BASIC MEDIA ADVISORY

TUESDAY 24 MAY 2005

Statement on the EU-Iran talks in Geneva

The current state of play

European Ministers from France, Germany and the UK are scheduled to meet an Iranian delegation led by Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), in Geneva on Wednesday to try and make progress on long-standing talks about Iran's planned nuclear programme. This meeting takes place against the backcloth of acrimonious exchanges between the United States and Iran during the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference at the United Nations in New York.

Iran has made it clear that it intends, under its legal right as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT, to continue to develop a range of facilities which will enable it to generate electricity from nuclear power reactors without undue reliance on commercial sources for supply of materials. Its leaders have also said, repeatedly, that it has no desire to divert any of this effort into a nuclear weapons programme and that it will comply with its obligations to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its facilities, take samples and make extensive enquiries about its developing programme.

The US Administration has repeatedly asserted that Iran cannot be trusted and already has a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, although this has not been substantiated by the US government or by the IAEA. US officials have sought to have Iran declared in non-compliance with its NPT obligations and referred to the UN Security Council by the IAEA Board of Governors. The EU3 have positioned themselves between the two protagonists in an effort to seek a diplomatic solution and avoid what is likely to be a counterproductive and inconclusive exchange at the UN Security Council.

The EU3-Iran negotiations: pre-programmed to fail?

In November 2004 in an agreement with the EU3, Iran agreed to extend its 'temporary' suspension of "all enrichment related and reprocessing activities", while negotiations took place on a long-term agreement covering nuclear, technological and economic cooperation, and security issues. The United States agreed not to actively press its case in order to allow the EU3/Iran negotiation to run its course. The meeting this week may well determine whether the negotiations have indeed run their course, but did the stances taken by each side of this dispute have any real chance of prevailing?

Much has been said about Iran's 'inalienable right' as a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT (Article IV) to "develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes". However, these rights are conditional on the understanding that facilities will not be used "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons" (Article I and II). To verify this, Iran must accept full safeguards on its nuclear programme "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons" (Article III).

While Iran has not formally been declared in breach of any of these obligations, failures to declare significant aspects of its nuclear activities are a major cause for concern and have led diplomats to be understandably cautious about assisting Iran with technology and materials. The current position is that the IAEA is yet to complete a full assessment of Iran's nuclear programme, in part because of significant delays and a lack of transparency by the Iranians. It cannot, therefore, confidently state that Iran is in full compliance with its NPT obligations.

The way forward: reciprocal confidence-building measures

Given the antipathy of the United States since Iran became an Islamic Republic, and the difficulty of operating under long-term US sanctions, it is understandable why Iran's leaders are cautious about transparency and its potential implications. However, transparency is essential to building the trust that is needed to make progress.

One way to build trust is by the progressive introduction of reciprocal confidence-building measures, which may require amendments to existing policy positions on all sides. BASIC notes that the EU3's red line of outright opposition to Iran's resumption of uranium enrichment, recently buttressed by the threat of referral to the UN Security Council, is seen as unjust by Iran. It is certainly questionable, legally, and can probably not be sustained in the long term. On the other hand, Iran's insistence in its inalienable right to develop a full, indigenous fuel cycle is considered inadvisable and, potentially, dangerous.

As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, notes, "States that wish to exercise their undoubted right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must not insist that they can only do so by developing capacities that might be used to create nuclear weapons. But, equally, those same States should not be left to feel that the only route to enjoying the benefits of nuclear energy is a domestic fuel cycle capability."

BASIC suggests that the following confidence-building measures be placed on the negotiating table.

The EU3 should:

Make a formal commitment to oppose any threats of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities;
Indicate that Iran may enrich uranium for fabrication into fuel elements for power generation in nuclear reactors - provided that it is in strict compliance with all safeguards agreements with the IAEA;
Make explicit their continued support for a resolution of this disagreement to be sought via the good offices of the IAEA and around the table in Vienna;
Commit to enabling Iran access to European markets and financial institutions;
Guarantee the supply of uranium fuel for Iranian nuclear power reactors (with the agreement and oversight of the IAEA);
Continue to actively press for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East; and
Encourage Iran and the United States to desist from exchanging inflammatory rhetoric from afar and move to diplomatic engagement.

Iran should:

Reaffirm that it will proceed with the process of ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocols following the June Presidential elections;
Forego any consideration of reprocessing spent fuel elements and extracting plutonium;
Strengthen its legal export control mechanisms;
Declare a ceiling on uranium enrichment level (unsuitable for weapons purposes) and that all enriched uranium be used in fuel assemblies;
Introduce national legislation making any research and development work on nuclear weapons illegal;
Actively engage in the debate regarding strengthening Article X of the NPT (the 3 month notice of withdrawal); and
Accept that any plans to move forward with a nuclear power programme must be considered alongside the issues of spent fuel management, facility and material security, nuclear waste disposal and environmental consequences for loss of control and containment.

Conclusion

BASIC believes that threats to refer Iran to the UN Security Council or to bomb its nuclear facilities are likely to be counterproductive. BASIC urges all parties to show flexibility in order to find a diplomatic solution to the current impasse. The EU3 must accept that Iran needs to be assured of its security and of greater economic cooperation in future. Whilst Iran must recognise that any further prevarication over implementation of safeguards may serve only to increase distrust and undermine its long-term security.

For further comment, please call Nigel Chamberlain on 01768 898641 (UK)
or Ian Davis on +44 (0)7887 782 389 (at the NPT Review Conference in New York)

For earlier comment on Iran's nuclear programme, IAEA Board meetings
and implications for the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, please see:

'Addressing the Challenge of Iran' http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/2005rc/brief15.pdf

'The IAEA and Iran: Crisis averted - for the time being' http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN041123.htm

'The IAEA and Iran - Iran's check-mate prematurely called' http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN040910.htm

'The IAEA and Iran - Once More to the Brink?' http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN040612.htm