BASIC MEDIA BRIEFING

TUESDAY 27 JULY 2004 - FOR IMMEDIATE USE

9/11 Commission Recommends Expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative

BASIC Report Shows The Way Forward

The commission into the September 11 attacks published a 567-page report last week, which found fault with almost every government department and agency involved in counter-terrorism, but declined to categorically say that the attacks should have been prevented. The commission concluded: "What we can say with confidence is that none of the measures adopted by the US government from 1998 to 2001 disturbed or even delayed the progress of the al-Qaida plot”.

President Bush said the report contained "some very constructive recommendations" and promised "where the government needs to act, we will". The report does include several key recommendations to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. According to the commissioners:

“Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program”.

In an appendix to this briefing we provide in full the report’s proliferation-related recommendation, which the commissioners say "warrants a maximum effort". BASIC strongly endorses this recommendation and has been urging maximum effort towards these goals for the past 18 months or more.

Specifically, BASIC has closely followed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since its birth just over a year ago. The PSI is a new coalition of states willing to take practical steps to interdict weapons of mass destruction and related materials in the air, on land and at sea. In short, the PSI is likely to have a profound impact on several legal and political international frameworks, and may change forever the way we look at arms control.

The new BASIC report ‘Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea’ puts fragmented and summary news reports into the context of one of the most important and solid international legal regimes to date: the Law of the Sea. The report reviews the history of the PSI, draws attention to potential problems and recommends ways to strengthen it and make it more accountable.

As retired US Ambassador James Goodby writes in the foreword, the “PSI could have a major impact as an anti-proliferation tool but only if it is done right. Doing it right is what this report is all about”. Co-author and BASIC Director, Dr Ian Davis, says “The PSI could be a credible enforcement mechanism and a solid expansion of the current non-proliferation regime. But if implemented incorrectly, it may hamper free trade and the rights of all humankind to use the resources of the ocean freely, and reinforce discriminatory non-proliferation practices”.

Download the executive summary from: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm

To discuss further with the authors call BASIC’s London Office +44 (0)20 7324 4680;

Dr. Ian Davis +44 (0)7887 782389; or Mr. Andreas Persbo +44 (0)7786 102021

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Appendix 1: Extracts from Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons. As we note in chapter 2, al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years. In chapter 4, we mentioned officials worriedly discussing, in 1998, reports that Bin Ladin’s associates thought their leader was intent on carrying out a "Hiroshima."

These ambitions continue. In the public portion of his February 2004 worldwide threat assessment to Congress, DCI Tenet noted that Bin Ladin considered the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a "religious obligation." He warned that al Qaeda "continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability." Tenet added that "more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] materials."

A nuclear bomb can be built with a relatively small amount of nuclear material. A trained nuclear engineer with an amount of highly enriched uranium or plutonium about the size of a grapefruit or an orange, together with commercially available material, could fashion a nuclear device that would fit in a van like the one Ramzi Yousef parked in the garage of the World Trade Center in 1993. Such a bomb would level Lower Manhattan.

The coalition strategies we have discussed to combat Islamist terrorism should therefore be combined with a parallel, vital effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We recommend several initiatives in this area.

Strengthen Counterproliferation Efforts

While efforts to shut down Libya’s illegal nuclear program have been generally successful, Pakistan’s illicit trade and the nuclear smuggling networks of Pakistani scientist A.Q.Khan have revealed that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem of global dimensions.

Attempts to deal with Iran’s nuclear program are still underway. Therefore, the United States should work with the international community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and prosecution of such smugglers by any state in the world where they do not disclose their activities.

Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative

In May 2003, the Bush administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): nations in a willing partnership combining their national capabilities to use military, economic, and diplomatic tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related technology.

The PSI can be more effective if it uses intelligence and planning resources of the NATO alliance. Moreover, PSI membership should be open to non-NATO countries. Russia and China should be encouraged to participate.

Support the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

Outside experts are deeply worried about the U.S. government’s commitment and approach to securing the weapons and highly dangerous materials still scattered in Russia and other countries of the Soviet Union. The government’s main instrument in this area, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (usually referred to as "Nunn-Lugar," after the senators who sponsored the legislation in 1991), is now in need of expansion, improvement, and resources. The U.S. government has recently redoubled its international commitments to support this program, and we recommend that the United States do all it can, if Russia and other countries will do their part. The government should weigh the value of this investment against the catastrophic cost America would face should such weapons find their way to the terrorists who are so anxious to acquire them.

Recommendation: Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort—by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.