BASIC PAPERS

MAY 1998 • NUMBER 26 • ISSN 1353-0402

Eastern Europe's Arsenal on the Loose:  Managing Light Weapons Flows to Conflict Zones 

By Abdel Fatau Musah and Robert Castle, Consultants

For many years, Central and Eastern Europe has been a major source of licit and illicit light weapons transfers to the developing world.¹ Both legal and covert transfers of light weapons to client states and insurgent groups were a key strategy of the Cold War proxy battles orchestrated by the competing blocs. During that period, vast quantities of Central and Eastern European light weapons were transferred to the developing world. While the security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, transfers of light weapons continue unabated.

The stores of light weapons that have accumulated in Central and Eastern Europe since the 1950s are now coming back to haunt both supplier and recipient states by escalating conflicts and fuelling banditry. Both economic and political factors are contributing to the light weapons crisis, including:

• Lax controls. The breakdown of state structures has resulted in the weakening of state control over weapons production and import/export systems. In this power vacuum, a plethora of non-state actors have emerged, including brokers, criminal groups, and privatised factories. These actors further limit the state's ability to control weapons transfers.

• High demand. The proliferation of intra-state conflicts has produced a high level of demand for weaponry, especially light weapons.

• Cascading. Competition for membership in western politico-military alliances is fuelling new weapons purchases. As states in the region attempt to modernise their arsenals, financial need may prompt a "cascading" of older weapons to countries of instability.

• Economic strain. The collapse of civilian economies in many areas has left domestic arms industries as one of the most profitable and competitive sectors. As a result, new emphasis is being placed on weapons exports.

Light weapons have become a stumbling block to global security. The easy availability of light weapons frustrates negotiations, exacerbates tensions and contributes to the spreading of low intensity conflicts. Yet, despite the well-documented dangers of these unrestrained light weapons flows, to date, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have devoted minimal time and resources to curbing these transfers. As the primary institutions responsible for security in Europe, it is critical that they develop appropriate transparency, oversight and control programmes to control light weapons. These should developed in concert with related efforts being undertaken by the United Nations, the Group of Eight Industrialised States (G-8), the European Union (EU) and others.

Recommendations
The OSCE is principally a confidence-building institution, acting as a mediator in conflict situations and a bridge between former Eastern Bloc states and the rest of Europe. NATO, on the other hand, is a security umbrella with advanced military capabilities. The former is best suited for diplomatic endeavours while the latter is well-equipped to enforce cease-fires, arms embargoes, and agreements on the surrender of weapons. Both are capable of making unique and powerful contributions by instituting preventive and reactive measures to control light weapons.

Institutional efforts and policies to combat light weapons should include:

• Developing NATO and OSCE control programmes. NATO and the OSCE must develop and implement discrete European light weapons control programmes. Building on the strengths of each institution, these programmes should complement and mutually reinforce one another.

• Involving other institutions. NATO and the OSCE should enlist the help of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the G-8 in the fight against licit and illicit proliferation at the regional and global levels.

• Controlling surplus weapons. Emphasising destruction of surplus stocks and enhancing the capacity of states to control weapons diffusion will help limit diversion of surplus weapons. In particular, the mandates of peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations should emphasise closing down weapons pipelines and cross-border trafficking during conflicts and ensuring weapons collection and destruction after conflicts end.

• Adopting restraint measures. To generate restraint over both supply and demand, the OSCE needs to build pan-European political consensus on light weapons control. Possible measures include: restricting weapons flows to areas of tension from or through the territory of any OSCE state; extending the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers to cover all OSCE states; strengthening the OSCE criteria governing arms exports; and advocating adoption of a similar code of conduct within the CIS.

• Instituting effective management over the arms industry. Supporting industry conversion and diversification and assisting institutional capacity-building to manage dealers and brokers will greatly improve weapons management.

• Cracking down on grey and black market weapons transfers. Sharing information, gathering international intelligence, developing national legislation and establishing an OSCE convention on controlling illicit weapons trafficking will help limit illegal weapons transfers.

• Promoting "security first". By addressing the social and economic causes of proliferation, this approach can provide peaceful alternatives for demobilised soldiers and states in transition.

Introduction
In the post-Cold War era, weapons flows from Central and Eastern Europe to the developing world have remained relatively high, despite an overall reduction in global arms transfers. In 1995, Russian arms sales agreements with the developing world rose to $6 billion compared to US agreements of $3.8 billion.² These contracts represented 40 percent of the international market. Meanwhile, demand for these weapons remains high, as violence continues to rage in conflict zones.

The weakness of central authority in many parts of the region has hindered control and oversight over weapons production and transfers, particularly light weapons. Combined with the lack of international control mechanisms, these lax national policies have led to a mushrooming of weapons factories, illegal pipelines, brokers and gunrunners.

NATO enlargement could also provoke Central and Eastern European countries to dump their weapons abroad. With interoperability and modernisation established as prerequisites for Alliance membership, candidate states have initiated a flood of new weapons purchases. As they buy advanced weapons from the West, potential new members may finance new acquisitions by exporting obsolete and non-standard weapons. Conflict-ridden developing states and unscrupulous gunrunners are likely to be the main recipients of this "cascade" of surplus weapons.³

This paper is part of a series of publications analysing global light weapons proliferation and offering practical recommendations for control.⁴ It examines the dynamics of weapons proliferation within Central and Eastern Europe, traces the weapons pipelines to conflict zones and analyses the impact of these transfers on international conflict prevention and conflict resolution efforts. Finally, the paper offers recommendations for policy options and practical measures to eliminate surpluses, control weapons flows, and build the capacity of the institutions best placed to accomplish these tasks.

The Roots Of Proliferation

There's enough weaponry throughout the [Eastern] Bloc to keep wars going for decades. It's scarcely worth the trouble to reload: you might as well just pick up another gun.

Sam Cummings, international arms dealer⁷

Throughout the Cold War, Central and Eastern European states transferred weapons to insurgent groups, Soviet-influenced governments and revolutionary movements around the world, nearly all of them involved in continuing or sporadic armed conflict. In 1975, the Bulgarian state trading agency, Texim, sold large quantities of weapons, including AK-47s, to Christian militias in Lebanon.⁸ Polish weapons worth $5 million were shipped to Contra forces in Nicaragua by GeoMilitech, an arms company implicated in the Iran-Contra affair.⁹ All told, during this period, Central and Eastern European weapons were sold, transferred or donated to over 50 countries, including 13 of the 36 countries involved in major conflicts in 1996.¹⁰ These weapons continue to re-circulate in conflict zones today. For example, many of the weapons fuelling crime and banditry in South Africa have been smuggled across the border from Angola and Mozambique; both were major recipients of Central and Eastern European weapons.

Post-Cold War Transfers
The end of the Cold War added a dangerous new dimension to proliferation: diminishing oversight and control. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the vast military stocks of the former Soviet Union came under a multitude of jurisdictions, thus fracturing existing control mechanisms. In addition, considerable light weapons production capabilities exist outside Russia in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania and Poland. These too generally suffer from inadequate oversight and control.

The rise of organised crime, economic instability, civil strife and violent conflicts in the region, particularly the Balkan and Chechen wars, have further weakened control over weapons. This environment has provided fertile ground for illegal transfers and diffusion of weapons within states and across borders.

Russia itself requires more stringent export controls and stricter enforcement. Between 1992 and 1994, Russian authorities attempted to end Rozvooruzheniye's monopoly over arms exports by issuing export licences to 12 enterprises. However, the experiment had to be terminated. According to Boris Kuzyk, presidential aide for foreign military and technical co-operation, the enterprises were run by "scores of intermediaries involved in all kinds of scams".¹¹

Management of Russian weapons is also ad-hoc and uncoordinated. When the Russian 366th Motor Rifle Regiment withdrew in 1993, it left its entire stock of weapons to Karabakh Armenians.¹² The return of surplus weapons to Russia from former Soviet republics has also been problematic. Throughout 1992, up to seven train loads of weapons arrived in Kaliningrad each day, only to be left in an insecure compound with no accounting procedures.¹³ Today, security of Russian depots continues to be inadequate. A Russian news agency described most of the 70 weapons depots covering 75 hectares of land in Moscow as "built in the last century" and "sparingly guarded by three elderly men".¹⁴ According to Dmitriy Milin, deputy head of St. Petersburg area directorate against organised crime, the sixteen weapons depots in St. Petersburg containing a total of 60,000 tonnes of ammunition "are virtually unguarded; large quantities of explosive materials enter the criminal world from [these] army stores".¹⁵

The New Arms Merchants
With a long shelf life and large accumulated stocks, light weapons control cannot focus on new weapons production. Rather, it is the re-transfer of existing stocks that defines the market.¹⁶ In the past, the majority of both legal and clandestine weapon shipments were conducted by the state and party bureaucracies. However, the current wave of exports from Central and Eastern Europe takes all forms: government-sanctioned transfers; tacitly-sanctioned semi-official transfers; individual profiteering by members of the armed forces; multi-national contracts organised by arms brokers; diversion and theft from official sources by organised crime groups; and black market sales of stolen and seized weapons. (See Table on p.5 describing recent transfers.)

On the black market, weapons sales are booming. In Lithuania, over 40 groups are reportedly engaged in shipping weapons obtained from local army garrisons all over the former Soviet Union.¹⁷ Hundreds of thousands of AK-47s and other weapons looted from army supply depots during the Albanian crisis in 1997 are also finding their way into conflicts via black market transactions. Many are being smuggled across the border by Albanian militants to arm the Kosovo Liberation Army in their secessionist war against Serbia.¹⁸

Distinguishing between licit and illicit transfers has become increasingly problematic. For example, in April 1997, Russian authorities acknowledged that large quantities of arms worth over $1 billion were transferred to Armenia from late 1992 until 1996. The deliveries were made without any state to state agreement or formal government permission.¹⁹

Light Weapons, Conflict and Crime
In Uganda, an AK-47 can be procured for the same cost as a chicken and in northern Kenya for the cost of a goat. Inside Mozambique and Angola, an AK-47 complete with a couple of clips of ammunition can be bought for less than $15.00, or for a bag of maize.²⁰

Light weapons are particularly prone to recycling; they re-circulate time and time again from one conflict to the next. Stocks of weapons often surface in countries far removed from their original destination. As a result, it is very difficult to trace the provenance of weapons recovered or spotted in conflict zones. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that light weapons of Central and Eastern European origin are found in large numbers in many of today's warring countries.

Top-level officials of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), spotted in South Africa while allegedly arranging arms transfers with rogue intelligence officers, were later arrested for shipping AK-47s from Mozambique.²¹ Polish, Russian and Bulgarian weapons have been sent in small batches to Kurdish insurgents in Turkey and Northern Iraq.²²

These weapons are also fuelling violence far beyond Europe's borders. Throughout Central America, insurgents, criminal gangs and narco-traffickers depend on readily available and inexpensive light weapons. More and more, these weapons are coming from sources in Central and Eastern Europe. Former Eastern bloc weapons smuggled from massive post-civil war stocks in El Salvador and Nicaragua have been supplied to rebels of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Mexico, and AK-47s were among the weapons used in the December 1997 massacre of 45 ethnic Indians in Acteal, Chiapas.²³ In addition, during the Peru-Ecuador war in 1995, Ecuador scoured the world market for arms, and reportedly found considerable stocks in Eastern Europe.²⁴

Africa is awash in light weapons, with masses of weaponry freely moving between countries and conflicts. In many parts of Southern Africa, AK-47s are reportedly available for the cost of a chicken, goat, or bag of maize.²⁵ Warring parties in Rwanda have procured weapons from Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.²⁶ In early 1998, Bulgarian suppliers were also reportedly the source of a $1.5 million arms deal between Sandline International, a UK-based private military company, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the overthrown President of Sierra Leone.²⁷ A large proportion of light weapons in Africa are re-circulating Cold War weapons. Between 1972 and 1990, Ethiopia and Somalia imported $18 billion worth of weapons and ammunition, the majority from Central and Eastern Europe. These continue to fuel conflicts in the Horn of Africa.²⁸

In Asia, re-circulating Cold War weapons have fallen into the hands of drug traffickers, terrorists, paramilitary groups and criminal gangs and are facilitating conflict in tense areas such as Kashmir. During the war in Afghanistan, the US Central Intelligence Agency supplied Mujahideen fighters with Soviet and Chinese weapons, including at least 400,000 AK-47s. Pakistani intelligence officers claim that they still have 3 million AKs stored in crates.²⁹ In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tiger liberation movement has developed supply links with Ukraine, and seizures indicate connections with other Central and Eastern European states as well.³⁰

NATO and the OSCE
There is no doubt that the individual governments of Central and Eastern Europe need to develop more stringent export policies and become more vigilant in stopping illicit weapons transfers. However, the global nature of light weapons proliferation also requires a larger-scale control effort. Committed to ensuring Europe's security, NATO and the OSCE need to take up this challenge. Yet, to date, neither has made any concrete efforts to control light weapons, and in some cases, their actions may in fact be intensifying the problem.

Enlargement May Spur Weapons "Cascade"
NATO enlargement has the potential to boost, rather than curtail, rearmament and proliferation.³¹ For the few states earmarked for full NATO membership, the interoperability requirements for membership appear to be translating into the acquisition of sophisticated western weapons.³² To date, candidate states for NATO membership are focusing on purchasing major weapons, such as fighter aircraft, from the West. However, it is possible that the process could extend to light weapons. Many of the purchases appear to be driven not by the technical requirements of interoperability, but by the political need to develop closer ties to the West. For example, while MiG fighters could be modified to fulfil NATO standards, many candidate countries are opting for US F-16s. Just the same, while the AK-47 may be an altogether appropriate infantry weapon for NATO forces, potential new members might elect to purchase M16s in hopes that this would make them more "attractive" partners. Considering the overall decline in the international arms market, economics may lead major exporting countries within NATO to encourage such purchases.

The potential consequences are two-fold. First, weapons rendered obsolete or redundant might be sold to developing countries in order to finance new purchases. This "cascade" of surplus weapons could fuel violence in conflict areas. Second, neighbouring states may perceive these new purchases as an arms build-up on their borders. To counter qualitative and quantitative improvements, states on the periphery of enlargement might revamp their domestic weapons industries or increase weapons imports, possibly generating a new regional arms race.

Light Weapons and NATO's Mandate
NATO and UN troops are stationed in various conflict zones in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, though light weapons are the most prevalent form of weaponry in these conflicts, NATO has yet to develop a coherent policy. As a result, unrestricted light weapons flows continue to heighten tensions in hotspots, prolong conflicts and endanger civilians and peace-keepers. Through post-conflict disarmament and light weapons controls, the Alliance can play a key role in stemming light weapons proliferation. To this end, NATO should address adoption of a light weapons policy in the ongoing review of its Strategic Concept. Through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, NATO can also assist the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in implementing comprehensive import/export controls and ensuring more effective arms management.

As a participant in peace processes, NATO has a special responsibility to help develop and implement a comprehensive disarmament programme. In today's conflicts, disarmament must address the whole range of weaponry, not just major weapons. The Dayton Accords, which officially ended the war in the former Yugoslavia, had a unique opportunity to institute a comprehensive disarmament regime. Unfortunately, only heavy weapons were considered.³³ To make matters worse, after the conflict ended, the United States actually introduced new weaponry into the region under its "Train and Equip" programme with the Bosnian-Croat Federation. Under the scheme, 41,000 M-16s, 2,000 machine guns, and over 21 million rounds of ammunition were delivered to the new Bosnian army.³⁴ The programme was rationalised as a means to ensure parity of weaponry between Bosnia and Serbia. Furthermore, the United States argued that if they did not supply the weapons, countries such as Iran would do so.³⁵ Thus, rather than disarming all warring factions, or establishing parity at a lower level, Washington chose to introduce more weapons into the post-conflict zone and its NATO allies failed to insist otherwise.

NATO should ensure that the disarmament elements of peace agreements address light weapons and should play a key role in ensuring that warring parties comply with these arms control measures. By enforcing embargoes, improving border controls and collecting and destroying surrendered weapons, NATO can stem the flow of light weapons in conflict areas.

OSCE and Micro-Disarmament
The OSCE's mandate in the region should be broadened from diplomatic conflict management to include the economic and social aspects of light weapons tracking and management. In his address to the OSCE Permanent Council in March 1998, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans van Mierlo called on the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation to develop "an integrated approach to the small arms problem at the core of [their] work".³⁶ This "security first" approach calls for simultaneous programmes to dismantle the physical instruments of violence and to address the underlying economic and social causes of weapons proliferation.

The OSCE is best placed to oversee light weapons buy-back programs, destruction efforts and reintegration initiatives. These can be carried after conflicts end, in conjunction with the United Nations and the CIS. The OSCE should also promote the development of peace education programmes, through churches, schools and youth clubs.

Building a Framework for Co-operation
While NATO and the OSCE are behind the curve in addressing the light weapons problem, other institutions have already made significant progress in developing such policy initiatives. In particular, the United Nations, the European Union and the G-8 have already begun developing policies to stem the proliferation of light weapons which are directly relevant to Europe.³⁷ NATO and the OSCE can benefit greatly from the lessons learned by these institutions, as well as their expertise. They should co-ordinate their efforts with these initiatives, and promote them wherever possible. To be successful, NATO and the OSCE also need the partnership and co-operation of the CIS. The CIS serves as an umbrella organisation for parts of Europe and the Caucasus, a major source of illegal weapons. Establishing a clear division of labour among NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations will also be critical to the success of these operations.

Policy Recommendations

Develop NATO and OSCE Control Programmes
There is clearly an urgent need for light weapons control efforts to address the diffusion of weaponry within and beyond Europe. Offering different but complementary capabilities, NATO and the OSCE can develop a co-operative programme to address the main aspects of proliferation.

With its military capability, NATO is best placed to enforce peace and prevent weapons recycling and proliferation through seizure, collection and destruction. NATO's efforts should include:

• Raising the light weapons issue within the framework of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), with a view to evolving a common strategy on controlling light weapons.

• Advocating curbs on light weapons proliferation in PfP military-to-military contacts.

Given its limited capability to police conflict, the OSCE should concentrate on building bridges between parties in conflict, undertaking micro-disarmament programmes, and assisting reintegration. OSCE initiatives should include:

• Co-ordinating development of an early warning system, including databases on light weapon stocks, transfers and military movements. These databases would be invaluable to NATO in policing light weapons transfers.

• Developing micro-disarmament programmes within individual states and in conflict zones, including gun buy-backs, destruction programmes and peace education.

• Instituting confidence-building measures, such as a regional light weapons register.

Destroy Surplus Weapons
The volume of weapons already in circulation in Central and Eastern Europe is sufficient to cause devastation for years to come. To prevent further recycling of weaponry, all international peace-building and peace enforcement initiatives in the region should prioritise collection and elimination of weapons. In light of the temptation to fund new weapons purchases by exporting older weapons, necessary steps must also be taken to prevent such "cascading". Destruction is the only means of ensuring that excess weapons - whether deemed surplus after conflict or as the result of modernisation - are permanently taken out of circulation. Efforts undertaken in conjunction with the United Nations should include:

• Ensuring that all peace-keeping and peace enforcement mandates address light weapons collection.

• Destroying all weapons and ammunition collected as a result of micro-disarmament efforts and in the course of peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations.

• Destroying all weapons rendered surplus or obsolete as the result of modernisation or downsizing.

• Offering financial and technical assistance to states to implement safe and affordable destruction, including in situ destruction for weapons in depots and weaponry declared too unsafe to transport.

• Offering financial and economic incentives, as well as security guarantees, to states in return for the destruction of surplus weapons.

• Undertaking destruction of surplus stocks in NATO member states. These exercises could act as a confidence-building measure and demonstrate NATO's own commitment and credibility. For example, the Dutch Defence Ministry has announced that, unable to find buyers that satisfy the EU common criteria governing arms exports, they will destroy most of their surplus small arms. Small arms to be destroyed include 115,000 Uzis, FAL rifles, Garand rifles, Browning pistols and M1 carbines.³⁸

Control Light Weapons Diffusion
The existence of loose state controls in many countries in the region plays a major role in facilitating theft and diffusion as well as prompting reckless import/export policies. With the explosion of conflicts in the region, weapons keep pouring into war zones, where they are later re-circulated to new conflicts or sold abroad to the developing world. For example, pipelines of light weapons from Serbia, Albania and Macedonia and Bulgaria continue to fan the flames of conflict in Kosovo. Urgent measures are required to maintain watertight control over weapons and ammunition. Control measures should include:

• Enhancing the capacity of local forces to detect and recover weapons from caches and seize illicit weapons. Efforts should involve police, army, border personnel, and customs officials.

• Increasing local capacity to institute effective security over official weapons depots and maintain accurate records of weapons stocks.

• Building capacity of non-governmental organisations, religious and community-based groups to carry out aspects of micro-disarmament programs, including education, buy-back and barter programmes, collection and destruction.

• Assisting institutional capacity-building to manage dealers and brokers.

• Developing and supporting regional light weapons registers.

Adopt Restraint Measures
Building support for restraint in both supply and demand is a crucial element in any lasting weapons control effort. The first step for the OSCE will be to build pan-European political consensus on light weapons control. OSCE efforts to encourage restraint should include:

• Promoting measures restricting weapons flows to areas of tension from or through the territory of any OSCE state.

• Supporting extending the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers to cover all OSCE states.

• Strengthening the OSCE criteria governing arms exports and advocating adoption of a similar code of conduct within the CIS. The OSCE should also develop measures for monitoring compliance.

Institute Effective Management Over Industry
Lack of state control also extends to the region's domestic arms industries. Shifting emphasis from privatisation of the weapons industries to conversion and diversification will benefit both weapons control efforts and confidence-building in the region. Efforts should include:

• Offering financial packages for conversion and downsizing of weapons industries. To this end, popular debt-forgiveness arrangements could be adapted to further disarmament goals. For example, Ukraine has offered to deliver surplus weapons to Russia in exchange for debt reductions.³⁹ Instead, the West could offer debt relief or development assistance in return for the decommissioning and destruction of surplus weapons or the conversion of military industries to civilian use. The incentive package offered to Ukraine in return for its nuclear weapons stockpiles could also serve as a model.

• Emphasising civilian, rather than military industries, in technology transfers.

Stem Illicit Weapons Trafficking
Control efforts must also tackle the massive grey and black markets in light weapons. These efforts should be pursued in consultation with the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), which maintains the Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS). The only international database for stolen and recovered weapons, IWETS can facilitate weapons tracking. The World Customs Organisation could also help provide training and support for Central and Eastern European customs agencies. Possible initiatives include:

• Strengthening security around weapons factories and depots and maintaining accurate and updated inventories of stored weapons.

• Increasing intelligence co-operation to track illegal and semi-legal arms deals and to clamp down on weapon-related criminal groups and bogus dealers and brokers. This should include compiling a database on persons and organisations involved in the weapons trade.

• Converting existing military training facilities into training centres to instruct specialists on tactics for weapons tracking and seizure.

• Actively supporting regional and global conventions on illicit weapons trafficking. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union have established programmes, and a legally binding international instrument to combat firearms trafficking is under consideration in the G-8.

• Improving border controls. Co-operative strategies should be developed among local border personnel in consultation with intelligence and military units from NATO, the European Police Organisation (EUROPOL), the CIS and the OSCE.

• Instituting micro-disarmament programmes, such as weapons buy-backs and amnesties.

• Reviewing and enforcing national legislation limiting civilian possession of firearms.

• Supporting the adoption of regional and global codes of conduct on weapons transfers, to provide clearer definitions of legal and illegal weapons transfers.

Emphasise "Security First"
With the exception of those states gripped in intractable internal conflicts, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are undergoing significant military downsizing. While this is a welcome sign of demilitarisation, the process has been fraught with problems, and is proceeding without regard to the post-military needs of demobilised troops. In addition, existing troops are poorly and irregularly paid. As a result, there is great temptation for disgruntled soldiers to use the AK-47 as a "blank cheque" for survival, and many have turned to black market weapons sales or criminal activity. Clearly, more positive measures to re-integrate demobilised troops into civilian life are required. In conjunction with the United Nations, OSCE efforts should include:

• Initiating and overseeing programmes to absorb demobilised troops into civil society after conflicts and in the course of downsizing.

• Promoting, supporting and financing job re-training and local job creation through co-operative ventures.

• Funding housing for demobilised troops through both state and external sources.

In addition, there is no obvious reason for future NATO members to acquire new weapons, particularly light weapons, for future joint operations. A collective security shield with more than adequate military capability, NATO should help alleviate the military burden, not add to it. Along these lines, NATO efforts should focus on:

• Promoting confidence-building measures among states in concert with the OSCE, with particular emphasis on reducing the overall level of armaments in the region.

• Ensuring destruction of obsolete and incompatible weaponry in cases in which new members require modernisation. Appropriate compensation should also be considered.

Conclusion
The weakening of state structures and economies, the emergence of powerful criminal elements and the explosion of conflicts are the key factors contributing to irresponsible weapons transfers from Central and Eastern Europe. Beyond that, however, the failure of major multilateral institutions to address the light weapons crisis has meant that tracking and managing weapons flows has been at best inconsistent and ad-hoc. In the worst cases, their failure to prioritise light weapons control has endangered their very own peace efforts.

Offering a range of different skills and capabilities, NATO, the OSCE, the European Union and the United Nations must work together to develop a co-ordinated and comprehensive system of light weapons initiatives. Undertaken with a clear division of labour and a strong a co-operative spirit, these efforts can help stem the dangerous flows of light weapons from Central and Eastern Europe to conflict zones around the world. However, like all such challenges, success will depend on the political will of the participating organisations and member states.

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Endnotes

1 In this paper, the use of the term Central and Eastern Europe includes reference to Russia.

2 Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1988-95 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 1996).

3 Interoperability refers to the process of bringing military hardware and combat science into line with NATO norms. For additional information on weapons purchases driven by NATO expansion, see: Kirsten Ruecker, "Military Build-up in Central and Eastern Europe: NATO Membership for Sale", BASIC Paper No. 22, (Washington, DC: British American Security Information Council, July 1997).

4 Related BASIC publications include: Abdel Fatau Musah at al., "Africa: The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping Operations", BASIC Paper No. 23, December 1997; Alexander Chloros et al., "Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in Central America", BASIC Paper No. 24, December 1997; Susannah Dyer and Geraldine O'Callaghan, "Combating Illicit Light Weapons Trafficking: Developments and Opportunities", BASIC Project on Light Weapons Report 98.1, January 1998; Alex Vines, "The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique", BASIC Paper No. 25, April 1998; and Rachel Stohl, "Deadly Rounds: Ammunition and Armed Conflict", BASIC Project on Light Weapons Research Report 98.4, May 1998.

5 Michael Renner, Small Arms, Big Impact, Worldwatch Paper 137 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, October 1997) p. 19; Terry J. Gander and Ian V. Hogg, Jane's Infantry Weapons, 21st Edition, 1995-96 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1995) p. 132; Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms Today: Latest Reports on the World's Weapons and Ammunition, 2nd Edition (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1988).

6 Renner, p. 20.

7 Brian Freemantle, The Octopus (London: Orion Books, 1995) pp. 33-4.

8 Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York, Viking Press, 1977) pp. 19, 173.

9 Michael Klare and David Anderson, A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project, 1996) p. 80.

10 Ezell; SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1997) pp. 25-30

11 Financial Times, 5 December 1996.

12 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (no city: Human Rights Watch, 1994) p. 86.

13 R.T. Naylor, "The Rise of the Modern Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply-Side Control", in Virginia Gamba, ed., Society Under Siege: Crime, Violence and Illegal Weapons (Cape Town: Institute for Security Studies, 1997) p. 55.

14 NTV Moscow, in Russian 1900 GMT, 19 November 1997.

15 NTV Moscow, in Russian 1600 GMT, 26 November 1997.

16 Naylor, p. 52.

17 Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) p. 209.

18 Philip Smucker, "Albanian weapons cross to Kosovo", The Washington Times, 8 April 1998, A1, A18.

19 Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 April 1997, p. 15.

20 Chris Smith and Alex Vines, "Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa", London Defence Studies 42 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1997) p. 9.

21 Liam Clarke and Inigo Gilmore, "IRA linked to African arms deal," Sunday Times, 15 March 1998, p. 28.

22 "Global Black-Market Arms Trade Should Be Next Target of NGOs", FAS Public Interest Report 50(4) (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, July-August 1997), p. 9.

23 "El Calderon Sol Voices Concern, Over Arms Shipments in Region," Panama City ACAN in FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-LAT-97-033, February 17, 1997; Obtained on the Internet at http://cns.miis.edu/pacdc/chiapas.html.

24 Klare and Anderson, p. 52.

25 Smith and Vines, "Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa", p. 9.

26 Peter Batchelor, "Intra-State Conflict, Political Violence and Small Arms Proliferation in Africa", in Gamba, Society under Siege, p. 117.

27 "Sierra Leone: Freetown Fracas," Africa Confidential, 39(5), 6 March 1998, p. 8.

28 Clement Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996) p. 85.

29 Chris Smith, "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia" in Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds., Lethal Commerce: the Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995) p. 64.

30 Anthony Davies, "Tamil Tiger International", Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1996, pp. 469-473.

31 For more details on NATO expansion and weapons transfers, see Ruecker.

32 In NATO Review No. 3 of June 1994 NATO Assistant Secretary-General Gebhardt Von Moltke claimed that the concept of "interoperability" is aimed at ensuring compatibility in approaches and procedures, not at common or standardised equipment. However, in practice, common equipment is being increasingly implied. States earmarked for membership are already placing orders for modern aircraft and major weapons from the West.

33 Jane M.O. Sharp, "Update on the Dayton Arms Control Arrangements", Bulletin of Arms Control No. 25 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, March 1997) p. 8.

34 Arms Sales Monitor, No. 36, 28 February 1998.

35 Sharp, p. 11.

36 Address by Hans van Mierlo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, OSCE Doc. No. PC.DEL/87/98, 26 March 1998.

37 For additional information, see Dyer and O'Callaghan.

38 Saferworld Bulletin No. 2 (London: Saferworld, January 6, 1998).

39 Andrew W. Hull and David R. Markov, "The Changing Nature of the International Arms Market", IDA Paper 3122 (Alexandria VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, March 1996).