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THURSDAY 29 JANUARY 2004 - FOR IMMEDIATE USE

The Hutton Inquiry Report: Missing the Bigger Picture

Appendix 1:

Summary and Assessment of the Hutton Report

By Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, BASIC

Introduction

The scope of the Hutton enquiry was to "urgently conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly". Lord Hutton decided that the question of whether the intelligence in relation to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) "was of sufficient strength and reliability to justify the Government in deciding that Iraq under Saddam Hussein posed such a threat to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom that military action should be taken against that country" was not one that fell within his terms of reference. (para. 9)

The major part of the 740-page report is a review of the evidence presented. Lord Hutton's handling of the evidence, however, gives the impression that where it appears to be inconsistent, he gives ministers and Government officials the benefit of the doubt - rather than the BBC. Despite its rather narrow scope and strict handling of the evidence, Hutton's report nevertheless contains some interesting conclusions.

The report clears the Government of the charge that it "sexed up" its Iraqi weapons dossier

Lord Hutton concluded that the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) had overall responsibility for the drafting of the dossier and that the dossier was published with the full approval of the Committee.(para 467.1.i)

Lord Hutton does not, however, take a stand on how the British intelligence community assessed the 45-minutes claim. He simply states that the intelligence community regarded the information as reliable. And since he concludes that the Government believed that the intelligence was correct, it follows that Andrew Gilligan's claim that the "Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong" was an unfounded allegation. (para 467.1.ii) Rather, Lord Hutton deduces that Dr. Kelly had expressed concern about the 45 minutes claim, but those concerns had not been acted upon by the JIC. Instead the JIC approved the wording in the dossier.

Dr. Brian Jones, a senior weapons expert at the Ministry of Defence, also expressed concern over the content of the dossier, but the MoD did not act on his concerns either. In fact, the MoD only believed that the wording of the dossier was too strong and that the dossier should only reflect that "intelligence suggests" that some NBC weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes of an order to use them. (para 467.1.iv)

Lord Hutton argues that the "the term 'sexed-up' is a slang expression, the meaning of which lacks clarity in the context of the discussion of the dossier" and that the term has two possible meanings, namely that:

a) the dossier was embellished with items of intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable to strengthen the case against Saddam Hussein or,

b) whilst the intelligence contained in the dossier was believed to be reliable, the dossier was drafted in such a way as to make the case against Saddam Hussein as strong as the intelligence contained in it permitted. (para 467.1.viii)

Given his findings, Lord Hutton concludes that the government could be said to have "sexed up" the report only if the term were used in the latter sense. However, since Lord Hutton already had decided that the government believed the 45-minute point to be reliable at the time of the BBC broadcasts, he considered "that the allegation was unfounded as it would have been understood by those who heard the broadcasts to mean that the dossier had been embellished with intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable, which was not the case."

The report exonerates 10 Downing Street from unduly influencing the JIC

Regarding the involvement of 10 Downing Street in the drafting of the dossier, Lord Hutton states that the Prime Minister's office made it clear to the intelligence community that it "wanted the dossier to be worded to make as strong a case as possible in relation to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's WMD". Therefore, the Prime Minister's office made written 'suggestions' to the intelligence community, while it at the same time held that "nothing should be stated in the dossier with which the intelligence community were not entirely happy". (para 467.1.v)

Interestingly enough, Lord Hutton concludes that several 'drafting suggestions' were sent to the JIC and that the JIC only accepted those "which were consistent with the intelligence known to the JIC". (para 467.1.vi) This implies that the Prime Minister's office did indeed suggest changes in the draft document inconsistent with current intelligence, but that those changes were rejected by the intelligence community.

Lord Hutton cannot rule out the possibility that the Prime Minister's desire to make as strong as case as possible against Iraq "...may have subconsciously influenced Mr Scarlett and the other members of the JIC to make the wording of the dossier somewhat stronger than it would have been if it had been contained in a normal JIC assessment". Nevertheless, Lord Hutton argues that the intelligence community's intention was to "ensure that the contents of the dossier were consistent with the intelligence available to the JIC". (para 467.1.vii)

The report clears the Prime Minister of any wrongdoing in the strategy which led to the unmasking of Dr Kelly

Lord Hutton never mentions the Prime Minister's office in the context of the strategy eventually leading to the exposure of Dr. Kelly to the media. Instead, he summarily states that there "was no dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous strategy by the Government covertly to leak Dr Kelly's name to the media". (para 4.A.1) In addition, Lord Hutton believes that the MoD's decision to confirm Dr Kelly's name if the correct name were put to it by a reporter was based on the view that it would not be sensible to try to conceal the name as the MoD thought that the press were bound to discover the correct name anyway. (para 4.A.ii) Therefore, Lord Hutton concludes that it was reasonable of the Government to believe that Dr. Kelly's name would eventually be exposed. However, Lord Hutton does criticise the MoD for not "informing Dr Kelly that its press office would confirm his name if a journalist suggested it". (para 467.4.B.i)

The report heavily criticises the BBC for its reporting on the dossier and its handling of the Kelly affair

Lord Hutton concludes that the BBC quoted Dr. Kelly incorrectly in its reporting of the dossier. (para 467.2) He says that the allegations "that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was wrong or questionable before the dossier was published and that it was not inserted in the first draft of the dossier because it only came from one source and the intelligence agencies did not really believe it was necessarily true" were unfounded. (para 467.3.i)

Lord Hutton then seriously questions the BBC's editing system and points to some faults in the BBC's management of the Government's subsequent complaint on the broadcast. (para 3.ii-iv) Therefore, the BBC Governors "are to be criticised for themselves failing to make more detailed investigations into whether this allegation reported by Mr Gilligan was properly supported by his notes and for failing to give proper and adequate consideration to whether the BBC should publicly acknowledge that this very grave allegation should not have been broadcast". (para 467.3.v.)

Conclusion

Lord Hutton's hearings made a remarkable contribution to open government, but his report has nothing to say on the broader questions on the decision to go to war. This omission, combined with the grave doubts now circulating around Westminster and the media as to whether the overall balance of the report's conclusions are reasonable, only strengthens the case for an independent inquiry into the intelligence failures that took the UK into an unjustifiable war.

Appendix 2:

Conclusions and Recommendations from BASIC Special Report:

Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why no Weapons of Mass Destruction have been found in Iraq, by David Isenberg and Dr Ian Davis, BASIC Special Report 2004.1 · January 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004WMD.pdf.

Introduction

This BASIC Report provides a timely update and summary of the evidence of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), code for nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, that has been accumulated by the US inspectors in Iraq and from other public sources over the past eight months.

There are four potential explanations for the failure to find banned weapons in Iraq:

Were the missing weapons destroyed or moved out of Iraq prior to the invasion?

This is an unlikely explanation for the general failure to find illicit weapons that had been identified so confidently prior to the war. The logistical problems of transporting or destroying large stocks of chemical and biological weapons just days before the US-led invasion are likely to have precluded this as a realistic option.

Were the weapons destroyed in the bombing campaign or stolen by looters?

Scores of suspect sites, industrial complexes and offices were stripped of valuable documents and equipment. Again, although it is very possible that much evidence for Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) would be degraded by looting or military action, all conclusive evidence could not possibly have been destroyed.

Isn't it a question of needing more time to find the weapons?

Tony Blair and some US inspectors continue to argue that more time is needed, and Pentagon officials have said that the search process could take up to a year to complete. That is rather ironic, considering that UNMOVIC said before the war inspections could be wrapped up in a few months. It has been suggested that Iraq may have concentrated on dual-use programs in recent years - putting chemical and biological production equipment within commercial facilities so that it would not be discovered but could be used "on demand" or "just in time". This seems plausible enough but hardly constitute the imminent threat to the US, UK and the rest of the world that justified the decision to go to war.

Were the missing weapons destroyed many years ago?

Claims that Iraq destroyed all its illicit chemical and biological weapons in the 1990s - claims that failed to convince the UN inspectors and UK and US intelligence officials prior to the invasion - are now being given greater credence. It is increasingly likely that Iraqi officials were telling the truth. Demetrius Perricos, acting chairman of the UNMOVIC, has pointed out that most of the weapons-related equipment and research publicly documented by the US-led inspection team in Iraq was known to the UN before the invasion.

Was the Iraqi WMD threat overstated by Britain and the United States?

Despite unparalleled searching, nothing has turned up. The evidence is overwhelming that Iraq did not have banned weapons at the time of the invasion. The brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime was not an adequate justification for war, and the US and British authorities did not seriously focus on it until long after the war began and the false justifications began to fall apart. Official statements made immediately before the war suggesting a far more advanced and extensive program need to be reassessed.

Final conclusions as to whether the primary fault lies with US and British intelligence on Iraqi's WMD program, or with the part played by senior US and UK figures in interpreting and disseminating that evidence, must be deferred until further information becomes available. However, the case against President Bush already seems clear cut, especially given the recent testimony by former Treasury Sec. Paul O'Neill that the debate over military action against Iraq began as soon as the President took office.

What are the implications of these intelligence and political failings and what are the policy lessons for future challenges involving suspected WMD proliferation?

Acknowledge past mistakes

Tony Blair and George Bush must acknowledge that they were wrong about Iraq's WMD and show that they are taking sweeping action to rectify the concerns that led to this miscalculation. There must also be sufficient political space for political leaders to acknowledge their mistakes. In both the US and UK, the continuing search for hidden agendas and the lack of trust afforded to politicians are among the most corrupting aspects of politics.

Learn the right lessons

Despite continuing instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, both interventions are being lauded by US and British administration officials as political/military successes. While the hard line stance is said to be improving the security situation in other parts of the world, such claims are wildly overstated and mean that important lessons are lost. For example, Libya return to the international community is welcome but lies in the patient diplomatic initiative set in motion long before the recent pursuit of Saddam. The invasion of Iraq appears to have exacerbated the terrorist threat, reversed peace and democracy in parts of the Middle East and undermined the transatlantic alliance, the UN and international law.

Review the role of intelligence

The demands on intelligence gathering and assessment are enormous and the consequences of getting it wrong can be dire. One issue that undoubtedly affected intelligence assessments in Iraq was the prior failure of US and British intelligence to spot Al Qaeda's strategic ambitions, particularly the attack on 9/11. US and British intelligence agencies tended to "worst case" thinking, especially after political pressure was brought to bear. The failure to find any banned weapons makes it more difficult to trust intelligence reports about North Korean, Iranian or other "rogue state" threats. Already, in the crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions, China has rejected US intelligence that North Korea has a secret program to enrich uranium for weapons use.

Threats to our security - such as those from NBC proliferation and catastrophic forms of terrorism - are now much more diffuse and debatable. Since most of these threats are developed in secret, the case for maintaining secret specific intelligence is strong. This is not only to provide early warning, but to facilitate diplomatic and other policy responses short of military action. But it is vital to base future non-proliferation and counter-proliferation strategies on carefully collected and analysed open evidence rather than on prejudice or political expediency.

While there will always be a requirement to turn "raw" intelligence data into a document or information for public consumption, all intelligence assessments are doctored to some extent for public consumption. It is also self-evident that all governments have a tendency to edit and shape raw intelligence data to present the case in the best possible light. In the case of Iraq, it is clear that the requirement to persuade took precedence over the requirement to be objective. In future, therefore, public information that draws on intelligence data should have more health warnings and clearly set out the context for and motives behind publication.

Bring the spooks out of the shadows

In Britain at least, the intelligence agencies need greater visibility and accountability. If the existing Intelligence and Security Committee is not up to this task, then a new small oversight committee should be established to vet intelligence gathering and assessment procedures and be responsible for publication of unclassified intelligence reports and related materials. New ways of sharing the raw intelligence data with a broader cross-section of MPs should also be explored.

Politicians also need more detail in order to judge appropriate policy responses -particularly more context as to why something is going on. In the UK at present, almost all policy - as evidenced by the most recent Defence, Foreign and Development White Papers - assumes an established nexus between WMD proliferation, state failure and terrorism. However, all the available evidence suggests that most "states of concern" are actually diminishing their active support for terrorism, perhaps partly in response to the threat of US military force. Only Sudan and Afghanistan's former Taliban regime are known to have materially aided Al Qaeda. In terms of transferring WMD materials to non-state actors, the biggest risk lies in theft or diversion of the huge stockpiles in the existing nuclear states.

Re-examine the doctrine of pre-emption

Over reliance on intelligence makes the doctrine of pre-emption a flawed and dangerous instrument of foreign policy. Greater caution has to be exercised in thinking about pre-emptive warfare and its consequences. Moreover, if pre-emption became widely acceptable, it could encourage other countries that fear an assault to attack their rivals first, pre-empting the pre-emptor and escalating a conflict that might have been resolved without force. Or a nation under a sudden attack might choose to deploy CBW or nuclear weapons it otherwise might not use. When much of the world is working toward common understandings about the legal use of force, the very act of one country pre-emptively attacking another carries troubling echoes of vigilante justice.

Return UN Inspectors to Iraq

International inspections and monitoring actually worked effectively in Iraq. The return of the UN inspectors would confer some much needed legitimacy to the post-conflict search for weapons, and also help to re-engage the wider international community in the reconstruction effort. UNMOVIC should also be given the task of monitoring in Iraq on an ongoing basis once the 'coalition' military forces have left.

Create a permanent international cadre of inspectors

The British and US governments should also support the establishment of a broader mandate within UNMOVIC, as suggested by Hans Blix. Over the years, UNMOVIC has acquired much experience in the verification and inspection of biological weapons and missiles as well as chemical weapons, but only in Iraq. Its trained scientific cadres could be mobilized to provide the Security Council and other concerned actors with a capability for ad hoc inspections and monitoring elsewhere.

Support multilateral and international law-based solutions to WMD proliferation

Non-proliferation and arms control remain essential elements in the fight against further WMD proliferation. International arms control regimes must, however, be reinforced and adapted to current developments, both technological and political. We have reached a pivotal moment in inter-state relations with a real opportunity to shape a new world order based on the rule of law. The US and UK should be working to write those rules and get them implemented. Direct action will sometimes be necessary, including military action in extreme circumstances, to stop the rules being broken. But such action should only be undertaken within the rules of international law, and preferably with Security Council authorisation.

Think about WMD closer to home

WMD threat reduction should begin at home. It is not just a 'rogue' state problem. Existing nuclear-armed states (including the US and UK) should reaffirm their intention to implement the 13 disarmament steps agreed to in 2000 under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US Senate's decision in May 2003 to at least partially rescind a ten-year ban on funding research and development of new 'low-yield' nuclear weapons was unnecessary and destabilising. Efforts to expand threat reduction programmes, such as the G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, to new regions and countries, such as North Korea, the Middle East and South Asia, should be actively supported.