PRESS RELEASE

20 June 1996

Storm in Teacup at the Test Ban Talks

India's announcement today that it will not agree to the current text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) brings the negotiations to a key point. India made clear that it will not block agreement on the treaty, nor will it walk out of the negotiations. However, the announcement will force a reevaluation of the current position of the nuclear-weapon states that India must agree to the treaty before it can take effect, or enter into force. The negotiators must now decide whether they will attempt to meet some of India's demands, or if they will agree to allow the CTBT to enter into force without India. Otherwise they risk concluding a treaty which may not enter into force. In fact, all the West must do to solve India's concerns is to move toward fulfillment of the commitments the nuclear-weapon states have already made.

"The supposed crisis at Geneva can easily be solved if the US, Britain, and the other nuclear-weapon states implement their non-proliferation agreements by a declaration not to build new nuclear weapons and to start talks on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons which, like any treaty, would have to include a time table for implementation, something India is adamant about", said Daniel Plesch, Director of BASIC.

India has two key demands. First, it wants a test ban that is, in its view, truly comprehensive. What that means is a ban on computer simulations and laboratory tests of nuclear weapons. In India s view, the CTBT as drafted will create another division between the nuclear haves and the have-nots. The five nuclear-weapon states, because of their advanced technical capabilities, will be able to maintain their nuclear arsenals almost indefinitely without nuclear test explosions.

The difficultly with this demand, which India fully realizes, is that it is unverifiable. Even if the nuclear-weapon states were to agree to ban these activities, no verification system could ensure compliance. What India asks for is a political commitment from the nuclear weapon states that they will cease these activities. Even this step, however, is adamantly opposed by the nuclear-weapon states. They hold that computer simulations and laboratory tests are necessary for maintaining the safety of the nuclear arsenals.

There is an intermediate step the nuclear-weapon states could take, however, that would go a long way toward meeting India s demands. The five countries could make a statement, outside of the treaty but linked to it, foregoing the development of new nuclear weapons. While this statement does not directly address all of India s concerns, it would offer India a substantial incentive to agree to the treaty. It would also be a step towards bringing the nuclear-weapon states into compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, perhaps more directly, with the commitments they made in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament document at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. That document requires the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

India s second demand has been to call for the nuclear-weapon states to agree to a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament, which the latter also strongly oppose. However, there are other options that would take steps towards India s position. For example, much of the last phrase above, from the Principles and Objectives document, is repeated in Ramaker's draft treaty text. Removing the word ultimate and leaving the phrase with the goal of eliminating those weapons would go a long way toward meeting India's demands. A second option would be for the nuclear-weapon states to agree to talks about elimination of nuclear weapons, without committing to a time-frame to undertake the disarmament. These talks, formal or informal, could build on the work of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Commission, pulled together by the Australian government, will issue a report on how to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons this fall.

Finally, the nuclear-weapon states could find language that would incorporate some reference to a time-bound framework without specifically committing to one. One version of the language India proposed reads this Treaty shall enter into force only after all states parties have committed themselves to the attainment of the goal of total elimination of all nuclear weapons with a well-defined time framework (of ten years) . If the last clause is left out, the phrase only means that the parties are committed to a time-bound framework, not that they have agreed to one. Under the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states are already committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. As that would most certainly have to happen, like the START I and II treaties, under some sort of schedule, or time-bound framework , the nuclear-weapon states would in fact not be extending their commitment very far.

"India has real concerns but they should not be used by people who have never wanted a nuclear test ban as a last minute excuse to wreck the Treaty", added Stephen Young, Senior Analyst at BASIC.

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