20
MAY 1997 • NUMBER 20 • ISSN 1353-0402
A New Strategic Concept for NATO
By Tasos
Kokkinides, Alistair Millar, Daniel Plesch, and Kirsten Ruecker
The British American Security
Information Council (BASIC) believes that NATO leaders meeting
in Madrid in July 1997 should agree to a revision of the
Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept, whether or not the
Alliance decides to enlarge.
NATO leaders should instruct
the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to revisit the
Strategic Concept in light of the significant changes in
European security.
The new Strategic Concept
should be agreed to as soon as possible. To ensure maximum
transparency, each NATO member should discuss the new strategy
with the foreign and defence committees of the NATO 16
Parliaments. BASIC believes that the next round of NATO
Ministerial Meetings, scheduled for December 1997 in Brussels,
provides the ideal opportunity for the adoption of the new
Strategic Concept.
What follows is BASIC’s
recommended text.
Key Proposed Policy
Changes
Note to the reader:
Normal text is as appeared in the 1991 Strategic Concept, bold
text is recommended changes.
-
The Alliance
recognises the tensions that have been generated by its policy
of enlargement. Measures to reduce such tensions will continue
to have high priority on the Alliance’s agenda. The Alliance
will continue to work to develop a structure of political,
economic and security co-operation throughout Europe and the
Atlantic community that will make further selective
enlargement of the Alliance militarily unnecessary and
politically irrelevant. [Strategic Concept, paragraph 2c]
-
The predominantly
non-military nature of the new challenges in Europe means that
there are profound limitations on what the Alliance can
contribute. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN)
and the Council of Europe have important roles to play in
meeting the new security challenges in Europe and in most cases
they are better equipped than the Alliance to do so. In
particular, the Alliance takes note of the OSCE's stated
objective of creating a common security space in Europe, free of
dividing lines. [paragraph 10e]
-
Nevertheless, the
principle of Alliance and the existence of the potential for the
effective deployment of armed forces remain essential elements
of European security. In these circumstances, NATO continues to
update its purpose and to revise its concept of operations and
its political and military structures. [paragraph 10g]
-
The Alliance’s
new role in peace-keeping operations on behalf of the
international community has been demonstrated by the success of
the NATO-led mission to former Yugoslavia. The Alliance is
prepared to continue to make its resources available to meet
such challenges where appropriate. The on-going adaptation of
the Alliance structures will help the Alliance to carry out the
full range of its missions more effectively, including future
IFOR-type operations. [paragraphs 10b, 10d]
-
Substantial progress
in arms control has already enhanced stability
and security far beyond the level achieved in 1991 by further
lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency
and mutual confidence (including the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC); the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ);
the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the accession of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon
states; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the
entry into force of START I; the implementation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE); and the
removal of the vast majority of non-strategic nuclear weapons
from Europe). The Alliance looks forward to the entry into force
of the CTBT and START 2 at the earliest possible time. The
implementation of existing agreements and the development of new
agreements restricting weapons of mass destruction is of the
utmost importance. [paragraph 4]
-
Implementation of
the 1992 START II Treaty will lead to increased stability
through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of
strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and
reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the
Russian Federation have been pursued following President
Clinton’s initiative to de-target nuclear weapons and his
recent decision to reduce dramatically the alert status of
nuclear forces. [This is an initiative suggested by a number of
non-governmental individuals and former government and military
officials]. Retaining nuclear weapons on immediate alert is
incompatible with strategic partnership with the Russian
Federation. The agreed framework for START III will further
reduce the nuclear danger by bringing the number of deployed
strategic warheads to a total of 2000-2500 in phase A and to
1,000 in phase B. The Alliance welcomes the political
declarations of France and the United Kingdom not to increase
their nuclear forces and looks forward to unanimity amongst the
five nuclear weapons states to enable the implementation of
START III B. [paragraph 4a]
-
The circumstances in
which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated
by the Alliance are therefore even more remote. The Alliance can
therefore eliminate their remaining sub-strategic nuclear
forces as part of a verifiable, irreversible and reciprocal
process. The Alliance looks forward to these steps being taken
unilaterally by the United States, Russia and France to
eliminate all remaining sub-strategic nuclear weapons.
[paragraph 57]
-
The on-going
negotiations on the modernisation of the CFE will remove the
Alliance's numerical superiority in all CFE-lim- ited conventional
weapons systems, reduce the overall numbers of CFE-limited
weapons throughout the CFE application area and strengthen verification
procedures. The Alliance, together with its CFE Partners,
will explore ways and means to extend the Treaty’s coverage so
as to include new or expanded categories of conventional
armaments and equipment and restrict the introduction of new
weapon types and technologies. [paragraph 4b]
-
Destabilising
concentrations of military forces exist in certain parts of
Europe, particularly in its southeast corner. The Alliance will
intensify its efforts to convince its members and partners alike
that reductions in military holdings are essential for reducing
the real or residual threats to peace. Allies and Partners alike
will implement an appropriate mix of unilateral and multilateral
steps to achieve this goal. [paragraph 4d]
-
The OSCE has
become an organisation in its own right. The "Common
and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First
Century", agreed in Lisbon in December 1996, provides the
framework for the future of European security. As agreed in
Lisbon, the Alliance recognises that the OSCE plays a central
role in achieving the goal of a common security space in Europe
free of dividing lines, in which all States are equal partners.
[paragraph 5]
-
The Alliance is
one of the instruments available for conflict prevention and
resolution. The OSCE and the EU have developed mechanisms which
are more suited to tackling risks to European security. At their
meeting in Lisbon in December 1996, Heads of State and
Government from OSCE participating states reaffirmed the
Organisation’s key role in fostering security and stability,
and they decided to further enhance its efficiency as a primary
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis
management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities. In
1992, the Alliance offered to support OSCE peacekeeping
activities, including by making available its resources on a
case by case basis. The Alliance reaffirms its willingness to
consider requests by the OSCE to make its military capabilities
available and will jointly explore and develop with the OSCE the
necessary modalities. [paragraph 32]
-
Pursuant to the
"Scope and Parameters" Document adopted by all CFE
States, the Alliance, together with its CFE Partners, will
explore ways and means to extend the Treaty’s coverage so as
to include new, or expanded, categories of conventional
armaments and equipment and restrict the introduction of new
weapon types and technologies. [paragraph 4]
-
The United
Nations Security Council has identified the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction as a threat to the peace. So too is
their existence. Nuclear weapons make an unquantifiable
contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression
incalculable and unacceptable. They carry with them the
catastrophic consequences of unpredictable and irrational action
through a combination of human and technical fallibility
naturally increased in crisis. The Alliance affirms that
it will only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear
attack. The Alliance attaches the highest priority to
securing their global elimination in accordance with the legal
obligations of member states and has accordingly created the
High Level Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament which will
coordinate Alliance policy toward this end. The High Level Task
Force will consist of two working groups. The first group will
deal with weapons of mass destruction and the second group will
deal with other threats to stability such as the transfer of
military technologies, arms sales, and non-nuclear systems that
are potentially destabilising. [paragraphs 39, 39a]
-
The Alliance will
concentrate on developing its ability to carry out new roles and
missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management.
The NATO-led mission in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that
Allied military forces can become an important instrument for
peace enforcement, conflict resolution and post-conflict
rehabilitation in Europe. The Alliance will utilise military
forces from Partner countries by developing the Combined Joint
Task Forces. [paragraph 41]
The Alliances New
Strategic Concept
Agreed by the Heads of
State and Government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991
Brussels on . . . December 1997
|
Note to the
reader: Plain text is NATO's current Strategic Concept agreed
in 1991. Struck out text has been deleted
because it has been overtaken by events or a policy change is
being proposed. Bolded text is modernising
language and is underlined where the
most important changes in Alliance policy are recommended.
|
1. At their meetings
in London in July 1990, Rome in November 1991 and Brussels in
January 1994, NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on
the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more
promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on
which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised
that the developments taking place in Europe would have a
far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in
future. The Strategic Concept agreed by the Alliance in November
1991 has been kept under review in the light of the continually
improving political context in Europe. These improvements have
allowed the Alliance to further revise its Strategic Concept, which In
particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The
resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.
PART I - THE STRATEGIC
CONCPET
The New Strategic
Environment
2. There are no major
inter-state conflicts in Europe. This situation is unprecedented in
Europe as a whole and in Western Europe has not existed since the
fall of the Roman Empire. The Alliance is determined to seize the
moment and make the successes in arms control and confidence
building more far reaching and permanent. Since 1989
1991, profound political changes have taken place in Central and
Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security
environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve
its objectives. The USSR no longer exists. The
USSR’s former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty.
The Republics of the former Soviet Union and its
Republics have become independent sovereign states and
together with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe they
continue to develop their democratic societies. are
undergoing radical change. The three Baltic
Republics have regained their independence.
2a. Former Soviet
forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to
have now completed their withdrawal from Poland and
Germany by 1994 to the Russian Federation. All the
countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the
Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. Many
of these countries have expressed a strong desire to become members
of the Alliance. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun
to are implementing policies which are aimed
at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law,
respect for human rights and a market economy. The political
division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation
of the Cold War period has thus been overcome and will not be
reestablished. NATO now meets and works with almost all the
nations of Europe through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and
the Partnerships for Peace (PfP) programmes. The newly established
Atlantic Partnership Council, and the signing of separate bilateral
agreements between the Alliance and the Russian Federation and
Ukraine is a mark of the mature co-operative relations between all
European states and will further intensify contacts and promote
security and stability throughout Europe. Following these major
accomplishments the possibility of conflict has been greatly reduced
and large-scale military confrontation in Europe has become
implausible.
2b. At the 1994
Brussels Summit, the Alliance decided to enlarge, a decision which
is likely to shape the future of European security. At the 1997
Madrid Summit, the Alliance took the next step by inviting X, Y and
Z to begin accession negotiations to become members. By 1999, the
Alliance’s 50th anniversary, these States will become members of
the Alliance, subject to legislative approval.
2c. The Alliance
recognises the tensions that have been generated by its policy of
enlargement. Measures to reduce such tensions will continue to have
high priority on the Alliance’s agenda. The Alliance will continue
to work to develop a structure of political, economic and security
co-operation throughout Europe and the Atlantic community that will
make further selective enlargement of the Alliance militarily
unnecessary and politically irrelevant.
3. In the West, there
have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and
remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The
European Community has become the European Union. The fact that
the countries of the European Community Union
are working towards the goal of political and monetary union,
including the development of a European security identity; and the
enhancement of the role of the WEU, are important factors for
European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in
the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role
and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are
positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a
European security identity and defence role through the Combined
Joint Task Force concept, which is separable but not separate from
NATO, reflecteds in the
strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, and will
not only serve the interests of the European states but also
reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a
whole.
4. Substantial progress
in arms control has already enhanced stability and
security far beyond the level achieved in 1991 by further lowering
arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual
confidence (including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ); the indefinite
extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) and the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the
Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states; the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT); the entry into force of START I; the
implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE); and the removal of the vast majority of non-strategic
nuclear weapons from Europe). through the Stockholm CDE
agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements
and confidence and security-building measures of 1990). The
Alliance looks forward to the entry into force of the CTBT and START
2 at the earliest possible time. The implementation of existing
agreements and the development of new agreements restricting weapons
of mass destruction is of the utmost importance.
4a. Implementation of
the 1991 START Treaty 1992 START II Treaty will
lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced
reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further
far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the
United States and the Soviet Union will be Russian
Federation have been pursued following President
Bush’s September 1991 President Clinton’s initiative
to de-target nuclear weapons
and his recent decision to reduce dramatically the alert status of
nuclear forces.1
Retaining nuclear weapons on immediate alert is incompatible with
strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. The
agreed framework for START III will further reduce the nuclear
danger by bringing the number of deployed strategic warheads to a
total of 2000-2500 in phase A and to 1,000 in phase B. The Alliance
welcomes the political declarations of France and the United Kingdom
not to increase their nuclear forces and looks forward to unanimity
amongst the five nuclear weapons states to enable the implementation
of START III B.
4b. Also of great
importance is the CFE, signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; the
on-going negotiations on its modernisation its
implementation will remove the Alliance’s numerical infsuperiority
in key all CFE-limited conventional
weapon systems, reduce the overall numbers of CFE-limited
conventional weapon systems throughout the CFE application area
and provide for effective strengthen CFE verification
procedures. Pursuant to the "Scope and Parameters"
Document adopted by all CFE States as agreed at the OSCE Lisbon
Summit in December 1996, the Alliance, together with its CFE
Partners, will explore ways and means to extend the Treaty’s
coverage so as to include new or expanded categories of conventional
armaments and equipment and restrict the introduction of new
weapon types and technologies.
4c. All these
developments will have also resulted
in an unprecedented and increasing degree of military
transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual
confidence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the entry
into force of the Treaty on achievement of an Open
Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for
further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces,
and for in particular the achievement of the
ultimate goal of a global ban on chemical
nuclear weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising
arms exports through enforceable Codes of Conduct on the Arms
Trade and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.
4d. Despite these
developments, destabilising concentrations of military forces exist
in certain parts of Europe, particularly in its southeast corner.
The Agreement on Regional Stabilization, achieved at Dayton in
November 1995, constitutes the first step towards the progressive
demilitarisation of the region. The Alliance will encourage the
implementation of all provisions contained in the Dayton Agreement
and will intensify its efforts to convince its members and partners
alike that reductions in military holdings are essential for
reducing the real or residual threats to peace. The Allies will
implement an appropriate mix of unilateral and multilateral steps to
achieve this goal and encourage their Partners to do the same.
5. The OSCE CSCE
process, which began , formerly the CSCE, in
Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to
overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris,
Helsinki and Budapest Summits, it has become an
organisation in its own right. The OSCE it now
includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual
framework for consultation and co-operation that can play a
constructive role, complementary to that of NATO, the EU, the WEU
and the Council of Europe and the process of European
integration, in preserving peace. The OSCE’s
"Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the
Twenty-First Century", agreed in Lisbon in December 1996,
provides the framework for the future of European Security. As
agreed in Lisbon, the Alliance recognises that the OSCE plays a
central role in achieving the goal of a common security space in
Europe free of dividing lines, in which all States are equal
partners.
6. The historic changes
that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfilment of a
number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have
significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The
monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the
principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has
disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty
about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.
7. The new
Strategic Concept of 1991 lookeds forward to
a security environment in which the positive changes of 1986-1991
referred to above have come would come to
fruition. In particular, it assumed both the completion of
the planned withdrawal of former Soviet
military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full
implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. These
changes have occurred. In addition the dissolution of the USSR and
the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the
introduction of the PfP and the conclusion of the several treaties
controlling weapons of mass destruction have resulted in a further
dramatic improvement in the security environment, unanticipated in
1991. These changes make possible further important changes
by the Alliance. The implementation of the Strategic Concept
will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security
environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these
assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent
necessary.
Security Challenges and risks
8. The security
challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from
what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale
attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been
removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly
in Central Europe, The risk of a surprise attack no
longer exists has been substantially reduced,
and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly
enormously. The reduction in nuclear alert status, in
particular separation of warheads from missiles, will further
increase stability in Europe.
9. In contrast with the
predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that
remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which
makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of
responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of
Alliance members are to be preserved. In 1991, the Alliance
assessed that tThese risks could can
arise in various ways. These assessed risks have been largely
contained and reduced in the last seven years.
10. Risks to Allied
security are less likely to result from calculated aggression
against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions which may
result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten
the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance.
They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability
and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or
spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the
security of the Alliance.
10a. Since 1991 new
challenges have emerged in Europe resulting principally from the
collapse of multi-ethnic states in Central and Eastern Europe. The
wars in former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh have
demonstrated the fragility of the post-Cold War stability in parts
of Europe. Nationalist forces are increasing and although
they pose no military threat to Allied security, they nevertheless
constitute a risk to European security. Other acute problems include
the continuous violations of human rights, the lack of full
democratisation, threats to independent media, electoral fraud,
racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.
10b. The
Alliance’s new role in peace-keeping operations on behalf of the
international community has been demonstrated by the success of the
NATO-led mission to former Yugoslavia. The Alliance is prepared to
continue to make its resources available to meet such challenges
where appropriate.
10c. However, the
tragedy of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia leaves many lessons
to be learned by all the nations and institutions of Europe. The
slowness of the Alliance’s response, the conflicting views of
member states and resulting uses and misuses of command, control and
intelligence arrangements in pursuit of national interests, at a
minimum, failed to live up to the Alliance’s mission in European
security and resulted in unnecessary loss of life. On the ground in
Bosnia, the Alliance has shown that, despite its considerable
success, its member states have not made the political decision to
assist in the apprehension of war criminals or the return of
refugees.
10d. In Berlin in
June 1996 the Alliance’s Ministers took a step forward in shaping
new NATO missions such as the Implementation Force (IFOR) and
Stabilisation Force (SFOR). The on-going adaptation of Alliance
structures will give the Alliance the opportunity to carry out the
full range of its missions more effectively, including future
IFOR-type operations.
10e. However, the
predominantly non-military nature of the new challenges in Europe
means that there are profound limitations on what the Alliance can
contribute. The OSCE, the EU, the UN and the Council of Europe have
important roles to play in meeting the new security challenges in
Europe and in most cases they are better equipped than the Alliance
to do so. In particular, the Alliance takes note of the OSCE's
stated objective of creating a common security space in Europe, free
of dividing lines.
10f. The Alliance
attaches great importance to the role of the OSCE as a primary
instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention,
post-conflict rehabilitation and regional co-operation. The
Alliance supports the strengthening of the operational capabilities
of the OSCE, including the development of its peacekeeping
capabilities, as agreed at the OSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992. The
Alliance re-affirms its willingness to consider requests by the OSCE
to make Alliance military capabilities available for OSCE
peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis.
10g. Nevertheless,
the principle of Alliance and the existence of the potential for the
effective deployment of armed force remain an essential element of
European security. In these circumstances, the Alliance continues to
update its purpose and to revise its concept of operations and its
political and military structures.
11. In the particular
case of the former Soviet Union, none of the conventional
forces of the successor states pose a threat to Alliance members
that cannot be more than adequately addressed by a reduced
Integrated Military Structure. The Russian nuclear arsenal can only
be compared to that of the United States and will be dramatically
reduced under the START process. the risks and
uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in
isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are
significantly larger than those of any other European State and its
large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United
States. These capabilities have to be taken into account Further
major reductions in nuclear forces and conventional air and ground
forces are essential if stability and security in Europe are to
be preserved.
12. The Allies also wish
to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the
countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The
stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of
Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991
Gulf war has shown. The Alliance, through its dialogue initiated
in December 1994, seeks to engage non-NATO Mediterranean countries
in a mutually beneficial discussion which will strengthen security
in the region. This is all the more so because of the build-up
of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in
the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of
the Alliance.
12a. Despite the
availability of these weapons technologies, the Alliance recognises
that the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles cannot be mainly addressed by counterproliferation
measures. The Alliance notes with satisfaction that there has been
no significant increase in the quantity and quality of weaponry
posing a threat to the Alliance since 1991, and affirms that in
responding to the risks of proliferation, the principle objective of
the Alliance is to prevent proliferation, or, if it occurs, to
reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance will remain
vigilant. The Alliance notes the successful contribution of
political, diplomatic and economic measures implemented by the
nations of the Alliance, through all European institutions, in
ensuring that this risk has not materialised over the last seven
years.
12b. The Alliance
supports efforts that will address security issues along its
southern flank, including the Mediterranean Forum, initiatives
towards a Conference for Security and Co-operation in the
Mediterranean, and bilateral and multilateral talks. The Alliance
will consider ways and means to enhance its Mediterranean dialogue
by including other countries from the region without duplicating
similar initiatives by the OSCE and the EU.
12c. The Alliance has
initiated a discussion in the Partnerships for Peace on a
multi-lateral moratorium on transfers of weapons within the CFE
Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) categories to all nations in the
Middle East.
13. Any armed attack on
the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be
covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty, which
places the right of self-defence within the authority of the UN
Charter and the Security Council. However, Alliance security
must also take account of the global context. Alliance security
interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature,
including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption
of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and
sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation
among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where
appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses
to such risks. However, the Alliance is convinced that other
institutions must play the leading role in conflict prevention.
Therefore, NATO actively supports collective security organisations,
including the OSCE and the UN, in addressing these risks to European
and global security. The Alliance has been supportive of this
strategy in achieving the permanent NPT, the CTBT, the CWC and the
ANWFZ.
14. From the point of
view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in
different ways. In 1991, the Alliance based its strategy on the
need to maintain the strategic balance in Europe. Even
in a The non-adversarial and cooperative
relationship which has been established with the Russian
Federation Soviet military capability and build-up
potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the
most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in
maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West
confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major
conflict in Europe. requires the Alliance to abandon
the need to maintain strategic balance in Europe. Russia’s
conventional military capability and build-up potential has declined
to the point where it cannot be considered a serious threat to the
rest of Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of
different crises arising, which could develop quickly and would
require a rapid response, but they will be likely to be
of a lesser magnitude.
PART II - ALLLIANCE OBJECITVES
AND SECURITY FUNCTIONS
The purpose of the
Alliance
15. Two conclusions can
be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is
that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security
functions of the Alliance, but it does reduce substantially
the resources that need to be devoted to fulfilling these purposes. rather
underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the
other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities
for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to
security by allowing the OSCE and other organisations to take
leading roles in addressing the new non-military risks to security.
16. NATO’s essential
purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the
London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all
its members by political and military means in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked
since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.
The Alliance intends to exercise its responsibilities with
respect to its aforementioned values by inviting presentations and
recommendations from the relevant bodies of the OSCE, the UN and the
Council of Europe to the North Atlantic Council and Cooperation
Council and the Atlantic Partnership Council. The Alliance welcomes
the work conducted at the OSCE toward "A Common and
Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First
Century" and is committed to assisting with concrete proposals
towards concluding the OSCE’s work in this area. The Alliance
intends to discuss the observation of OSCE-set standards for its
values along with those it continues to set for military matters in
order to play its full part in the prevention of the security risks
from economic, social, political, ethnic and territorial factors.
The nature of the Alliance
17. NATO embodies the
transatlantic politico-military link by which the security of
North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. Alliance
members recognise that the transatlantic link should not rest solely
on the military aspect, and recognise the OECD, the G7, the Atlantic
Partnership Council and the OSCE as the appropriate avenues to
strengthen transatlantic relations. The Alliance It
is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its
members in support of their common interests.
18. The fundamental
operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and
mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the
indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within
the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO’s daily work in
both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally
is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing
with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of
their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in
the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective
effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national
security objectives. In the absence of a continuous process of
arms control, membership in the Alliance would enable states to rely
on far smaller forces for their defence than were they standing
alone.
19. The resulting sense
of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of
differences in their circumstances or in their national military
capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall
stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions
conducive to increased co-operation both among Alliance members and
with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance,
together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of
cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.
The fundametal tasks of the Alliance
20. The means by which
the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will
continue to include the maintenance of a military capability
sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an
overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the
security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts
favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a
cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of
arms control and disarmament.
21. To achieve its
essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental
security tasks:
I. To provide one of
the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in
Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and
commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no
country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation
or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
II. To serve, as
provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that
affect their vital interests, including possible developments
posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate
coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
III. To deter and
defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of
any NATO member state.
IV. To
preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
IV. To serve as a
forum for co-operation between Allies and Partners.
22. Other European
institutions such as the EUC, WEU and OCSCE
also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective
responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a
European identity in security and defence will underline the
preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of
responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce
transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and
of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can
perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential
forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement
on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its
members under the Washington Treaty.
23. In defining the core
functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states
confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and
obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain
unchanged.
PART III - A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY
Protecting peace in a
new Europe
24. The Alliance has
always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security
and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just
and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and
military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the
Alliance’s security policy.
25. But what is new is
that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the
opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political
means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all
the consequences from the fact that security and stability have
political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as
the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of
challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to
security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements
of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the
maintenance of a collective defence capability.
26. The Alliance’s
active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its
commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to
reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or
design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among
all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of
the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine
partnership among all European countries in dealing with common
security problems.
27. In this regard, the
Alliance’s arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to
dialogue and to co-operation with other nations, and thus will
continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s
security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and
disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest
possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of
defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and
arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.
28. In fulfilling its
fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance
will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of
others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in
the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote
peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic
institutions. In this respect, it recognises the valuable
contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Union
Community and the OSCE, CSCE,
and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are
complementary.
Dialogue
29. The new situation in
Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of
the Alliance with the Soviet Union Russian
Federation and the other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and
military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
as provided for in the London Declaration. Since 1991 the
Alliance will has further promoted
dialogue through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the
Partnership for Peace and the Atlantic Partnership Council. regular
diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and
information on security policy issues. Through such means
the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full
use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of
freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual
understanding of respective security concerns, to increase
transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to
reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions
of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and
greater military transparency. The Alliance’s pursuit of dialogue
will provide a foundation for greater co-operation throughout Europe
and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful
means.
Cooperation
30. The Allies are also
committed to pursue co-operation with all states in Europe on the
basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New
Europe. The Partnership for Peace programme, the Atlantic
Partnership Council, the bilateral treaties with the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, and the proposed coordinating structures
with the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe ensure that the
Alliance is engaging in systematic dialogue and developing concrete
forms and mechanisms of co-operation with all European States. Allied
forces have successfully co-operated with forces from Partner
countries in former Yugoslavia ensuring the implementation of the
provisions of the Dayton Agreement. Military exercises and
seminars involving Partner countries have now become a permanent
feature of European security co-operation. They will
seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and
multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European
security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should
they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership
between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing
with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond
past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of
co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security
among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among
Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or
social divisions across the continent could lead to future
instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.
30a. The Alliance
will intensify its efforts to enhance co-operation between all
European states through the strengthening of PfP and the Atlantic
Partnership Council. At the Lisbon Ministerial Meeting in May 1997,
the Alliance decided to develop PFP on the basis of transparency by
making the Partnership more operational, by strengthening its
political consultation element, taking full account of the
respective activities of the OSCE, the EU and the WEU, and involving
Partners more in operations planning and Partnership
decision-making.
30b. In line with
the OSCE’s declared goal of establishing a web of interlocking and
mutually re-enforcing institutions in Europe and noting that adverse
consequences may arise from duplication of functions, the Alliance
will intensify efforts to strengthen dialogue and co-operation
between all European institutions. In particular, the
Alliance will structurally link the Atlantic Partnership Council to
the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe. Such structural
linkage will benefit all relevant organisations through the sharing
of expertise and resources, and improve the capability of these
organisations for rapid, coordinated and effective response to
emerging causes of instability in Europe. Areas of co-operation
could include: conflict prevention; peacekeeping; civil-military
relations and the democratic control of the armed forces; and
education programmes on human rights including minority rights.
Collective Defence
31. The political
approach to security will thus has become increasingly
important the primary focus of the Alliance’s security
policy. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential.
The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear
preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central
essential to the Alliance’s security objectives. Such a
capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order
to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee
that military aggression directed against the Alliance, however
unlikely this may be, can never be perceived as an option with
any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that
dialogue and co-operation can be undertaken with confidence and
achieve their desired results.
Management of crises and conflict prevention
32. In the new political
and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance’s
policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than
in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and
successful management of crises affecting the security of its
members. The Alliance is one of the instruments available for
conflict prevention and resolution. The OSCE and the EU have
developed mechanisms which are more suited to tackling risks to
European security. At their meeting in Lisbon in December
1996, Heads of State and Government from OSCE participating states
reaffirmed the Organisation’s key role in fostering security and
stability, and decided to further enhance its efficiency as a
primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis
management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities. In
1992, the Alliance offered to support OSCE peacekeeping activities,
including making available Alliance resources on a case by case
basis. The Alliance reaffirms its willingness to contribute its
resources and will jointly explore and develop with the OSCE the
necessary modalities. Any major aggression
in Europe is much more unlikely and would be
preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller
scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the
Alliance Europe are less predictable than before.
33. In these new
circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful
resolution of crises at an early stage. The OSCE and the European
Union are the main instruments for the prevention of crises in
Europe. The Alliance will lend its assistance by providing expertise
and resources on a case-by-case basis. The success of
Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the
Alliance’s political authorities choosing and co-ordinating
appropriate crisis management measures, in consultation with the
OSCE and the EU, as required from a range of political and other
measures, including those in the military field. Close control by
the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the
outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision
making procedures are essential to this end.
34. The potential of
dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully
developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts
since the Allies’ security is inseparably linked to that of all
other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the
role of the OSCE CSCE process and its
institutions. The OSCE can develop into a primary instrument for
conflict prevention and resolution in Europe. Other bodies
including the European Union, Community,
Western European Union and United Nations may will
also have an important role to play.
PART IV - GUIDELINES FOR DEFENCE
Principles of Alliance
strategy
35. The diversity of
challenges now facing the Alliance Europe
thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed
political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to make
further changes to a number of important features
of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while
reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London
Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy
and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.
36. Alliance strategy
will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The
Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will
ever be used except in self-defence, or in peacekeeeping
operations on behalf of the international community, and it does
not consider itself to be anyone’s adversary. In the context of
the on-going CFE modernisation talks, the Alliance will
substantially reduce its armed forces to reflect the significant
improvement in European security. Furthermore the Alliance
will never use its weapons first. The Allies will maintain
military strength capability adequate to
convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the
territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective
action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating
conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the
Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to
stop an aggressor’s advance as far forward as possible,
to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations
and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his
decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the
Alliance’s military forces is to assure the territorial integrity
and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute
to peace and stability in Europe.
37. The security of all
Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all.
Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial
prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the
Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing
of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of
common defence. The presence of North American US
conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe
remains vital important to the security of
Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the
process of developing a European security identity and defence role
progresses, and is reflected in the strengthening of the European
pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance
will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence
of Europe.
38. The collective
nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements
that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and
resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the
re-nationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies
of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated
military structure as well as on co-operation and co-ordination
agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common
operational planning; multinational formations; the
stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a
mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement
arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and
procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined
exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics co-operation.
To reflect the new political context in Europe and to reaffirm
the indivisible nature of security between the members of the
Alliance and other European States, the Alliance will increasingly
extend its practical arrangements to all States participating in the
Partnership for Peace and the Atlantic Partnership Council.
39. To protect peace and
to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for
the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where
necessary, although at a significantly reduced level significantly
reduced conventional forces. Taking note of the
North Atlantic Council statement of March 1997, the Alliance
reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment,
there is no need for permanent stationing of substantial combat
forces in the territory of new member States. Both
elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute
one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention
by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or
easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means.
Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance
could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to provide a
wide range of conventional response options. But the
Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention
of war. The United Nations Security Council has
identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a
threat to the peace. So too is the existence of these weapons. Nuclear
weapons make an unquantifiable unique
contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable
and unacceptable. They also carry with them the catastrophic
consequences of unpredictable and irrational action through a
combination of human and technical fallibility naturally increased
in crisis. The Alliance attaches the highest priority to
securing their global elimination in accordance with the legal
obligations of member states and has accordingly created the High
Level Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament which will
coordinate Alliance policy toward this end. The Alliance agrees that
a legally-binding instrument that it will never use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT would make an
important contribution to international security. The Alliance
affirms that it will only use nuclear weapons in response to a
nuclear attack. In the immediate future, the Alliance looks forward
to verifiable, reciprocal unilateral steps by the United States, the
Russian Federation, the UK and France to eliminate all remaining
sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, they remain
essential to preserve peace.
39a. The High
Level Task Force will consist of two working groups. The first group
will deal with weapons of mass destruction and the second group will
deal with other threats to stability, such as the transfer of
military technologies, arms sales, and non-nuclear systems that are
potentially destabilising.
The Alliance's new force posture
40. At the London
Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate,
from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward
presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to
reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming
from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the
Alliance Europe enable significant further
modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies’ military
forces and in their posture.
The Missions of Alliance Military Forces
41. The 1991 New
Strategic Concept affirmed that the Alliance’s military forces The
primary role of Alliance military forces, is to
guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states.,
remains unchanged. This role remains important, but this
role must it does not take account of the new
strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat does
not exist has given way to diverse and multi-directional
risks. The Alliance will concentrate instead on
developing its ability to carry out new roles and missions relating
to conflict prevention and crisis management. The NATO-led mission
in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that the Allied military
forces can become an important instrument for peace-enforcement,
conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation in Europe. The
Alliance will utilise military forces from Partner countries by
further developing the Combined Joint Task Forces. Alliance
forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.
42. In peace, the role
of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security
of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of
stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that
peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and co-operation
throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building
activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve
communication; as well as in verification of arms control
agreements. Through the Partnership for Peace programme, Allied
military forces have made a significant contribution towards
improving confidence and understanding between Allied and non-Allied
military forces. The Alliance is committed to enhance the PfP
programme and its military forces will continue to support its
activities. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute
to global stability and peace by providing forces for United
Nations and OSCE missions.
43. In the event of
crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of
Alliance members, the Alliance’s military forces can complement
and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security,
and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their
peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a
capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances;
the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event
that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as
to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.
44. While in the new
security environment a general war in Europe has become highly
unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance’s military
forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace,
have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at
the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should
aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the
capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.
Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture
45. To implement its
security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment,
the organization of the Allies’ forces must be adapted to provide
capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing
crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing
war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary,
all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies’
forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following
paragraphs.
46. The size, readiness,
availability and deployment of the Alliance’s military forces will
continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be
adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms
control agreements. The Alliance welcomes the integration of
French and Spanish armed forces into the Allied military structures.
This, together with introduction of the armed forces of new Alliance
members X, Y and Z, represents a significant enhancement of Allied
military capability which will be balanced by appropriate reductions
to reflect the improved security situation in Europe. This means
in particular:
a. that the overall
size of the Allies’ forces, and in many cases
their readiness, will be significantly reduced, following
the CFE modernisation talks. The Alliance is prepared to
take steps to this effect and will abide by this commitment
irrespective of the number of new members that may join the
Alliance in the future.
b. that the
maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture
in the central region will no longer be required. T the
peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a
sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the
Alliance. including where necessary forward deployment of
appropriate forces. Major forward deployment in the
northern, southern and central regions is no longer required. Regional
considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within
the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the
shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions
will be subject compared with the central region and, in the
southern region, the potential for instability and the military
capabilities in the adjacent areas.
47. To ensure that at
this reduced level the Allies’ forces can play an effective role
both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any
Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an
assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these
reasons:
a. Available forces
will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion,
ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to
respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are
unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and
readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend
the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those
launched without long warning time.
b. The forces of the
Allies will be structured so as to permit their military
capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up
by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting
forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance
security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one
that prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major
conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and
resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of
critical importance.
c. Appropriate force
structures and procedures, including those that would provide an
ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and
discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and
timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These
arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.
d. In the event of use
of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other
available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis
management, the Alliance’s political authorities will, as
before, exercise close control over their employment at all
stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the
new missions and posture of Alliance forces.
Characteristics of Conventional Forces
48. It is essential that
the Allies’ military forces have a credible ability to fulfil
their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the
new security environment. This will be reflected in force and
equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and
exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up
capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The
conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to
immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will
provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance’s
territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of
communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means
of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence
and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable
elements. Major reductions will be implemented in main defence
forces.
49. Ground, maritime and
air forces will have to co-operate closely and combine and assist
each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These
forces will consist of the following:
a. Ground forces,
which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will
normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will
be a greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories
of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness
together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible
deployment.
b. Maritime forces,
which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and
endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance’s
crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure
sea control in order to safeguard the Allies’ sea lines of
communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to
protect the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based nuclear
deterrent.
c. Air forces, whose
ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air
and combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and
offensive air support - as well as to contribute to surveillance,
reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to
the overall effectiveness of the Allies’ military forces. Their
role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require
appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities.
Air defence forces, including modern air command and control
systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.
50. In light of the
potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction should be given special
consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary
approaches including, for example, export control,
and missile defences. non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament measures.
51. Alliance strategy is
not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain
committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global,
comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical
weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions
of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained. welcome
the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
52. In the new security
environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future,
the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost
effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important
for the achievement of the missions of the Allies’ forces. The
Alliance’s collective defence arrangements in which, for those
concerned, the integrated military structure, including
multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this
regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they
are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence
Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to
play in enhancing the Allies’ ability to work together in the
common defence. Allies’ efforts to achieve maximum co-operation
will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above.
Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary
mutual transparency and complementarity between the European
security and defence identity and the Alliance.
52a. Agreement on the
Combined Joint Task Force concept is an important development which
will enhance the ability of the Alliance to perform its functions.
By permitting a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces,
including for new missions, this concept will facilitate the
mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but
not separate military capabilities in operations led by the OSCE
and the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance
in operations such as IFOR.
52b. The Alliance
welcomes the recommendations of the Military Committee’s Long-Term
Study on the adaptation of the Allied military command structure.
53. In order to be able
to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the
Allies concerned will require effective
surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control,
mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics
capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must
be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit
effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the
Allies concerned to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained
forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to
Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to
crisis management and defence. This capability will include the
ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the
Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this
is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of
being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and
transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will
require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as
appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will
be of increasing relevance in this context.
54. For the
Allies concerned, c Collective defence arrangements
will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing
national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the
Alliance’s resolve to maintain a credible collective defence;
enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership
and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in
particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also
provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be
available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use
of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated,
multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.
Characteristics of Nuclear Forces
55. The fundamental
purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to
preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They
will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in
the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response
to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind
is not a rational option. However, nuclear deterrence is
not an infallible system and is particularly unsuited to the real
world environment of irrational actors and simple human and
technical errors. The supreme guarantee of the security of the
Allies from nuclear attack will be the elimination of nuclear
weapons. is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of
the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the
independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which
have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall
deterrence and security of the Allies.
56. A credible Alliance
nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and
common commitment to war prevention continue no
longer to requires widespread
participation by European Allies involved in collective defence
planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on
their territory and in command, control and consultation
arrangements. These military structures, created and implemented
after 1967, were not needed in the first twenty years of the
Alliance and are even less useful in the new security environment.
Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide
an essential political and military link between the European and
the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will
therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces
need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate
flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and
effective element of the Allies’ strategy in preventing war. They
will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace
and stability.
57. The Allies concerned
consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation,
including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative
balance and increased reaction times, NATO’s ability to defuse a
crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be
necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will
has significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use
of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are
therefore even more remote. They can therefore eliminate their
remaining significantly reduce their
sub-strategic nuclear forces as part of a verifiable,
irreversible and reciprocal process. The Alliance looks forward to
steps being taken unilaterally by the United States, the Russian
Federation, the UK and France to eliminate all remaining
sub-strategic nuclear weapons. They will maintain
adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an
essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the
trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable
aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore
systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be
deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack
submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or
ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be
eliminated.
PART V - CONCLUSION
58. This Strategic
Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the
resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The Alliance’s security policy is based on
dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as mutually
reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of
the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security
at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the
requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an
essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.
59. The Allies will
continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and
confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing
security and stability. They will also play an active part in
promoting dialogue and co-operation between states on the basis of
the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.
60. NATO’s strategy
will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the
politico-military environment, including progress in the moves
towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the
risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic
Concept will form the basis for the further development of the
Alliance’s defence policy, its operational concepts, its
conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence
planning arrangements.
1 This
is an initiative suggested by a number of non-governmental
individuals and former government and military officials.
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