Nuclear Proliferation Talks Off Tracks

Negotiations on the future of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are now underway New York. They are in unnecessary difficulty one week from the end of the talks. The Conference is taking stock of the Treaty's effectiveness as the centerpiece of global efforts to control nuclear arms and must make a crucial decision on how long the Treaty should remain in force. Some 160 of the 178 countries that have signed the Treaty are at the Conference. A few key states--Israel, India and Pakistan--remain outside the Treaty. A majority of the 178 is needed to decide the future of the Treaty. The outstanding issues mainly concern nuclear disarmament. They must be reviewed immediately at the highest level of government and where necessary delegations should be reinforced with officials able to act directly for the chief executive.

Before the talks began April 17 US officials briefed that there would be a bare majority for extending the Treaty indefinitely by the start of the first week and that this would produce a snowball effect of increased support. Three weeks later the Campaign for the NPT counted 103 for indefinite - a majority plus a dozen. Canada has been seeking signatures on a document endorsing indefinite extension but is still short of a majority with only some 80 signatures. Meanwhile US and other Western officials continue to brief that they have 130 votes already.

There is a widespread feeling that the Treaty would be weakened if it a large minority do not support the final outcome. These figures suggest some 50 states are lukewarm supporters of indefinite extension. Meanwhile, a group of non- aligned states is collecting support for an alternative proposal which would extend the Treaty for consecutive periods of twenty five years.

There are two main reasons for the lukewarm support for indefinite extension: the discussions on the NPT's disarmament provisions have stalled and new ideas for strengthening its future implementation are not yet finalized. Some ambassadors say privately that they are unwilling to commit to indefinite extension unless they see real progress in these two areas of negotiation. However senior U.S. officials regard failure in the disarmament negotiations as normal and consider the prospect with little concern. Previous review conferences have also failed when states with nuclear weapons were unwilling to commit to more disarmament.

The proposals for more effective implementation were first publicly proposed by South Africa--the only state ever to voluntarily give up a nuclear weapons capability. They would create a stronger review mechanism including a standing committee to review the Treaty according to reaffirmed principals, but have yet to be agreed. In addition the Conference has not yet agreed a procedure on how to vote which adds a further complication. As these issues are likely to remain unresolved before the decision on extension is taken late next week it seems clear that decision--and thus the NPT--is at risk.

The uncertainty that still remains and the time consuming process involved in consulting capitals over changes in position requires intervention by government leaders before the final week of talks begin on May 8th. In particular there needs to be a review of the instructions being sent from the nuclear powers to their ambassadors in New York and to come up with a program of action. A fresh look should be taken at proposals from countries such as Switzerland and Sweden who propose negotiations on specific measures with deadlines. New Zealand has, for example, recommended talks on a halt to nuclear warhead construction by 2005. Many states want to start talks on a Treaty which would securely and verifiably eliminate nuclear weapons.

Neither the opening of negotiations nor a target date commits a government to sign a Treaty it does not agree with. But the political cost of refusing to talk is not merely that the review process may fail. Countries may well conclude that if they cannot trust the nuclear powers to fulfill their commitments now there is little point in agreeing new principals and mechanisms. Such a view has been reinforced by a statement from the British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind that the NPT contains no commitment to put British nuclear weapons into the disarmament negotiations. Similarly, the commitment to conclude a comprehensive test ban has been undermined by persistent reports from Washington that Defence Secretary Perry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will push for nuclear explosions equal to several hundred tons of TNT to be excluded from the ban. Nuclear weapons of this size been deployed on active service.

National and international security can be directly enhanced by arms reductions. Were new initiatives to be taken now they would also produce overwhelming support for indefinite extension of the Treaty and greater enthusiasm for making it work. Faced with terrorism, smuggling, rogue states, and ever increasing production of plutonium, enthusiasm for controlling proliferation should not be carelessly destroyed. With so much at stake one is forced to ask why when Ronald Reagan was able to negotiate with "the evil empire," Bill Clinton will not sit down with the Swiss.

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