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BASIC PAPERS
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
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AUGUST 1998 • NUMBER 29 • ISSN 1353-0402 Diplomacy and
Arms: By Tasos
Kokkinides, Lucy Amis and Nino Lorenzini While the danger of a major armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey is becoming increasingly real, the United States and other NATO countries are continuing to arm both sides in the conflict. Jeopardising efforts by the US Department of State to de-escalate tensions between the long-time adversaries, the US Department of Defense is continuing to authorise transfers of advanced offensive weapons to both countries. The long-standing arms race between Greece and Turkey continues to spiral. Together, they already have a larger tank fleet than the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy combined. Last year, both countries also announced massive procurement programmes for their armed forces (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Greece has unveiled plans to spend $24 billion over the next eight years. Turkey has committed to a $31 billion expenditure over the next decade in the first stage of a massive modernisation programme expected to reach nearly $150 billion over the next 25 to 30 years. Further south, the consignment of Russian S-300 (SA-10) anti-aircraft missiles to Greek Cyprus scheduled for November 1998 is further aggravating tensions. Turkey has not ruled out the use of force to stop the missile deployment, whilst Greece has vowed to protect Greek Cyprus at any cost. As the brinkmanship continues, there is an obvious need for the international community, particularly NATO, to develop a comprehensive risk reduction strategy aimed at decreasing the threat of war in south-eastern Europe. In recent years, numerous international organisations have made efforts to improve relations between Greece and Turkey. To date, the European Union, NATO and the United Nations have failed to achieve any breakthroughs in Cyprus. In February 1996, Washington intervened to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in a dispute over the ownership of uninhabited islets in the Aegean. Although ad hoc diplomatic initiatives may avert war in the eleventh hour, the international community cannot rely on such limited crisis management tactics. Only a comprehensive set of confidence- and security-building measures developed co-operatively by all European security organisations can provide the level of conflict prevention and resolution necessary to bring peace to the region. This Paper recommends that a programme of risk reduction be pursued without delay in the Aegean, including:
Both Greece and Turkey have far more weapons than is necessary to meet their legitimate defence needs (see Table 1.1). In addition to calling on the adversaries to limit their weapons procurement, the international community should exercise restraint in the transfer of weapons to the region. In particular, EU member states should apply the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports agreed in June 1998. The Code explicitly calls on EU member states to "not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim". Given the fact that Greece and Turkey remain locked in a dispute over the ownership of certain Aegean islets -- a disagreement that nearly began a war -- these provisions should clearly apply to both countries.
Adopting a comprehensive set of CSBMs would decrease the likelihood of an accidental outbreak of hostilities and decrease overall tensions in the region. Specific measures might include: establishing demilitarised zones along the Greek-Turkish border; agreeing mutual force reductions in the eastern Aegean; installing a hot-line between defence ministries; and fully implementing verification measures outlined in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).
The on-going review and revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept presents an ideal opportunity to create and support an effective system for resolving conflicts among NATO members. Considering NATO’s emphasis on projecting stability to its eastern neighbours through expansion of the Alliance, it seems justified to call on NATO to facilitate a similar level of stability in the Aegean.
The full range of disputes between Greece and Turkey should be addressed in and mediated by the International Court of Justice or any other mutually acceptable international mechanism. This Paper also recommends a number of proposals aimed specifically at reducing tensions in Cyprus, including:
In return for Cyprus’ agreement to halt the planned missile deployment, Washington and London should offer to enforce a no-fly zone over the divided island. The Cypriot government should also turn over the S-300 radar system to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or an international verification team of inspectors for use in monitoring the implementation of the no-fly zone.
The OSCE has been successful in implementing a range of confidence-building and disarmament measures in Bosnia. Drawing on its expertise and lessons learned from this experience, the OSCE could adapt these measures and apply them to the situation in Cyprus. Tensions Remain High Both Greece and Turkey regard the other as its chief security threat. While Cyprus is often seen as the principal source of tensions, a number of other key issues remain unresolved. In recent years, the delineation of the allegedly oil-rich continental shelf of the Aegean, the extent of Greece’s air space and territorial waters, the alleged militarisation of Greek islands in the eastern Aegean and the ownership of uninhabited islets have all intensified animosity between these neighbouring countries. These disagreements continue to induce violence and cause instability. In early 1996, President Clinton’s intervention averted war between the two NATO allies over the ownership of the uninhabited islets of Imia/Kardak in the south-eastern Aegean. Yet the undercurrent of tension and violence remains. Greek and Turkish fighter planes are often involved in dog-fights, some with casualties. Lives are also lost in incidents between soldiers at the tense border between the two countries. While limited in their overall effect on stability in the region, diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions have made progress in certain areas. After months of negotiations, on 4 June 1998 Greece and Turkey agreed to a limited set of CSBMs proposed by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. The two sides agreed to implement two declarations that had been signed in 1988 but with which neither country had entirely complied. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in Athens on 27 May 1988 and the Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspaces signed in Istanbul on 8 September 1988 oblige the two countries to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and recognise their rights to use the high seas and the international airspace of the Aegean. In their recent agreement they also agreed to allow NATO a role in monitoring air sorties over the Aegean. As a result, Greece and Turkey will be part of the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) which will closely monitor the movements of their air force units. Military
Modernisation After the Cold War ended, NATO allies sent thousands of offensive military weapons to Greece and Turkey, including main battle tanks, attack helicopters, armoured personnel vehicles, artillery and combat aircraft. Under NATO’s "cascade" programme, the Alliance withdrew this equipment from its central front and transferred it to the two Aegean powers. Adding fuel to the fire, both have announced massive procurement programmes for their armed forces. Greece plans to spend $24 billion over the next eight years (see Table 2.3). Turkey has committed to a programme costing $31 billion over the next decade in the first stage of a massive programme expected to reach almost $150 billion over the next 25 to 30 years (see Table 2.4). The United States and other NATO allies appear to welcome the opportunity to increase their own weapons exports. Despite the inherent risk of war, they are continuing to supply Greece and Turkey with advanced weaponry. If a war were to occur between the two adversaries, the bulk of weaponry would be of US origin or from European NATO countries. For example, the fiscal year 1999 Defence Appropriations Act would authorise the US Secretary of the Navy to transfer 14 vessels to Turkey and 11 to Greece. This surplus equipment includes Knox- and Perry- class frigates, and Adams- and KIDD- class guided missile destroyers. These procurement programmes are aimed at power projection beyond the Aegean. Both countries are developing the necessary capabilities to fight a war in Cyprus. For example, planned military procurement in Greece would result in the deployment of a credible deterrent posture in Cyprus and would also allow the Greek air force to operate effectively deep inside Turkish territory. Both countries have requested the US-made F-15E fighter aircraft, an addition that would double the reach of their respective air forces. Turkey has asked for 40 F-15s and Greece plans to add 30-40 new fighter aircraft to its fleet, possibly F-15s. Turkey has also acquired seven refuelling tanker aircraft, substantially increasing the operational capability of its fighter aircraft fleet. Greece plans to acquire four similar tanker aircraft. Recommendations Arms Control
Both countries have more weapons than their legitimate security needs require (see Table 1.1). The United States and other NATO countries should introduce a moratorium on weapons transfers and upgrades until the two sides adopt a comprehensive set of CSBMs and agree on measures to resolve their differences. To this end, the countries of the European Union should apply the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports agreed in June 1998 which outlines criteria governing weapons exports. The fourth criterion of the EU Code asserts that EU member states "will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim". In this context, it directs Member States to take into account the following: the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country; a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force; whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient; and the potential effects on regional stability.
Although Greece and Turkey are members of the CFE Treaty and comply with its provisions, both continue to maintain the maximum number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, aircraft, attack helicopters and artillery allowed by the treaty. A reduction in their respective ceilings of conventional forces would help reduce military tensions.
NATO should encourage the two countries to discuss a number of practical arms control measures. Establishing demilitarised zones along the Greek-Turkish border, beginning with the withdrawal of heavy offensive equipment would significantly reduce the risk of violent outbreaks. Turkey should also disband, or at least withdraw, its landing-craft based on the western coast of Turkey and facing the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean. In return, Greece should agree to a verifiable "thinning out" of its defences there. NATO should also request that both countries comply with provisions in the Dayton Accords calling for Balkan-wide regional arms control negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE. Greece and Turkey have agreed to participate to the talks under Article 5 of the Dayton Accords, but according to an official close to the preliminary discussions, they are not prepared to reduce their armaments in a multilateral Balkan setting.
To date, Greece and Turkey have agreed only limited confidence-building measures. NATO should call on them to adopt a comprehensive set of CSBMs addressing the full range of their disputes. These should include: organising air and sea sorties in the Aegean without weapons systems on board; installing a hot-line between the defence ministries in Athens and Ankara; fully implementing verification measures outlined in the CFE Treaty (e.g. on-site inspections of military installations and military hardware); agreeing a bilateral open skies agreement; and increasing the transparency of maritime operations and exercises.
The on-going review and revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept presents an ideal opportunity to create and support an effective system for resolving conflicts among NATO members. Considering NATO’s emphasis on projecting stability to its eastern neighbours through expansion of the Alliance, it seems justified to call on NATO to facilitate a similar level of stability in the Aegean.
The two sides should build on the agreement signed by Turkish President Suleiman Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis in Madrid in July 1997. In this agreement, both sides made a commitment to respect international law and to refrain from threats or acts of armed aggression. Bilateral discussions for the non-aggression treaty should be based on the understanding that the Aegean can neither be transformed into a "Greek lake" nor subdivided so as to surround and isolate Greek territories. In this context, Greece should sign a protocol relinquishing the right to extend its territorial waters beyond the current limit of six miles. Turkey should reciprocate by abandoning the twelve-mile limit it currently enforces in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
International pressure should be brought to bear on Turkey to acknowledge the mediation role of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Unresolved territorial questions should be referred to international arbitrators or to the International Court of Justice. Cyprus on a
Knife-Edge The United Nations has been working to broker a peaceful solution in Cyprus since 1974. On 29 June 1998, it adopted a resolution reiterating its "grave concern at the continuing excessive levels of military forces and armaments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded and modernised, including by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry". The resolution also calls upon the concerned parties "to commit themselves to a reduction in defence spending". Yet despite UN concerns, the two communities are continuing to arm themselves. In addition to the resident Turkish army of 30,000 and fighter aircraft bases in the north, Greek Cyprus is now funding huge military programmes, including the purchase of Russian-made T-80U main battle tanks in the first step of an ambitious five-year military programme. Greek Cyprus will develop the programme in co-operation with Greece under their Joint Defence Doctrine. The expected deployment of the S-300s has also inadvertently sped up the permanent partition of the island. In response to the planned missile deployment, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is intensifying political, military and economic integration with mainland Turkey. While Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots may welcome this move, Greece and Cyprus consider it the least desirable option. A permanently divided island would not only constitute a blow to UN credibility but could become a constant source of tension in the eastern Mediterranean. Greece and Greek Cyprus are unlikely to accept the status quo established through armed confrontation in 1974. Missile Deployment
Looms The sophisticated and powerful radar system of the S-300 could also pose a problem for British, Israeli and other forces in the region. Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem warned that the missile’s "powerful radar will keep a very broad region under control, including Incirlik Air Base. Due to this radar, information on Turkey’s and NATO’s military activities in the region will be supplied to Russia...Thanks to the contribution of Greece, a NATO member itself, the S-300 will harm NATO’s south-eastern defence". NATO countries have reacted strongly to the proposed deployment of S-300s in Cyprus. According to the US Department of State spokesman, "The Cypriot decision introduces a new destabilizing military element on the island and in the region at the very time that the international community is exploring ways to foster political cooperation to significantly advance a settlement". Likewise, a statement from the UK Foreign Office stated that, "we have repeatedly expressed to the government of Cyprus our concern about the arms build-up, and specifically the proposal to buy surface-to-air missiles". However, Greek Cypriot Government spokesman Manolis Christofides has responded to the international criticism arguing that, "We believe it is the country's obligation and right to see to its defence because the Turkish occupation force is illegally armed up to its teeth with American arms". Recommendations: Cyprus
In return for Cyprus’ agreement to halt the planned missile deployment, Washington and London should offer to enforce a no-fly zone over the divided island. The Cypriot government should also turn over the S-300 radar system to the OSCE or an international verification team of inspectors for use in monitoring the implementation of the no-fly zone. However, support for a full no-fly zone remains in question. A US initiative calling for a voluntary moratorium on military flights over Cyprus is still on the negotiating table. A US official told BASIC that Washington "is not prepared to enforce any Iraq-type no-fly zone over Cyprus." He added that the moratorium on military flights "is the best we can hope for now...It is hard to go beyond that because in the climate of mistrust between Greece and Turkey it is always a question of who goes first". The official also confirmed that, "There is reluctance on the part of Turkey to adopt this proposal now. Turks do not want to be seen to be paying a price for the S-300s".
Turkey should withdraw its 30,000 forces in the north in return for the demobilisation of the Cypriot National Guard and the withdrawal of Greek forces stationed in Cyprus. UK forces based in Cyprus could play a crucial role in verifying implementation of such a disarmament agreement. Greece and Cyprus should also renounce their Joint Defence Doctrine and freeze all related military procurement programmes. In return, Turkey should cease political, economic and military integration with the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus.
Diplomatic efforts by the European Union, the United States and the United Nations have all failed to find a workable solution to the impasse in Cyprus. These failures highlight the need for a co-ordinated approach among institutions and increased involvement on the part of the OSCE. The OSCE has been successful in implementing a whole range of confidence-building and disarmament measures in Bosnia. Drawing on its expertise and lessons learned from this experience, the OSCE could adapt these measures and apply them to the situation in Cyprus. In addition, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities should be called upon to address the problems of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot minorities living on the "wrong" side of the UN-controlled Green Line which divides Cyprus.
In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1179 of June 1998, international pressure must be brought to bear on the self-proclaimed Turkish-Cypriot republic to engage in meaningful negotiations on a workable solution in Cyprus. The resolution reaffirms the Security Council’s position that "a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities...in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession". To this end, Ankara has a vital role to play in persuading the Turkish Cypriots to resume negotiations. Turkey may be more likely to acknowledge the need for a political settlement if the European Union drops its opposition to Turkey’s membership on the condition that Ankara adheres to high standards on democracy and human rights. Conclusion Appendix: Balance of Power in the Aegean The authors would like to thank Vasilis Magouliotis and Otfried Nassauer for their comments.
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