BASIC PAPERS

APRIL 1996 • NUMBER 16 • ISSN 1353-0402

NATO Enlargement and Ukraine

Executive Summary
Ukraine has so far been treated as marginal in the discussions on NATO enlargement. Despite the fact that Ukraine has, on a number of occasions, expressed concern about NATO enlargement, the Alliance is preparing to expand into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and Ukraine is not a candidate for membership. The Alliance issued its Study on NATO Enlargement in September 1995, but it has not yet addressed specific countries' concerns.

Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has demonstrated its willingness to work with NATO by participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and by joining the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP). However, these structures could lose their appeal for Kiev if NATO expands to selected countries of central Europe.

This paper argues that the enlargement of NATO to the borders of the former Soviet Union may create new dividing lines in Europe and isolate Ukraine. It may:

• undermine the West's strategy of preserving an independent and unified Ukraine which serves as a strong counterweight to rising nationalist or neo-imperialist forces in Russia. Ukraine may turn into a buffer state pulled back and forth between an enlarged NATO and an isolated Russia, or it may be forced to integrate into the CIS military structures at the cost of its independence. Priority should be given to devising an agreed place for Russia and Ukraine in the European security structure. Decisions on NATO enlargement should not be made until this question has been decided. The West should encourage Ukraine and Russia to solve their bilateral problems by tying financial aid and cooperation with Western organisations to the signing and implementation of the long-postponed friendship treaty between the two states;
  
  
• lead to a deterioration of Ukraine's bilateral relations with its neighbours, namely Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and, in particular, Romania. Ukrainian-Romanian relations are far from being normalised and the long-awaited bilateral treaty is still pending. Romanian admission to NATO would further complicate relations between the two countries. If NATO takes the decision to enlarge it should, at least, ensure that outstanding issues are resolved beforehand;
  
  
• undermine Ukraine's policy on nuclear weapons, especially proposals concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones. NATO should make a commitment not to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

Ukraine's Foreign Policy and NATO
When independence was declared in 1991, former President Leonid Kravchuk placed great emphasis on conducting an independent foreign policy with the aim of linking Ukraine to the rest of Europe. He was prepared to consider Ukraine's membership in NATO. However, his successor, Leonid Kuchma, adopted a more cautious approach to NATO enlargement. Although Kiev is an enthusiastic participant of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, its leaders have ruled out Ukrainian membership in the Alliance for the time being and have called for an overhaul of NATO's mission.

During his visit to NATO headquarters in September 1995, Ukraine's Foreign Minister, Hennady Udovenko, acknowledged NATO's "substantial role in ensuring peace, stability, democracy and the prosperity of Western Europe and the wider transatlantic area". Ukraine was the first CIS country to join the PfP in February 1994 and became one of its most fervent supporters.¹ Ukraine's Individual Partnership Programme, (IPP) initialled in 1995, sets out a comprehensive set of measures designed to increase military cooperation between the Ukrainian Army and those of NATO. Ukraine has already carried out a number of joint military exercises on foreign and home territory including 3 bilateral peacekeeping exercises with the US Army.

During President Kuchma's visit to Washington in February 1996, US Defence Secretary William Perry claimed that "Ukraine can achieve its security interests through a vigorous role in the Partnership for Peace and through a strong bilateral security relationship with the US, both of which exist now".² For the time being, PfP might accommodate Ukraine's security concerns, but the partnership scheme could lose its appeal if NATO expands.

Ukraine is unwilling to be seen as obstructing NATO's policy of enlargement. Instead, Kiev has put forward alternatives. Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko has described Ukraine's vision for a new security system in Europe which would involve a critical review of NATO's mission and purpose. He wants: "NATO to thoroughly reconsider its role in modern Europe and to develop itself by an evolutionary process from a collective defence organization into a collective security institution, thus becoming a possible nucleus for a future all-European security system that would encompass other mutually complementary, interlocking institutions". Expressing Ukraine's ambivalence, he signalled a slight variation in Ukraine's standpoint: "Ukraine ... still adheres to the policy of nonparticipation in military alliances and has not put the issue of NATO membership on the agenda for the time being".³

Whereas in Russia outright rejection of NATO enlargement is to be found all along the political spectrum, Ukrainian parties represent a variety of viewpoints: the communists, the strongest force in the parliament, opted against NATO enlargement and, first and foremost, against Ukrainian membership. The more nationalist faction Rukh, however, came out in favour of a closer integration into the West via NATO. Ukraine thus far lacks extremist politicians like Zhirinovski, the leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who has added to the confusion and emotional overload of the debate.

Effects of NATO Enlargement on Ukraine
The Study on NATO Enlargement states that the Alliance will "attach particular importance to our relations with Ukraine which we will further develop, especially through enhanced cooperation within the PfP".⁴ However, in the Study there is no attempt to analyse the impact of NATO's enlargement on Ukraine. Two scenarios will be considered here:

1. NATO enlargement without Ukraine
2. NATO enlargement including Ukraine but excluding Russia

1) NATO Enlargement without Ukraine
1.1. Ukraine may unwillingly be converted into a buffer state with NATO and Russia competing for influence over it, in a situation similar to that of Serbia before World War One. The increase in Russian influence, which is the most likely outcome, would bring about enhanced CIS collective security arrangements and could lead to a Cold-War-like confrontation. The Head of Ukraine's delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, I. Zaiets, expressed his country's unease. He said: " [The] role [of a buffer zone] for Ukraine ... cannot be acceptable. Such a situation enforces re-integrational tendencies in the military-political field inside the CIS, threatens to draw Ukraine into the CIS military block and provokes a new break-up of Europe".⁵

Although Kiev initially opted out of CIS economic and political agreements, now it has partly been drawn back in due to economic necessity. The fact that Ukraine at the 1995 CIS summit signed "a decision on setting up a unified air defence system, although with reservations"⁶ could mark the beginning of an unvoluntary military integration.

Ukraine's unease about NATO enlargement stems from the fear that the West, and the US in particular, is pursuing a "Russia first" approach in its dealings with eastern Europe and would abandon Ukraine. Ukraine's military attache in Washington, writing to BASIC in April 1995, voiced concerns stating: "The views are expressed that the USA may protect Central and Eastern European countries by admitting Visegrad states to NATO, and Ukraine will be the 'recompense' to Russia for the loss of its influence in Central Europe. Such development we consider as extremely dangerous and one that contradicts the national interests of Ukraine". US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, has tried to allay these fears by stating that: "It would be a terrible mistake for the United States to ignore Ukraine or to have it overshadowed by our relationship with Russia".⁷

1.2. Ukraine's relations with neighbouring states to the west would deteriorate, particularly since troops and nuclear weapons might be deployed close to the Ukrainian border. Russian political objections to NATO enlargement tend to obscure the fact that Russia and an extended NATO would only share one rather limited border: Poland's border with the Russian enclave Kaliningrad. Ukraine, however, borders four potential new NATO members: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Therefore, Ukraine's relations with its Central and East European neighbours are of vital importance.

Ukraine has signed agreements with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary on cooperation and good-neighbourly relations, including guarantees for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Kiev proposed a regional security zone encompassing Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria as a means of filling the "security vacuum" of central and eastern Europe. However, the attention of its western neighbours turned to NATO and this proposal was dismissed by the Visegrad countries in June 1993.⁸

Although Ukraine cannot veto the CEE countries' accession if NATO expands, it has voiced serious concern about the fact that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have agreed to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory should NATO require this.⁹ "The appearance of nuclear weapons near Ukraine is a provocation against Ukraine ... It would complicate the situation in Europe" said Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko.¹⁰

Romania is so far the only country that has raised territorial claims against Ukraine. Former parts of Romania, the northern Bukovina and southern Bessarabia, were only incorporated into the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, irredentist forces in Romania have gained considerable influence. Although it looked as if the foreign ministries from both countries had reached consensus in July 1995, Romania has now offered amendments to the draft agreement on good-neighbourly relations and cooperation. The original compromise entailed a mutual condemnation of the secret protocol between the USSR and Germany, the basis for the transfer of Romanian territory to the USSR, as well as both sides' acceptance of today's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders. Romania's latest draft, however, envisages "a peaceful way towards changing borders"¹¹ and therefore perpetuates the possibility of future Romanian territorial claims. The relations grew even more tense when the Romanian Foreign Minister, Teodor Melescanu, declared in Parliament on 4 December 1995 that his government would appeal to the International Court of Justice if Ukraine continues to refuse to hand over Serpents Island to Romania. In turn, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko recalled the 1994 trilateral agreement which guaranteed Ukraine's security and territorial integrity.¹² The tiny Black Sea island is symbolic of the larger issues at stake.

Because of the extensive bilateral problems between Ukraine and Romania, NATO should follow its own guidelines set out in the Study on NATO Enlargement . The Alliance stressed that "new members . . . must commit themselves . . . [to] settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means. . . . Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance".¹³ The West also needs to support the growth and deepening of ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the CEE.

1.3. The financial costs of NATO enlargement will be extremely high. Western financial support to CIS countries might, as a consequence, be reduced or held at a low level. Leonid Kuchma's economic reform programme would suffer at a time when Ukraine is highly dependent on foreign aid, a fact that was illustrated by the latest IMF agreement in February 1996 on a resumed $1.5 billion loan.¹⁴

1.4. Should NATO enlarge, Ukraine would find it increasingly difficult to contain regionalist forces within the country. NATO enlargement up to but not including Ukraine would provide one answer to the question of how Europe is defined in cultural terms. Inside Ukraine, it would reinforce the cultural faultline that runs through the country separating the catholic West, the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism, from the more russified, orthodox East and South. Historically, these parts have never been part of the same independent state. The western regions are more western-oriented, whereas the eastern parts have closer ties to Russia. Intensifying domestic political conflict would add to Ukraine's instability and provide domestic partners for the competing foreign powers.

1.5. NATO enlargement would considerably change the balance of conventional forces in Europe and leave an enlarged NATO with even greater military superiority over Russia. Although US Defence Secretary William Perry praised Ukraine's fulfillment of its obligations in accordance with the trilateral accords when Kuchma visited the Pentagon in February 1996, the possibility remains that Ukraine might slow the fulfillment of its arms control commitments and seek again to renegotiate its obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).

In 1992 President Kravchuk agreed to return all nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to Russia, to become a non-nuclear state and to join the NPT. At first, Kravchuk met severe opposition from the communist-dominated parliament, but eventually, in December 1994, the US and Russia formulated the security guarantees Ukraine was asking for in a trilateral agreement. This agreement includes, above all, the preservation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and political independence. It opened the way for Ukraine to declare its non-nuclear status, join START-1 and the NPT and to become a recipient of US, IMF and EU financial aid.

At the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summit in Budapest in December 1994, Kuchma stressed the symbolic significance of the trilateral agreement as a commitment to eradicate all nuclear weapons around the world.¹⁵ "By ratifying the NPT and giving up the world's largest nuclear weapons inventory, Ukraine's leaders sent a powerful message: nuclear weapons are not necessary to assure national security."¹⁶ So far this message has not been discussed in the West; neither have subsequent suggestions from Ukraine and Belarus to create a nuclear-free zone in the centre of Europe.¹⁷ Ukraine has to date given up all tactical nuclear weapons and continues to remove the strategic ones.¹⁸ NATO enlargement and the possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of its members in CEE would be a disproportionate answer to Ukrainian unilateral steps, and would destroy any momentum toward a nuclear weapons free zone, which the Ukraine is trying to build.

2) NATO Enlargement including Ukraine but excluding Russia
2.1. NATO membership for Ukraine embodies one of Russia's greatest fears: losing Ukraine to the West. Ukrainian-Russian relations can be considered the most important of all relations within the CIS. At the same time they have far-reaching consequences for the West. Russia's difficulty in accepting Ukrainian independence presents the general backdrop for the problematic relationship. Unexpectedly, Russia was confronted with the fact that its historic birthplace, Kiev, had become the capital of a separate state. Russian elites and a majority of the Russian population still consider this a temporary and unnatural stage. Ukraine and Russia are therefore almost bound to clash during the difficult process of parallel state- and nation-building and the creation of national identities. The relationship is rendered even more complicated by the presence of an 11 million strong Russian minority in Ukraine plus the many Ukrainians whose mother tongue is Russian.

Concrete moves towards Ukrainian membership of NATO would trigger a serious backlash in Russia. Such moves may cause Russia to bring its cooperation with the West to an end, reinforce the military integration in the CIS -- a move which is considered as being likely within the foreign policy concept of the new Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov -- restore Cold War patterns and induce Russia to exert economic, perhaps even military pressure on Ukraine.

2.2. An assertive Russian foreign policy, nurtured by nationalism, might start playing the "Russian card" in areas with considerable Russian or Russian-speaking communities such as Crimea and eastern Ukraine: "Moscow would regard NATO membership for Ukraine as a Western shield behind which Ukrainian nationalism would feel free to Ukrainianise the present Russian-speaking population of eastern and southern Ukraine, cut the Ukrainian economy off from the Russian one, and introduce strict border controls which would separate Russians in Ukraine from those in Russia and cut Russians off from Kiev, which they regard as the historic birthplace of their state."¹⁹

The status of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) belong to the most contentious issues hampering Russian-Ukrainian relations. Only in 1954 did Khrushchev hand the peninsula, which had been part of Russia since 1783, over to Ukraine. Two-thirds of the Crimean population are Russians, and Ukrainians in Crimea are politically undermobilised. Russian nationalists in Moscow have played on the issue and supported Crimean separatism which peaked in 1994. Yeltsin, however, has so far refrained from playing the "Russian card". Moreover, the Russian nationalist faction in Crimea itself split and became insignificant after Kiev's clampdown on Crimean separatism in March 1995.

The Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, has become a focal point of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute which turned into a matter of principle rather than a rational argument over valuable assets. The fleet and its base in Sevastopol are considered the holy-of-holies of Russian imperial history. The fact that the fleet, based on Ukrainian territory, was incorporated into the new Ukrainian units inevitably evoked Russian protests. A series of protracted debates and agreements resulted. In December 1995 the transfer of Black Sea Fleet assets to Ukraine officially began and, according to plan, should be finished during the first half of 1996.20 For the time being, the issue of Crimea seems settled. However, should NATO expand, Russia might well reopen the issues of Crimea and the BSF on security grounds, perhaps underscored by a new and more openly nationalist Russian presidency and Kiev's reform failure.

Conclusions
Over the past year, the improving relationship between Ukraine and the West has helped to stabilise Ukraine under Kuchma, who is trying to push ahead with reforms. At the Clinton-Kuchma meeting in Washington in February 1996 it was emphasised that Ukrainian-American relations had reached their highest level since diplomatic relations were established.²¹ However, this positive trend may well be reversed if NATO enlargement takes place. Ukraine, physically and culturally cut off from the rest of Europe, would most likely be drawn into the Russian-dominated sphere of the CIS. The West should therefore support and strengthen the vital function Ukraine plays as a "mediator" between Russia and the West.

Given Ukraine's economic dependence on Western aid and on Russian energy resources, Kiev's warning about the possible adverse consequences of NATO enlargement is a strong indicator of Ukraine's concerns and opposition.

According to the Alliance's Study on NATO Enlargment, an enlarged NATO would "contribute to enhanced stability" and foster "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" in the new member states. However, the countries under consideration for early enlargement, the Visegrad countries, are already well on their way to liberal democracy and a market economy. If the need to bolster stability and democratization were in fact the main criteria for NATO enlargement, Russia and Ukraine would certainly be recognised as most suitable candidates.²²

NATO enlargement up to the borders of Ukraine would make Ukraine the object of political rivalry between Western states and Russia. It would galvanize nationalism both in Russia and Ukraine. The stage would be set for Russian efforts to dominate Ukraine and, perhaps, Western efforts to counter these attempts, a struggle that could end in the reduction of Ukraine's independence and outright hostility between Russia and the NATO states. The mere possibility of that outcome should make the West step back and reconsider its policy of NATO enlargement.

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Endnotes

1. Taras Kuzio, Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 9, p. 391.
2. Economist, 17 February 1996.
3. Hennady Udovenko, November 1995, "European Stability and NATO Enlargement: Ukraine's Perspective", NA