BASIC PAPERS

DECEMBER 1997 • NUMBER 24 • ISSN 1353-0402

Breaking the Cycle of Violence:
Light Weapons Destruction in Central America

By Alexander Chloros, Joel Johnston, Katherine Joseph and Rachel Stohl

Instability and low-level conflicts thrive on the proliferation of light weapons. In Central America, the large numbers of weapons in circulation testify to the duration and extent of these conflicts, and impede the reconstruction and development process. Although UN peacekeeping in the region has been extremely successful in implementing lasting peace agreements, as long as these small arms remain easily available, there can be little chance of real stability and reconciliation.

Small arms are often re-circulated, hindering post-conflict reconstruction and fueling violence and crime. Since the end of the Cold War, many governments have built up surplus stocks of weapons. They are tending to sell these weapons, at inexpensive prices, rather than dismantle or destroy them. The only way to finally break this cycle is to remove the weapons from circulation through collection efforts and destruction programs. Without government sponsored dismantling or destruction programs, surplus weapons are increasingly likely to be smuggled and stolen, and used for violence and instability.

Post-conflict peace-building missions in other parts of the world, especially in Africa, have seen collection and destruction of surplus weapons as a necessary part of the disarmament effort.¹ However, most initiatives, including those in Central America, have not seriously integrated this option within in peacekeeping and reconstruction, possibly because destruction is more costly than other alternatives.

Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti are all countries which suffered long-running conflicts in the 80s and early 90s. Following several peace agreements, most have since benefited from UN-sponsored disarmament efforts. These programs tended to focus on demobilization, reintegration of combatants, and restructuring of the armed forces. The UN peace-keeping operations monitored the collection of weapons from insurgent groups and provided logistical and policing support for registration and storage of these weapons.

However, the UN efforts, while initially successful, often failed to eliminate the destabilizing effects of conventional weapons on Central American societies because they were unable to collect a large number of the small arms in circulation. Furthermore, although re-circulation of small arms often reverses disarmament and demobilization, the UN stored the confiscated weapons to rearm existing security forces, for example in Haiti, or to equip new ones, as occurred in Guatemala, rather than implement destruction. The weapons can then be used again for internal violence and conflict. Another problematic situation arises when the weapons are stolen, which occurs frequently, and sold to insurgent groups or even the general population, potentially re-igniting hostilities. To ensure that weapons are taken permanently out of circulation, collection and destruction of surplus weaponry should be incorporated into efforts to control light weapons’ flows whenever possible.

The failure to embark upon destruction from the start of the peace processes left an abundance of light weapons in circulation and contributed to the upsurge in violence and crime in the Central American states under consideration. As will be shown, none of the peacekeeping missions included the destruction of weapons as part of their mandate, and subsequent destruction policies were seldom implemented precisely and consistently. This paper will draw certain lessons for UN-sponsored disarmament from the Central American experience, and will go on to make specific recommendations for future destruction efforts in the region.

Destruction within Disarmament
Weapons collection and destruction programs have different benefits depending upon the stage of the conflict or conflict resolution process at which they are implemented. It can be maintained, that in certain instances, weapons collection programs should be implemented during the conflict, thus disarming combatants and facilitating the end of the conflict. If citizens are encouraged to put down their weapons, or prevented from acquiring them from the outset, regional instability can be halted or avoided.

Collection and destruction programs which occur at the beginning of the post-conflict reconstruction process can limit the instability created by a proliferation of surplus weaponry. These disarmament initiatives identify weapons as part of the problem, and demonstrate how they lead directly to increased violence and crime. Even if a collection program fails, and citizens do not turn in their weapons, a stigma against those weapons has been created. As a result, members of the public become wary of carrying weapons openly, and may be less likely to use them for violence and crime.

Additionally, weapons collection and destruction can have symbolic effects, signaling an official end to the conflict and hostilities.² If the conflict is seen as officially over, a high political cost becomes associated with the rearming of combatants. This was especially true of El Salvador, where the FMLN rebels chose not to rearm once weapons collection programs were introduced, fearing they might jeopardize the role they gained within the political process.³

In spite of the benefits of destruction programs in conflict management, UN missions have seldom included destruction of surrendered or confiscated weapons as part of their initial peacekeeping mandates. Often there is a lack of political will, although it appears that in Central America, destruction had been proposed as the best option for coping with the weapons collected. The Montelimar Summit in 1990 is the best example of this, when the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua actually requested the UN to extend its mandates in the region to include destruction. Specifically, the Summit asked the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) to destroy all weapons collected in situ, stating, "the arms that ONUCA will receive must be destroyed on site in the presence of representatives from other Central American governments who will have been invited by the corresponding government."⁴ The individual UN missions complied only sporadically, often lacking the resources to do so. Notably, a declaration signed by the current presidents in Honduras in January 1997 omits any reference to destruction policies, in spite of calls for weapons collection as a means of combating illicit arms trafficking.⁵

Nevertheless, some attempts at destruction are worth examining. This paper will assess five Central American countries, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti, and Guatemala, where destruction was incorporated as part of the reconstruction process. In Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador, the mandates of ONUCA and ONUSAL were eventually redefined to include destruction. These countries’ experiences provide better models for states undergoing post-conflict reconstruction than those where destruction was omitted as a key disarmament policy. Even recent UN missions to Central America did not promote destruction of weapons in any meaningful way. For example, the ongoing disarmament process under the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) initiated in March 1997, only ever ambiguously involved destruction.

In the absence of United Nations leadership, other organizations and forces often assumed responsibility for destruction. In Haiti, it was the US-led Multi-National Force mission, rather than the UN, which carried out the disarmament and demobilization mandates. After the withdrawal of the United States from Haiti, the responsibility for weapons collection and destruction programs fell to the Haitian government. The Canadians, who remained in Haiti, have been unenthusiastic about weapons collection programs in general and decided, therefore, to assign responsibility for these programs at a local and state level.

The following case studies illustrate the progress made on destruction so far in Central America. They demonstrate how the concept of the destruction of weapons collected has gradually gained momentum within the region and within the UN missions, facilitating the transition from war to peace. Nevertheless, this transition has had varying degrees of success. In many countries, an enduring legacy of crime and violence thrives on the easy availability of those weapons which were not destroyed.

Table 1:  Weapons collected and destroyed in Nicaragua and Honduras⁶

Nicaragua and Honduras
The ONUCA mission to Nicaragua and Honduras was the first substantial UN-sponsored disarmament operation, and included the first significant destruction effort in Central America. The mission’s original mandate was limited to preventing weapons trafficking one from country to the other, and was later extended to cover the verification of all Contra disarmament and demobilization programs. The UN command deployed a Venezuelan Battalion (VENBATT) to assist with the collection, registration, storage, and eventual destruction (in compliance with the Montelimar Summit decision) of weapons, ammunition, equipment and uniforms.⁸ As a consequence, from 10 April to 29 June 1990 a total of 17,883 weapons were collected and destroyed in Honduras and Nicaragua.⁹ (see table 1).

In Nicaragua and Honduras, the estimated number of mobilized Contra rebels from 1979-1987 ranged from 20,000 to 22,000. The high number of combatants and their guerrilla style of warfare left a profusion of light weapons in both countries. However, since the Contras did not provide detailed information regarding exact numbers of weapons and war-related materiel in their possession, it is difficult to assess what percentage of arms were collected and destroyed.

It is known that Contra weapons are still in circulation, and that the Sandinistas and their allies, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, have caches of weapons hidden in Nicaragua. On 14 March 1997, Nicaraguan police discovered an arms cache outside Managua containing more than 1,300 sticks of dynamite, two tons of ammunition, assorted rifles, grenades, machine guns, rocket launchers, plastic explosives, and mines. This prompted a senior FMLN commander to comment "to find an arms deposit in Nicaragua is even easier than finding water."¹⁰

Although hidden caches do exist, the level of re-armed insurgent groups in the northern regions of Nicaragua is falling. ONUCA’s successful verification of weapons collection also helped inspire confidence in UN involvement in the region. "The continuing UN presence in the area was considered to be a positive factor in the process of building confidences, as it assisted states to maintain their commitments to respect the peace agreements, and the insurgent forces to trust the commitments made by the governments."¹¹ Although ONUCA was not as successful as the original mandate might have hoped, the mission’s efforts and contribution must be acknowledged as a significant disarmament operation in the region, including destruction^.12

Nicaragua has also benefited from gun-buy back programs in an effort to eliminate the proliferation and diffusion of small arms in civil society. At the end of the war, the government sponsored a weapons collection program conducted by the Special Disarmament Brigade (BED) made up of officials from both sides of the conflict. The government sponsored program offered cash and food incentives, as well as in some cases housing and construction materials. The majority of weapons were exchanged for $80 - $200 depending on the caliber and condition of the weapon.¹³

Additionally, an Italian-sponsored micro-enterprise program was held during 1992-93. Individuals received $300 -$500 for their weapons to be used as "seed money for development projects."¹⁴ As a result of the program, which had a cost of $6 million, approximately 64,000 weapons were bought back and 78,000 were confiscated. All of these weapons were destroyed. Additionally, the program collected 250,000 rounds of ammunition.¹⁵

At the end of the two year period, the combined efforts of the BED and Italian programs collected over 142,000 weapons (at the end of the program, however, it was realized that over 30% of the weapons turned in were non-functioning). The collected weapons were "publicly destroyed in an open fire; a display intended to psychologically erode the cultural norm of violence."¹⁶

Despite the partial success of ONUCA and weapons collection programs and the peace process, many tensions remain unresolved in Nicaragua, and armed groups continue to operate in northern and central Nicaragua. A significant number of armed rebels did not turn in their weapons during the initial collection programs. Many of those who did have now rearmed, joining former ex-combatants in movements to protest the lack of fulfilled promises made by former President Violeta Chamorro.¹⁷

Efforts to demobilize the rebel groups have continued, but through new techniques.¹⁸ According to one report, current Nicaraguan president, Armando Aleman, is not in favor of giving cash to the armed groups for their weapons. Instead, he has proposed a land-for-guns program, which grants five parcels of land, technical agricultural assistance, vocational training, and guaranteed local political involvement to the former rebels in exchange for their weaponry.¹⁹

Honduras, too, is still facing issues involving surplus weapons left over years after the conflict ended, and the UN troops have gone home. In Honduras, gun ownership is still extremely widespread, and government efforts at demilitarization have not included destruction.²⁰ "Defense Minister General JosJ Luis Nd Z ez Bennet declared in May 1996 that more than a million people in Honduras illegally carry a firearm, while Attorney General Edmudno Orellana asserts that some 67,000 AK-47 rifles-formerly the property of combatants in civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua-are in the hands of Hondurans who bought them in the black market."²¹

Although initial efforts have been made by the government in terms of weapons collection and destruction, and the fact that Honduras has a lower crime rate than any of its neighbors, there have been continued problems of violence since the end of the war. The increase in violence began in 1994; and during1994 and 1995, a daily average of five murders, ten assaults and eight robberies was recorded.²²

El Salvador
The second major destruction effort in Central America took place in El Salvador and was monitored by the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). ONUSAL’s original mandate of July 1991 only required it to monitor human rights abuses. Seven months later a military division was created to "supervise the cease fire, the separation of forces, the assembling of government, the destruction of arms and war-related materiel in possession of the FMLN, and the reduction of armed forces."²³

During El Salvador’s eleven year war, the FMLN force is estimated to have mobilized approximately 5,000 to 10,000 combatants.²⁴ Under the Chapultepec Peace Accords signed in 1992, the FMLN and the government agreed the combatants would turn in their weapons and destroy them under UN supervision.

ONUSAL’s task was made much easier than ONUCA’s because the FMLN leadership provided a list of weapons and war-materiel, confirmed by the UN mission, to use as a baseline estimate. Disarmament efforts in El Salvador continued throughout 1992, despite delays in negotiations between the government and the FMLN. By 15 December 1992, a total of 9,979 weapons, 382,971 rounds of ammunition, 687 kg of explosives, and 29 communication units had been destroyed through the ONUSAL program.

In May 1993, an explosion occurred at a hidden arms cache in Managua, Nicaragua, indicating that FMLN weapon’s caches crossed country borders. The investigation that followed uncovered an additional 114 arms caches, both within and outside El Salvador’s borders, which belonged to the FMLN. These developments forced the FMLN to produce a second, more accurate inventory which "added about 30% more to the original inventory handed over in 1992."²⁵ In accordance with the Military Division of ONUSAL, all of these weapons were destroyed by 18 August 1993, marking the completion of ONUSAL’s mission. Specifically, the two inventories are provided in Table 2.

Table 2:  Weapons collected and destroyed in El Salvador²⁶

Throughout the disarmament process, these figures were augmented by the destruction efforts of the Salvadoran armed forces. After the official departure of ONUSAL in April 1995, and its replacement with the smaller MINUSAL observer mission, private sector initiatives such as the Patriotic Movement Against Crime (MPCD) continued the disarmament process by trading food and clothing vouchers for weapons collected from former combatants.

The MPCD program is headed by its general coordinator, David Guitierrez, with the general support of the government and Catholic Church. The MPCD project has thus far consisted of two phases. Phase 1 lasted from 21 September to 15 December. Those who turned in weapons received vouchers worth US$345 for each rifle, US$ 172 for each handgun, and US$3 for each grenade."²⁷ Subsequently, the weapons collected by MPCD were turned over to the custody of the National Civilian Police and then to the Ministry of Defense for destruction.²⁸

The first phase of the MPCD buy-back and destruction program was extremely successful. From 21 September to 15 December 1996, MPCD collected 4,277 weapons, 1,589 explosives, and 52,693 rounds of ammunition, at a cost of $571,693.²⁹ Due to a lack of funds, the project was shortened from eight to five weekend sessions. However, once additional funding was received, the second phase of the program was organized to take place from March to October 1997. In an important symbolic gesture, the weapons collected are to be made into a sculpture of a plow.

As was also the case in Nicaragua, the sheer volume of weapons hampered destruction efforts in El Salvador which would have permanently removed weapons from circulation. The 20,000 arms destroyed by the UN and MPCD comprise only a fraction of the estimated 200,000 weapons still circulating in El Salvador since the end of hostilities in 1992.³⁰

The surplus weapons have facilitated a post-war crime wave in El Salvador, where the homicide rate is believed to be the highest in Latin America.³¹ El Salvador experienced 7,877 violent deaths in 1995, an average of approximately 21 homicides per day.³² Youth gangs, known as maras, have been responsible for the majority of crimes in El Salvador. These US-styled gangs have major military weapons in their possession, including M-16s, AK-47s, M-3 hand grenades, and RPG-2 rocket launchers. They are involved in a variety of crimes, including road blocks, bank robberies, bus robberies, street theft, kidnappings, extortions, and street violence.³³ The participation of youths in criminal violence in El Salvador is staggering. Minors have been involved in up to 70% of the crimes in San Salvador.³⁴

Although the increase in crime should be taken seriously, and measures should be undertaken to combat crime, violence, and weapons proliferation in El Salvador, the effectiveness of destruction programs to date should not be ignored. Private and state initiatives similar to that sponsored by MPCD have had a psychological as well as a practical impact in El Salvador; the perception that a weapon is necessary for protection and self-defense has diminished. In a recent survey, around 15% of inhabitants of San Salvador supported the view that owning a gun might be necessary for self-protection. Nevertheless, there is still widespread concern over the levels of gun ownership, especially in San Salvador, where 52,270 people carry weapons.³⁵

Haiti
The American military intervention under the Port-au-Prince Agreement of September 1994 brought to an end a crisis that had begun with the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. Of the two agreements intended to transfer power back to Aristide, neither the earlier Governors Island Accord nor the Port-au-Prince Agreement contained a disarmament mandate.³⁶ The US-led Multi-National Force (MNF) mission, however, did conduct a buy-back program based on a broad interpretation of the UN Resolution 940, which called for the establishment of "a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement."³⁷

From September 1994 to March 1995, the US-sponsored buy-back program collected over 33,000 weapons (both bought-back and seized) at a cost of $1,924,950.³⁸ Initial low turn-out was stimulated after January 1995, when prices were increased to match those on the black market.³⁹ Handguns were bought for $200, semiautomatic weapons and grenades for $400, fully automatic weapons for $800, and heavy and large caliber weapons for $1200.⁴⁰ When the immediate cash supply for the buy-back had been depleted, Haiti turned to the use of "chits" or promissory notes. The chits were also given to military personnel, who could then act as their own "disarmament units." The "chits" proved quite a successful tool, however, it was noted that it was easy to counterfeit them.⁴¹

Most of the weapons collected through the buy-back program were destroyed or disabled in Haiti by the 8th Ordnance Company, US Army. Some of these weapons, however, were shipped to Letterkenny Army Depot in Pennsylvania, USA, where they were melted down at a destruction facility, while those of historical value were handed over to Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, USA, and donated to science and technology centers and museums.⁴² Additionally, the weapons found to be in good condition were stored to equip the future Haitian police force.⁴³

Following the US withdrawal from Haiti in March 1995, the responsibility for maintaining peace and security was transferred to the United Nations Observer Mission in Haiti, UNMIH, which had no disarmament mandate. As a result, the national police undertook some disarmament measures, but never embarked on a full program of destruction which would have guaranteed demilitarization.

In the long term, it is fair to say that weapons disarmament and destruction in Haiti has failed. From the beginning, the impact of the entire buy-back program was undermined by the absence of a baseline weapons estimate prior to the start of the disarmament process, and the lack of inventory list of those weapons collected and destroyed. From the outset of international involvement in Haiti, no clear mandate regarding disarmament and destruction was enacted. Under the control of the US, the MNF disarmament process was only a partial preliminary measure, and never fully established destruction as an integrated disarmament option for Haiti. Initial efforts were only enough to secure the immediate stability of the country, and failed to remove the majority of light weapons from circulation. In addition, the reluctance of UNMIH to adopt a long-term strategy and continue the disarmament and destruction efforts initiated by the MNF indicates no attempt was made to build upon the disarmament achievements to date. Even when the UNMIH mandate was extended until 30 November 1997, destruction was not implemented in the disarmament strategy.⁴⁴ Instead, the Haiti National Police was charged with disarmament. However, Michelle Karshan, a spokesperson for the Haitian President, explained that these efforts have not been very successful, and said, "the country is still heavily armed".⁴⁵ The situation is unlikely to improve following the withdrawal of UNTMIH at the end of November. The 300-member international civilian police force recently approved by the UN Security Council (UN Police Mission to Haiti - MIPONUH) has a year-long mandate focusing on the training of the Haitian National Police.⁴⁶

Weapons collection remains the responsibility of an under-funded and inexperienced police force. It appears that little disarmament has been implemented. Consequently, the proliferation of light weapons has ensured that crime and insecurity continue to plague Haitian society.

Guatemala
The government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) signed a formal peace agreement in December 1996, ending a 36 year civil war that left 100,000 dead and a further 40,000 missing. Under the agreement, the URNG pledged to give up its weapons as part of the reconstruction process.

The UN Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) monitored the disarmament program from 3 March until 14 May 1997. Unlike UNMIH, MINUGUA began with a disarmament mandate, requiring it to oversee the "deposit, registration, and delivery to the UN of all kinds of offensive and defensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, mines, and other military equipment in URNG forces’ possession - both at hand and in mined fields or in clandestine deposits located anywhere."⁴⁷ However, MINUGUA’s authority never extended to cover destruction measures of surplus weapons.

MINUGUA’s baseline estimate of weapons held by the 3,600 former URNG combatants is derived from the URNG’s inventory of 1,818 small arms, approximately 100kg of explosives, 409 mines, and various heavy weapons.⁴⁸ While the leader of MINUGUA, French diplomat Jean Arnault, has supported this estimate, it is believed to significantly underreport the URNG’s actual weapons holdings.

Although Guatemala was one of the five participants at the Montelimar Summit, which decided that weapons collected during the disarmament processes would be destroyed in the country concerned, weapons destruction is conspicuously absent from MINUGUA’s mandate. Even after the mandate was extended on 3 April 1997, the UN did not seek to correct the omission.

The Secretary General’s Report on the MINUGUA disarmament process did not mention destruction of weapons collected, although it did describe how all mines, grenades, and other explosive devices were destroyed in situ. Provisions to guard against theft or diversion of weapons collected are detailed in the Secretary-General’s report, and reflect the obvious concern over theft and diversion of these arms.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, this concern was not deemed strong enough to warrant a policy of destruction. The following table shows the numbers of URNG weapons handed in to the military observer group.

Table 3:  Weapons and explosives handed in to MINUGUA by the URNG⁵¹

The Guatemalan Ministry of the Interior has assumed responsibility for the weapons collected, and has not implemented a policy of destruction.⁵⁰ Those in good working condition will form part of the armaments of Guatemala’s Civilian National Police (PNC), and will be used mainly to fight organized crime. Weapons collection programs have not formed a part of the Guatemalan government’s reconstruction process, although the police have been carrying out raids to confiscate weapons which are not registered under the Interior Ministry’s new more restrictive ownership laws.

The Guatemalan government’s failure to destroy the small arms collected during and after the demobilization process can be seen as the natural continuation of MINUGUA’s own policies. Had the UN mission been more forceful about destroying arms, these weapons would not have been placed under the care of the Guatemalan government. Furthermore, no precedent for destruction has been set in the country. It should also be noted that, in general, ex-combatants are less likely to have in their weapons if they believe they will be used to arm existing or new security forces. Consequently, no incentive for continuing demobilization and disarmament exists in Guatemala.

As with other Central American countries, Guatemala is experiencing increased crime and violence resulting from internal security threats and the presence of surplus weapons. There were 2,270 violent deaths reported by the National Police in Guatemala from January to October 1995.⁵² The election of President Alvaro Arzu has not remedied the situation, and the country is now experiencing a wave of kidnappings.⁵³

Conclusion
The figures presented in the four cases above demonstrate that a significant number of weapons can be removed from circulation by through destruction during the disarmament process. Certain lessons can be learned from these four cases which may facilitate the development of peace-building processes with a destruction mandate.

Lessons Learned

• UN peacekeeping missions which have not had a clear destruction mandate before the arrival of the mission have had difficulties enacting one later;

• When these mandates are not accepted and supported by the host countries’ governments as well as former warring parties and armed groups, weapons collection and destruction can be disrupted;

• Weapons collection and destruction programs should be carried out at a stage appropriate to each conflict situation. The times and purposes of each program may differ from conflict to conflict; the programs should be determined on a case by case basis;

• Where the weapons collected were used for the re-armament of security forces, former combatants had an added disincentive to hand in their weapons;

• The support of the local population was more likely when grass roots and indigenous groups were involved in weapons collection and destruction programs;

• Because of the close ties between Central American societies and the Catholic Church, the involvement of the Church in collection and destruction programs can lend validity and respectability, as well as encourage compliance;

• Even weapons collection programs which do not achieve the destruction targets anticipated can have positive psychological and sociological effects on the population.

To ensure the lessons learned from the Central American cases are followed through, peacekeeping operations should look to the recommendations of the report of the UN Panel on Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These can be cited as a justification for disarmament and destruction mandates, even if they do not prove too popular with some UN Member States.

The panel, at the end of their report, made recommendations to be carried out by the United Nations and Member States. These recommendations discuss measures to reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons in the future. The Panel suggests that destruction is one of the best tools for reducing the flow of small arms and light weapons.

"In view of the problems stemming from an excess of small arms and light weapons left over from many internal conflicts and the lessons learned from the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations… guidelines should be developed in order to assist negotiators of peace settlements in developing plans to disarm combatants, particularly as concerns light weapons, small arms, and munitions, and to include therein plans for the collection of weapons and their disposal, preferably by destruction."⁵⁴

Additionally, the Panel makes recommendations for preventing the excessive or destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons. States should "exercise restraint with respect to the transfer of the surplus of small arms and light weapons manufactured solely for the possession of and use by the military and police forces." The panel further encourages "All States should also consider the possibility of destroying all such surplus weapons."⁵⁵

The responsibility for destruction of weapons lies not only with the United Nations. Domestic legislation must be reformed to require destruction of all weapons collected through a variety of means. This is particularly important in post-conflict societies. It is important to keep in mind that "public destruction, while unable to be quantitatively measured, is an effective psychological tactic. Not only do those who turned in their guns see that they are truly being put out of commission, there is also a symbolic rejection of the norm of violence being demonstrated. A subsequent monument formed from the melted down metal can provide an effective long-term reminder."⁵⁶

The case studies bear out the validity in this statement. In the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador, the UN mandates existed and the missions fulfilled them with varying degrees of success. In Haiti, the MNF’s destruction effort realized its short term objective of securing the environment for the MNF forces, but failed to promote long-term peace and stability. In Guatemala, it is unclear whether or not the weapons collected during the demobilization process will be destroyed by the national police in accordance with the Montelimar Summit decision.

The absence of weapons destruction can be seen as either as an omission or as a deliberate policy. The United Nations missions were ill thought out and under-funded, but were also constrained by the individual countries in which they were operating. It appears that in some countries, vested interests preferred to keep the arms collected for the security forces. Admittedly, the governments of the countries examined in this study often may not have had the resources necessary to implement comprehensive destruction policies themselves. Although non-UN destruction of weapons was carried out, notably in El Salvador, this was through initiative by independent organizations rather than the governments.

In general, Central America remains a heavily-armed region. The absence of consistent disarmament and destruction policies leaves the way clear for a resurgence of violence, as weapons can be recycled and re-used in new conflicts. The Central American arms control effort should be furthered by a more constructive destruction policy, led by the UN or by national governments, which would remove these weapons from circulation once and for all. While the Montelimar Summit went some way towards mandating such a policy, universal compliance has not yet been forthcoming. It could be achieved through the implementation of a few key recommendations, listed below.

Recommendations:

• Encourage mandatory and public destruction as an element in all weapons collection efforts (eg: gun amnesties, seizures of illegal weapons) to ensure that weapons are permanently taken out of circulation.

• Recommend destruction policies as a priority within the demobilization process and peacekeeping.

• Advocate the establishment of support funds within international and regional organizations, such as the UN, the OAS and EU, for destruction efforts, including resources for training, technical assistance, and equipment.⁵⁷

• Review and ultimately improve domestic legislation in post-conflict countries to ensure that those weapons collected are destroyed.

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Endnotes

1. A "Flame of Peace" ceremony held in Timbuktu, Mali on March 27, 1996 represented the culmination of a weapons collection and destruction program that occurred in Mali at the end of the five-year internal conflict. Approximately 3,000 weapons of thousands of ex-combatants were burned in a symbolic bonfire. The majority of weapons were handguns, automatic rifles, and grenade launches. Although the disarmament process has been hailed a success, in reality, it represents only one-third of the weapons still possessed by some 10,000 rebel soldiers ("Micro-Disarmament in Africa," Disarmament Times, May, 1996).
   

2. This was the case in the "Flame of Peace" ceremony in Mali. Ex-rebels believed in the collection and destruction process as part of the legitimate peace process the country was undergoing. The success of the "Flame of Peace" ceremony made way for the "Week of Peace" held in March 1997.
   

3. Interview with Ed Laurance, 23 October, 1997.
   

4. "Montelimar Declaration" signed by the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, in Montelimar, Nicaragua, 2-3 April 1997, supplied by Carlos Walker, Arias Foundation, Costa Rica.
   

5. "Declaration on the Reacquisition of Illicit Arms From Civilians in Central America" signed by the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Prime Minister of Belize, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 28 January 1997, supplied by Carlos Walker, Arias Foundation, Costa Rica.
   

6. Paulo S. Wrobel, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador, UNIDIR (Geneva: UN, 1996), p. 29.
   

7. Ibid., p. 31.
   

8. Wrobel, op cit., p.29.
   

9. Includes Ak-47s and other assault rifles, rifles, and light machine guns.
   

10. "Arms Cache in Nicaragua Casts a Long Shadow", New York Times, 22 March 1997.
    

11. Wrobel, op cit., p. 22.
    

12. Central America Update, bulletin, 30 April 1997.
    

13. Ed Laurance and Sarah Meek, "Brief 7: The New Field of Micro-Disarmament," Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996, p.84.
    

14. Ibid., p.84.
    

15. Michael Renner, "Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament," Worldwatch Institute, October 1997, p. 53 and Laurance, op cit., p. 85.
    

16. Laurance, op cit., p. 85 as quoted in Julie Conroy, "Weapons Collection Programs in Central America," Seminar Paper, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1997, p. 8.
    

17. Adam Isacson, Altered States: Security and Demilitarization in Central America (Washington, DC :Center for International Policy and The Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, 1997), p. 142.
    

18. "Nicaragua: rearmed groups", Central America Update, 14 June 1997.
    

19. Conroy, op cit., p. 8.
    

20. "Honduran military fights crime", Central America Update, 26 April 1997.
    

21. Isacson, op cit., p. 137.
    

22. Ibid., p. 136.
    

23. Wrobel, op cit., p. 131.
    

24. Ibid., p.124. This source suggests 5,000-8,000 combatants, but refers to the figure of 10,000 in The Military Balance 1986-87 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987).
    

25. Wrobel, op cit., p.134.
    

26. Ibid., p. 137.
    

27. Julie Conroy, "El Moviemento Patriotica Contra la Delincuencia: Voluntary Weapons Collection Program in El Salvador", working paper, Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 30 April 1997, p. 6.
    

28. Central American News, posted September 30,1996.
    

29. "MPCD: Patriotic Movement Against Crime in El Salvador, Presented to the Regional Workshop on Light Weapons in Central America", 16-18 September,1997, as translated by the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies, p. 7.
    

30. Central American News, posted September 30,1996.
    

31. "Murders Soar in El Salvador Since Devastating War’s End," Washington Post, 1 October 1997.
    

32. Isacson, op cit., p. 122.
    

33. Ibid., p. 122 and Laurance, op cit., p.60.
    

34. Isacson, op cit., p. 122.
    

35. Study by the Organizacion Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), cited in ‘El Salvador: El Mas Violento de America Latina’ in Dialogo Centroamericano, September 1997, p.5.
    

36. The Governors Island Accord of July 1993 was signed by the President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the chief commander of the Haitian armed forces, Raoul Cedras, under the auspices of UN/OAS. The Port-au-Prince Agreement was signed in September 1994 by former President Carter and Lt. Gen. Cedras.
    

37. Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti, UNIDIR (Geneva: UN, 1996), p. 21.
    

38. Laurance, op cit., p. 84. Once participation in the buy-backs had waned, US troops also seized illegally held weapons.
    

39. Ibid. p.84.
    

40. Mendiburu and Meek, op cit., p. 24.
    

41. Neil O’Connor , "Buy-Back Programs as and Instrument of Micro-Disarmament: Observations from Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic," Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies, January 1996, p. 5.
    

42. It is important to note here that the Letterkenny Army Depot authorities kept no inventory records of the destruction process.
    

43. Mendiburu and Meek, op cit., p. 63.
    

44. Ibid., p. 26. UNMIH was originally extended until 31 July 1997. The name of the mission then changed to the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), with an extended mandate until 30 November 1997.
    

45. Telephone interview with Ms. Karshan, 23 July 1997.
    

46. "UN Council approves police "SWAT" team for Haiti", Reuters, 28 November 1997.
    

47. "Daily Publishes Text of Oslo Peace Agreement," in Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE, FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-LAT-96-237.
    

48. "UN Monitors Disarmament in Guatemala," Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 12, 1997, p. 14.
    

49. "Report of the Secretary General on the Group of Military Observers Attached to MINUGUA", United Nations, S/1997/432, 4 June 1997, Paragraph C/21.
    

50. Ibid., Annexes III and IV.
    

51. "Guatemala Peace Process", Central America Update, 26 April 1997.
    

52. Isacson, op cit., p. 129.
    

53. Ibid. p.129.
    

54. "General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms: Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms", A/52/298, (New York: United Nations, 27 August, 1997), Paragraphs 79 d & i.
    

55. Ibid., Paragraph 80e.
    

56. Conroy, "Weapons Collection Programs in Central America", op cit., p. 13.
    

57. Such initiatives could be publicly funded and privately run. For example, a British company recently made a proposal for a weapons smelter in Namibia to the European Union and the UK government.

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