes documents which are negotiated on a 16+1 basis are not even available to other Partners. If NATO maintains the present policy, a series of semi-secret agreements will be constructed with CEE countries. Since the initial PfP documents are not being made public, it is most unlikely that subsequent and more detailed documents will be in the future. The secrecy surrounding the development of Baltic Action Plan may further alienate Russia and NATO should take concrete steps to reverse this pattern.

Responding to a letter by BASIC on behalf of the Secretary General of NATO on 21 June 1995, a NATO official acknowledged that "transparency and openness contribute to confidence building". However, he declined to make a commitment to make PfP documents publicly available. He said: "...[W]e also have to take into account the expressed interest of Partners, as well as of Allies, to protect sensitive information. In this context Presentation Documents and Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs) contain information considered sensitive by most. Therefore it is unlikely that a wholesale release will take place".

Partner countries have no common policy for release of the documents. Most refused to release their own, stating either that the documents are "classified" or that "according to bilateral agreement [with NATO] ... [the Presentation Document] is not allowed to be published or underwent [sic] public information". In contrast, Hungary published its Presentation Document and Finland, Romania and Poland made it available to BASIC.

Secrecy in NATO relations with Partner countries already reflects a hierarchy of relations between those countries who are favoured by NATO for early membership, and those who would be left out. In addition, this secrecy raises the level of anxiety in Russia about NATO's real intentions.

Chapter Seven: Prioritise EU enlargement

"The European Union, not NATO, should take the lead in incorporating Europe's new democracies into the Continental community. It can assist their continuing transformation into market economies and offer incentives to keep them on the path of political democracy and individual freedom".²⁵

It has been reported that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and European Commission President Jacques Santer have held informal discussions concerning NATO and EU expansion.²⁶According to these reports, NATO would like to see at least the three Baltic Republics included in the next wave of EU enlargement, to assure them of western support. It seems to follow that if EU membership, and the broad non-military view of security implied by that, is to be preferred for these countries, it should be the preferred institution for other NATO candidates as well.

The case for this economic view of European security is strong since the European Community (now European Union) has done the most to create the current peace. Beginning with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s, the economies of western Europe have been integrated, removing the economic motive for war. This created the necessary preconditions for a rebalancing of traditional great power politics inside the European Community. It is this process, together with increased democracy and respect for human rights that has done the most to make war unthinkable in western Europe. In the absence of an external military threat it makes little sense to look for a military solution to security problems that are primarily economic in origin, particularly when that military option will create divisions in the region that will make the EU option untenable.

Although integration into the EU will be a difficult, slow-process, given the relative backward state of CEE countries' economies, Western leaders should concentrate on this option. To this end the Western resources already allocated to developing defence infrastructure in CEE countries, as well as military expenditure on NATO membership, should instead be devoted to developing and strengthening the economies of the CEE countries to prepare them to join the EU. The London Times argued: "If European governments are serious about enhancing the Continent's stability, they should be at least equally in haste to enlarge the European Union eastward ... NATO enlargement is a neat way of keeping the EU door shut. This is a policy of historic irresponsibility, outranking even the miserable fumbling while the Balkans drifted into war".²⁷ To this end, work should begin immediately on a comprehensive assessment of the costs of enlargement, on a country-by-country basis.

Before full membership, a method of strengthening CEE confidence in their security situation could be to integrate them more deeply into the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Those nations with Association Agreements with the EU are already consulted on foreign affairs matters, and regularly add their names to EU policy declarations. They may feel their security is enhanced if a mechanism is created to enable the CEE countries to participate more fully in raising issues and making CFSP decisions. Since the CFSP is an inter-governmental process, and raises no financial issues, this would not cause the difficulties that quick EU membership would.

The fact that the CFSP is evolving only very slowly, and is focussed on building stability, democracy and peacekeeping, means that it is in no way threatening to Russia. It is precisely these characteristics that make this an attractive alternative to NATO membership.

The EU and the US will hold their regular Summit meeting on December 16 in Washington. Whitehouse briefers indicated that the agenda included "promoting peace and stability across the globe". Their talks about Europe should focus on promoting EU enlargement and on financial assistance the US could provide to facilitate this process.

Chapter Eight: Avoid renewed nuclearisation in Europe

NATO should make a public commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members and should also consider the possibility of establishing a Central European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. This would help reduce tensions in the region and avoid a serious breach of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The North Atlantic Assembly emphatically endorsed the non-nuclear option for CEE countries by stating: "We see no reason why NATO could not commit to not deploying nuclear weapons in peacetime on the territory of new Allies in light of the current international environment".²⁹

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. All surface-to-surface nuclear weapons, missiles and artillery shells, as well as all nuclear weapons based on surface ships have been withdrawn from the arsenals. NATO currently deploys B-61 free-fall nuclear bombs, as well as UK Trident nuclear missile submarines. French nuclear forces, both air launched and sea launched missiles, are not technically allocated to NATO, but coordination between France and its allies has always included exchanges of targeting data and has increased in recent years. Even so, NATO nuclear forces have been reduced by around 85% since the mid-80s.

The danger is that NATO may introduce nuclear weapons to the CEE countries either by design or default. Alliance leaders stress that new members will be given equal status to the current 16. European NATO allies are associated with the nuclear strategy of NATO through the Nuclear Planning Group. This body, composed of defence ministers, meets twice a year and oversees NATO's nuclear deployment posture and strategy for nuclear use in time of war.

Nuclear cooperation in the Alliance is governed by the 1964 Agreement Between the Parties to The North Atlantic treaty for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information. Furthermore, nuclear cooperation programmes exist on a bilateral basis between the United States and those allies which request participation. Units of the armed forces of participating countries are trained for nuclear use. In some, previously all, cases nuclear weapons are stored on the territory of participating states, and allocated for the use of their armed forces. In peacetime these nuclear weapons are held by US armed forces personnel and are only released to the host nation in time of war following an order from SACEUR. Participating nations are Belgium, Italy, Greece, Turkey, The Netherlands and Germany. These programmes are governed by bilateral agreements with the United States. There is no precedent for refusing a request for participation in these cooperation programmes. To refuse a request from a new NATO member would create a two-tier membership system that NATO wants to avoid. Approving a request would not necessarily mean building nuclear storage facilities in a new member state or moving nuclear weapons to their territory, but it would mean preparing these nations to fight nuclear war. Such action would clearly be perceived as threatening by those nations to NATO's new eastern front. The Czech Republic has already altered its constitution to allow for nuclear deployment on its territory.

At the last Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in April-May 1995, several Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) led by Mexico, raised their concerns at these NATO cooperation programmes. Claims were made that these programmes represent a breach of Articles I and II of the NPT, under which Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) undertake not to transfer in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons to a NNWS, and the NNWS undertake not to receive nuclear weapons in any way.

US administration officials told Congress in 1968 during the NPT ratification hearings that because no actual transfer of warheads takes place until war has begun, the Treaty is no longer applicable and there is no breach of the NPT.³⁰ This allows all preparations to be made to break a treaty commitment without making the final step and is politically unacceptable and legally questionable under international law. A further argument that these arrangements predate the NPT, and are therefore outside it, are legally incorrect. This question will certainly arise during future NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences.

The nuclear cooperation programmes were ignored during the Cold War, but the prospect of their continuance and extension in today's very different circumstances has caused deep concern among the NNWS. To understand the weakness of NATO's arguments, one only has to imagine the furious reaction that would be provoked by Russia entering a similar arrangement with Serbia.

The Study on NATO Enlargement states that there is no a priori requirement for a change in the Alliance's nuclear posture, but NATO officials have declined to rule out deploying nuclear weapons further to the East. This refusal to accept any constraints on NATO nuclear policy is one of the major problems in NATO relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The refusal to understand those countries' concerns, let alone accommodate them, is all the less explicable, since, in the 1990 4+2 accords on German unification, NATO was willing to accept that no nuclear weapons should be deployed on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic as the price for bringing East and West Germany together in the Alliance.

Accepting similar restrictions for new Alliance members would significantly reduce Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian concerns over expansion, and it is hard to understand why such a policy is resisted so strongly.

Even if NATO doesn't plan a nuclear expansion, this could result from conventional enlargement. The danger is that even without nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of new NATO members, Russia, faced with a conventionally superior NATO, could decide to deploy tactical nuclear weapons as close to NATO's territory as possible to counter this perceived conventional threat. NATO did just this in the Cold War. NATO would be likely to perceive such Russian action as a threat, and answer such nuclear deployments with deployments of its own. Such developments would destabilise Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine and Belarus in particular would have to choose between realigning themselves with Russia or being left in the cold, trapped between the lines of a nuclear standoff.

Alexander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, warned that he would allow nuclear weapons to be stationed in his republic again if Eastern European countries were admitted to NATO. He said: "I am afraid we will have to redeploy in Belarus the nuclear weapons that were withdrawn from it" if NATO extends membership to CEE.³¹ They have proposed a Central European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to avoid just this possibility.

NATO is trying to reassure the Russians that it has no plans to station nuclear weapons in the territory of new members. NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana said, "One point that keeps being raised by Russia is a fear that NATO will deploy nuclear weapons eastward once we enlarge. This is not true. We see no need and have no plans to change our current nuclear deployment".³² Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski said that, "We perceive no security requirement for stationing nuclear weapons on Polish territory".³³These assurances, however, fall short of a pledge not to accept nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Since 1991, Ukraine and Belarus have proposed the creation of a Central European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. These countries have voluntarily given up the nuclear arsenals they inherited from the Soviet Union, and now are understandably keen not to be trapped between a nuclear armed NATO and Russia. The exact countries which would be included and logistical arrangements for the zone are unclear. However, creating a space in Central Europe where nuclear weapons could not be deployed contributes to an easing of tensions between NATO and its eastern neighbours. Since NATO candidate countries fear support for such a zone would harm their chances for membership, NATO should include creation of the CENWFZ as an integral part of the expansion package.

Conclusion

NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1996 should alter President Clinton's timeline for NATO expansion. The NATO Summit called by President Clinton for the first half of 1997 should still happen, but with a different agenda. With the unfinished business of NATO's internal adaptation and the deadlock over developing NATO-Russian relations, the time is not right for inviting the selected few Central European countries to become members.

NATO can enhance the security of CEE countries and ease their fears by reassuring and integrating rather than marginalising Russia. Regional security packages, developed in consultation with the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, could significantly improve security and stability in Europe, especially if accompanied by transparency and openness.

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Endnotes

Clinton, Bill, Speech in Detroit, 11 October 1996.
New York Times editorial, 25 October 1996.
Primakov, Yevgeny, "Multipolar World on Horizon", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 October 1996.
Christopher, Warren, Statement in Stuttgart, 6 September 1996.
Primakov, Yevgeny, "Multipolar World on Horizon", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 October 1996.
Tigner, Brooks & Pyotr Yudin,"Russia sets its terms for NATO expansion into East bloc", Defense News, 7-13 October 1996.
Portillo, Michael, "European Security, NATO and 'Hard' Defence", IRRI, Brussels, 23 October 1996.
Kohl, Helmut, Munich Conference on Security Policy, 5 February 1994.
New York Times editorial, 25 October 1996.
Kohl, Helmut, Munich Conference on Security Policy, 5 February 1994.
"The Eastern Dimension of European Security", Doc 1542 of the WEU Assembly, Para. 38, 4 November 1996, Rapporteur Mr. Antretter.
Hamzik, Pavol, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, address to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 10 October 1996.
Bridge, Adrian, "NATO chief tours states fighting to join alliance", The Independent, 15 April 1996.
"Hungary Ups Budget With An Eye On NATO", Defense News, 18-24 November 1996.
"President: Army will need additional money for modernisation", PAP Polish News Agency, 28 October 1996.
Military Procurement International, Vol 6, No 7, 1 April 1996.
Military Procurement International, Vol 6, No 20, 15 October 1996.
Military Procurement International, Vol 6, No 16, 15 August 1996.
Erlich, Jeff, "Romania Helps Proliferate F-16", Defense News, 7-13 October 1996.
Tigner, Brooks, "Swedes Offer Hungary $1 Billion Aid to Help Buy Gripens", Defense News, 18-24 September 1996
MTI news agency, 19 September 1996, [cited in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2723 B/5, 21 September 1996].
Rompres News Agency, 3 September 1996, [cited in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2708 B/5, 4 September 1996].
"The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance", CBO Papers, Congressional Budget Office, March 1996, p. 12.
"Public Attitudes Toward European Security", The New European Security Architecture: Volume II, US Information Agency Office of Research and Media Reaction, September 1996.
New York Times editorial, 25 October 1996.
"NATO-EU discuss expansion east", Financial Times, 15 November 1996.
London Times, 30 September 1996.
"Clinton to host US-EU Summit", Reuters Wire, 9 November, 1996.
Goss, Porter J. & Annette Just, "On the Verge of a Wider Alliance", Draft Interim Report, NAA Assembly, 26 September 1996.
NPT, Hearings, US Senate Foreign relations Committee, 10,11,12,17 July 1968, pp262-3.
Freeland, Chrystia,"Belarus Warning Over Arms", Financial Times, 19 January 1996 .
Solana, Javier, speech at the NAA meeting, Athens, 20 May 1996.
Kwasniewski, Aleksander, Chatham House, October 1996.

NATO EXPANSION: Time to Reconsider

A Special Report by:
Tasos Kokkinides, BASIC & Martin Butcher, CESD
With assistance from Sami Fournier, BASIC and Sharon Riggle, CESD

25 November 1996

BASIC: ISBN #1 874533 28 8

CESD: Issues in International Security, no. 6, November 1996

Back to European Security Home Page

NATO Expansion: Time to Reconsider

NATO EXPANSION: Time to Reconsider

NATO Expansion:
Time to Reconsider