BASIC PAPERS

DECEMBER 1997 • NUMBER 23 • ISSN 1353-0402

Africa:  The Challenge of Light Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping Operations 

Executive Summary
With ninety percent of the world’s low-intensity wars in the 1990s taking place in Africa, the continent has become the epicentre of intrastate conflict. In addition to violence, these conflicts often entail other lasting consequences, such as the breakdown of civil order and dramatic increases in lawlessness, banditry and illicit drug trafficking. The proliferation of light weapons, particularly small arms, in the region plays an enabling role not only in the execution of war, but also in the ills associated with it.¹ Although efforts by the international community to resolve conflicts in Africa have involved the demobilisation of soldiers and the integration of belligerent forces into unified national armies and civilian life, in most cases, the actual disarming of combatants has been at best half-hearted. With strategies for comprehensive collection and destruction of weapons either conspicuously absent or severely limited in scope, the weapons that facilitate and often exacerbate conflict have returned to circulation. Thus the weapons of one war are simply recycled to the next. Until peace and disarmament processes begin to address these issues effectively, the cycle of violence is likely to continue.

Nonetheless, the United Nations has taken come steps towards the inclusion of weapons destruction in peacekeeping mandates. The UN Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraph 1 of resolution 50/70 B of the General Assembly adopted on 12 December 1995, appointed a panel of governmental experts to prepare a report on the "nature and causes of the accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons", as well as on "ways and means to prevent and reduce their excessive and destabilising accumulation and transfer, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict.^" With reference to Africa, the report identified the uncontrolled availability of small arms and light weapons as "not only fuelling conflicts but also exacerbating violence and criminality." In paragraph 79 (4) of its recommendations, the panel called for the development of plans to disarm combatants during peace settlements, and for the inclusion "therein plans for weapons collection and their disposal, preferably by destruction."²

Through an analysis of arms management during and after conflict in Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Mali and Liberia, this paper looks at the lessons learnt about weapons collection and destruction. These case studies demonstrate that efforts to find enduring solutions to conflicts tend to concentrate on a reactive, fire-brigade approach as opposed to proactive measures aimed at preventing the breakout of hostilities. It is also clear that in times of fragile peace, the easy availability of light weapons has severely undermined peace efforts by jeopardising negotiations and contributing to the continuation of hostilities. This report argues that the collection and destruction of light weapons have not been sufficiently prioritised in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa. The evidence it presents makes a strong case for ensuring that strategies for effective weapons collection and destruction are incorporated in future disarmament policies as one means of securing a peaceful and stable security environment.

This paper also offers recommendations for incorporating weapons collection and destruction into conflict resolution programmes, improving and expanding weapons destruction initiatives, and applying successful models for integrated conflict resolution. It also argues that the Malian experiment in peacemaking, modified to suit local conditions in other conflict zones of Africa, would contribute significantly to ending conflicts and achieving lasting peace on the continent. However, the evidence from these case studies should not be viewed solely in the African context. Rather, in response to growing concerns about the dangers of light weapons proliferation world-wide, this analysis can inform future peace efforts in all conflict regions, as a similar BASIC paper on destruction in Central America shows.³

Introduction
The ease of light weapons acquisition and diffusion within and across borders has added a dangerous dimension to intra-state conflicts in Africa. The growing number of small arms in circulation not only diminishes the prospects of ending on-going civil wars, but also increases the probability of new conflicts breaking out. Light weapons are cheap, easy to operate, reliable and mobile, favouring their use in low-intensity wars. In spite of the fact that overwhelmingly, light weapons are the weapon of choice in African civil wars, there is no consensus on prioritising their collection and destruction in the course of peacekeeping operations. In many instances, major weapons have been given priority in terms of collection. The reasons for this, and the consequences are analysed in this study. In contrast, destruction was pursued more vigorously in Central America, where conflict had been endemic during the eighties and early nineties. Although destruction was not part of the original United Nations mandates in the disarmament operations, later initiatives in across the region recognised the value of destruction as a policy option in isolation.⁴

Demilitarisation and Destruction
More often than not, the post-conflict demilitarisation processes in Africa were not carried to their conclusion. To fully succeed, demilitarisation during peacekeeping operations should dismantle the physical instruments of violence, and as such must include from cease-fire monitoring, disarming of combatants, disbanding of informal armed groups, and the collection and destruction of weapons. In peacekeeping missions, collection and destruction of weapons, particularly vital for sustainable peace, has often been overlooked or carried out unsystematically. Factors inhibiting the effectiveness of these disarmament efforts include:

• Inadequate mandate and/or insufficient resources for operations (e.g. Angola, Liberia).

• Absence of an inclusive atmosphere (a multi-track approach) before the deployment of peacekeeping forces (e.g. Somalia and Angola).⁵

• Lack of impartiality, fairness and firmness of peace brokers (e.g. in Somalia).

• Failure to adopt a so-called "Security First" approach in which demilitarisation is accompanied by a socio-economic package to assist societal reintegration and address the root causes of conflict.⁶

In many instances, such as Mozambique, peacekeeping forces have managed to collect a sizeable number of light weapons in the course of their work. However, instead of destroying these weapons, they are often handed over to restructured national armies. This has occurred even when enough weapons and ammunition have been collected to arm the new security forces many times over.⁷ In post-conflict societies, when institutions are still fragile, and the population vulnerable, these weapons often return to circulation through theft from armouries or black market trade. The weapons soon fall into the hands of criminal sub-state elements, or are smuggled across borders, exporting violence to neighbouring states. Only destruction can ensure that weapons and ammunition will be taken permanently out of circulation and will not be recycled to a new conflict.

In past decades, efforts of varying intensity have been made to halt many of the civil wars plaguing Africa, with mixed results. Bodies that have undertaken conflict resolution and peace building activities in Africa at different times include the United nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), as well as various sub-regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-Governmental Agency For Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC. Individual nations have also played a mediation role. So far, these efforts have produced mixed results. In cases such as Mali and, to some extent, Mozambique, where significant resources and political will have been invested in attempts to comprehensively remove light weapons from circulation, hopes of eventual and sustainable peace are higher. In contrast, in Somalia and Angola, where a combination of factors has prevented the collection and destruction of weapons during peacekeeping operations, stable peace has remained elusive.

The case studies below examine destruction efforts in Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Mali and Liberia. They provide strong arguments to support the claim that the inability to pursue destruction thoroughly has significantly hampered the long-term reconstruction of civil society. The studies likewise support the conclusion that destruction can significantly reduce the levels of guns in circulation. It must, however, be pursued with consistency and real attention to the post-demobilisation prospects of combatants, requiring concerted political will and a tangible commitment to the provision of adequate resources for destruction.

Somalia
The easy availability of light weapons in the Horn of Africa and the deliberate arming of civilians in Mogadishu by President Siad Barre in the last days of his rule were among the factors responsible for the escalation of conflict and the implosion of the Somali state in 1991. Between 1972 and 1990, Presidents Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia imported $18 billion worth of weapons and ammunitions between them into the Horn of Africa.⁸ These imports were dictated by the need to arm their military, to meet the contingencies of the Cold War proxy war between the two states, on the one hand, and to suppress internal opposition in both countries, on the other. Most of these weapons have circulated in and around Somalia since the outbreak of its internal conflict.⁹ By mid-1990, Siad Barre’s regime had been put under sustained pressure by armed militias fighting to overthrow the dictatorship. Prominent among these politico-military groups were the Somali National Movement (SNM) based in the north, and the United Somali Congress (USC) in the south. The leadership of the USC split, with General Farah Aideed forming the Somali National Alliance (SNA). General Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi of USC soon emerged as the main protagonists in the civil war, warlords of the two principal clans vying for control of Somalia.

In a bid to save his falling regime, General Siad Barre indiscriminately armed the population of the capital, Mogadishu, before eventually fleeing the country in January 1991. Mohamed Sahnoun, then Special Representative of UN Secretary-General in Somalia, put the number of weapons circulating in Mogadishu at over half a million.¹⁰ Any peace efforts in Somalia necessarily had to take these factors - the violent struggle for state power and the level and destabilising role of light weapons in the country - into account.

The UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia began with Security Council resolution 733 of 23 January 1992, which called for a cease-fire, permitted a relief operation and began the search for a political settlement.¹¹ In March 1992, the leaders of the two main factions signed a cease-fire agreement. In August, the United Nations authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force of 3,800 Blue Helmets (UNOSOM I). Disarmament was emphasised as the primary reason for intervention in Somalia. UNOSOM I initiated a "food for arms" policy to collect weapons from the civilian population. However, the mission soon ran into difficulties, first with relief organisations for offering incentives in return for arms, and secondly with General Aideed himself, who maintained his faction had not been adequately on the UN intervention. Aideed also accused the UN of favouring his rival, Ali Mahdi, after a UN-hired plane had apparently delivered military equipment to troops loyal to Ali Mahdi, and consequently refused to co-operate.¹² The humanitarian situation worsened as a consequence. Naturally, the UNOSOM operation, and along with it collection of weapons, had to be suspended.

As a result, by resolution 794 of December 1992, the UN Security Council replaced UNOSOM with a US-led non-Blue Helmet task force, UNITAF, made up of 37,000 multi-national troops.¹³ Unlike UNOSOM, disarmament was not stipulated as an element of the UNITAF mandate. However, the Rules of Engagement for UNITAF required troops "...to use all necessary force to disarm individuals in areas under its control", thus allowing troops to apply a form of coercive disarmament.¹⁴ The collection of weapons was not a conscious UNITAF policy but rather a response to the emergence of anarchy in Mogadishu. As a result, disarmament was inconsistent and unsystematic. As the operation unfolded, a number of weapons collection methods were tried, including confiscation and a "food for guns" policy based on the "guns for cash" model that had been used in Panama in 1990.

In addition to an absence of disarmament policy, or maybe precisely because of it, UNITAF committed serious errors in its operations that further undermined the disarmament efforts. In particular, when UNITAF singled out General Aideed and his militias as the villains, and targeted them for coercive disarmament, it shed its cloak of neutrality, making impartial disarmament impossible. As the situation rapidly deteriorated, UNITAF had no option but to pull out. Nevertheless, an inventory was made of those weapons which had been collected and stored. UNITAF transferred control of these stored weapons to the various factions in the conflict, demanding only the right to inspection by UNITAF and UNOSOM forces.¹⁵ It then handed over the Somali operation to a new UN Force and began to pull out in May 1993.

The second UN Peacekeeping Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) officially took over the Somali operation from UNITAF in May 1993 following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 814 on 26 March 1993, approving a transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. A contingent of about 18,000 multinational troops was deployed. The tasks of UNOSOM II included securing and maintaining a register of small arms seized from all unauthorised armed elements in Somalia. The Security Council Resolution "mandated UNOSOM II, among other duties, to disarm and demobilise troops, collecting weapons and destroying those that were considered unsuitable for a new Somali army."¹⁶ Cantonments were established for the storage of collected heavy weapons, along with temporary accommodation for the factional forces while they turned in their small arms and registered for future reintegration. Inventories were kept by UNOSOM troop units for their individual sectors.

There was no systematic approach to weapons collection as part of the peacekeeping mission. Given the volatile nature of the Somali situation and Aideed’s uncooperative stance in particular, UNOSOM officials were reluctant to exacerbate the fragile situation by insisting on weapons surrender. In fact UNOSOM II troops were instructed not to make the collection of light weapons a priority.¹⁷ A culture of violence and impunity flourished, as elements of the Somali factions resorted to banditry and terror against the local population with a plentiful supply weapons, which they could now overtly display. Similarly, according to some peacekeepers in Somalia, weapons were destroyed, but on a strictly ad hoc basis. For example, weapons collected in one area of Somalia, Baidoa, were actually destroyed, but it appears that this approach was never extended to other areas. In other sectors, UN troops offered cash as a reward for weapons or information leading to the discovery of weapons caches, apparently with some success.¹⁸ On 13 and 14 June 1995, UNOSOM II destroyed two clandestine weapons and ammunition sites within the Aideed stronghold in retaliation for an ambush on Pakistani peacekeepers.¹⁹ There is, however, no official record of the number of weapons that were collected or destroyed. This is probably because the Somali warlords effectively controlled the cantonments, while UNOSOM troops used aerial bombardments to destroy suspected clandestine arms depots, leaving no opportunity for record taking.

Because the operation to collect weapons was based on consent and co-operation with the warlords, whenever the factions could neither reach an agreement nor honour previous agreements, demobilisation began to falter.²⁰ Incidents such as the aforementioned attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers and the October 1993 US Rangers gunship battle with the Somali factions dramatically increased the political and human costs of UN involvement. This led to the termination of UN involvement in the country in March 1995. Consequently, militias regained control of Somalia, which soon descended once more into carnage.

The UN peacekeeping operation was a catalogue of errors. Given the proliferation of light weapons in Somalia, it is difficult to explain why a clear mandate for disarmament was conspicuously absent, and why UNOSOM-UNITAF had to apply reactive methods for weapons collection. One possible reason was the absence of consensus within Somalia and the Horn of Africa on the peace process. The Somali operation eloquently demonstrated that adequate consultation within an inclusive atmosphere that allows inputs from diverse players is a sine qua non for successful peace management and disarmament. UNOSOM demonstrated that UN peacekeepers are not suited for operations in a non-permissive environment requiring coercive disarmament. The limited involvement of Somalia’s neighbouring states in the process also diminished the ability of peacekeepers to control the flow of weapons across Somalia’s porous borders, thus undermining any weapons collection efforts. In the end, these factors, combined with a complete lack of knowledge about the psychological mindset of the population and the cultural imperatives of the theatre of relief intervention, doomed "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia. It seems that these lessons were only partially taken into account by the UN in its next operation in Angola.

Angola
The end of the Cold War created favourable conditions for initiating a peace process in the Angolan civil war between the Marxist-Leninist Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola (MPLA) government and the anti-Communist rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The peace treaty ending the 16-year war, "Acordos de Paz para Angola," or the Bicesse Accords, was signed in Lisbon on 31 May 1991. It provided for a cease-fire, the disarming and demobilisation of combatants, the establishment of an integrated and impartial national army drawing troops from both factions, and the organisation of free and fair elections. Little attention was paid to the collection of weapons and no provision was made for their destruction. The Bicesse Accords granted the United Nations only an observer status. The Security Council approved the surprisingly limited UN mandate and, on 30 May 1991, agreed to set up a monitoring unit, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) made up of just over 500 military, police and election observers. The ratio of UNAVEM II personnel to population was 1:16,000. By comparison, just two years previously in Namibia, a state one tenth the size of Angola with a more established infrastructure, the ratio of UNTAG personnel to population was 1:150.²¹

The cease-fire initially appeared to be holding, until the MPLA won the general elections held in September 1992. When UNITA rejected the results and effectively pulled out of the peace process, the presence of the under-resourced UNAVEM II did little to prevent the nation from sliding back into a bloody civil war. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, then UN Secretary-General, later admitted that restricting the UN's mandate to verification duties meant that it was impossible to prevent what he called the "...drift to non-compliance." Not until a year after the breakdown of the treaty, and a stalemate in the renewed war, did the UN make fresh attempts to revive the peace accords, culminating in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. This time, UNAVEM was entrusted with the supervisory role. "Demobilisation" of combatants under the protocol was later amended to "demilitarisation,^" thus broadening the agenda to include the surrender and destruction of weapons.

New weapons continued remained easily available in Somalia, in spite of the arms embargoes. The "Triple Zero" clause in the Bicesse Accord had prohibited the transfer of fresh weapons to either faction in the conflict. The Lusaka Protocol reinforced this clause by prohibiting the re-supplying of MPLA and UNITA forces with "any military equipment, lethal or otherwise." The international community also imposed sanctions on UNITA. Despite these measures, weapons continued to pour into Angola. Conservative estimates put the number of light weapons circulating in Angola at 2 million; weapons are so cheap one can acquire a rifle for as little as the price of a second-hand shirt.²² Both factions in Angola had access to oil and diamonds, which could be converted into the cash necessary to procure weaponry. According to Human Rights Watch/Africa, De Beers admitted spending $500 million to buy legally and illegally mined diamonds from Angola in 1992 alone.²³ MPLA continued to receive weaponry from eastern Europe. For example in 1994, a cargo ship that was impounded at the British port of Plymouth was discovered to be carrying 4 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition for AK47 rifles from the Czech Republic and Russia for MPLA.²⁴ Other suppliers of weapons and ammunition included Brazil, North Korea, Israel, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. UNITA continued to procure weapons in the black and grey markets, using the former Zaire and Congo Brazzaville as the main conduits for diamond and arms smuggling in and out of UNITA-controlled zones in Angola. According to UN sources, in July 1997 alone, 120 flights from Congo-Brazzaville and elsewhere in the region were spotted landing at airstrips in UNITA-controlled zones of Angola, but UN observers were denied access for inspection.²⁵

In February 1995, the UN Security Council agreed to mount a new peacekeeping operation, setting up a significantly strengthened UN verification mission (UNAVEM III) made up of a military contingent of 7,000. More resources were promised for retraining and resettling demobilised combatants and restoring infrastructure. Fifteen quartering sites were set up for disarming, integrating and demobilising combatants. On 19 October 1996 the UN Secretary-General’s special representative in Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, stated that "as of 17 October 1996, 63,704 UNITA troops had been registered in the quartering areas, but 13,476 had deserted leaving 49,658...,of whom 11,322 had been selected to join the unified national army."²⁶ The majority of quartered UNITA troops were either "child soldiers", non-combatant villagers with unserviceable weapons who had been forcibly rounded-up, or logisticians. They reported unarmed or with unusable weapons.

On 11 October 1996, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali warned that "only 28,762 personal weapons and 3,969 crew-served weapons, the overall quality of which was low, had been surrendered by UNITA."²⁷ The majority of UNITA troops, retaining their higher quality weapons, remained at large. UNAVEM III, in spite of its enlarged size and mandate, was still incapable of enforcing compliance with the Protocol largely because there did not seem to be the will on the part of the factions, more so UNITA, to submit to the peace process.

Since February 1997, a number of events have occurred that have cast further doubts on the prospects of maintaining the momentum of the peace effort. In February, UNAVEM III, considering its work largely done, pulled out the bulk of its troops, leaving a much reduced force of 2,650. Meanwhile, the remaining token UN mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), is helpless to enforce any disarmament. In November 1997, a UN spokesman in Angola, David Wimhurst, admitted that there had been very little progress at all on demobilisation and disarmament.²⁸

Efforts by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to complement the efforts of the UN have also met with frustration. On 2 October 1996, a SADC summit was held in Lusaka, Zambia, in an attempt to salvage the peace process. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, refused to attend. Angered by the snub and UNITA’s intransigence, the Heads of State despatched a high level delegation to New York to urge the Security Council to impose sanctions on UNITA.²⁹ Since then UNITA has become even more isolated as the international community has tightened sanctions against it, including travel bans on its officials. The UN-sponsored bans are intended to halt the supply of weapons to UNITA, which have been funnelled into Angola throughout 1997 from a number of African nations.³⁰

Compared to similar operations in Mali or Mozambique, the UN disarmament efforts in Angola have been a catalogue of missed opportunities. Before the high-profile international community’s peace initiatives, there had been no local or regional initiatives to ensure confidence-building between the warring factions to narrow their differences, as occurred in Mali. That serious thought was not given to, and counter-measures not taken against the unrestricted access to vast riches by UNITA, likewise undermined peace efforts. It is also disappointing that adequate resources were not sanctioned to enable UNAVEM to effectively and creatively apply the carrot and stick approach in Angola. Such an approach would have prevented the situation spiralling out of control, and strengthened the weapons collection capacity of UNAVEM. In the event, collection and destruction of weapons were never central to UN involvement in Angola, and UNAVEM was reduced to merely reacting to events as dictated by the warring factions. The unhindered flow of weapons into Angola has also rendered the consolidation of any fragile peace more difficult. Until this is checked through a viable regional consensus, and an effective mechanism is put in place to collect and destroy the large quantities of weapons already circulating, ensuring a sustainable peace will remain problematic. The overthrow of President Mobutu, a long time ally of Savimbi, in former Zaire and the new consensus developing among some of the leaders of southern and central Africa (Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo Brazzaville, South Africa, Mozambique and Rwanda) offer new opportunities to block weapons flow into Angola.

Mozambique
In many ways, the Mozambican civil war mirrored that in Angola. The conflict involved two main protagonists - the ruling leftist Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) supported by the Communist world, and the right-wing guerrilla opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), nurtured and sustained by former Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Light weapons were the most commonly used in the conflict. FRELIMO distributed 1.5 million assault rifles to the population for self-help during the war. Some estimates suggest that six million AK47s were in circulation in 1995.³¹

By December 1988, after twelve years of fighting, it had become clear to both sides that neither could claim an outright victory. Talks facilitated by the Community of Sant' Egidio (a Catholic lay organisation with headquarters in Italy) established a partial cease-fire that later led to the General Peace Agreement of 1992. With hindsight of its failures in Angola to guide it, the UN decided there could be no elections in Mozambique before total disarmament. The UN's peacekeeping mission to Mozambique, ONUMOZ, was given a four-fold mandate, the military part of which empowered ONUMOZ to "monitor and verify the cease-fire, the demobilisation of forces, the collection, storage and destruction of weapons."³²

The UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (UNOHAC) was created to take charge of the humanitarian dimensions of ONUMOZ’s demilitarisation mandate. Among its tasks were the provision of food and health-care needs to the Assembly Areas, transportation of demobilised troops and their dependants, and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. This represented a more integrated approach, dealing with some root causes of conflict and instability.

The United Nations had hoped to complete the weapons verification process before the October 1994 elections. ONUMOZ officials were able to visit 744 sites before the elections successfully took place between 27 and 29 October 1994.³³ However, ONUMOZ faced a dilemma in its operation: the General Peace Agreement failed to negotiate an arms embargo on Mozambique. This, according to Glenn Oosthuysen, led to "a farcical situation where the UN was implementing disarmament whilst arms were still being brought in by both RENAMO and FRELIMO." When they were transferred to new posts, FRELIMO troops were supplied with fresh weapons without handing in or recording any old arms. During the demobilisation, a soldier could surrender one set of weapons while keeping others.³⁴

Due to a lack of time, initial restrictions on the range of competence of ONUMOZ, and the unwillingness by the parties in conflict to submit all sites to inspection, ONUMOZ was unable to complete its verification tasks. According to the UN secretary General, "ONUMOZ Collected from the military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population, a total of 189,827 weapons. A limited amount of arms, ammunition and explosives was destroyed, while the remainder was transferred to the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM)".³⁵ The military equipment surrendered by demobilised troops was transferred and stored in three regional depots secured by armed ONUMOZ infantry battalions. The figures on military equipment collected and registered during the verification are shown in the table below.

Table 1: Military equipment collected during the verification phase⁴¹

As the figures in the table above indicates, the number, and quality, of weapons surrendered were below expectations, suggesting that many more weapons were being held in caches. Though ONUMOZ had sufficient personnel and a clear mandate, only a very small amount of weapons collected - those considered too dangerous to move - were destroyed in situ.³⁶ Material deemed to be beyond repair was to be destroyed, but a UN study concluded that disposal of this equipment at any of the metal foundries was uneconomical. In 1993, a $52.5 million request by ONUMOZ officials to fund the disarmament was rejected by the UN in New York as too expensive.³⁷ In the end, instead of comprehensive destruction, all movable weapons collected were handed over to the government to further equip an already overarmed army.

The consequences of this failure to take weapons out of circulation through destruction were felt beyond the Mozambican border. After the peace agreement in Mozambique, a boomerang effect occurred whereby weapons supplied to Mozambican rebels (and also Angolan rebels) by the South African apartheid regime were then smuggled back across the border and sold to sub-state elements in South Africa. According to Superintendent Henning Brand, South Africa’s National Firearms Co-ordinator, an illicit weapons market in Angola is opening up as local gunrunners "finetune their operations to Gauteng and Western Cape (in South Africa) before too many competitors move in".³⁸ These illicit weapons fuel criminality and the so-called "Taxi Wars" between rival taxi operators in South Africa. To counter this development, police units in the region are teaming up in joint operations. The Firearms Unit of the South African Police and Mozambican Police joined forces in July 1995 in a unique co-operation exercise to recover and destroy weapons along their common border. In the first operation and second operations in 1995 codenamed "Operation Rachel I" and "Operation Rachel II," the joint action located and destroyed 45 arms caches. "Operation Rachel III," the third operation carried out in July-August 1997, proved the most successful. According to Reg Crewe, Director of the South African Police Detective Service, tip-offs and intelligence sources led them to uncover and destroy more than 500 tons of military hardware. These included 5,500 machine guns and automatic rifles including 1,177 AK47 rifles, about 80 pistols, over 500 anti-personnel mines, 330 hand grenades with 750 detonators, over 3,700 mortar bombs, 79 rocket and mortar launchers, over 2,300 projectiles, 13 cannons, about 3 million rounds of ammunition and 3,700 magazines for rifles.³⁹ After the elections in October 1994, and with pressure from the international community, ONUMOZ was able to engage more actively in clearing and destroying some more weapons caches. The new Mozambican police also played an active role in uncovering arms caches. In 1996 alone, the Mozambican Police uncovered and destroyed 32 clandestine arsenals in the Mocuba district in the central Mozambican province of Zambezia.⁴⁰ The police said there may be as many as 100 hidden arsenals in the region.

Weapons collection programmes in Mozambique have primarily been successful because they have overcome substantial popular barriers to support. The policy of weapons destruction has been instrumental in this development. The Mozambican population, war weary and eager to receive agricultural supplies such as basic tool kits and seeds in exchange for information on the whereabouts of light weapons, has been co-operative in weapons collection. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the general public, although initially suspicious about destruction initiatives, and fearing that collected weapons would be re-circulated by the military and police to supplement their meagre wages, supported the destruction initiatives undertaken by international organisations. According to Alex Vines of Human Rights Watch/Africa, local communities have been known to place landmines, light weapons and ammunition by the road if they know a humanitarian organisation or a mine clearing group is in the vicinity.⁴² Thus the local community is depleting secret arms caches, but they still will not hand weapons over to the local police. The churches and other civil institutions in Mozambique, realising the damaging effects of arms on post-conflict reconstruction, are also playing a key role in supporting the collection and destruction of weapons.⁴³

The collection and destruction component of the Mozambican peace process can be considered a partial success. There has been no renewal of prolonged fighting since the general elections. The operation started by ONUMOZ to rid the country of small arms has continued, with the active participation of civil society and joint action by the police forces in the region. Similar to the Malian case (see next section), an unofficial body, in this case the church, has undertaken a facilitating role in bringing the parties together for talks. The local community, church groups and NGOs have been active and influential in the recovery and destruction of arms caches since the elections. As a result of the successful "Operation Rachel" initiative, concrete sub-regional co-operation to uncover illegal weapons and stop cross-border arms trafficking is picking up pace in southern Africa. A network for co-operation involving the police of South Africa, Swaziland and Namibia is taking shape with the view to "increasing the detection of dealing in illegal firearms and increasing co-operation with foreign agencies to check cross-border flow of illegal weapons".

Despite the many successful aspects of the Mozambican case, there remains much room for improvement. It is disappointing that the opportunity to comprehensively destroy light weapons as part of a UN mandate existed, but was never fully realised.⁴⁴ The relative success of the disarmament process in Mozambique is also hampered by the many destabilising illegal arms caches that do remain. However, much like the Malian case, the multi-dimensional approach to the problem, incorporating the range of internal actors, supported by regional and international co-operation, appears to be an effective formula for the recovery and destruction of weapons, and may provide a model for other conflict zones in Africa.

Mali
In Mali, the destruction of collected weapons was an integral part of the peace agreement between the government and a coalition of Tuareg rebels fighting for autonomy. The democratic process in Mali, culminating in successful elections in 1992, paved the way for a non-military solution to the armed rebellion that had been continuing since June 1990. The Malian authorities relied on quiet diplomacy to start the peace process, and traditional community-based organisations (and later the Algerian government), as medium of dialogue in the conflict. The international community was not involved in this initial confidence-building stage of the process.

The conflict was brought to a close in April 1992 when the government signed a peace accord, Le Pacte National with the Tuareg rebels, known as Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de l’Azaouad (MFUA). A co-ordinating structure, Commissariat au Nord, was set up to oversee the implementation of the agreement. In December 1993, recognising the threat to the peace process posed by the continued circulation of small arms, President Konare requested assistance from then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali to locate and curb the flow of small arms in Mali.

In January 1995, the Secretary-General submitted a report of the UN fact-finding mission to the Malian government. Reiterating the country’s own concerns, the mission’s report concluded that the problem of illicit light weapons proliferation in Mali was significant. The mission’s report also outlined two main conclusions that would serve as the basis for a disarmament strategy in Mali. First, that dealing with the problem required a regional approach involving Mali’s neighbouring states. Second, that a socio-economic package addressing the wider issue of security had to accompany the collection and destruction of weapons, if the latter was to succeed. Meeting this objective would require "a proportional and integrated approach to disarmament and security,^" which came to be known as the "Security First" approach.

Following these recommendations, the United Nations initiated a dual-track integrated approach that was to be viewed as central to the peace agreement. The programme consciously integrated disarmament and development, while also outlining a division of labour. Whilst the UN Secretariat took steps to enhance security by tracking light weapons, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), individual governments and non-governmental organisations addressed key underlying causes of conflict and poverty. These included developmental issues - tackling the problem of drought, providing potable water, restoring the health delivery system and infrastructure. The peace agreement likewise created "Transitional District Colleges" to handle decentralisation questions, which culminated in conferring a "special autonomous status" on the northern rebel territories. Le Pacte National was based on goodwill and required a voluntary approach to the surrender of weapons.⁴⁵

By March 1996, a total of 2,700 light weapons had been collected. The weapons, 95% of which were in good working condition, included rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns and pistols. On 27 March 1996, the collected weapons were destroyed in a spectacular bonfire at the "Flame of Peace" ceremony in Timbuktu, and the melted remains of weapons were used to create a peace monument.⁴⁶ The Director of the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, described the Malian peace process as "one of the great success stories of the UN," emphasising that the burning of the weapons was an act of "political courage on the part of both the government and MFUA."⁴⁷ The ceremony also made a significant impression on a society where bearing a weapon is considered a symbol of manhood and a source of pride.

In total, 3,000 rebels were completely disarmed of individual or collective weapons. By mid-September 1997, all of the almost 12,000 combatants declared by the rebel groups at the beginning of the peace process had either been absorbed into the national security network, or resettled in the civilian domain. Of these 2,090 were integrated into the armed forces, 300 into the paramilitary corps (Police, Customs, Forest and Water Guards) and 150 into the Public Service. In all, 9,509 demobilised troops were offered grants to go into non-military individual or co-operative ventures, through a UNDP Trust Fund.⁴⁸ The US, Norway, The Netherlands and Canada contributed almost $2 million to the Fund, while France provided bilateral assistance. Below is a table showing the breakdown of the demobilisation, weapons collection and destruction programmes:

Table 2: Mali: Demobilisation, Weapons Collection and Destruction⁴⁹

The Malian experience demonstrates the significant potential of an inclusive approach to conflict resolution. The involvement of grassroots organisations in seeking solutions to conflict started the entire process, with traditional community based structures, including eminent elders and women, playing a confidence-building role. Secondly, the regional approach brought states like Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger into the framework, ensuring that the routes of new arms supplies were blocked. Without this, the whole destruction process would have been undermined. Third, the root causes of the conflict, issues of structural instability, were addressed concurrently with the disarmament process, providing a strong foundation for sustainable peace. Finally and most significantly, the decision to destroy collected weapons in a bonfire instead of returning them to the national armoury was a gesture of both practical and symbolical significance.

Liberia
The peacekeeping operation undertaken in Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the first attempt at such an endeavour by a regional grouping. The Liberian civil war that began in mid-1990 was a the result of the failure of the state, and, at its peak, involved as many as six factions fighting to seize state power. The proliferation of light weapons in the country was an enabling factor in a prolonging a particularly sanguine war. ECOWAS intervened in Liberia for a number of reasons, most notably the spill-over effect of the conflict. The sub-regional leaders feared that the influx of refugees into neighbouring states would add to the strain on their already fragile economies. Worse still, there was the real danger that weapons and violence from the war would be exported across borders, as was later borne out in the Sierra Leonean civil war.⁵⁰ Finally, the peak of the war coincided with the Persian Gulf War. With the United Nations and United States for the most part otherwise occupied, the initiative naturally passed to ECOWAS.

Disarmament was placed at the heart of the mandate of the peacekeeping force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Article 1(2) of the ECOWAS decision establishing ECOMOG stated that all factions would surrender their arms and ammunition to the custody of ECOMOG, and refrain from importing or acquiring all types of arms and ammunition.⁵¹

ECOMOG’s "Operation Liberty" to restore peace in Liberia began in August 1990, with a series of consultations with faction leaders in a confidence building process. As a sign of goodwill, representatives of factions were requested to give up their weapons when attending meetings. In September 1990, Prince Johnson’s break-away Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) faction took advantage of the situation and ambushed, captured, tortured and later murdered the beleaguered Liberian president, Samuel Doe. As a result of this incident, as well as the inability of ECOMOG troops to be on top of the deteriorating security situation in Monrovia, the ECOMOG commander, Brigadier Arnold Quainoo, was replaced. His successor, General Joshua Dogonyaro, immediately abandoned ECOMOG’s conciliatory posture, and scrapped the voluntary disarmament programme in favour of "an all-out war to defeat and disarm all the factions."⁵²

The disarmament process did not resume until late 1991 after the "all-out war" policy had failed. Up to this point, a number of cease-fire agreements had been reached between the various factions and ECOMOG. However, fighting continued, due in great part to a fundamental lack of mutual trust as well as the ability of the factions to exploit natural resources including gold and diamonds. As a result, ECOMOG was unable to guarantee nation-wide security, and had insufficient resources to extend its operation to cover all the originally agreed disarmament locations.

Meanwhile, negotiations sponsored jointly by ECOWAS and the United Nations continued with efforts to forge a peaceful formula for the crisis. Two peace agreements were reached between 1993 and August 1996. In 1993, a new cease-fire, which stipulated voluntary disarmament as its ultimate objective, was agreed in Geneva. Emphasising the voluntary nature of disarmament, this agreement stated that "....the Parties hereto agree and express their intent and willingness to disarm to and under the supervision of ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIL)".⁵³ Ultimately, this cease-fire agreement failed to hold and a second one was agreed in Abuja, Nigeria in August 1996. This last accord called for the acceleration of disarmament to be followed by general elections in May 1997.

Exhausted by the long war, the faction leaders realised that there was no viable alternative to peace and made efforts to disarm their followers. A major disarmament initiative was started on 22 November 1996 with the goal of disarming 50,000 combatants from all factions by 31 January 1997. Faction leaders inflated the figures of troop numbers in attempts to gain advantage in negotiations. For example UNOMIL sources both in Monrovia and New York put the total number of combatants in the civil war at about 33,000, of whom 4,306 were child soldiers.⁵⁴ General Victor Malu, the new head of ECOMOG, advised that the factions be disarmed and weapons handed in since 31 January 1991 would be destroyed. By January 1997, however, only around 20,000 combatants instead of (the widely overestimated) 60,000 had been disarmed.⁵⁵ The slow pace of disarmament may be due in part to suspicions among the faction leaders, a lack of incentives offered to belligerents to disarm, and inaccurate figures on combatants. Below are the disarmament statistics as at 31 January 1997.

Table 3: Liberia: Disarmament Statistics as at 31 January 1997⁵⁶

In conjunction with the voluntary disarmament, ECOMOG troops actively sought out arms caches. In December 1996, ECOMOG forces recovered a large cache of arms including assault rifles and pistols.⁵⁷ Despite earlier criticism, ECOMOG has been successful in discovering additional weapons caches following the initial voluntary demobilisation period. A cache seized at the residence of Alhaji Koromah, leader of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) faction and a candidate in the presidential elections, included an anti-aircraft gun, two mortars, 660 bombs, 80 grenades, 86 rifles, and 40,613 rounds of ammunition.⁵⁸

In spite of the calmer nature of Liberian politics recently, incomplete disarmament still threatens stability and reconstrcution. The presidential elections were relatively free and fair, and brought to Charles Taylor, the leader of the main faction, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). However, peace remains fragile in Liberia. ECOMOG forces are expected to complete their mission by 2 February 1998. Many combatants have still not surrendered their weapons, substantial arms caches remain hidden, and there exist lingering suspicions among faction leaders. There are also concerns about the eventual fate of weapons handed in and uncovered from caches, which were to be disposed of by the incoming President as he or she saw fit. However, given the destabilising potential of arms still in circulation, destroying these weapons remains by far the most effective means of ensuring that they are taken out of circulation and do not contribute to any further violence. Ultimately, the consolidation of the fragile peace will also hinge on how quickly the international community is able to put together a rehabilitation package to restore infrastructure, reintegrate demobilised combatants and resettle refugees.

An Approach to Conflict Resolution
Different approaches to conflict resolution have a crucial bearing on the success of weapons collection. Partly due to colonial experience, parties to a conflict in Africa are often wary of what they see as solutions imposed from outside the region. Therefore, it is vital that local and regional structures are actively involved in international peacekeeping efforts in a multi-track framework. Such an approach ensures that collective energy, influences and subtle pressure from all sectors of society are brought to bear on warring parties, making them amenable to negotiation. It also creates a platform for medium and long-term weapons control measures, such as transparency, moratoria and codes of conduct governing weapons transfers on the regional, sub-regional and national peace agendas.

Recommendations
The experiences of the various peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Mali and Liberia vividly demonstrate the urgent need for future missions to ensure that the following conditions are met to ensure effective disarmament:

• A clear mandate addressing collection and destruction within the context of disarmament;

• Adequate resources for operations necessary to fully execute the mandate;

• Emphasis on carrying out the mission in an inclusive atmosphere that addresses the needs and concerns of all parties, and encourages participation of a wide range of actors in the peace process;

• Effective mechanisms to ensure impartiality.

In addition, a comprehensive arms management mechanism should be developed as a fundamental component of peacebuilding efforts. Elements of such a mechanism could include:

• Initiating comprehensive programmes for the disarming of combatants;

• Assisting in the retraining and integration of demobilised combatants into civil society;

• Ensuring the collection and destruction of weapons and ammunition. This should include weapons surrendered or seized as well as those considered surplus to legitimate national security needs;

• Blocking access to easy riches (diamonds, gold, oil, etc.) to warring factions;

• Tackling underlying social and economic causes of conflict by undertaking a "Security First" approach to conflict resolution. Such an approach can help limit the symbolic and economic value of weaponry.

The study above strongly suggests that the relative success of peace efforts in Mali and Mozambique with regard to weapons surrender and destruction was predicated on the effective combination of the above components, against the background of popular conflict fatigue. Disregard for these factors created the paralysis of similar efforts in Somalia and Angola. It can also be argued that the success of the Malian peace process, much like the Mozambican, is in large part due to the important role accorded to weapons collection and destruction. By contrast, efforts at ending civil wars in Angola and Somalia have been undermined because, among other factors, incentives to continue the war existed - unlimited riches in the case of Angola, state power as a prize in the case of Somalia. Large numbers of weapons remained in circulation and gave the parties the means to continue fighting for these goals. Furthermore, international efforts at peace enforcement were inconsistent and incomprehensive, and as a result, circumstances pushed weapons decommissioning to the bottom of the agenda.

Regional and international support can be enhanced, especially in the following areas:

• Controlling arms transfers to the country and/or region of conflict through sanctions, moratoria or other means;

• Blocking illicit light weapons trade routes through international border and customs co-operation;

• Encouraging regional co-operation to uncover and destroy weapons caches. "Operation Rachel", the co-operative effort undertaken by Mozambique and South Africa, could provide a useful model;

• Controlling the production and transfer of ammunition. Without ammunition, weapons are rendered useless. Since curbing ammunition flow can contribute greatly to the reduction of violence, pressure should be brought to bear on countries that produce and transfer ammunition, especially African producers that include Egypt, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya. As the bulky nature of ammunition makes smuggling across borders more difficult, regional co-operation on limiting illicit trafficking should also target ammunition;

• Developing and encouraging inexpensive methods of weapons destruction. A hydraulic press, mounted on the back of a four-wheel drive vehicle is perfectly adequate. The South African police used this method to destroy weapons uncovered in their operations with Mozambican counterparts;⁵⁹

• Retraining, re-equipping and capacity-building of police, border guards and customs officials. Additional resources in this area could facilitate better tracking of weapons caches within states, monitoring of cross-border arms trafficking, and interdiction of grey and black market weapons traffickers.

Conclusion
This brief study of weapons management in peacekeeping operations in Africa asserts that light weapons proliferation is a key factor contributing to the perpetuation of violence and instability in Africa’s intrastate conflicts. The survey identifies them as both a powerful catalyst to the escalation of conflict and as an impediment to the peaceful resolution of low intensity wars. Evidence shows that light weapons can also engender the explosion of banditry and other forms of criminal activity in the immediate post-conflict period. It follows, therefore, that the extent to which light weapons and ammunition are collected and destroyed in the course of peacekeeping operations has a direct bearing on the success of the operation. As evidenced by the case studies above, the objectives of a peacekeeping mission can be significantly hindered by the absence of an integrated conflict resolution package that combines the non-military security component (social and economic rehabilitation) with the military component (demilitarisation) within an inclusive atmosphere. Social and economic rehabilitation is crucial to the success of weapons collection and destruction. In the same vein, demilitarisation cannot be considered complete without the elimination of weapons from conflict, most effectively through collection and destruction.

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Annex

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFL - Armed Forces of Liberia

CBO - Community-Based Organisation

ECOMOG - ECOWAS Monitoring Group

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

EU - European Union

FADM - Forças Armadas de Defensa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defence Force)

FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)

IGAD - Inter-Governmental Agency for Development

INPFL - Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

MCPMR - OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

MFUA - Mouvements et Fronts Unifies de l’Azaouad (United Movements and Fronts of Azaouad)

MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertacão de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

NPFL - National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NPP - National Patriotic Party (Political wing of NPFL)

OAU - Organisation of African Unity

ONUCA - United Nations Observer Group in Central America

ONUMOZ - United Nations Operation in Mozambique

RENAMO - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)

RUF - Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SNA - Somali National Alliance

SNM - Somali National movement

ULIMO - United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy

UNAVEM - United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNITA - União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola)

UNITAF - United Nations Interim Task Force (for Somalia)

UN(O) - United Nations (Organisation)

UNOHAC - United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination

UNOMIL - United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM - United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNTAG - United Nations Transition Assistance Group (for Namibia)

USC - United Somali Congress

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Endnotes

1. A working definition of small arms describes them as a sub-category of light weapons, comprising automatic weapons up to 20 mm which include sub-machine guns, rifles, carbines, revolvers and self-loading pistols.
   

2. "Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms" (New York: United Nations, July 1997), p. 25.
   

3. "Weapons Destruction During Peacekeeping: Central America", BASIC Paper 24, December 1997.
   

4. Ibid.
   

5. The multi-track approach to conflict resolution presupposes the concerted and harmonious harnessing of inputs by many different actors, both vertically and horizontally, towards the peaceful resolution of conflict and establishment of sustainable peace. Actors in multi-track conflict management include the international community, inter-governmental organisations at the regional and sub-regional levels, and civil society (the media, grassroots networks, churches, etc.).
   

6. For an example of the "Security First" approach, see section on Mali.
   

7. Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique, UNIDIR (Geneva: United Nations, 1996), p.85.
   

8. Clement Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia, UNIDIR (Geneva: United Nations, 1995), p. 70.
   

9. Ibid.
   

10. Sahnoun Mohamed, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The case of Somalia", Irish Studies in International Affairs (vol. 5, 1994).
    

11. UN Security Council Resolution 733, Document S/RES/733, NY 23/1/92, para. 3.
    

12. Sahnoun Mohamed, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The case of Somalia", Irish Studies in International Affairs (vol. 5, 1994).
    

13.  

14. "The Non-Blue Helmet" operation was to emphasise that though sanctioned by the UN, UNITAF was not a normal UN operation. UNITAF was, to all intents and purposes, a US-led operation.
    

15.  

16. Sahnoun Mohamed, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The case of Somalia", Irish Studies in International Affairs (vol. 5, 1994), p.74.
    

17. "Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding", Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 1997, p.25.
    

18. Report of the Secretary-General, Document S/25354, New York, United Nations, 3 March 1993, p. 30, para. 66.
    

19. Jakkie Potgieter, Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization DuringPpeacekeeping Operations, Analysis Report in Adibe, op cit., nos. (SO55), (SO73), (SO99) and (S144).
    

20. Ibid.
    

21. Adibe, op cit., p. 96.
    

22. Potgieter, op cit., p. 159.
    

23. Winrich Kühne, "Lessons from peacekeeping operations in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia", in "WEU's role in crisis management and conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa", Chaillot Paper no. 22, December 1995, p. 19.
    

24. BICC Conversion Survey 1996: Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 225.
    

25. Ibid. p.15.
    

26. "Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections", Human Rights Watch Arms Project/Human Rights Watch Africa, London, November 1994, p37.
    

27. Christopher Smith and Alex Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa (London: Centre for Defence Studies/ Brassey’s), 1997, p.12.
    

28. Quoted in Angola Peace Monitor, Vol. III, 30 October 1996.
    

29. Ibid.
    

30. Quoted in Reuters, "Angolan summit may boost peace process", 13 November 1997.
    

31. Angolan Peace Monitor, op cit.
    

32. Washington Post, "Face to Face With Angola’s Future", 11 November 1997.
    

33. "Underpaid, Underfed and Unruly", Africa Confidential, Vol. 36, No. 17, 14th April 1995, p.7. on the Third International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives, INTERPOL, Lyons, 7-9 September, 1994.
    

34. UN Security Council Document S/RES/797 (1992) adopted 16 December 1992.
    

35. Final Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission (Maputo: 5 December 1994), p. 15.
    

36. Glenn Oosthuysen, Small Arms and Proliferation Control in Southern Africa (South Africa: South Africa Institute of Peace/United States Institute of Peace, 1996).
    

37. Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ, S/1994/1449, 23 December 1994, quoted in Smith and Vines, op cit., p.16.
    

38. Ton Pardoel, former chief of the ONUMOZ Technical Unit, as seconded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), interviewed by Eric Berman, 8 July 1995.
    

39. Vines, Alex, "Light Weapons Transfers, Human Rights Violations and Armed Banditry in Southern Africa", Research Paper presented at Light Weapons Proliferation And Opportunities For Control, BASIC Workshop on Light Weapons, London 30 June - 2 July 1996, p. 8.
    

40. "Angola guns surplus takes aim at S Africa", The Star & South Africa Times, November 26 1997.
    

41. Voice of America Report, gopher://gopher.voa.gov:70/00/newswire/tue/SAF - MOZAMBIQUE, 12 August 1997.
    

42. "Mozambique: Police Destroy 32 Arms Caches in Zambezia," Maputo Radio, Maputo, (FBIS-AFR-97-104), 14 April 97.
    

43. Created from a composite of UN Secretary-General’s Report and Berman, op cit., p.85.
    

44. Alex Vines, addressing Conference on Comparative Regional Security, Institute for Security Studies.