BASIC PAPERS

MARCH 1996 • NUMBER 15 • ISSN 1353-0402

Implementing Dayton:
Arms Control and Intelligence in Former Yugoslavia 

By Sami Fournier, Tasos Kokkinides, Daniel Plesch, and Richard Thomas

[NOTE: Tables not included in this version. Please see the PDF version of this BASIC Paper.]

Executive Summary and Recommendations
This paper provides a guide to Articles II, III, IV and V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement titled Agreement on Regional Stabilization and analyses US and NATO intelligence operations in Bosnia. These articles cover different parts of the territory in the Balkans and contain measures aiming at reducing military tension by requiring the parties to conclude:

1. A comprehensive set of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) for Bosnia, which has already been achieved;
2. Arms control limitations for Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia, which are ongoing;
3. Arms control measures which will include all former Yugoslav states and those neighbouring former Yugoslavia, which have not yet been initiated;

At the Proximity Peace Talks in Dayton, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Repblic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska agreed ...on the importance of devising new forms of cooperation in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence and achieving balanced and stable defense force levels at the lowest numbers consistent with the parties respective security and the need to avoid an arms race in the region. ¹

The task of reaching an agreement on all aspects of the Regional Stabilization package was handed over to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the past, the OSCE has been dismissed as a talking shop. It has now been entrusted with complex operational tasks which include monitoring human rights and organizing and monitoring elections in Bosnia. Its budget for all tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 1996 totals $24.5 million. [Decision No 100, 53rd Plenary Meeting, Permanent Council, OSCE, 11 January 1996] In contrast, the US contribution alone to the IFOR budget is about $2 billion.² There is a clear need for the OSCE to be given more political support and resources in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it.

The former warring parties in Bosnia, under the auspices of the OSCE, reached agreement on a comprehensive set of CSBMs on 26 January 1996. On 11 March the first inspections pursuant to the agreement are scheduled to take place. The agreement prevents any party from moving the bulk of its forces until 1998. Until January 1998 no party is allowed to carry out more than one military exercise involving more than 4,000 troops, 80 tanks, 100 armoured personnel carriers, 100 artillery pieces, 15 combat aircraft and 20 helicopters. In addition, there are strict territorial limits. No party can conduct notifiable (above 1500 troops) military exercises within 10 kilometers of international borders, either side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, the city limits of Gorazde, Brcko, Posavina Corridor and the territory transferred from one entity to another.

The CSBM agreement prohibits the re-introduction of the foreign forces which have been operating in Bosnia but allows the introduction of new foreign forces (pp. 3-4) Despite this and other limitations discussed in (pp. 3-5), the CSBM agreement will promote stability in Bosnia. The geographical application of the CSBM Agreement should be expanded to cover the whole territory of former Yugoslavia (pp. 5-6).

The Bosnian parties plus rump Yugoslavia and Croatia are currently involved in arms control negotiations in Vienna with the aim of substantially reducing their armaments. (pp. 5-8) The OSCE and the major powers should encourage the parties to go beyond the Dayton provisions which established a 5-2-2 ratio in the military holdings of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia respectively.

On 13 March light weapons can again be imported into Bosnia according to the timeline established at Dayton. The US plans to resume weapons transfers to the Bosnian Federation. The current Vienna arms control talks may be undermined if outside powers show little restraint in shipping offensive weapons to the region (pp. 6-8).

The OSCE needs to introduce imaginative arms control proposals for adoption. Demilitarization of border areas, inclusion of lighter weapons, binding limits on military personnel and destruction of excess military equipment are some of the measures which should be included in the negotiations (pp. 6-8).

Neighbouring states to former Yugoslavia should be prepared to reduce their military holdings in order to help bring about an arms control agreement in south-east Europe. (pp. 9-10) The Dayton accords envisage arms control negotiations on a regional level. Anumber of options are being proposed which could help reaching a regional arms control and limitation agreement (pp 9-10).

Military CSBMs and arms control measures should be accompanied by political CSBMs. The establishment of a regional negotiating forum in south-east Europe within the framework of the Stability Pact, mutual recognition between all former Yugoslav states and the re-admission of rump Yugoslavia into the OSCE structures are some of the options that should be considered. (p 10).

Effective intelligence sharing with all organisations involved in implementing the provisions of Dayton will be crucial (pp 10-13). In the Cold War, intelligence products were treated as the most precious secrets of state. It appears that in Bosnia, the culture of secrecy has empowered the leading Western nations to engage in political games with each other. Their practices have contradicted the policies they present to their publics and their claim to unique coalition cohesion in solving foreign policy problems. Transparency and the greatest possible openness is the remedy. The OSCE has been promised immediate and detailed information from IFOR to ensure the safety of inspection teams implementing the CSBM agreement. IFOR should be forthcoming with intelligence assessments and information to meet OSCE needs.

Article II:  CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Under Article II, the Agreement on Regional Stabilization, the parties were required to negotiate CSBMs designed to avoid a return to conflict. On 26 January 1996, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska reached that agreement, making a major step toward military stabilisation in Bosnia. Hungarian Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, who conducted the negotiations on behalf of the OSCE, hailed the agreement as a big success. He said: It is the first time in history that former warring parties switched from war to arms control within weeks.³

The agreement is of an unlimited duration. However, in January 1998 any party can withdraw from it. The OSCE shall convene a Review Conference February 15, 1998 to assess its implementation and decide about the future.

Although there are a few potentially serious loopholes in the CSBM agreement, it nevertheless provides a strong basis for easing military tensions. It is based on the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs which was updated in 1994. The Vienna Document, which is the most comprehensive CSBM Document applied throughout the OSCE territory, has been instrumental in reducing military tensions and improving confidence in Europe. Like the Vienna Document, the 26 January CSBMs agreement contains provisions for the exchange of military information including plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems, the identification and monitoring of weapons manufacturing capabilities, the establishment of military liaison missions between the Chiefs of the armed forces and an ambitious programme of military contacts and co-operation.

In addition, it contains a number of measures which fall outside the traditional agenda of CSBMs. The OSCE has experience in Europe with monitoring notification and military information exchanges. However, the restraining measures such as restrictions on military deployments in certain areas, on the reintroduction of foreign forces, on the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to cantonments/barracks and the restrictions on locations of heavy weapons are more specific an extensive than the conventional notion of CSBMs. The OSCE, having been called on to help enforce the restoration of normal relations between formerly warring parties, is venturing into unknown waters.

The limitations of CSBMs were exposed during the Russian military involvement in Chechnya. Despite strict guidelines layed down in the Vienna Document obliging Russia to notify 42 days in advance the movement of its troops, Moscow violated its obligations by failing to notify and by exceeding the 9,000-troop mark specified in the document. The OSCE is not mandated to enforce the Vienna Document provisions, which are in any case not legally binding. Its role is based on the political commitments of OSCE States to comply with its provisions. The Bosnian CSBM agreement is unique in that it is the first agreement of this type to be initiated in the presence of a huge multinational peace enforcement operation. IFOR commanders, fearing mission creep , are reluctant to enforce implementation of the agreement. NATO takes the position that such a role would not fall within their mission as defined.

Maximizing the chance of success of the civilian and military aspects of Dayton would require expanding the geographical application of the CSBMs accord to the whole territory of former Yugoslavia. As Carl Bildt, the High Representative for Bosnia, remarked: How can anyone expect Bosnia-Herzegovina to live in peace, while being surrounded by a highly unstable area from all sides? ⁴

Loopholes In the CSBM Accord
The regional stabilization objectives layed out in Annex 1-B of the Dayton Accord can be best achieved by closing the three major loopholes in the 26 January CSBM agreement:

1. The section (V) Information on Defence Related Matters of Measure I fails to fulfill the letter of the Dayton Accords with respect to equipment and training. It does not request information on foreign military aid which the Dayton Accords require. The CSBM accord is meant to fulfill the requirements in Dayton, which specify that there should be notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programs. Under the CSBM accord, the parties shall inform each other on the training programs for their armed forces. However, there is no provision for the exchange of information regarding international assistance in training. Questions remain as to why this language from Dayton did not appear in the CSBMs agreement. Special provisions should therefore be made outside of the CSBMs agreement to exchange this information.
   
   
2. Measure VI titled Restraints on the Reintroduction of Foreign Forces leaves the door open to the introduction of new foreign forces to the region. The measure states that All forces...which are not of local origin...including individual advisers, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers and personnel from neighbouring or any other states, which are withdrawn together with their armaments and equipment in accordance with Article III of Annex 1-A, shall not be reintroduced into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. [CSBM-Measure VI, p. 15] This clearly allows the introduction of new advisers, trainers and volunteers.

   In paragraph 2 of the same measure it is stated that The Parties shall notify each other and the Personal Representative on the first of each month on the status of any foreign military personnel that are physically present on their territory . The measure, therefore, effectively calls for restraints on the reintroduction of mainly Iranian or Russian mercenaries but permits the introduction of US or Turkish personnel since they were not previously present. A US official, talking to BASIC on condition of anonymity, confirmed that this was a deliberate change in policy since the international community could not legislate forever on stopping foreign military personnel entering the region. However, the provision can be revised during the Review Conference in February 15, 1998, when the CSBM agreement will be assessed and its future will be decided. The Parties should at least agree to impose until that date strict limits on the number of foreign military personnel who will arrive in the region.

   This measure has not been fully implemented. According to IFOR spokesman Lt. Col. Hoey there are still 150-200 foreign personnel operating in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in contravention of the 19 January 1996 deadline in Dayton and in violation of the CSBMs agreement. The Federation government is required to make a report at the first of every month about the presence of foreign troops, and has done so as of 1 March 1996.

3. Measure IV titled Notification and Observation of and Constraints on Certain Military Activities prevents substantial troop movements, aiming to prevent the parties from threatening or preparing war. Large scale military movements will be a breach of the agreement and a clear early-warning signal. Although the restraining aspect of this measure is a step in the right direction, the ceiling of permitted military activities should have been lower. The measure draws heavily from the Vienna 1994 CSBM Agreement (see p. 2) and adjusts its provisions to the Bosnian context, defining a notifiable military activity as subject to notification and observation by other parties and the OSCE if it involves more than 1,500 troops, 25 tanks, 40 armoured combat vehicles, 40 artillery pieces, 3 combat aircraft and 5 combat helicopters. In addition, the measure contains detailed constraining measures which prohibit military activities involving more than 4,000 troops, or 80 battle tanks, or 100 ACVs or 100 Artillery pieces or 15 combat aircraft or 20 combat helicopters until January 1998. According to the Pentagon, the size of the Bosnian Serb force that overran Srebrenica in July 1995 was not more than 4,000 troops with 10 tanks and 20 to 50 artillery pieces.⁵ The movement of such a force would be militarily significant and could destabilise the fragile peace. Thus, to provide an extra measure of security, the limit should have been lower. Additionally, other countries in the region are not part of the CSBM agreement and therefore those measures do not constrain them from mobilizing on Bosnia's borders.

Verification of the CSBM Accord
Ensuring that the OSCE has adequate political support and resources to verify the CSBMs agreement will be vital. The accords contain detailed and intrusive verification procedures. After delays due to the temporary termination of contacts by the Republika Srpska from 5 to 28 February (in response to the arrest of a Bosnian Serb General by Federation forces), the schedule of implementing the agreement has been able to make up for lost time. The first two inspections on 11 March will be conducted by 9-person multinational teams headed by French and German inspectors, one in the Federation and one in the Republika Srpska. The OSCE States will provide trained personnel to assist the parties in verification. Over the next four months, 19 inspections are scheduled throughout the territory of Bosnia. Unimpeded movement of inspectors in the territory of Bosnia will be a top priority. To ensure the inspectors' safety, IFOR should assist the OSCE.

The OSCE will be saddled with an enormous burden of tasks in connection with verification of the agreement. Seventeen of them are enumerated in the verification annex. These include:

• having countries provide technical support and inspectors and, on a national basis, cover the costs of the technical support and their inspectors;
  
  
• facilitating technical support (transportation etc.) for all inspections in the baseline validation period;
  
  
• processing inspection requests from the Parties and incorporating them in the plan of inspections;
  
  
• sharing inspection reports immediately with the Parties;
  
  
• establishing the schedule of inspections, which shall include the number and timing of inspections per week, the selection of team leaders and inspectors, after consultation with the Party concerned, ensuring proper representation of the Party whose active quota is used and the assembly points to be used;
  
  
• offering training for inspectors from the Parties;
  
  
• preparing an impartial assessment after the completion of the baseline validation period.

The OSCE has little leverage with which to ensure compliance. The international community must lay down plans and procedures for dealing with possible violations of the CSBM agreement. A hot line between inspection teams, Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati and foreign ministries of the major powers should be established to respond to non-compliance. Devising a coordinated means of bringing political and economic pressure to bear on the parties to maintain the schedule of inspections and compliance should also become a priority. The reconstruction programs which are currently being planned should be tied to full compliance with Dayton and the CSBMs and arms control agreements. As the Republika Srpska is brought into the reconstruction effort, reconstruction funds are a powerful carrot which can be offered in exchange for compliance.

At the London Peace Implementation Conference on 8-9 December 1995 it was decided that IFOR might be asked to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace Agreement .⁶ Despite the relctance to be drawn into the implementation of the CSBM agreement, it is feasible that NATO could receive a request from the OSCE to offer protection and access to military installations for its monitors.

NATO must deliver on its promise to work with the OSCE and to make its assets available. The Alliance has promised assistance in sharing the experience and expertise of the Verification Coordination Committee which was established to oversee CFE implementation and making available its database, VERITY, to the OSCE and the parties to the agreement.⁷

Another important area of cooperation would be the sharing of intelligence assets. (see section below) It would be helpful to expand the availability of intelligence for use by OSCE officials planning and monitoring the agreements. OSCE mission offices should be issued ground station equipment for receipt of early warning reports about the areas they will inspect. The computerized trip planners with detailed maps which are used by the US military should be made available to OSCE inspectors.

Article III:  Regional CSBMs
This article instructs the Parties to initiate steps toward a regional agreement on CSBMs. Part of this agreement is the commitment of the Parties not to import any arms until 13 March (90 days after the Annex entered into force) and not to import heavy weapons or heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft and helicopters until 11 June (180 days after the Annex entered into force or until the arms control agreement takes effect). Heavy weapons refers to all tanks and armoured vehicles, all artillery 75mm and above, all mortars 81mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20mm and above.

Although those two measures are important in stemming the influx of weapons to the region until the Spring and early Summer of 1996, the duration and area of application are limited and therefore not sufficient to promote an atmosphere of confidence and security between all the former Yugoslav states.

Article IV:  Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control
At Dayton, Yugoslavia, Croatia, and the former warring parties of Bosnia reached an arms control agreement which establishes a balance of forces on a 5-2-2 ratio. The allocations for Bosnia will be divided 2-1 for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska respectively.The baseline, which was exchanged on 15 February but has not been made public, is the determined holdings of former Yugoslavia. The more difficult task of negotiating larger cuts in the military holdings of the parties is on-going.

According to data compiled by BASIC, Yugoslavia would be required to reduce substantially its holdings of the specified five categories of military equipment. Croatia would be required to make cuts in its tanks and armored combat vehicles but it will be allowed more artillery, aircraft and attack helicopters. Republika Srpska wll be allowed more aircraft and attack helicopters whereas the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be allowed to obtain weapons on all categories, except tanks, in order to achieve the 5-2-2 ratio.

The 5-2-2 ratio is a positive arms control measure based on the CFE-principle of unequal cuts in military holdings. It will be essential in creating a military balance between Yugoslavia, Croatia, and the former warring parties in Bosnia. However, the price to be paid in achieving military balance is the military build-up in the Bosnian Federation and Croatia. In order to avoid this the international community and the OSCE should encourage the parties to conclude an arms limitation agreement which will include substantial cuts in their armoury.

The parties to the agreement are currently negotiating in Vienna under the auspices of the OSCE toward the establishment of a stable military balance based on the lowest level of armaments [Dayton]. The ongoing talks, conducted under the chairmanship of General Vigleik Eide of Norway and due to conclude by 6 June 1996, aim at limitations beyond the 5-2-2 ratio. Failure in Vienna would require the parties to implement the 5-2-2 formula.

The parties agreed in Dayton that the arms control accord shall establish numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, as defined in the relevant sections of the CFE Treaty, with the additional understanding that artillery pieces will be defined as those of 75mm calibre and above . [Dayton]

The arms control negotiations should be supported in the following ways:

1. Other countries should demonstrate restraint in offering military training and assistance to any party in former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Federation must be able to defend itself after the departure of IFOR. However, Washington and other potential suppliers should refrain from shipping to Sarajevo offensive and destabilising weapons systems. Similarly, Moscow should refrain from equipping Belgrade and Pale.

   The US and Turkey, in particular, have promised support for the training and equipping of the Bosnian Federation army. The US State Department's Ambassador-at-large charged with overseeing Dayton's implementation, Robert Gallucci, confirmed that the Federation would be armed and trained even if the arms control agreements are fulfilled.⁸ The Clinton administration is drawing up plans for transferring between $100 to $800 million worth in arms and other military equipment to the Federation. Some of these weapons may come out of the Excess Defense Articles program, which allows the US to transfer to other countries excess military equipment.⁹ The US Administration is expecting financial contributions from other states which may be forthcoming during a series of conferences on military aid to Bosnia. The Turkish government has announced that it will host the first conference on 15 March 1996.¹⁰

   According to US sources, the US package will include anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, command, control, communications and intelligence systems and other non-lethal equipment. The US Administration has briefed Belgrade and other interested parties on the details of the proposed package for the Bosnian Federation.

   Turkey signed a military training deal with the Bosnian government. Although details of the deal have not become available, General Rasim Delic of the Bosnian Army said: We expect huge aid from Turkey which has a long military tradition...This is only the beginning. Full military training is expected .¹¹ Ankara should provide details of this and the Bosnian government should inform the OSCE and the parties to the CSBM agreement of the provisions of the training deal.

   If the defensive disposition of the US package and the Turkish military training deal were made public, the arms control process would benefit. Even if they brief each other privately, the failure to disclose the numbers and types of equipment involved in the planned transfer undermines the confidence and transparency in military matters that Washington has worked so hard to try to install on all the parties of former Yugoslavia. It also complicates the negotiations in Vienna where the parties are attempting to agree lower arms limits. Arms control efforts are hindered by the awareness that, while negotiating parties attempt to deal with the capabilities declared in the baseline data, the Federation is due to have its own capabilities enhanced. Unrestrained and covert international military assistance to one of the parties may undermine the arms control negotiations and may open the door for reciprocal military assistance from another State. A renewed arms race in the region will fuel the fires of war in former Yugoslavia.

   In a thinly disguised warning to Washington, British Foreign Minister Malcolm Rifkind, said that all members of the international community will need to show wisdom and restraint in ensuring that the pursuit of markets for weaponry does not undermine the arms control process and fuel a regional arms race .¹² Rifkind then made an apparent U-turn of Britain's position, when, during his visit to Slovenia, he told the Slovenian government that it should buy British and other European defence equipment if it wants to join NATO.¹³ Other NATO allies have warned that arming and training the Bosnian Federation forces could jeopardize the neutrality and trust which IFOR is trying to build.¹⁴

2. The parties should agree and the OSCE should ensure that all defence equipment reduced under this agreement is destroyed. The Dayton accords do not specify what will happen to them. The danger is that if those weapons are stored they could quickly be re-introduced.
   
   
3. The parties should agree to establish 10 km demilitarized zones along border areas throughout former Yugoslavia and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) within Bosnia. This could be done by extending the provisions of Measure V of the CSBM agreement titled Restrictions on Military Deployments and Exercises in Certain Geographic Areas. This measure prohibits military exercises or any other verifiable military exercises within 10 kilometers of an international border, either side of the IEBL between the Federation and the Republika Srpska, the city limits of Gorazde, the city limits of Brcko and all areas within the Posavina corridor, and the territory transferred from one entity to another. The parties should demilitarize the areas specified above and extend Measure V provisions around the borders of the rest of former Yugoslav states.

   The parties should agree to introduce operational arms control measures which will include constraints on the range and deployment areas of weapons in order to reduce their offensive capability. For example, all artillery with a range of 10km would be deployed at least 15km behind borders and the IEBL.

4. The arms control agenda should include smaller artillery than 75mm as currently forseen. All mortars 81mm and above and all anti-aircraft weapons 20mm and above should also be included in th negotiations. These categories are restricted for the first 180 days by Annex 1-B, Article III, B of Dayton.
   
   
5. The agenda should be modified in order to make binding commitments in reducing the inflated armies in former Yugoslavia. The current agenda forsees only voluntary limits on military personnel. In addition, special provisions should be made to account for paramilitary forces in the region.
   
   
6. Progressive demilitarisation of former Yugoslavia, including light weapons, should receive active consideration. Such an option make seem unrealistic. However, should the international community be required to maintain a major force in the region for some years at cost of billions of dollars, it may prove to be far-sighted to consider this option now. Clearly, reciprocal measures by neighbouring countries and concrete assistance in the implementation of demilitarisation by the international community would be needed.

Article V:  Regional Arms Control Agreement
This article states that The OSCE will assist the Parties by designating a special representative to help organize and conduct negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Forum on Security Cooperation ( FSC ) with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia [emphasis added].

At the December 1995 OSCE Summit in Budapest participating states reaffirmed their commitment to regional negotiations with the added qualification that the mandate of these negotiations will take into account and respect existing arms control rights and obligations including limitations already undertaken on a multilateral basis by certain States in the region .¹⁵

Negotiations on Article V of the Dayton accords would begin after completion of the negotiations on Article IV. However, the format and the agenda of these negotiations have not been decided. Article V attempts to reduce armaments not only within former Yugoslavia but in south-eastern Europe as a whole region which is excessively militarised. [see Table II ] All countries neighbouring former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Albania, are parties to the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). However, the CFE limits on their tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, aircraft and combat helicopters are high. The prime consideration of policy makers negotiating the Treaty in the late 80's was to reduce tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact across central Europe. The south-east corner of Europe was not a focus of the negotiations.

Greece, Bulgaria and Romania stated at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Budapest that they will not go beyond their CFE obligations: ... the limitations on armaments, equipment and personnel strength for Bulgaria, Greece and Romania stemming from the CFE Treaty and the Concluding Act of the negotiations on personnel strength of conventional armed forces in Europe will not be subject to the negotiations forseen under Article V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement .¹⁶

Recently, initiatives toward regional arms control for the Balkans and south-east Europe have been launched, but achieved little success. The Rome Ministerial meeting of the OSCE in November 1993 instructed the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation to examine an OSCE contribution to regional security through arms control and disarmament as well as confidence-and security-building .¹⁷ A year later, at the OSCE Budapest Summit, the commitment was made to develop a framework which will serve as a basis for an agenda for establishing new measures of arms control, including in particular confidence- and security-building. We have also mandated it [the Forum for Security Cooperation] to address specific regional security problems, with special emphasis on longer-term stability in South-Eastern Europe.¹⁸

Despite the declarations of intent, there was no progress. The continuation of the Bosnian war was seen as one of the stumbling blocs in initiating regional negotiations for arms control and CSBMs, the second being the reluctance of most neighbouring states to former Yugoslavia to reduce their armaments. Article V of the Dayton accords has a better chance for success, as the hostilities have ended and the momentum is building for regional stabilisation.

Other south-east European states have not to date offered any response to the statement by Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Alfred Serreqi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Albania, stressed at the CSBM conference in Petersberg on 18 December 1995 that : It is important to ensure both the internal balance of the ex-Yugoslav states and the external balance, with the participation of absolutely all the states in the region .¹⁹ However the refusal of the three Balkan countries to negotiate the CFE-established limits on their weapons may induce Albania and the rest to ignore the talks.

OSCE sources in Vienna told BASIC that the provisions of the Dayton agreement are legally binding only for the signatories. Therefore neighbouring states are not obliged to participate in those talks. However, having made the commitment at the OSCE Council in Budapest to participate, failing to do so in good faith will be against the spirit of Dayton. High-level delegations from the principle two European institutions, the EU and NATO, should approach Greece, Bulgaria and Romania in order to persuade them to abandon their reluctance to reduce their armaments.

There is also a clear need to develop imaginative arms control proposals which would reverse rump Yugoslavia's and Croatia's reluctance to reduce their weapons and personnel. Both those two countries cite the need to maintain military balance with their neighbours beyond former Yugoslavia. One option to meet this need could be to subdivide the former Yugoslav territory into a series of zones, similar to the ones established in the CFE Treaty. According to this principle, rump Yugoslavia, for example, would be permitted only 10% of its forces to be stationed within 100 km of the borders with Bosnia and a further 10% within 100 km of the borders with Croatia. Belgrade would therefore maintain the military balance with Romania and Bulgaria. The same will be true for Croatia if Zagreb is limited to maintaining a fraction of its armed forces 100km away from the borders of Bosnia and rump Yugoslavia.

Negotiators should also adapt a sufficiency rule to south-east Europe. No state may have more than a certain percentage of the total number of weapons in all categories, including military personnel in the region.

Political CSBMs

1. A regional negotiating forum for former Yugoslavia and south-east Europe should be established within the framework of the Stability Pact. Under the Stability Pact, wich was adopted in March 1995, two forums have already been established, one for the Baltics and the second for Central Europe. These forums provide for regular and high-level consultations between all regional states. South-east European states should be encouraged to negotiate and agree bilateral friendship treaties with their neighbours confirming the inviolability of the borders and respect for ethnic minority rights. France, which originally conceived the idea for a Stability Pact, supports the establishment of a south-east European regional forum. Herve de Charette, the French Foreign Minister, said: "In order to facilitate the dialogue and emergence of solutions, this should fall within the process of the Pact on Stability in Europe...So I suggest, with the current and future OSCE presidencies, looking at what action it will be possible to take to follow up our meeting. Consideration will probably have to be given, at the appropriate moment, to the usefulness of establishing a regional table."²⁰
   
   
2. All former Yugoslav states should recognise each other. Croatia is threatening to withdraw from the Vienna talks on arms control if Belgrade continues to refuse to recognise Zagreb.
   
   
3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose OSCE membership was suspended on July 1992, must be re-integrated into the OSCE structures. Milan Milutinovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, said: Unless the decision barring the FR of Yugoslavia from cooperation with the OSCE is changed, the FR of Yugoslavia will be prevented to cooperate despite its readiness to do so. After all, cooperation implies full equality of participants in every respect, including their status... ²¹

IFOR Intelligence
Complex multinational operations such as the IFOR in Bosnia have required the US and NATO to reevaluate how they deal with intelligence. Lessons being learned in Bosnia while conducting a mission whose objectives include impartiality and transparency will serve as a foundation for the evolution of the intelligence-sharing and synthesis approach by the US. In Europe, prior to the IFOR joint task force deployment, the US has largely controlled NATO's intelligence apparatus. This has resulted in at least three incidence, discussed below, in which coalition decision-making has eroded due to withheld information.

Out of a concern not to compromise US and other national intelligence contributions, NATO established a fundamental principle limiting the sharing of intelligence with allies, which states,

Under normal circumstances nearly all NATO intelligence is supplied to the Alliance by nations for the exclusive use of the Alliance as a whole and for its constituent nations. Intelligence provided on this basis cannot be given by NATO to a non-member nations or any international organization containing non-member nations. Whatever different requirements emerge for peace support operations, this fundamental principle must be upheld. (MC 327, Annex D).

NATO has managed to work around this principle to achieve some sharing of information in IFOR by protection of sources and methods. In Bosnia, for the first time, arrangements have been made to distribute information to NATO military commanders and to connect the Allies to a dissemination system. Via the Joint Intelligence Distribution System, sanitized information is provided to NATO allies. In addition to the modifications made in military intelligence dissemination, the CIA has agreed an initiative in early 1996 to supply civilian diplomats and State Department officials with high-quality imagery and analysis, based on the fused, real-time, all source intelligence that is available to the military. The process begun last summer of reassessing intelligence needs in the Bosnian theater was impelled in part by the poor quality of photo imagery, which had undergone degradations after repeated transfers. Requirements for rapid transmission of information also prompted the reform. A group of four experts, titled the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield, evaluated sources and their distribution to commanders. Their recommendations included sharing end product intelligence with European allies. They also agreed a distribution of labor, whereby the Defense Human Intelligence (Humint) Service would concentrate on providing information on immediate threats to US forces while the CIA looks primarily at long term problems for the region. The more recent Brown Commission report, however, recommends the dissolution of military human intelligence collection, a duty which it suggests should be the sole responsibility of the CIA.²²

There has been a change in US policy of cooperation with NATO allies. Information from photography, electronic eavesdropping, troops in the field and spies is now being collated more rapidly and prepared as analysis, while protecting sources and methods. Noncritical imagery received through commercial satellites and other sources is being shared with the coalition partners. Currently in Bosnia, as part of the joint military command, the Bosnia C2 Augmentation System merges command and control with the functional information gathering and communications technologies at a center in Tuzla.²³ This system of communications using, among other high-tech equipment, satellites and fibre-optic cables, connects Pentagon planners to NATO commanders in Bosnia via the Joint Intelligence Distribution System. The information that gets shared with the allies is first sanitized by a team of analysts called a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). These teams are composed of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, and CIA personnel.²⁴ French commanders in Sarajevo and the British in Gornji Vakauf are also linked to the electronic image system and receiving information on, for example, weather, mines and locations of troops as well as the battlefield situation. The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters in Sarajevo is also connected to the system.

The nations involved in IFOR, including Britain, France, and Germany, also have significant national assets available to them, such as signals intelligence, the broad category under which communications falls. The British use satellite electronic eavesdropping which they may also be contributing to the joint system. On the US military side, the Joint Forces Air Component Commander Situational Awareness System links all the information systems.

Russia and non-NATO partners are more remotely linked to the joint system. The intelligence they are supplied from NATO is down-graded and has been treated to protect the sources and methods. IFOR-generated intelligence is coordinated by another bureaucratic layer, joint military councils composed of members of the participating forces.²⁵

The unique role of the IFOR operation and its connection to civilian reconstruction and nation-building will require further steps toward expanding intelligence dissemination. Restrictions placed by the US on intelligence-sharing might be asking NATO Allies to take too much unsourced material on faith. The success of the IFOR mission will depend on expanded sharing of high-quality information among a broad range of actors with a need to know. The US has recently moved in this direction, agreeing a policy of providing tactical information to State Department officials who travel in Bosnia and to diplomats who need specially tailored intelligence products.²⁶

The tension between needing to inform coalition partners on the one hand and maintaining secrecy on the other has only been partially resolved by adjustments to the policy of withholding certain products previously labeled No Foreign . Intelligence-sharing with NATO allies is still evolving. Several unforeseen operational issues have arisen, such as bringing foreign intelligence officers on board US reconnaissance planes. In all the intervening years between the end of the cold war and the IFOR deployment, when NATO's peacekeeping roles were being designed, these problems had not been foreseen. The matter of foreign intelligence officers was resolved,²⁷ but there were a number of instances where major political differences among Western nations were played out in the operational use of intelligence. Through control of intelligence assets, the US can choose to exert political control and influence over an operation. The following are examples which give cause for close attention to intelligence sharing issues in the Dayton implementation process.

Srebrenica
US intelligence was observing Serb activity around Srebrenica in June 1995. They obtained information based on aerial photography that troops were massing. Telephone and radio traffic between Serbian General Perisic and the Bosnian Serb General Mladic indicated the Bosnian Serb Army was planning to capture Srebrenica with support and direction from Belgrade. The Europeans were also collecting their own data and all the major European powers had intelligence information they did not make public. The US information was not shared with NATO or the UN. The UN believed the Serbs only wanted to take a small part of the enclave in the South. Pictures from US reconnaissance planes operating outside the range of vision of the Dutch units stationed in the city portrayed a different situation.²⁸

US intelligence ascertained an intent on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to neutralize the UN designated safe area.²⁹ The US did not disclose its knowledge of the impending offensive or of the massacres that followed until long after decisions had already been taken not to intervene or order NATO airstrikes. After some controversy, the US has agreed to share the intelligence with the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.³⁰ The detection of impending military activities is a common role for intelligence analysts, and will be conducted in a similar manner during the IFOR operation in Bosnia. There is no evidence that sufficient improvements have been made in intelligence gathering, distribution and interpretation to ensure more accurate and widely available assessments in Bosnia.

Bihac
Political differences between the US and Britain played out with the involvement of US intelligence near Bihac in November 1994, when the British General Sir Michael Rose, commanding UNPROFOR, was caught in a struggle with the US over the use of NATO air power. To strike Serb artillery positions, NATO planes relied on undercover SAS teams assigned to the UN. Under pressure from the US, the General, who opposed the air strikes as ineffective for defense of the UN Safe Area , nevertheless heeded UN Undersecretary-General H.E. Koffi Annon's request for close air support. However, the General's control over the intelligence assets effectively blocked the planes from making any strikes. According to US intelligence sources which were eavesdropping on communications between General Rose in Sarajevo and the SAS, he issued a command to the SAS not to show the required target information to the NATO pilots.³¹ This controversial decision and its exposure by US intelligence sources illustrate the potential difficulties in political cooperation in coalition efforts. Authority over intelligence is effectively political control, and may be unintentionally driving key military decisions which affect the safety and security of IFOR personnel.

Tuzla
In July 1995, reports emerged that US planes were supplying Bosnians with arms.³² Subsequent reports indicated that the Americans had been flying C-130 transports into Tuzla with arms for the Bosnians and that the US had manipulated intelligence operations for the no-fly zone over Bosnia so that its closest allies would not be aware of what it was doing.³³ An internal NATO inquiry conducted by Americans declared the Norwegian UN personnel who spotted the deliveries to have been in error. NATO surveillance planes detected such transports into the Bihac enclave in July as well. These US actions have caused deep and lasting concern at the highest levels in allied governments as to the reliability of America as an ally. This example is especially worrying because of the political disagreement over the US program to arm and train the Bosnian Muslims.

Coordination of improved intelligence fusion capabilities could greatly upgrade the lower-level intelligence which informs the work of the OSCE. The US assets can be valuable for implementing the CSBMs and arms control agreements, especially the rapid transmission of satellite imagery, communications databases and the Joint Decisions Intelligence Support System. The OSCE was promised use of the NATO VERITY database of military holdings of CFE States, but the database has not been made available. OSCE officials monitoring the agreements have been assured, however, that they will receive immediate information from IFOR in order to ensure the safety of the inspection teams. They will also need to make use of much of what NATO has already gathered on military holdings for effective verification.

In the year-long mission in Bosnia, the alliance will be learning how to work in coalition in the realm of intelligence, and should also consider cost factors. In the future, the coalition may be able to operate more efficiently by splitting up responsibilities for data collection according to functional specialisation, easing the burden on the US, whose National Reconnaissance Office has developed a number of high-tech tools, and has born the cost of research and development as well as providing the sophisticated equipment. The Brown Commission agrees with this in its recent report:

Through expanded international cooperation, the United States should take advantage of its preeminence in the intelligence field to further its broader political and military interests, sharing the capabilities as well as the costs.³⁴

As the concept of operations for Coalition operations develops, so should the concepts of burden sharing and comparative advantage in the realm of intelligence.

Effective implementation by the international community of all aspects of the Dayton accords, and particularly political/military measures such as the CSBMs agreement and arms control agreements, put at a premium the appropriate and effective use of intelligence assets. Intelligence gathering is only purposeful if it serves to inform policy makers and military operators. The wide variety of gathering mechanisms and sources employed in Bosnia should be available to all the actors in IFOR and many of the civilians and diplomats working to implement Dayton's provisions. These capabilities and cooperative efforts to employ them lie at the core of the claim of the Western powers to be the sole guarantor of a successful resolution of the Bosnia situation.

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Endnotes

1. Agreement on Regional Stabilization, Annex 1-B, Article I, Dayton Accords, 14 December 1995.
2. "Administration, Congress Haggling over Funds for Bosnia Mission," Inside the Pentagon, 30 November 1995.
3. OSCE Press Release No. 7/96, January 1996.
4. Conference on CSBMs and Arms Control, Petersberg, 18 December 1995.
5. "Bosnian Serbs Seize Safe Area," Washington Post, 12 July 1995.
6. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held at Lancaster House, London, 8-9 December 1995.
7. Intervention by the acting SG of NATO at the Bonn Conference on Regional Stabilization, Bonn, 18 December 1995.
8. Briefing at the Foreign Press Center, Washington, DC, 13 February 1996.
9. "US May Send $100 Million in Arms, Equipment to Bosnia", Washington Post, 8 February 1996.
10. "Turkey to Host Conference for Military Aid to Bosnia", Agence France-Presse, 8 February 1996.
11. "Turkey and Bosnia sign military training deal , Reuters, 23 January 1996.
12. Intervention by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Malcolm Rifkind, Conference on Arms Control in the Former Yugoslavia, Bonn, 18 December 1995.
13. "Buy arms from Britain, Rifkind tells Slovenia," Guardian 21 February 1996.
14. Karen Donfried and Paul Gallis, Bosnia and NATO Allied Contributions to IFOR, CRS Report, 11 December 1995.
15. 5th meeting of the Ministerial Council, Decision on OSCE action for Peace, Democracy and Stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, para. 22, OSCE, Budapest, 8 December 1995.
16. Interpretative statement under paragraph 79 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, by the delegation of Bulgaria (also on behalf of the delegations of Greece and Turkey), OSCE Ministerial meeting, 8 December 1995.
17. Decisions by the Rome Council Meeting, CSCE Secretariat, 1 December 1993.
18. Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, OSCE Budapest Summit Declaration, 5 December 1994.
19. Statement, Bonn, 18 December 1995.
20. Royaumont, Press and Information Service, French Embassy in London, 13 December 1995.
21. Statement at the Bonn Conference, 18 December 1995.
22. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996.
23. "Bosnia C2 System to Bridge Allied Communications Gap," Defense News, 12-18 February 1996.
24. US DoD background briefing regarding intelligence support to Operation in Bosnia, 18 January 1996.
25. "Data Flow to Fuel IFOR Mission," Defense News, 11-17 December 1995.
26. Walter Pincus, CIA Expands Strategic, Tactical Intelligence for Diplomats in Bosnia, Official Says, Washington Post, 10 February 1996.
27. US DoD background briefing regarding intelligence support to Operation in Bosnia, 18 January 1996.
28. Andreas Zumach, "US Intelligence knew Serbs were planning an Assault on Srebrenica," Basic Reports, 16 October 1995.
29. "New Proof Offered of Serb Atrocities," Washington Post, 29 October 1995.
30. Andreas Zumach, "Evidence Withheld," Tribunal, January/February 1996.
31. Ed Vulliamy, "How the CIA Intercepted SAS Signals," Guardian, 29 January 1996.
32. "Plane slips into Bihac with supplies," Washington Times, 28 July 1995.
33. Channel 4 News,UK, Nic Gowing, 17 November 1996

34. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996.