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BASIC PAPERS

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

February 2007 . NUMBER 54

Present at the Creation:

U.S. Perspectives on the Origins and Future Direction of the Proliferation Security Initiative

By Ian Davis, David Isenberg and Katherine Miller

This Paper is also available in pdf at: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP54.pdf

This paper was originally presented as a background paper for a roundtable discussion organized by BASIC on 'The Proliferation Security Initiative: Three Years On', at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC on 25 September 2006. BASIC's project on the PSI is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). For further details, see the special section on the PSI on the BASIC Web site at: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/counterproliferation/psi.htm.

Key Points

• The PSI is an American-led, ad hoc multilateral activity with over 80 participating states that seeks to interdict suspect WMD cargoes across air, land, and sea.

• Open registries (so-called 'flags of convenience'), locations and countries with a history of illicit trafficking of WMD materials, and increasing participation in East Asia are particular issues of interest to U.S. officials who helped set up and implement PSI.

• Maritime interdictions carried out under the PSI are unlikely to cause international incidents.

• An awareness-raising process was established to reassure concerned nations before inviting them to sign on to the PSI.

• There appears to be a lack of awareness of the PSI in key U.S. agencies and departments that would be expected to be leading players. The U.S. Department of State appears to be the only key U.S. stakeholder in the PSI.

• Increasing the number of bilateral ship-boarding agreements with major commercial flag states is a key U.S. objective

• There is a close relationship between UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the PSI. The new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is further confirmation that WMD in the hands of terrorists is now a global threat that requires urgent action. PSI has the potential to play an important role in the Global Initiative.

• Excessive secrecy surrounding interdictions is hampering the development of the PSI.

1. Introduction

What is PSI?

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a largely multilateral attempt to interdict land, air, or sea vessels, suspected of transporting components of, or actual weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PSI is not an organization, but, to cite an often-repeated cliché, an activity. It operates according to both multilateral and bilateral agreements; there are principles that participating countries have agreed to follow; and there is a web of international activity with a purpose, yet this is not a formal organization. It has no dedicated support structure of secretariat.

BASIC has been closely following and researching PSI since it formally began in 2003. Past BASIC publications about the PSI include:

• The Proliferation Security Initiative: Targeting Iran and North Korea?, by Richard Bond, BASIC Paper No. 53, January 2007;
• The Proliferation Security Initiative: Three Years On, by Richard Bond, BASIC Notes, August 2, 2006;
• The Proliferation Security Initiative: Towards a New Anti-Proliferation Consensus? by Fabrice Pothier, BASIC Notes, November 18, 2004;
• Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea, by Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, BASIC Research Report 2004.2, June 2004;
• The Proliferation Security Initiative: Dead in the water or steaming ahead?, BASIC Notes, December 12, 2003; and
• Interdiction Under the Proliferation Security Initiative: Counter-Proliferation or Counter-Productive? BASIC Briefing, October 6, 2003.

The U.K. Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) support BASIC's project on the PSI. For further details, see the special section on the PSI on the BASIC Web site at: http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/counterproliferation/psi.htm.

Objectives and methodology

The legal and political details of the PSI have been discussed elsewhere.[1] The goal here is to explore its origins and determine whether those who instigated the PSI are satisfied with its progress. In the spirit of Dean Acheson's famous 1969 diplomatic memoir, 'Present at the Creation', in which he described the early post-WWII years, BASIC set out to review the original aims and motivations for establishing the PSI through discussion with some of its key U.S. founding fathers. Between August 2005 and August 2006, BASIC interviewed seven current or former U.S. State Department officials with an intimate knowledge of the PSI.[2] All of the interviews, bar one, were carried out on a non-attribution basis. The interview objectives were to:

• Piece together recent history concerning the development of the PSI;
• Discover what was currently happening in terms of both operational procedures and policy-making within the U.S. government in relation to the PSI; and
• Test attitudes of U.S. policy stakeholders towards WMD proliferation and counter-proliferation strategies (and in particular, to discover the level of awareness about the dynamics that drive WMD proliferation and the level of support for common interdiction policies).

This paper is based on these in-depth interviews supplemented by open source materials (official documents, briefings and media reports).

Structure of the paper

The paper starts with an overview of the origins of the PSI and then discusses how the U.S. government set about creating it. This section also explores the criteria and methods used to draw in participating states. The relationship of PSI to U.S. foreign policy and UN Resolution 1540 are outlined next. This is followed by a discussion of the practical implementation of the initiative, in terms of interdictions carried out so far, and the role and purpose of U.S. bilateral ship-boarding arrangements. In the last sections, the need to reach out to East Asian states, and other future options for developing the initiative are discussed, including the relationship of the PSI to the latest initiative on the block: the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The paper finally draws a number of conclusions.

2. Origins of the PSI

The impetus for creating PSI was the increased concern over the proliferation of WMD. Prior to the 9/11 attacks U.S. concern was primarily with proliferation of WMD to so called 'rogue' states. Later, after 9/11, the concern grew to include sub-state actors, such as terrorist groups. Particularly significant in the development of PSI was the interdiction of the M/V Sosan. Spanish naval forces stopped the Cambodian-flagged Sosan bound for Yemen on December 9, 2002:

Spanish forces located 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads and rocket propellant under a cargo of cement after stopping this North Korean-owned vessel in the Arabian Sea that had sought to conceal its true identity and nationality. Only the cement was manifested. The vessel was said to be headed for Socotra. After consultations at the highest levels, on December 11, the vessel was permitted to proceed to Yemen.[3]

Conventional wisdom says the Sosan was allowed to continue on its way because there was no legal authority to seize the cargo. The legal basis for the interdiction was the failure of the vessel to fly its flag, which allowed investigation and boarding, but not seizure of the cargo. The White House confirmed that the legal case for confiscation was weak on December 11, 2002:

There is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea. While there is authority to stop and search, in this instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen. And therefore, the merchant vessel is being released.[4]

One former State Department official argues, however, that politics rather than the law was the determining factor:

[Although it was] asserted to be a problem of sufficient authority, that we didn't have the legal framework to do anything. I don't believe that to be the case. I think that the SOSAN was allowed through for political reasons because the vice president of all people decided that it had to be let go. the relationship with Yemen on counterterrorism was more important than a bunch of North Korean scud missiles.[5]

And the same official thought the Sosan interdiction actually sent the wrong message:

You can't board a ship, document what's on board, we couldn't even do it ourselves, the Spanish did it, and then let it go. It sent all the wrong messages because the North Koreans, they go to school on us.

There's nothing worse than... having your bark be worse than your bite. ....and a lot of things that could and should probably be done unilaterally, or bilaterally, not multilaterally to be most effective, are trying to be worked multilaterally, which is not necessarily the way to do it. ... We have equated the existence of the PSI with the existence of a coherent approach to stopping proliferation from key target countries. ...People assume that things are happening coherently try to stop proliferation networks and functions. And, so having an exercise in the sea to demonstrate that we can board ships doesn't scare the North Koreans, ok? They laugh at it.[6]

Other U.S. officials see things differently, citing the capture by the U.S. navy of thousands of centrifuges on board a German-owned vessel, the BBC China, en route to Libya as a high-profile example of a ground-breaking interdiction on the high seas. While this seizure was not a PSI operation, since it predates the start of the initiative, it nonetheless hinted at why the PSI was needed:

The BBC China was a huge, huge success. It's hard to exaggerate the importance of that success because it led to the exposure of an illegal nuclear weapons program in Libya.[7]

Although much casual press coverage refers to PSI as being the brainchild of former U.S. State Department Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, until recently U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, the PSI was actually created as a result of the December 2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which lists 'interdiction' among various other 'counter-proliferation' strategies. President Bush formally unveiled the PSI in a speech in Krakow in May 2003.

Some think that implementation of the PSI has actually improved since Bolton left the State Department. One former State Department official said:

I think there is a significant difference between the way undersecretary Joseph is running things and the way undersecretary Bolton ran them. Undersecretary Joseph was intimately involved with the AQ Khan network ... he's been a believer in the use of all the intelligence resources to drastically stop proliferation. I mean, he's a very tough guy, but he's serious. My impression of the previous leadership was weak; it was a lot of talk. It was focused on expressions of indignation; "those bad guys, those evil guys". Well so what? ...

The point is what do we do... The president says there's no greater threat, before September 11, than proliferation of WMD. And North Korea, Iran, are the focal points of that threat, then its incumbent upon the government to come up with focused efforts to stop proliferation from one to the other or between the two or from either one to other people in the world or from other people to them. And what alarmed me was this wasn't a coherent effort. It was very much half baked. And I think what I see now is there are coherent efforts and the PSI is an element. And that's all it should be. So finally I think we're coming to a policy that is in line with the rhetoric. But we shouldn't have had to wait.[8]

It is well known that the PSI is a US-initiated and led attempt to curb the international spread of WMD. The PSI was established as a voluntary multilateral attempt to encourage the participation of many nations to play a role in stopping the spread of WMD. The U.S. Administration has acted cooperatively with other nations both in terms of exercise preparation as well as actual interdictions. It is worth noting that the Bush administration has gone to great lengths to diplomatically negotiate with other nations to enlist their cooperation. This was probably made easier by the fact that the PSI is a voluntary agreement and not a treaty. As one interviewee noted:

There is nothing to negotiate because there is no agreement that is signed. A lot of it consists of answering questions that they have....[9]

Most of the literature on the PSI is broadly supportive and commends U.S. efforts in seeking to develop a counter-proliferation framework that includes other nations and relies more on law and diplomacy than force. One typical passage describes the PSI in the following manner:

PSI in its present form is primarily about states strengthening and enforcing existing national and international rules while taking advantage of the requirement of flag state consent to accord stop-and-search powers to each other.[10]

The PSI 'Statement of Interdiction Principles' (agreed in Paris in September 2003) and UN Resolution 1540 (adopted in April 2004 with the aim of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, particularly with regard to non-state actors) are often mentioned together in the literature, as well as in interviews. This linkage is confirmed by an official when commenting on the rationale for initiating the PSI as being a concern for the:

ability of non-state actors and others to evade/avoid export control laws and the sophistication of those enemies[11]

Thus, the PSI was conceived to:

deal with the increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. PSI is one of the key defensive measures. It is in the context of working with the intelligence community and defense department, other key agencies to ensure that we have the tools available for the interdiction of WMD or the elements thereof that would be directed at state or non-state actors from and among all PSI members.[12]

Our interviews with U.S. officials confirm what has generally been said in the literature regarding the reasons for establishing the PSI: the PSI is an activity, not an organization; there is voluntary agreement to adhere to a statement of principles; and, nations cooperate with one another to interdict shipments. If this answers the 'why?' question, what then of the 'how?'.

3. How was PSI created?

The PSI is commonly understood to be a U.S.-inspired initiative. Was this a unilateral effort conceived within the State Department or was it a combined effort across agencies and possibly other countries? A current state department official stated that the PSI was fleshed out:

internally in the state department. But, at the same time that was happening obviously there was a discussion going on.... I think there's been an effort to have other agencies and other groups to fully work with us[13]

Other specific agencies that were involved or consulted in the creation of the PSI probably included the Office of the Legal Advisor in the Department of State, CIA, Navy, Army, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy. But this is largely conjecture since none of those interviewed would specifically say which other departments were involved in the creation of the PSI. Also, this is rarely discussed in the literature. In terms of implementing the PSI, one author suggests that:

For Americans today, the burden of implementing the PSI falls mainly to the Navy. Nonetheless, the PSI has significant implication for the DoD in general and for the Army in particular.[14]

Interestingly, however, BASIC contacted the U.S. Coast Guard, Pentagon, CIA, Navy, and Army in an attempt to obtain contact points for the PSI, but failed to find anyone in these agencies with any knowledge of the PSI.[15] All of these agencies that denied knowing about the PSI should have been key actors in its creation since they are supposedly active in interdiction training and execution today. But how can they be active if they don't know about it? According to one article:

Much of the coordination is participation in interdiction training exercises. The U.S. Navy has participated in five maritime exercises in an ongoing series in support of PSI. The U.S. Navy led Exercise Sea Saber 2004 in the Arabian Sea in January.[16]

A key element of the PSI is the gathering and sharing of intelligence. How does the U.S. receive intelligence about suspect cargo? Presumably CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies work, both on their own and in cooperation with intelligence services in other nations. Since the PSI is a supporting element of the National Security Strategy, it would seem logical for the Department of Defense to be a key player. With PSI interdictions on land, air, and sea, the Army, Navy, and the Coast Guard would be apt to participate in those interdictions. We received limited help in trying to find other persons involved, in terms of contacting various public affairs offices, but either they were unfamiliar with PSI or said they would try and find someone to get back to us. But ultimately, when it came to explaining and detailing the origins and formulation of PSI we were always referred back to the State Department. No one other agency, it seems, wanted to acknowledge participation.

This may simply reflect the fact that in its first couple of years PSI was more talk than action. One former State Department official said:

I think things are definitely better organized now than they were before. Bob Joseph, he's moved this from being a sound bite to being something I would call a serious effort. The problem is that for the first four years, the last two years of the first term, there was a lot of talk and there was almost no action. ...But now, in fairness, they have the capability, they have an organization, they have people that are assigned to not just work interdiction-related issues on categories-nuclear, biological, chemical- but on countries. And that's a huge change.

The first time, we didn't have that though, with the exception of the A.Q. Khan network and the North Korean activities that I ran, which wasn't supposed to be doing proliferation. I mean, we were doing proliferation finances but we weren't doing counter-proliferation because the idea is the PSI would take care of it. Well the PSI wasn't organized to take care of it. PSI hardly existed. Having a bunch of people agree to stop proliferation, and stopping proliferation are two greatly different things.[17]

The recruitment of allies was also an early priority:

Allies were very important because of a number of reasons. Well, one expects to count on their support across the board on any major issue. But also U.S. forces operate from sovereign territories like treaty allies but are permanently based there like Japan, Korea; or exercise there, as is the case in Australia and Thailand. And so you really need them to sign onto these principles for this to be, in effect, an implementable proposition.[18]

But which countries was the United States most interested in persuading to join the PSI? A former State Department official commented that at the time of his employment, there were, "a couple of regions of strong interest because they were areas of trafficking"[19] Countries with Open Registries (so-called 'Flags of Convenience'[20]) and areas of high trafficking were clearly priorities. The same official stated:

The particular regions I had in mind were Southeast Asia, especially the area around the Strait of Malacca. So there's a lot of interest in persuading Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand to sign up; Vietnam, Cambodia as well...Likewise, the Persian Gulf. There's a strong desire to sign up countries in the Persian Gulf because that's where the oil transits are. They have a strong interest in Central Asia because of air transit...We'd be better situated if all the countries in that region, or at least key countries of that region, were to join the initiative....I think it'd be smart for India to join....I'd like to see South Korea join...Basically, with the South Koreans it is 'we fully support this initiative but kind of have this crazy neighbor and they will not understand if we publicly endorse the PSI. So please forgive us if we just remain silent. But if you ever need our help let us know and we're totally onboard with the concept.[21]

Why would 'flag of convenience' (FoC) countries be beneficial to the PSI? Based on gross tonnage in millions, almost one-third of the entire shipping industry is registered under 10 FoC countries alone. .

How did countries generally react to being courted for PSI 'membership'? A former State Department official who helped to set up a bilateral boarding agreement with the Marshall Islands, provided the following insight:

Countries want to know what they are signing up for. And this was presented as something different.... not an organization but an activity....What does that mean? What are the expectations? And what does an agreement to a statement of principles fully entail? Are there expectations beyond that? So at first there was, in my region, a lot of questions about what we were asking them to sign up for. What does this mean? What does this mean for existing agreements? You know is this something that's sort of an umbrella approach? Does this impact existing agreements and existing infrastructure that we need to know about?[22]

Three years is a relatively short amount of time for an international initiative to take hold. However, some officials in the U.S. government act as though the PSI was created last week and no other country has heard of it. So, if countries were reluctant to sign-up for the PSI, how did U.S. officials seek to convince and assuage their concerns? A former State Department official commented that:

There was an education process....No sovereign government...is going to say that 'we're not interested in helping,' but there's a great interest in knowing what we were asking them to sign, too. So I think the hurdle was sort of an education process.[23]

Another State department official stressed the educational value of dialogue with other nations:

And we try to tailor our response and our discussion to whatever concerns they have. So we work on a kind of bilateral basis in that regard.[24]

Much of this dialogue appears to take place on an informal basis, and consists of:

answering questions that they have and... there are cases where governments will come and say, 'assure us about x,y, or z, and then we'll think about it.'[25]

Dialogue and Q&A forums appear to have been successful in alleviating the main concerns of prospective 'member' states. But are there other ways to ease the concerns of other potential new partners besides dialogue? Actual examples of successful interdictions are one answer. Countries will be keener to be associated with a successful enterprise. The Libyan interdiction is often cited in this regard:

Libya is now on the right path of denouncing its weapons of mass destruction....I think, I would say, that certainly one of the elements, an important element was seeing that a number of the shipments, particularly those carrying centrifuge parts were interdicted on the high seas...[26]

Ultimately, the full diplomatic toolbox will be needed to entice new partners, including "diplomatic skills, technological assistance, and capacity-building."[27] And as a former State Department official pointed out, some states need little persuasion to join:

And a lot of governments that decide to sign on to the PSI, what they're really interested in is the benign forms of military cooperation with the United States and other countries that are possible. A lot of countries' militaries become supporters of the PSI because they like the idea of being engaged in exercises with the United States, Australia, Japan, and Italy. It's an opportunity they might not otherwise have.[28]

4. U.S. foreign policy and PSI

The PSI is without a formal structure.

PSI has no international secretariat, no offices in federal agencies established to support it, no database or reports of successes or failures, and no established funding.[29]

But in a structure-less coalition who leads? The leadership role of the United States in the PSI is not specifically detailed in the literature. Bilateral ship boarding agreements that the US has formed with several countries have been a major objective of U.S. leadership. And the resulting agreements with Liberia, Panama and other flag states reveal the diplomatic and economic power of the United States, even within a 'voluntary' initiative. Much of U.S. leadership is concerned with assuaging concerns of allies:

There's a number of meetings and conferences where we get together among countries...PSI issues are always part of the discussion, part of the overall context.... We try to tailor our response...to whatever concerns they have. So we work on a kind of bilateral basis in that regard.... Plus if a country believes there is good cause and would want to engage and take part in this they would.[30]

But as Michael Byers, writing in the American Journal of International Law, explains, this leadership reflects a new desire for flexibility of action to avoid the constraints of full-on multilateralism:

The Proliferation Security Initiative is reflective of a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward a more flexible approach to collective action that eschews both ad hoc unilateralism and institutionalized multilateralism. What Department of State Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass has characterized as a 'a la carte multilateralism' involves coalitions that will vary in size and composition depending on the issue at hand, with the only constant being that the coalitions are formed and led by the United States.[31]

Baker Spring, of the Heritage Foundation, concurs:

As a means of hindering proliferation, multilateral arms control has become too dependent on a treaty regime managed by cumbersome international bureaucracies.[32]

As the sole superpower, of course, the United States has the political, military and economic muscle to bend a loose arrangement like the PSI to its own ends:

One of the ironies of contemporary international politics is that the Bush administration's evident willingness to use force unilaterally and preemptively provides it with heightened influence in multilateral negotiations.[33]

Though the PSI does not have a hierarchal structure, the U.S. government is able to greatly influence, or persuade, other countries to join in. For example, both Panama and the Marshall Islands have signed boarding agreements, partly because of perceived economic benefits.[34] From Washington's perspective, this loose multilateral approach offers several advantages:

It largely avoids problems of institutional blockage, such as those that can occur within the UN Security Council; it allows for the limitation of new initiatives to small groups of like-minded states, with the group then being expanded once momentum has been achieved; and it enables the United States to focus its persuasive efforts on those most able and willing to assist with respect to any given matter.[35]

5. UN Security Council Resolution 1540

U.S. influence was also crucial in obtaining UN endorsement for the PSI through Security Council Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which declares nuclear weapons as a threat to the world and requires all states to prevent terrorists and non-State actors, as identified under Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, from acquiring WMD.[36] Resolution 1540 is generally seen as complementary to the PSI. It states that:

proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biology weapons...constitutes a threat to international peace and security" and requires the "urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery" by banning States from "providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery"[37]

In order to implement the resolution, a special committee (the 1540 Committee) was formed, which informs the Security Council about progress in the implementation of the resolution, and also makes relevant recommendation when necessary.

Resolution 1540 encourages States to develop national implementing regulations to further protect domestic and international shipping, carry out border patrols, and other types of physical protection for their particular state. That Resolution 1540 is often cited by U.S. officials to further legitimize the PSI should come as no surprise. As a former U.S. State Department official stated

if you recall in paragraph 10, of the resolution there are specific requests of states to under take measures to protect themselves to take measures like the PSI to fit directly into some of the activities and views that were clearly mentioned in 1540.[38]

Specifically, paragraph 10 of Resolution 1540:

calls upon all States, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.[39]

In other words, Resolution 1540 requires states to also take responsibility for the protection of their domestic territory. In order to help facilitate that protective environment, PSI can help foster cooperative international relationships that will further protect the borders of other countries involved in the activity.

From a U.S. perspective, therefore, PSI appears to have been, in part at least, an attempt to raise awareness in other countries that the threat of WMD proliferation should be a global concern, and then to bring key countries on board for a common response. The initial core member group, who were supportive from the onset of the activity, was particularly important to the U.S. Administration.

Resolution 1540 also established a normative basis for the PSI. It created a broad consensus around the scale and nature of the threat from 'catastrophic terrorism', and also signaled a 'paradigm shift' in the use of force:

For centuries, states exercised a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force.... Now Resolution 1540 and the PSI appear to be eroding that distinction by authorizing the use of armed force on the high seas and possibly even within the territory of nonconsenting states in order to staunch the flow of WMD.[40]

However, it should be noted that resolution 1540 falls short of authorizing interdictions.

6. Land, sea and air interdictions: the story so far

Although the PSI includes land, sea, and air interdictions, the literature tends to focus on the maritime aspect. As a State Department official commented, "a lot of our publicized exercises have involved the maritime aspects of PSI" but was quick to add that "we've been concentrating on all three." [41] He also said that there were still "ongoing discussions"[42] regarding how to properly and safely undertake air and land interdictions.

Evaluating the effectiveness of any interdictions is difficult, given the secrecy around such activities. As one State Department official commented:

"if we announced them even afterwards often it can complicate our ability to carry out further interdictions and additional sensitivity.... And in most cases, the specific information is too sensitive."[43]

The most noted case of interception at sea was the BBC China carrying centrifuges to Libya. Many analysts have suggested that this interdiction contributed to Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programs. However, as stated previously, this case pre-dates the PSI, and stemmed from previous efforts to track and uncover the Khan network.[44] As a former State Department official emphasized:

the most exemplary thing this administration did and probably the most exemplary thing I've ever done in counterproliferation was the AQ Khan network And that was done with a great deal of coherence and leadership in the coordination, secrecy, in lots of international support. And the PSI wasn't anywhere near involved with that. You could argue that the PSI was stimulated by it. You could argue that the ship stopped on the way to Libya was attributed to PSI action. But we didn't need the PSI to stop it. It can't.

Again, I'm not trying to negate the PSI. It can't really hurt but it doesn't function as a counterproliferation strategy in the 21st century. At time when you see proliferation networks increasing their sophistication. ...A network destruction strategy is really the only effective way to do that. You can do that corroboratively using the international consensus that has been around PSI principles. But we already have UN Resolution 1540. I'm not against international resolutions, they're very helpful. We got the new one on North Korea; very helpful I think And the PSI is an important supporting policy, but... we created this sort of smoke screen to mask the fact that we didn't have sort of coherent strategy on proliferation. I can tell you, we certainly didn't have it on North Korea.[45]

Others, especially the Polish Government (which, as the host country for President Bush's launch of the Initiative, has taken a strong supportive role ever since, and likes to refer to it as the Krakow Proliferation Security Initiative[46] ) prefer to paint a rosier picture of the PSI. In this news reports, for example, a Polish official is quoted as saying that:

around 12 illegal shipments have been seized in the past three years by countries that back an international scheme to halt the spread of WMD. [47]

These figures are backed up by more recent public declarations by the U.S. Department of State: between April 2005 and April 2006, the United States in concert with PSI participants in Europe, the Middle East and Asia conducted approximately two-dozen interdictions. Specifically, it is claimed that co-operation under the PSI has prevented the export to Iran of components and dual-use materials related to its missile program and on another occasion the export of heavy water-related equipment destined for Iran's nuclear program.[48] But does this seemingly increasing number of interdictions prove that the PSI is a success? One former State Department interviewee was extremely skeptical:

We've stopped a remarkably small number of ships by the way. Ask how many North Korean ships we've stopped. Some people say there may have been one stopped. Well that's pretty interesting because there's hundreds of ships sailing around. The fact is that for the first two years we didn't stop any. And that's bad; that's very bad. I think that's inexplicable.

Someone's going to have to explain how on earth the Iranians ended up with eighteen North Korean missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to most every capital in Europe in the last 24 months. How the hell did that happen?[49]

The test of any policy or control mechanism is, of course, the hard cases, such as North Korea and Iran. But part of the problem is that the PSI needs a stronger legal basis to enable interdictions in such cases. And the PSI was never going to be a 'silver bullet'. For a cooperative effort that is barely three years old, the PSI does have some successes. First, it has enabled the formation of an international 'coalition of the willing' dedicated to cooperative action in interdiction. As Tadeusz Chomicki, deputy director of Poland's security policy department, has said:

The initiative creates an exchange of information between countries that makes it significantly easier and quicker to undertake operations.[50]

Second, the fact that WMD may be intercepted and confiscated before they are deployed or used is a worthy aim given the huge comparative costs of intervention further down the line.[51]

7. U.S. bilateral boarding agreements

The first two U.S. bilateral boarding agreements were reached with Liberia, the second-largest flag state (in February 2004) and Panama, the world's leading flag state (in May 2004). Together these two flag states cover 20% of global merchant shipping, which means the United States may now legally board two out of ten merchant vessels. Agreements have also been reached with other flag states, including the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Belize and Cyprus.[52]

It is clear that the U.S. State Department sees these agreements as providing a stronger legal basis for interdiction. According to a former State Department official:

It's from the statement of interdiction principles that there's no intention here to proceed in an unlawful manner; but what we need is a lawful basis for acting and that's why we go through all the trouble of signing ship boarding agreements.... There are other bases under international law and if you look at the way that PSI is actually operated, I am not aware of any allegations of any case where it said that the PSI is carried out in a manner contrary to international law.[53]

The United States is also actively pursuing ship boarding agreements with Malta and Greece, as well as nearly twenty other bilateral agreements at various stages of negotiation.[54] As a former State Department official explained:

There is a desire to sign additional ship boarding agreements.... There are additional countries where these agreements are being sought.[55]

What is the nature of these agreements? What is their purpose and have they been effective in enhancing U.S. counter-proliferation objectives? According to the U.S. Department of State, ship-boarding agreements provide:

authority on a bilateral basis to board sea vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipment of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or related materials..," by requesting "...the other to confirm the nationality of the ship in question and, if needed, authorize the boarding, search, and possible detention of the vessel and its cargo.[56]

The same official quoted above summed up these agreements by saying:

None of the ship boarding agreements provide prior consent. None of them are a blank check. They are expedited procedures for consideration of a request."12 [Under these agreements], if we come to you and say we have suspicion, and you want to know what the basis of the suspicion is, we share with you what we can share and you're not satisfied, then you have the right to say no.[57]

The agreements are mutually applicable and are expected to streamline boarding procedures. In the agreement with Panama, for example, each party may refuse a request to board one of their flagged ships, but must do so within two hours from the time they are contacted. Otherwise the other party is automatically authorised to go ahead and board, search and possibly detain the vessel and its cargo.[58]

What criteria does the U.S. State Department apply in identifying potential candidate countries for a ship boarding agreement? To a large extent, these mirror the criteria discussed earlier in seeking participating states for the PSI. In other words, the selection process appears to lean towards "top countries, in terms of tonnage"[59] in particularly sensitive regions. Countries that have access to choke points in the international seaways, such as the Panama Canal, or that are "being used with some regularity for those kind of traffickers,"[60] are other key criteria.

To what extent have these ship-boarding agreements enhanced U.S. interdiction efforts? It's hard to say for sure, but they have allowed the United States the potential to interdict in a timely manner a very large percentage of the world's commercial shipping fleet.

Interdiction is hardly a risk-free endeavor. But how likely is it that an interdiction carried out under the PSI might exacerbate a conflict? Given that there have been relatively few interdictions, it is hardly surprising that none so far have resulted in an international incident. However, according to a former State Department official, one pre-PSI interdiction incident did result in a "national embarrassment".

This was the Yinhe incident, which happened in the summer of 1993. The "Yinhe" was a Chinese regular container ship from Tianjin Xinggang. It sailed to its destination Kuwait via Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore and Jakarta, Dubai and Daman and Diu. On July 23, 1993, the CIA alleged that "Yinhe" was carrying chemical weapons material to Abbas Harbor, Iran. On September 4, it proved that the CIA accusation was baseless, through an open inspection, with Saudi Arabia as an intermediary.[61] Clearly, therefore, interdiction has the potential to cause an international incident because there may be

a problem if you disagree over the nature of the vessel and broke the agreement and didn't get permission to board; you board and there's nothing there.[62]

The purpose of the U.S. government signing bilateral ship-boarding agreements is to make it easier to gain permission to board a suspicious vessel. However, the flag country can still deny that request, although this is highly unlikely, especially when a specific boarding agreement has been signed:

Let's take a case like the Marshall Islands since I'm familiar with it. An interdiction on a Marshall Islands flagged vessel, which is going to be a 'flag of convenience' potentially impacts their ability to sell this to others, right? It hurts business, potentially.

So they're going to want to be sure that if we come to them with information this is a suspicious vessel we want to make pretty damn well sure that it is. They're not going to have the independent intelligence capability necessarily to say one way or the other. They know some things that we don't about the crew and people that are flying under their flag. But we may have national technical means, we might have intercepts, we might have something that says 'there's bad stuff on this ship.' Well, this is going to be bad for business for the Marshall Islands if somebody else is going to look at 'well, do I want to fly under Liberian flag or the Marshall flag?'...

There are other flags of convenience. [So potential shippers] may say 'I'll go with another flag where I'm not going to have my host country roll over to the United States.' So, the U.S. hypothetical question is 'could I see it?' I could see it but I'd put it in the unlikely category.[63]

Thus, it is clear that for the PSI to be effective, interdicting parties, such as the United States (but also other states with interdiction capabilities), must be sensitive to the concerns of flag states. This is especially true when a bilateral boarding agreement has been negotiated.

8. Policing East Asian waters: the need to involve China and Indonesia

Endorsement of the PSI from more East Asian countries is another clear U.S. objective. As one official commented:

We have made extraneous efforts....We're working with preexisting partners to encourage other countries to subscribe to the principles.... You know, I did a number of conferences and I know we sent a number of delegations to the region. A number of officials have spoken on the importance of PSI...and they continue to do that. We do have participation in Southeast Asia. We are always looking to enhance it. The volume of trade there is significant.[64] ...

A former State Department official added:

We're still talking, we were still talking to the Indonesians. They had concerns; they talked about Law of the Sea.... Truth is, there were no well-founded legal concerns. Their experts dealt with our experts and our experts would go through all the stuff....At the end of the day there are no well-founded legal concerns because the answer that it ultimately has to reassure them is we recognize there will be cases where neither you nor we can act because there is no lawful jurisdictional basis for doing so. We only intend to act where there is a lawful jurisdictional basis for doing so. That answer trumps all these concerns.[65]

One major obstacle to implementing the PSI in East Asia is China:

Although Russia has recently joined PSI, China has made considerable efforts to manage the North Korean situation by diplomatic and economic means. Hostility toward PSI from that large and powerful country could limit its effectiveness and provide a source of unnecessary friction in international affairs.[66]

So how important is China to the PSI? Very important, according to one analyst:

Disregarding U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's outspoken advocacy of the PSI, Chinese spokesmen have lodged vehement objections against the initiative, dashing U.S. hopes for a partnership. Unless China takes the lead, few if any Asian nations aside from Japan, a founding member of the PSI, will join in. Deprived of China's support, the initiative could lack ships, intelligence, and muscle it needs to prosecute operations effectively in Asian waters. Chinese commentators allege that the PSI reinforces U.S. claims to regional leadership and thus perpetuates U.S. geopolitical dominance. Why...would China ever consent to an initiative designed to hem it in?[67]

China is a powerful global actor, with a rapidly growing economic and military profile. Without the full support of China behind the PSI, neighboring Asian countries appear reluctant to join. Because China is heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas, it is reluctant to cede interdiction rights to the U.S. or allied navies that could potentially be used to interrupt the delivery of key energy supplies. Also, China appears wary of U.S. motivations behind the PSI and sees it as another tool for extending U.S. hegemony in its own regional setting. How then should the U.S. Administration go about persuading China to endorse the PSI?

Persuading Beijing that maritime security isn't a zero-sum game would help. ... Negotiating a compact under which the U .S., Chinese, and other participating navies jointly police East Asian waters for weapons-related cargoes should be Washington's chief aim. Acknowledging Chinese leadership-and putting that leadership to work for mutual gain-would pay dividends for regional security.[68]

Reservations also exist in other major East Asian states. When U.S. Secretary Rumsfeld met with Indonesian Minister Juwono Sudarsono in Indonesia in June 2006, for example, a reporter from the New York Times asked the latter about the PSI:

The United States has advanced the idea of the Proliferation Security Initiative as a means of interdicting suspected WMD on the high seas. The Indonesian government has expressed concerns about this - (inaudible) - to do with the notion of sovereignty. What is your assessment of the Proliferation Security Initiative? What are your concerns about it? What alternative ideas does Indonesia have for maritime security in this area?[69]

Minister Sudarsono, while acknowledging the rational behind the PSI, expressed "concern about sovereignty over our territory". But he went on to make the following endorsement:.

Perhaps we can agree on a limited framework of cooperation on an ad hoc basis rather than a multilateral, permanent structure of the PSI.[70]

Of course, a permanent structure for the PSI had never been the U.S.' intention. Secretary Rumsfeld went on re-iterate the close U.S.-Indonesian military relationship:

The United States and Indonesia have, as you know, reestablished normal military-to-military relations, which I believe is a very good thing for our country and for both our countries. The ability for our militaries to work more closely with each other is clear when one thinks of what took place in the tsunami or what took place with respect to the earthquake and the need to know each other and to be able to communicate well with each other and understand each other when there's a disaster of that type.[71]

With this type of military cooperation already established for relief and security assistance efforts, it is conceivable, even probable, that the U.S. government will pursue and eventually secure Indonesia's participation in the PSI. A Los Angeles Times reporter asked Minister Sudarsono:

You have been quoted a couple of days ago in essence warning the United States it should not impose the way it conducts its war on terrorism on Indonesia because it could lead to a backlash. Can you please expand on that a bit? Were you talking about the PSI there, or just exactly what you were discussing there, please?[72]

Minister Sudarsono replied:

I mentioned to Secretary Rumsfeld that the United States has a $12 trillion economy, so that by virtue of that, you are very powerful....So in application of security, including anti-terrorist laws and anti-terrorist measures, it's best that you leave the main responsibility of anti-terrorist measures to the local government in question....[73]

Secretary Rumsfeld reminded the audience that the concerns expressed by Indonesia were legitimate:

Recall that our position from the very outset has been that we wanted the cooperation of other countries because it is a global problem, to the extent that those countries felt comfortable doing it....The global war on terror now has a coalition that's probably the largest coalition in the history of the world of some 80 or 85 nations that are cooperating. They are sharing information. They are working together in - each in their own way, each in a way that's comfortable from their history, their backgrounds, their circumstance. And it strikes me that the minister is correct,...and it's necessary to allow that degree of flexibility so that they can participate in a way that they feel comfortable with and not feel imposed upon.[74]

The continued outreach and educational forums and discussions for the PSI, along with a focus on gaining China's acceptance should help facilitate a more inclusive and therefore conducive environment for the initiative.

9. What next?

Deepening and broadening integration

The effective implementation of the PSI requires a deepening and broadening of diplomatic interaction in order to facilitate both the timely exchange of intelligence and capacity-building assistance. As a current State Department official noted:

Widening the coalition beyond existing states would only enhance its effectiveness.... Exposing the PSI to a wider range of input should increase international confidence in it and enhance its effectiveness.... Revealing the levels of support for the PSI around the world would help establish the norm necessary for the creation of universal law. Dedicating resources to help poor or weak states conform to the requirements of Resolution 1540 would give additional legitimacy to the Security Council's ambitious legislative effort and presumably give the PSI supporters more congenial legal frameworks. Likewise, opening up the Initiative to participation by NGOs would also accelerate the norm-setting process and increase the PSI's capabilities. [75]

The question of how to enhance the PSI should also be discussed within appropriate intergovernmental organizations and processes, such as NATO, OSCE, OAS, G8 and IMO. By broadening the stakeholders, improving intelligence gathering and sharing, and giving better publicity to successful interdictions, over time the PSI should become a more efficient and effective mechanism, as predicted by one analyst:

The PSI's participants are building legal and political support for highly-focused use of force operations to counter the proliferation of WMD. Eventually these efforts may mature into the formation of clear and substantive law permitting highly-focused military operations anywhere in the world in order to halt the flow of prevent the use of WMD. [76]

The PSI and the G8 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

The prospect of the coordinating efforts exemplified by the PSI becoming standard counter proliferation practice should be a powerful motivating factor. However, the process of developing common planning and operational interdiction standards is likely to proceed in small steps, among like-minded groupings of states, either at the regional level or among other groupings with shared interests, such as the G8. Indeed, a G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation was adopted at the Sea Island Summit in 2004. With regard to the PSI the plan noted:

We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the PSI and the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support worldwide for PSI, which now includes all G-8 members.[77]

The importance of the PSI was again re-iterated at the 2006 G8 summit at St Petersburg, where a statement on non-proliferation was issued on July 16, 2006, in which it was acknowledged that:

The proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, together with international terrorism remain the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security.... We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative, which constitutes an important means to count trafficking in WMD, their delivery means and related materials. We welcome the increasing international endorsement for the Initiative.... States can work cooperatively to prevent and disrupt proliferation finance, in furtherance of the objectives of UNSCR 1540.[78]

Also at the St Petersburg summit, Presidents Putin and Bush announced the creation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism:

Building on our earlier work, the Global Initiative reflects our intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share our views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities.... We will take steps to improve participants' capabilities to: ensure accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive substances, as well as security of nuclear facilities; detect and suppress illicit trafficking or other illicit activities involving such materials, especially measures to prevent their acquisition and use by terrorists; respond to and mitigate the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; ensure cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensure that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists seeking to acquire or use nuclear materials; and strengthen our respective national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution of, and the certainty of punishment for, terrorists and those who facilitate such acts.[79]

Like the PSI, this new joint leadership effort between the United States and Russia, appears to seek ad hoc multilateral partnerships of like-minded states committed to working cooperatively to combat a common threat. According to a senior State Department official, the central objective of this Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is to:

establish a growing network of partner nations that are committed to taking effective measures to build a layered defense-in-depth that can continuously adapt to the changing nature of the threat.... The Global Initiative provides a capacity building framework for establishing new partnerships with those nations that wish to take similar action.[80]

This was exactly the sort of language deployed at the start of the PSI. In theory, the PSI should be one of the tools used to advance this latest initiative, and as such should complement it. However, as has been indicated in this paper regarding the PSI, there will be concerns about whether the fine words will be matched by actions and new resources. Other concerns that are periodically raised about the PSI-regarding its legal basis and lack of universal adherence, for example-are also likely to be raised in objection this new initiative. However, according to the State Department, the legal basis for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is robust:

The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is an important, although not the exclusive, legal basis for the work of the Initiative. Other important legal bases include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, as well as national legal authorities.[81]

Under Secretary Joseph has elaborated further on the legal basis for the Global Initiative, arguing that it will build on existing arrangements, such as:

the Nuclear Terrorism Convention.... ...the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) and International Counterproliferation Programs and the Department of Energy's main nonproliferation assistance programs.... We will also seek to develop new partnerships with the private sector to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, including through innovative DHS programs such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).... We must develop a robust international detection architecture. Here the Global Initiative will build on and sustain the successes of the Megaports Program and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and catalyze new partnerships between these programs.[82]

Thus, there appears to be a strong overlap between the PSI and the Global Initiative: the purpose of the PSI is to stop the illicit trafficking of WMD materials and their method of delivery via land, air, and sea interdictions; the Global Initiative builds upon the initial goals of the PSI, but also seeks to fill in some of the gaps that have been discovered over the last three years:.

As we proceed, we will build on the success of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the flexible partnerships it has established. However, we will also fill important gaps. For example, while PSI has focused on the interdiction of all WMD and related delivery systems, the Global Initiative brings a special focus to the operational and technical challenges associated with combating the nuclear terrorism threat. While PSI focuses on the proliferation trade among state actors, the Global Initiative will be focused on those pathways of nuclear proliferation that lead to terrorist end users. While PSI has strengthened our interdiction capabilities, the Global Initiative will move beyond interdiction within the nuclear and radiological area, to cooperation on tasks related to material protection, detection, emergency response, consequence management, attribution, and criminal justice.[83]

10. Conclusions

The PSI is an activity, not an organization. Founded in 2003 under the U.S. National Security Strategy, the PSI is reported to have undertaken at least 12 (and possibly as many as 24) successful interdictions - although few, if any, details are in the public domain, and few officials (in the United States at least, outside the State Department) appear to be aware of it. Although most information on the PSI is maritime related, a State Department official assured us that discussions are ongoing regarding the other two elements, and pointed out that: "just because they are publicly less visible doesn't mean that they're less important."[84]

Proponents of the PSI are also keen to trumpet the benefits of the ad hoc multilateralism at the heart of the PSI. The same State Department official stressed:

It is [a framework] in which we minimize, eliminate, or void [difficulties]... because if you are suddenly demanding a country with little or no notice to take part in some exercise about some ship they might or might not know about, you're going to end up running into trouble. But if you voluntarily get a country to subscribe to the general principles and be a participant in the workshops..., and they decide based on certain upper level that they want to take part, then it'd be a mutually satisfactory outcome....That's what we've found so far.[85]

However, developing even closer working relationships among key participating states, especially with regard to sharing of intelligence before and during the interdiction, would help to further minimize mistakes and make an interdiction turning into an international crisis an even more "unlikely" event.[86]

The PSI continues to demonstrate the potential to be a credible enforcement mechanism, and clearly has the support of the U.S. State Department and the foreign ministries of a growing number of participating states (81 as at the end of November 2006[87]). Its lack of structure and a clearly defined implementation process are both a strength and a weakness. The a la carte multilateralsm allows flexibility, but also breeds confusion and misinterpretation as to the real intentions of the participants in the eyes of skeptical nations like China. The lack of an institutional focus combined with excessive secrecy surrounding alleged successful interdictions means that there appears to be little awareness and support for the PSI beyond a few knowledgeable insiders. This will make expansion of the PSI (both in terms of attracting new participating states and the resources needed to mount successful interdictions and promote technical cooperation and assistance) more difficult.

U.S. leadership has been crucial to the development of the PSI, but with all new children is it now time to let go, and allow it to stand on its own? Could the 80 plus participating states look to turn the PSI into an independent organization, perhaps under a UN mandated interdiction committee, dedicated to enforcing Resolution 1540?

Endnotes

[1] See, for example, Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea, BASIC Research Report 2004.2, June 2004.

[2] All the interviews were carried by BASIC Senior Analyst David Isenberg and BASIC intern Katherine Miller, with the exception of the first interview in August 2005, which was carried out by BASIC intern Wilson Co.. All the interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis, with the exception of the June 14, 2006, interview with Francis C. Record, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State.

[3] Roach, Captain J. Ashley, JAGC, USN (Ret.). Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Countering Proliferation by Sea. Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, March 11, 2005.

[4] Ari Fleischer, White House Press Briefing, 11 December 2002.

[5] Interview with former State Department official, August 2, 2006.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[8] Interview with former State Department official, August 2, 2006.

[9] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[10] Byers, Michael. Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative. The American Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 3 (July 2004), p. 545.

[11] Interview with a current State Department official on June 14, 2006.

[12] Interview with Francis C. Record, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation-Department of State, June 14 2006.

[13] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[14] Shulman, Mark R. The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. April 2006, p. 34.

[15] We contacted various military service and other agency public affairs offices by phone to ask for a contact person on PSI. The response was either a complete lack of awareness and knowledge of PSI or a limited awareness but no knowledge of their own agency's involvement in it. In some cases they promised to find someone within their organization who could speak about PSI but in the end they either said they could not find someone, or did not get back to us (e.g. the CIA, Coast Guard and Navy).

[16] Munns, David W. 'Proliferation Security Initiative Seen as Start to Curbing Trade in Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Sea Power. November 2004, p. 11.

[17] Interview with former State Department official, August 2, 2006.

[18] Interview with former State Department official, June 28, 2006.

[19] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[20] Flag of convenience shipping is defined by the United Nations as shipping "under which there exists no genuine link between the State and the ships and in particular under which the State does not effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative technical and social matters over ship flying its flag". Toh, Rex S., Henry Susilowidjojo. 'Flags of Convenience Shipping in the 1980s: The American Perspective', Transportation Journal. Summer. See BASIC Research Report on FoC and the PSI, forthcoming.

[21] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[22] Interview with former State Department official, June 28, 2006.

[23] Interview with former State Department official, June 28, 2006.

[24] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[25] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[26] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[27] Shulman, Mark R., The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security, op. cit.

[28] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[29] Squassoni, Sharon. CRS Report for Congress. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). June 7, 2005, p. 3.

[30] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[31] Byers, Michael. Op. cit., p. 543.

[32] Munns, David W., op. cit., p. 10.

[33] Byers, Michael. Op. cit., p. 545.

[34] For detail see Winner, Andrew C., "The Proliferation Security Initative: The New Face of Interdiction," The Washington Quarterly, Sprin 2005, pp. 134-135; Judith Miller, "Panama Joins Accord to Stem Sips' Transport of Illicit Arms," New York Times, May 11, 2004;and Milan Vesley, "Liberia's flag of 'inconvenience'," African Business, April 2004, pp. 24-25.

[35] Byers, Michael. Op. cit., pp. 543-544.

[36] United Nations Press Release SC/8076, April 28, 2004, http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm.

[37] UN Security Council Resolution 1540. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/
328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement.

[38] Ibid.

[39] UN Security Council

[40] Ibid, p. 34.

[41] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Interview with a State Department official on August 12, 2005.

[44] Wade Boese, "Key U.S. Interdiction Initiative Claim Misrepresented," Arms Control Today, July/August 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/Interdiction_Misrepresented.asp. See also Paul Kerr, "Libya's Disarmament: A Model for U.S. Policy?," Arms Control Today, June 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/NewsAnalysis.asp, and Sammy Salama, "Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?," Issue Brief, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, September 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_56a.html.

[45] Interview with former State Department official, August 2, 2006.

[46] See the web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland: http://www.psi.msz.gov.pl/.

[47] " Anti-WMD Scheme Seizes 12 Illegal Arms Cargos: Polish Official," Agence France-Presse, DefenseNews.com, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1885397&C=europe.

[48] Joseph, Robert G., US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (2006) 'Broadening and Deepening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation', Warsaw, Poland, June 23, 2006.

[49] Interview with former State Department official, August 2, 2006.

[50] Anti-WMD Scheme Seizes 12 Illegal Arms Cargos, op. cit.

[51] As the old saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. For one example of the consequences of hypothetical WMD use in the United States see Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, RAND, TR-391-CTRMP, 2006.

[52] State Department website (http://www.state.gov/t/np/c12386.htm) accessed September 16, 2006.

[53] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[54] Interview with former State Department official, August 2, 2006.

[55] Ibid.

[56] U.S. Department of State. Ship Boarding Agreements. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12386.htm.

[57] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[58] Carol Giacomo, 'Panama Said to Let US Board Its Flagged Ships', Reuters, May, 10, 2004.

[59] Interview with a former State Department official, August 12, 2005.

[60] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[61] The incident referred to by the official was actually unrelated to PSI but he considered it relevant. The exact quote is, "but I remember the infamous example with the Chinese where we said 'you know that we know that we know' and now we're convinced that yes it was being unloaded but they found a way to get it off before the interdiction. Chinese are still saying no there wasn't anything. So that was a national embarrassment, and every once in a while the Chinese still pull that out as one of the horrendous things we've committed against them." Interview with State Department official, July 10, 2006. Source for background on the Yinhe incident: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yinhe_incident, and http://www.nti.org/db/china/ntmpos.htm.

[62] Interview with former State Department official, June 28, 2006.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[65] Interview with former State Department official, July 10, 2006.

[66] Byers, Michael, op. cit.

[67] Holmes, James. Rough Waters Ahead. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. November/December 2005.

[68] Wing, Maria J, op. cit.

[69] United States Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs). News Transcript. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060606-13223.html July 5, 2006

[70] Ibid and Holmes, James, op. cit.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Interview with a current State Department official on June 14, 2006.

[76] Shulman, Mark R., The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security, op. cit.

[77] "G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation," The White House, June 9, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-28.html.

[78] G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation. http://www.sgpproject.org/Personal%20Use%20Only/
G8%20Statement%20on%20Non.pdf

[79] U.S. State Department website. Press Release. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm.

[80] The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Approach to Today's Most Serious National Security Threat. Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. 18 July 2006.

[81] Media Note. Office of the Spokesman State Department. July 15, 2006. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69016.htm.

[82] "The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Approach to Today's Most Serious National Security Threat," Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Remarks to the Capitol Hill Club, Washington, DC, July 18, 2006, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/69124.htm.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Interview with Francis C. Record, op. cit.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Interview with former State Department official, June 28, 2006.

[87] US State Department Website: Proliferation Security Initiative Participants, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, November 28, 2006, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm.