ISSUE AREAS:

BASIC PAPERS

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

MARCH 2005 . NUMBER 48

Security Without Borders?
The U.N. High Level Panel and the Challenge of U.N. Security Council Reform

By Dr. Ian Davis and Trudy Fraser[1]

Key Points

• The High Level Panel Report must not be received as a conclusive cure-all but as the beginning of a process of long-term change, the responsibility for which lies with the Member States.
• The U.N. Millennium Review, due in March 2005, should further build on the recommendations of the panel and begin the process of practical reforms that will form the foundations of a reformed United Nations.
• Member States should be ready and willing to commit to a new era of collective security and shared responsibility at the U.N. World Leaders Summit in September 2005.
• Britain is well placed to take a strong leadership role on the issue of U.N. reform and should use its privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council to carry forward a progressive agenda.
• Britain must use its 'special relationship' with the United States to try and influence the White House to adopt a reform and enlargement agenda for the U.N. Security Council.
• Tony Blair must reinforce the message to President Bush that military might is not enough in the fight against 'rogue states' and terrorism, and that American strength needs to be combined with humility, partnerships with allies and the development of a strong and effective United Nations.
• Consideration should be given to replacing the veto powers of the permanent members with a form of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), such as constructive absenteeism.
• Enlargement from a P-5 to a P-11 (Model A of the High Level Panel) offers the most realistic opportunity for change.
• As suggested by the High Level Panel, the six new permanent members should reflect the growth of power and influence of African, Latin American and Asian countries, as well as the prime contributors to the United Nations, such as Japan and Germany.
• Consideration should be given to sharing or rotating the six new permanent membership seats on the Council, by a combination of bilateral arrangements between major powers (e.g. India and Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, Nigeria and South Africa, etc.) and regional representation (e.g. the EU and possibly other regional organizations).

Introduction

A strong and authoritative United Nations (U.N.) is central to making the world a safer place.

The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war - the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear. The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. George W. Bush[2]

The world has high expectations of the United Nations as the guardian of global peace and security. However, it has no standing peacekeeping army, and to help stop conflicts, it uses forces voluntarily provided by Member States. It has also used a variety of methods to help resolve disputes between nations, prevent conflicts and put an end to fighting: from quiet diplomacy to humanitarian assistance operations and peacekeeping missions. It also provides an important forum for taking forward the process of disarmament, or reducing the level of weapons in the world.

Initially founded as an organization of sovereign nations, over time states have surrendered an element of sovereignty to conform to U.N. ideals, which may clash with the interests of certain states. Through the union of these states, the United Nations provides the machinery to help find solutions to international problems or disputes. At the heart of this machinery is the U.N. Security Council: the Executive Branch of the United Nations.

However, the conflict in Iraq, and especially the way it was handled in the U.N. Security Council, has brought to a head a number of long-standing questions regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of this institution. Despite the semblance of global representation that pervades the United Nations, an uneven power structure remains entrenched. This overshadows the democratic aspirations of the United Nations and has resulted in criticism for its inability to become more than just the sum of its parts. Nearly 60 years after its creation, an increasing number of voices are calling for the reform of the United Nations and its Security Council.

It was with this backdrop that in September, 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan created a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change "to assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate how our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make recommendations for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security for all in the twenty-first century." In December 2004, the High Level Panel, consisting of sixteen senior diplomats from sixteen countries, including David Hannay of the United Kingdom and Brent Scowcroft of the United States, published its findings in A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

This paper reviews the findings of the High Level Panel, with particular attention given to some of the options for U.N. reform and the obstacles that a reform agenda are likely to face. Given BASIC's emphasis on transatlantic dialogue, it particularly focuses on the reform agenda of Britain and Canada, and the likely reaction of the United States. The paper also explores the recent and ongoing decision-making reforms within the European Union (EU) and asks whether these might be relevant for U.N. reform. Finally, a number of conclusions and recommendations are drawn.

The findings of the High Level Panel: An overview

The High Level Panel report argues that modern threats can no longer be contained within the categorization of state-led aggressive war and defines six 'new' core threats at the forefront of collective international security:

• Economic and Social Threats, including poverty, disease, and environmental degradation;
• Inter-state conflict;
• Internal state conflict, including civil war and genocide;
• Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
• Terrorism; and
• Transnational organized crime

The report notes that the central challenge for the 21st Century is to fashion a new and broader understanding of collective security based on these emerging definitions of contemporary threats, and to create a Security Council that has "greater credibility, legitimacy, and representation to do all that we demand of it."[3] In response to these 'new' threats, the report:

• Affirms the right of states to defend themselves preemptively if an attack is truly imminent: "We do not favor the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article 51." [para.192]
• Recommends that the Security Council "act early, decisively and collectively" [p.23] when dealing with new threats of terrorism and 'WMD.'
• Affirms the right of states to intervene to protect civilians from violence such as genocide and ethnic cleansing when individual countries are unwilling or unable to fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens: "We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing." [para.203]

Pre-Emptive Self-Defense

The High Level Panel recommends that five criteria of legitimacy need to be taken into account when considering the use of force, namely:

1. seriousness of the threat;
2. proper purpose;
3. last resort;
4. proportional means; and
5. balance of consequences [para.207].

Such criteria may well facilitate a decision-making process based on consistent norms but does not come close to resolving the debates vis-à-vis Iraq that crippled the Security Council in 2003.

The issue of reaffirming states' rights to take preemptive military action (against an imminent or proximate threat) but maintaining that Security Council authorization must exist before a state may act preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate threat) is paramount to the discussion of legitimate self-defense in the 21st Century. The report asserts "if there are good arguments for preventative military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to." [para.190] This, however, is the very core of the dilemma that the Security Council was unable to resolve prior to the Iraq War. U.S. Panelist to the report, Brent Scowcroft, is quoted in The Financial Times as saying, "however unsatisfactory Article 51 was, trying to sharpen it had its own pitfalls."[4]

The issue of legitimacy in both pre-emptive and preventive action lies in the perception of a threat's imminence.[5] In the case of Iraq, the disparity of interpretation over the imminence of the threat posed by Iraq's potential use of 'WMD' led to the division of the Security Council. While some members continued to fight for inspections and sanctions on the understanding that the threat could not otherwise be legitimately combated, the U.S. and U.K. governments exercised what they believed to be their right to 'legitimate' pre-emptive self-defense against the 'threat' of Iraq's potential 'WMD' capabilities. The [2002] U.S. National Security Strategy asserted that:

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries [especially when such adversaries] rely on acts of terror and potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.[6]

Likewise, the U.K. government argued that the notion of imminent threat should be reconsidered in light of new threats to international peace and security.[7] However, without the consensus of the other three permanent members, the United Nations was unable to act collectively. Therefore, by explicitly denying a common interpretation of imminence within the problem of terrorism or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, the report does little to abate the divisions within the Security Council.

Terrorism and 'WMD'

The response of the United Nations following the 9/11 attacks saw members depart from tradition and stand unanimously to adopt Resolution 1368 (2001) to take all necessary steps to combat terrorism in accordance with U.N. Charter responsibilities.[8] The recommendations of the panel reinforce this emerging global responsibility to "redouble [U.N.] efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts,"[9] including recommendations to fight the root causes of terrorist action:

• Working to reverse the causes and facilitators of terrorism through the promotion of social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform;
• Countering extremism and intolerance;
• The development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation;
• Building state capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations; and
• Control of dangerous materials and public health defense [para.148].

However, the ability to act "early, decisively, and collectively" in response to terrorism and CBRN weapons is likewise bound to a collective consensus by members. "The United Nations' ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention including a definition of terrorism." [para.157] Plans outlined in the report to create such a definition of terrorism as any action "that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from any act" [para.164 (d)] is itself, however, bound to result in differing interpretations. Many might argue, for example, that a U.S. assault on Fallujah, almost nineteen months after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, constitutes terrorism under these terms. Laws or definitions are never only applied in the abstract, but are always context dependent. The creation of a common definition of terrorism will undoubtedly provide a platform for synergy within the Security Council, but it will by no means guarantee a common consensus on specific issues.

Humanitarian Intervention

The issue of humanitarian intervention in the event of individual countries being unwilling or unable to fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens has long concerned the United Nations. Recommendations, such as creating a small corps of 50-100 senior police officers within the United Nations to help organize international civilian police operations [para.223], and having the Security Council mandate and the General Assembly authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programs from assessed budgets for U.N. peacekeeping missions [para.227] are laudable.

However, a larger problem remains after all of the humanitarian intervention recommendations are considered. "When diplomacy fails in the face of increasing violence and the international community cannot act within the boundaries of international law should the international community withhold military action to forestall ethnic cleansing simply because the U.N. Security Council cannot agree that there is an existing threat to international peace and security?"[10] Proposals for the right to collective intervention in the event of genocide, large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law cannot alone resolve the issue of interpretive legitimacy that would pretext any Security Council decision. What may constitute an obvious breach of humanitarian law to one party may not always receive a similar response from others. Within the Security Council alone, consider the different responses that members gave to the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. The right to humanitarian intervention will undoubtedly provide a platform for progression within the Security Council, but it will by no means free the Security Council from the constraints of individual interpretation that have marred the organization's ability to reach a collective consensus in the past.

U.N. Security Council Reform: A pre-requisite to progress?

The 101 policy recommendations of the panel-based on the notion that a threat to one state is a threat to all-are broad and ambitious. Following the release of the report, Kofi Annan commented that "if acted on [the 101 recommendations] would address the security concerns of all states, ensure that the U.N. works better, strengthen the rule of international law and make all people safer."[11]

"If acted on" remains the key question, since the core issues of preemptive and preventive self-defense, terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN) proliferation, and humanitarian intervention-indeed over 90 per cent of the report's recommendations-remain bound to the collective consensus of U.N. sovereign members. Effective reformation of the Security Council toward a truly legitimate collective security system would require the sublimation of national self-interest before the collective common good, and despite ambitions to this end, the history of the Security Council suggests that this is something that Member States have been reluctant to do.

Functions and Composition of the Security Council

The U.N. Charter was created in 1945 in a meeting of fifty countries in San Francisco and the United Nations was officially established on October 24, 1945. It is a successor to the Concert of Europe and League of Nations, which were also formed after major wars. The devastation caused by the Second World War and the ensuing political tension served to heighten the importance of creating an international political forum with the participation of all the major powers. The participation of all major powers in the United Nations was an important factor; the absence of the United States from the League of Nations had been a contributing factor to its downfall and failure to prevent WWII.

Since its creation, the United Nations has gained legitimacy through its democratic principles and near-universal membership. It has established a vast network of institutions, including UNICEF and WHO, to standardize policies and legislation pertaining to children, health and education and has enjoyed several global successes including the total eradication of smallpox and the provision of aid for over thirty million refugees.

However, the security and military aspects of the United Nations have often been more contentious, especially with regard to the role of the Security Council.

The Security Council is regarded as the executive branch of the United Nations and its primary function, outlined in Article 24.1 of the Charter, is to maintain international order. In the event of a conflict or international crisis, the Security Council has a wide range of options it may employ to resolve the situation. Failing mediation and diplomacy, the Security Council may

• impose economic sanctions;
• deploy peacekeeping troops; or
• authorize military action.

The 15 members on the Security Council include five permanent members (P-5), China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and ten rotating non-permanent members.

The P-5 must act within the provisions of the Charter, which outlines the aims, structure and functions of the institution. With the exception of France, the permanent members were the original authors of this document, prepared at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D.C., in 1944. It is important to note that they alone created the Charter. Two years later, the P-5 implemented the Council's rules of procedure at the first meeting of the Security Council.

Since the Security Council was not created with the intention of being a representative body, it does not adequately represent current global demographics. For example, France and the United Kingdom, with populations of approximately 60 million each, are permanently represented, while countries with significantly larger populations, such as India, with over one billion, have only sporadic representation. No African or South American country has permanent representation on the Security Council.

Consequently, the Security Council is regarded as a reflection of the world powers as they existed at the end of World War II. The elevated position of the permanent members is preserved through voting and decision-making procedures. Although decisions require a majority of nine votes, the P-5 have the power of veto on all decisions. This veto has been the source of much contention for U.N. Member States, as it is perceived as protecting and enhancing the interests of the P-5.

Strengths and weaknesses with the current structure of the Security Council

One of the long-standing concerns of many governments is that the composition of the Council does not adequately reflect the views and interests of all Member States. However, any changes to the membership will have to take account of the need for the Council to take prompt and effective action, and it could be argued that reducing the influence of powerful states would damage its decision-making capabilities.

The representation question

Smaller states within the United Nations find it difficult to participate in the Security Council, even on a non-permanent basis, due to the view that they lack the necessary competence and resources to contribute to the proceedings in a meaningful way. Members of the Security Council are bound to adhere to Article 23.1 of the Charter, which requires "the contribution of members statesto the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the [United Nations]."[12] Often, small states lack the military resources to contribute to the operations of the Council or the political power to influence the agenda. However, the inclusion of smaller states preserves the inclusive ethos of the United Nations and prevents large and powerful countries from dominating Security Council proceedings.

The placement of non-permanent members on the Council is usually achieved by a consensus within the General Assembly to fit the prescribed criteria of five Asian and African countries, one Eastern European country, two Latin American and Caribbean countries and two Western European and Other[13] countries. Some regions strictly rotate membership while other regions, such as Europe and Other, hold internal competition for nomination. Most Member States desire a position on the Security Council and an element of electoral campaigning to secure a position has become commonplace. This system does not appear to be as fair as U.N. principles require. For example, between January 1946 and December 2004, Indonesia's population of 207 million has been represented twice, while Germany, with a population of 84 million, has been represented five times.[14] As European interests are already well represented on the Security Council, the perception again emerges that wealthy, powerful nations are over-represented at the expense of others.

Indeed, in terms of amending the membership of the P-5, much of the debate in the 1990s focused on the question of including Germany and Japan because of their economic strength. While this is important, it does not address the need for greater representation of the views and interests of states from the developed and developing nations from the southern hemisphere. The growth in power and influence of African, Latin American and Asian countries has to be reflected if a stable and effective collective security structure is to be developed.

One obstacle for reform is the lack of unity between the different Member States from the South itself. No clear candidates for Permanent Security Council membership have emerged. Both India and Brazil have been suggested as new Permanent Members in the past, but met with fierce objections from their regional adversaries, Pakistan and Argentina.

The effectiveness question

Even within the current structure, disunity among the P-5 has been commonplace. The use of the veto or abstentions from voting has been a regular feature over the years, especially during the Cold War when the Security Council at times was effectively deadlocked.

The P-5's power of veto is unqualified and unregulated. Since the first meeting of the Security Council in 1946, the veto has been employed on 252 occasions: the majority by the former Soviet Union (FSU)/Russia (121) and the United States (76).[15] In contrast, Britain has vetoed 32 resolutions, France 18 and China 5. During the Cold War, the FSU was responsible for delaying resolutions on North Korea, regulation of armaments, and vetoing the applications for U.N. membership of several states including Italy, Ireland, Finland, Austria, Cambodia, Japan and Kuwait.[16] The Soviet and American use of the veto during the Cold War demonstrated that national security interests, shaped by the ongoing ideological conflict between East and West, rather than collective security concerns, were the dominant influence on P-5 voting patterns in the Council.

Toward the end of the Cold War and since, the United States replaced Russia as the most frequent proponent of the veto. Of the 13 vetoes between 1990 and 2002, the United States applied nine and Russia and China two each. The United States has blocked several resolutions regarding the situation in the Middle East and has effectively prevented U.N. intervention in the Israel-Palestine situation. The recent inability to reach consensus within the Council for a second resolution on Iraq, also highlights the problem of objective intervention and mediation on behalf of the United Nations when core national interests are at stake.

More recently, the Iraq crisis and the Balkan Wars of the 1990s highlighted the continuing shortcomings of the Council's operating procedures. The Balkan conflict highlighted several flaws within the U.N. structure, most notably the discrepancies between the aims of the Security Council and the resources of U.N. forces. The Security Council passed a resolution, which designated six 'safe areas' within the zone of conflict. These areas were to be a safe haven for refugees and civilians and were to be guarded by U.N. troops. However, the U.N. mission had neither the resources nor manpower to implement the resolution, and it subsequently failed to prevent a violent conflict within what were supposed to be demilitarized zones. It would seem elementary that the Security Council should be required to consider the effects and implementation of their decisions before adopting a resolution. Sadly, this is not always the case.

Various options for improving the Council have been suggested, including modifying or abolishing the veto. The reform agenda is discussed next.

Potential Reforms

The High Level Panel and other U.N. Proposals

The current wave of proposals to reform the United Nations was triggered in September 2002 by a report from the Secretary General entitled: "Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change." The report proposed reform of certain intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council so that they may administer themselves more efficiently. It stressed the necessity for the United Nations to adapt to rapid changes in the global climate to respond to globalization and conflict prevention, and declared that, "the stalled process of Security Council reform needs new impetus."[17] The impetus for reform of the United Nations is not recent, however. Previous U.N. Secretary Generals have attempted to reassess administrative structures and reorganize voting procedures within the Security Council. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was a vocal proponent of reform during his term of office but despite his efforts, political support for reform was not forthcoming.

While an Open-ended Working Group has been reviewing the possibility of reforming the Security Council for over a decade, it has yet to resolve the diverse and conflicting views of Member States. Press releases by participating permanent representatives in February 2003 reiterated that, "the discussions on Security Council reform have made little significant progress throughout the past decade."[18] The Secretary General's report plainly states that: "no reform of the United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council."[19]

Not surprisingly, the High Level Panel's most attention-grabbing recommendation related to U.N. Security Council reform. The Panel called for a new, 24-member Security Council, but was unable to agree on one proposal and ended up suggesting two options:

• Model A: To add six permanent members from Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe (with the likely candidates being Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Egypt and either Nigeria or South Africa) as well as three new two-year-term members [para.252].
• Model B: To create a tier of eight semi-permanent members chosen for renewable four-year terms and one additional two-year-term seat [para.253].

Neither option extends the right to cast vetoes, a function coveted by the nations seeking permanent status. The proposed new arrangement is aimed at rewarding countries that have achieved economic and regional prominence over recent decades as well as countries that make the most significant contributions to the United Nations.

Four of the nations with eyes on permanent membership pre-empted the outcome of the High Level Panel's deliberations by uniting in a four-way alliance in September 2004. Germany, Japan, Brazil and India issued a joint statement to announce their intention to support each others' candidacies as permanent members of the Security Council. The four also said that, "Africa must also be represented in the permanent membership." But no African leader was present at their meeting because the continent has no agreed candidate - South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt all lay claim to a permanent seat.[20]

United Kingdom Proposals

The U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has been spearheading the drive for a far-reaching internal reform of the United Nations. In June 2003, for example, the FCO announced that it had created a set of proposals to reform the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular.[21] A key proposal -- to expand permanent membership of the Security Council from five to ten and increase the overall membership to 24?almost mirrors Model A subsequently set out by the High Level Panel. Britain's stated preferences for new permanent Member States --Germany, Japan and India, as well as one Latin American country and one African country -- also have much in common with the High Level Panel's recommendations. And finally, British policy to deny these new permanent members the power of veto is also supported by the High Level Panel. According to the FCO, to do so "would make the Security Council unmanageable".[22] Under the U.K. (and High Level Panel) proposal, therefore, the real power would remain with the five existing permanent members. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any of the permanent members would willingly surrender the veto, as it is a powerful asset and bargaining tool.

Canadian Proposals

Jack Straw's Canadian counterpart, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham, has also been extolling the benefits of U.N. reform. He argues that the failure of the United Nations to realize all of its ambitions can be traced to the ulterior objectives of its Member States. He suggests a 'cultural' as well as structural reform of major U.N. bodies to overcome the deepening gulf between the North and South Member States and quoted Mark Twain; "Nothing so needs reforming as other people's habits".[23] Mr. Graham thus illuminated one of the deep-seated problems within the United Nations; too often Member States do not adhere to the standards they advocate. He suggested that Member States not adhering to the fundamental principles of the U.N. Charter should face expulsion. He claimed that membership criteria are not currently being enforced and noted as an example that Rwanda was a member of the Security Council in 1994 while its government failed to stop the domestic slaughter of an ethnic minority, the Tutsis.[24]

The Canadian proposals diverge from the U.K. and High Level Panel suggestions on the issue of the Security Council. The U.K. government, naturally, is protective of its power of veto and is likely to resist any attempts at reform in that area. Canada, in contrast, suggests that the permanent members of the Security Council should be restricted to using a veto only if they can find a second permanent member to support them. The Foreign Affairs Minister also proposes making greater use of the U.N. General Assembly to deal with major issues rather than passing them off to the Security Council. However, given the number of confrontations that have occurred within a Council of only 15 members, it is unclear how an Assembly of 191 members could be more effective.

U.S. Opposition?

The United States' position on Security Council reform, at least prior to the publication of the High Level Panel report, was similar to that of the United Kingdom. It supported the enlargement of the Council to include Japan and Germany as permanent members (since they are the second and third largest financial contributors to the United Nations, respectively) but opposed the removal or limitation of the veto.[25] As mentioned previously, the United States is the most frequent user of the veto in recent times. However, the current U.S. administration, while not being averse to wielding its veto, has gone further by seeking to use its substantial power and influence within the Security Council to generate resolutions, albeit with mixed results.

Given the recent turbulence in the U.S. administration's relationship with the United Nations, it is unlikely that it will be supportive of the High Level Panel reform effort. The nomination of John R. Bolton, a long-term critic of the United Nations and leading hawk as the next U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, subject to Senate approval, also suggests the continuation of a bellicose attitude.

Immediately after the release of the High Level Panel Report, Kim R. Holmes, U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, emphasized that the United States contends that the way to reform the United Nations will ultimately be through making the Member States into democracies. The United States sees the issue of broader representation as less important for reform:

We believe the United Nations indeed can play a vital role in solving the world's problems. But it is suffering not so much from inadequate representation or even lack of resources. No, it suffers from a lack of political will on the part of its members to solve hard problems, such as the humanitarian crisis in Darfur; the threat of nuclear weapons in Iran, and the need to stabilize and democratize Iraq. It also suffers from a democracy deficit. By that I mean the United Nations doesn't do enough to promote democratic self-governance. I also mean that democracies have too little influence in the United Nations. Until recently, there was a caucus for every reason under the sun, except promoting democracy.[26]

In keeping with those beliefs, the United States has supported efforts to develop a democracy caucus in the U.N. General Assembly and, along with the "Community of Democracies," initiated a democracy caucus at the Commission on Human Rights in Spring 2004.[27]

The United States has said that it welcomes proposals on Secretariat reform, terrorism and peacekeeping. However, the United States disagrees with the report in regard to issues of preventative military action. For example, Holmes said that U.S. policy clashes with the report's recommendation that, "a state should go to the Security Council first for authorization to take preventative military action."[28] Holmes adds, "Whether the Council could decide soon enough for effective military action is another matter. Such constraints will never be acceptable to the United States."[29]

Moreover, the United States government is likely to continue focusing on the Iraq 'oil-for-food scandal' as one of its primary points for U.N. 'reform' because of pressure from the legislature, especially with remarks coming from powerful members such as U.S. Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, who said on February 17, 2005:

[R]ather than list the entire range of subjects on which the Committee will focus its attention this year, I will mention but one, namely a thorough review and reform of the United Nations and its many agencies. Even the most steadfast of the U.N.'s supporters must concede that, after more than half a century of operation, this many-faceted, sprawling entity is very much in need of focused scrutiny and extensive reform. This fact has been dramatically revealed in the still-unfolding scandal regarding the enormous sums of the Oil-for-Food program that we have good reason to believe were stolen or needlessly wasted. In our ongoing investigation, each path we have gone down has branched into many others, and we have yet to see any end to the series of unwelcome discoveries. If abuses of this magnitude can occur in such a high-profile program and over a period of years, it is impossible to conclude that this is likely to be an isolated phenomenon[30]

Ultimately, U.N. Security Council reform is unlikely to succeed without strong U.S. leadership to push it through. Britain can play an important role in explaining to the U.S. Administration why such reforms are needed and why more general support for the United Nations and international law is in the long-term security interests of all of the P-5 states.

Lessons from the EU experience?

The EU's problems have been similar to those of the United Nations', as it represents a supranational entity that has to reconcile disparate political and social elements in order to function effectively. The EU has struggled to balance the power of national and European interests. It has only recently evolved from inter-state economic cooperation to formulating detailed and coherent common policies on issues including security and foreign affairs. The most important lesson learned by EU Member States is that, often, national policies must be compromised to a certain degree to reach a general consensus.

One of the key obstacles to European co-operation on foreign policy issues has been the unanimity requirement. Unanimity allows the EU to present a united front externally (at least in theory), although a single Member State can block or hold up agreement. Various changes in voting methods have been reviewed in recent years, including further use of qualified majority voting (QMV),[31] or the introduction of other variants such as 'reinforced' or 'super' majority voting32] or 'constructive abstention.'[33] During constitutional discussions in the mid 1990s, constructive abstention was considered to be a popular option among several Member States, including France and Germany, as part of a move toward 'flexible integration' (under which a federal core of states would move ahead without being delayed by weaker or unwilling ones). The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty approved different levels of flexibility for different issues, and with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) this was in the form of constructive absenteeism.

Thus, key foreign policy decisions (i.e. 'common strategies'[34] ) will continue to be taken by the European Council (i.e. Heads of State and Government) acting unanimously, but subsequent details about how the policy is to be implemented (i.e. joint actions and common positions) may be taken by QMV. Countries unwilling to take part in a particular joint action will be able to operate 'constructive absenteeism' allowing the others to act in the name of the EU. However, if the constructive abstainers comprise more than one third of the weighted votes, the decision will be blocked (under Article J.13(1)). Decisions without military implications will be taken by super QMV - that is, 62 votes in favor cast by at least ten Member States --unless a national veto is invoked on grounds of 'important and stated reasons of national policy' (Article J.13(2)). The national veto clause was inserted at the insistence of the U.K. government, and if invoked, the Council (i.e. Foreign Ministers) may vote by QMV to pass the matter up to the European Council for decision by unanimity.

Does this rather complex EU CFSP voting structure have any relevance to the debate on U.N. Security Council reform? In short, would the P-5 accept QMV or a variant for decision-making in the Security Council? While U.N. membership is far more culturally, economically and politically diverse than the EU, and therefore even more prone to the historical enmity and distrust between some of its key member nations, some form of QMV might be acceptable as a way of making the United Nations more effective. However, simply making it easier to reach a decision is not the same as building a consensus for effective action. In the past, the United Nations has been dogged by inconsistent or unenforceable resolutions.

On the other hand, a more flexible voting structure might open up the political space for countries to debate, define and reach consensus on when intervention can override state sovereignty-probably the biggest unresolved question in international relations at the moment. If the U.N. Security Council had been operating on the basis of constructive absenteeism, for example, the Clinton administration might have sought U.N. authority to intervene in Kosovo in 1999. As it was, this use of force (and his earlier interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and the bombing of Baghdad in 1998) was unsanctioned, and of questionable legality.

Conclusions and recommendations

In the wake of the Iraq war and the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, the legitimacy and relevance of the United Nations as a forum for handling matters of international peace and security is being increasingly questioned. However, the United Nations remains essential to securing a world order that respects both human rights and international law. In reaching such an end, reform of the United Nations and its Security Council is also essential and long overdue. But reformers have a difficult task: to reconcile the obvious value of the permanent members with the need for greater control of their decision-making processes.

The United Nations' future lies in the organization becoming more than the sum of its parts. The recommendations of the High Level Panel rely on "nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss." (p.2) The report is not a cure for the problems facing the United Nations, but presents a framework for change that could, if the members commit to it, bring the organization into the 21st Century with renewed relevancy, vigor and purpose. The United Nations has long recognized its own inefficiencies and shortfalls. The task is now whether or not the Member States are willing to pay heed to the recommendations of the panel and to act collectively to overcome problems.

The Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is an almost ideal vision for a flawed system. It can be argued that the reforms suggested in the document are based on an assumption of how responsible states ought to be acting, not how they are acting in the modern era. The United Nations is at a critical juncture. Whether or not the ideals of Dumbarton Oaks can yet be realized is hanging in the balance. The commitment of individual member states to an optimism and multilateralism that many think lost is the only way to ensure the future of the United Nations in the 21st Century.

• The High Level Panel Report must not be received as a conclusive cure-all but as the beginning of a process of long-term change, the responsibility for which lies with the Member States.
• The U.N. Millennium Review, due in March 2005, should further build on the recommendations of the panel and begin the process of practical reforms that will form the foundations of a reformed United Nations.
• Member States should be ready and willing to commit to a new era of collective security and shared responsibility at the U.N. World Leaders Summit in September 2005.

The United Kingdom exerts considerable power and influence in the international political, economic and military arena through its permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council and membership of other important international organizations, such as the G8, the OSCE and NATO. Britain also has highly developed and distinct global partnerships and cooperation agreements, largely through the EU and the Commonwealth.

• Britain is well placed to take a strong leadership role on the issue of U.N. reform and should use its privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council to carry forward a progressive agenda.

Unfortunately, the need for Security Council reform and the debate over when humanitarian intervention can be legal have been distorted by the agenda and behavior of the Bush administration. And without a strong U.S. commitment to the United Nations, it is likely to sink into irrelevance like the League of Nations. Britain needs to use its 'special relationship' with the United States to reshape the transatlantic agenda in a way that supports an international law-based approach guided by negotiated treaties and common security principles.

The Prime Minister is an idealist and constantly presents a strong moral case for British (and EU) engagement around the world, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, and would clearly like to see the United States playing a more progressive role in world affairs. He needs to turn this idealism into a hard-nosed strategy to influence the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The myriad of contacts between the two governments' bureaucracies - essentially the heart of the special relationship - could provide the means to do so.

• Britain must use its 'special relationship' with the United States to try and influence the White House to adopt a reform and enlargement agenda for the U.N. Security Council.
• Tony Blair must reinforce the message to President Bush that military might is not enough in the fight against 'rogue states' and terrorism, and that American strength needs to be combined with humility, partnerships with allies and the development of a strong and effective United Nations.

But the problems do not just rest with the current U.S. administration. The inability of its members to transcend national interests, even in the face of international crisis, is the United Nations' greatest failing. Until the good of the international community supersedes national interests, individual political agendas will continue to adversely affect the management of the United Nations.

The reforms proposed by the High Level Panel, U.K. and Canadian governments and the U.N. Secretary General may improve the functioning of the U.N. Security Council, but it will be difficult to convince any of the P-5 to alter the established hierarchy. Even reform-minded members of the P-5 will be unlikely to accept a dilution of their powers as permanent members, especially the removal of the veto. If the veto cannot be abolished, perhaps a compromise could be reached whereby the use of the veto would be regulated or diluted via a form of QMV.

• Consideration should be given to replacing the veto powers of the permanent members with a form of QMV, such as constructive absenteeism.

Although the proposed High Level Panel reforms seek to expand permanent membership, there are no calls to rescind the existing permanent position of the five major powers. It is recognized however, that the ability of the United Nations to participate and intervene in global politics is dependent on the military capability, wealth and resources of these states and that their involvement on the Security Council therefore is essential.

• Enlargement from a P-5 to a P-11 (Model A of the High Level Panel) offers the most realistic opportunity for change.
• As suggested by the High Level Panel, the six new permanent members should reflect the growth of power and influence of African, Latin American and Asian countries, as well as the prime contributors to the United Nations, such as Japan and Germany.
• Consideration should be given to sharing or rotating the six new permanent membership seats on the Council, by a combination of bilateral arrangements between major powers (e.g. India and Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, Nigeria and South Africa, etc.) and regional representation (e.g. the EU and possibly other regional organizations).

Endnotes

[1] This BASIC Paper incorporates research from an earlier BASIC Submission to the Labour Party National Policy Forum Consultation Document, "Britain in the World," The origins, membership and potential reform of the United Nations Security Council, BASIC, November 2003, written by Nigel Chamberlain, Ian Davis, Lynne O'Sullivan and Andreas Persbo.

[2] President George W. Bush's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002.

[3] "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, December 2, 2004, p.5.

[4] "U.S. Should be Positive Towards U.N. Reform," Financial Times, December 6, 2004.

[5] The term 'preemptive war' refers to the use of force in self-defense against an imminent attack, such as Israel's military action against Arab states in the 1967 'Six Day War.' But what the Bush national security strategy calls preemptive war, is really 'preventive war' to "act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed", as it says in The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). Preventive war is indistinguishable from outright aggression and has no legal justification. For a useful discussion of preventive versus preemptive war, see Jeffrey Record, "Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation," Policy Analysis, CATO Institute, July 8, 2004.

[6] U.S. National Security Strategy, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

[7] See House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism (Second Report of Session 2002-03), December 19, 2002, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/19602.htm.

[8] Statement Concerning the Terrorist Attacks, United Nations Security Council, September 12, 2001.

[9] U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001).

[10] Tomes, R. "Operation Allied Force and the Legal Basis for Humanitarian Intervention," Parameters, Vol. 30, No.1, p.40.

[11] "Courage to Fulfil Our Responsibilities," The Economist, December 4-10, 2004.

[12] United Nations Charter, Article 23.1, see http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html.

[13] Europe and Other is comprised of EU countries plus the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and various small European countries including Liechtenstein and Andorra. See http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/electedmembers/malone00.htm.

[14] Prior to reunification, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Democratic Republic represented Germany on the Security Council on separate occasions. See http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/mem2.htm.

[15] Bailey, Sidney D. and Daws, Sam, "The Procedure of the U.N. Security Council," 1998, (3rd Edition), Clarendon Press, Oxford. See also http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/veto/vetosubj.htm.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Report of the Secretary General, "Strengthening of the U.N.: an agenda for further change," September 2002, see http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/583/26/PDF/N0258326.pdf?OpenElement.

[18] Haraguchi, Koichi, Permanent Representative of Japan, Press Release, February 10, 2003, see http://www.un.int/japan/3-statements/archives/haraguchi030210.html.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Penketh, Anne, "Nations unite in four-way alliance to spread power of Security Council," The Independent, September 23, 2004 http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=564713.

[21] MacAskill, Ewen, "Straw plan to boost UN Security Council," The Guardian, June 11, 2003.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Graham, Bill, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16th Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, June 13, 2003, see http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/106272.html.

[24] Sallot, Jeff, "Expel Those Who Flout UN Rules, Canada Says," Globe and Mail, June 14, 2003, see http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/veto/2003/0614flout.htm.

[25] Statement by Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Statement in the General Assembly on Security Council Reform and Expansion, October 30, 2001, see http://www.un.int/usa/01_154.htm.

[26] "Why the United Nations Matters to U.S. Foreign Policy," Kim R. Holmes, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Remarks before the Baltimore Council of Foreign Affairs, World Trade Center, Baltimore, Maryland, December 6, 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2004/39496.htm.

[27] "Why the United Nations Matters to U.S. Foreign Policy," December 6, 2004.

[28] "Why the United Nations Matters to U.S. Foreign Policy," December 6, 2004.

[29] "Why the United Nations Matters to U.S. Foreign Policy," December 6, 2004.

[30] House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde (R-IL), remarks before the full committee, hearing on the International Relations Budget FY 2006, held on February 17, 2005, http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/hyde021705.htm. Also see the Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director of International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, "United Nations: Sustained Oversight is Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results," Testimony Before the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House of Representatives, March 2, 2005, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05392t.pdf.

[31] QMV has traditionally applied to EU laws covering agriculture, health and safety, foreign trade, transport and most environmental matters. Under QMV, a proposal needs just over 70 per cent of the total votes allocated to EU member states to become law. Although the large states have more votes than the smaller ones (United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, for example, have 10 votes, while Luxembourg only has 2 votes), the voting system gives small countries more votes per population to ensure that the EU is not dominated by larger states.

[32] Reinforced majority voting would require a percentage of votes larger than the existing 70 percent (required under QMV) or possibly another variant, such as unanimity minus one country.

[33] Constructive abstention would allow an EU country to remain outside a foreign policy initiative, such as sending soldiers on a peacekeeping mission, but would not enable that country to block such a decision or avoid contributing funds.

[34] The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a new policy instrument of 'common strategies.' Although such strategies are not defined in the Treaty, the fact that they require agreement by the European Council suggests that they are intended to be more significant than earlier common positions and joint actions.