There are confused but increasing indicators of impending violence in Macedonia and Montenegro, and Serbia’s future has not been resolved. Milosevic remains in control, although increasingly isolated and faced with a desperate economic and social situation. Ethnic unease among minorities in Serbia persists, and political disaffection among Serbs is widespread. The international community is increasingly concerned that efforts in Bosnia are not succeeding, and that UNMIK’s effort in Kosovo has not gotten started effectively. The potential for unrest, violence, and paramilitary or even military action in the region is high.

The West needs to hammer out soon an international definition of, and approach to, the emerging problem for effective response later on. One of the huge problems in 1991-1992 and 1998 was that European governments and the US had conflicting evaluations of the danger of conflict outbreak in the region and the consequences. They lacked an agreement on the nature of the problem, let alone the solution. Without a unified assessment of the danger growing now, their causes, and likely scenarios, there will hardly be sufficient political will when and if a crisis erupts. One advantage today is that approximately 80,000 troops under NATO are now positioned in the area, mainly in Bosnia and Kosovo. But the non-military efforts to build stability and cooperation in the region are lagging and political solutions to the underlying sources of tension and dispute have not been found.

There are different scenarios of how a new war could ignite. War is more likely if outside powers continue to base their policy on finding a "strong man" – Milosevic, Tudjman, Thaci, etc. –  and then counting on this chosen agent to fulfill their policy hopes.

Here is a non-exhaustive list of possible conflict:

• Civil war in Yugoslavia: Extreme Serb nationalists such as Seselj against pro-Westerners in Serbia and Montenegro –possibly inadvertently triggered by Western assistance Milosevic will try to save his skin by appearing to hold the middle ground.
• Montenegrin war of independence: Independence-minded elements in Montenegro could provoke resistance by pro-federation elements supported by Belgrade.
• Destabilization in Macedonia: Ethnic strife between Slavs and Albanians could suck in Albania, Serbia and less likely, Bulgaria and Greece. This may open the way for a Serbian move against Kosovo and retaliation against Albanians there.
• Albanians – from Kosovo or Tirana – could see an opening and decide to make a move toward "Greater Albania."

Presidential elections in Russia in June and in the US in November may complicate matters and may reduce the capacity for rapid reaction to the outbreak of a war. To prevent renewed violence the time to prepare is now. Some recommendations are:

• Prepare a standby combined monitor/paramilitary police brigade for deployment to one or more locations by the OSCE by February 1. Clear lines of authority for military support or extraction should be provided.
• Expedite efforts to develop regional projects and consultative mechanisms under the Stability Pact, placing highest priority on security measures such as weapons control and confidence-building measures.
• Fashion a US-European consensus on a policy to bring Serbia back under the provisions and constraints of the OSCE and the Stability Pact.
• Bend every effort to make effective the UNMIK in Kosovo to eliminate the political vacuum there and constrain Kosovar Albanian extremism.
• The UN Security Council should develop a resolution providing support for a re-affirmation by NATO of its April 1999 pledge to protect the territorial integrity of all Balkan states. Such a declaration could deter aggression from any quarter, provided NATO is ready—in both appearance and fact--to carry it out.
• The West must have a clear strategy and political goals for any use of force If political will is lacking, like in Bosnia and Kosovo, we run the risk of making hollow threats and being again manipulated by the locals.
• Prepare a policy to keep China informed and to engage Russia diplomatically from the beginning. We went into Rambouillet with a policy of keeping Russia and the UN outside the deal. In the end we needed both. Develop a Contact Group position on various predicted conflict scenarios or crisis scenarios, so implementation can be turned over to NATO and OSCE well in advance of the actual expected problem dates.

For more information, please contact:
Dan Plesch or Tasos Kokkinides at +44-(0)20-7407-2977