BASIC PAPERS

DECEMBER 1995 • NUMBER 14 • ISSN 1353-0402

Review of the Dayton Accords 

By Marin Gerskovic and Daniel Plesch

Author's Note:
This paper is intended to provide a brief overview of the Dayton Accords, highlight likely problems and recommend solutions. BASIC will periodically produce updates on the implementation of the accords as events require.

Recommendations and Summary
The Dayton Agreements provide a good and durable solution for ending the war. Forces in Bosnia are to be separated by the NATO presence and no fighting should occur between the formerly warring parties. The work which has been done is impressive. Unfortunately, there are still enormous obstacles for a peace settlement and nation-building. Broad international involvement must therefore be prompt and resolute. Unless the civilian components of the agreement are fully implemented and greater arms reductions carried out, IFOR may simply provide a time out for the warring parties before they resume the war in 1997, rested and rearmed.

Two very high political prices have been paid for the brand of peace represented in the Dayton accords: 1) it sets a very dangerous example by legitimizing the achievements of sectarian violence; 2) it sidelines the UN in favor of NATO as the central tool of international conflict resolution.

The agreements initiate a "nation building project" and Bosnia is supposed to be under an international protectorate. The roles of the UN, the OSCE, and other international organizations both in coordination with NATO and alone are much larger and more crucial than have been presented to the public. For example, "nation-building" etc., is expected to occur in a country where the blood on the ground is still very fresh, where minds are not clear, hate is burning, and war wounds are open. This is also a place where mercenaries, warlords and war profiteers are present and active.

The basic document is signed by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBH), the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). These groups have now recognized each other, and are referred to as the "Parties" within the annexes. Within the RBH two "entities" have been created: one Serb and one Croat/Moslem. It is essential that the Croatian "Republic of Hertza-Bosna" clearly and observably cease to exist--otherwise the three way conflict may recur. Note: Article I, paragraph 2(a) recognizes the existence of armed forces in each Entity (that is, Republika Srbska and Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina). Will the Croatian forces within the RBH retain their autonomy in practice? The outcome of Bosnian/Croat relations will be at least as important to the success of these accords as Bosnian/Serb relations.

In this context, the following recommendations should be taken into account:

• NATO must clarify its plan and make public the fact that it is more limited than the Dayton accords.
  
  

• The OSCE and other international bodies must be properly funded and politically supported to perform their roles.
  
  

• The military balance must be set at the lowest possible levels. The accords postpone the problem for 180 days by prohibiting the import of mines, heavy weapons or their ammunition, military aircraft or helicopters. But, under this provision, the spring could see another round of arming. Parties should instead be required to agree to further Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) restrictions including, for example, all self-propelled or towed weaponry, further rounds of reductions of TLE year on year, a moratorium on the introduction of new weapon types, and prior notification of all weapon acquisitions. If implemented, the accord makes Republika Srpska dependent on the FRY, as the target ratio for weaponry in Bosnia is 2:1 in favor of the Croat-Bosnia Federation in relation to the Bosnian Serbs.
  
  

• In order to attain the ratio, the US intends to ensure the build up of the joint military force of the Federation. It is unclear whether any extra-territorial body is willing or able to carry this out under the terms of the accord. This should be clarified.
  
  

• Former Yugoslavia and especially Croatia, RBH and Serbia are one region and the Agreement on Regional Stabilization is not complete without taking into consideration problems of refugees, foreign mercenaries, and others that can only be solved with the participation of all the parties.
  
  

• Provisions that are related to human rights, elections, and nation-building in general need much more time for implementation than is anticipated.
  
  

• The International Police Task Force (IPTF) should have police power over those who commit crimes against humanity.
  
  

• Joint institutions of RBH (Presidency, Parliament, Constitution Court, etc.) need to be located in an extraterritorial area within the city, as it is impossible to expect them to function in the territory of the previously warring Entities.
  
  

• NATO must change its current doctrine which forbids any intelligence sharing with non-NATO bodies or countries.

In general, the provisions of this agreement should also be applied to the other Former Yugoslav Republics. The Krajina should be subject to the provisions on the safe return of refugees. Slovenia and Macedonia should be included in the new regime outlined in the accords so that all the former Yugoslav republics come within European security structures.

Point-by-point analysis:

Annex 1A
In general the approach to military aspects of the agreement should be welcomed. However, in light of the past support of some NATO states for the Bosnians and Croatians, the maintenance of impartiality in the implementation of these agreements will be vital. Close attention should be given to liaison between IFOR and the civilian component if violence is used to prevent civilian nation-building tasks from being carried out.

US Secretary of Defence William Perry told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Dec. 1, "The military tasks of IFOR which we have described to you today are based on NATO's operational plan, which is approved by the North Atlantic Council. They are far more restricted than what is laid out in the Dayton agreement." It is important to clarify precisely what these differences are. According to Gen. George Joulwan, NATO "will just have one mandate, not 40, and tasks will be more clearly defined. The mandate will be crystal clear. We will have 10 times the military muscle for one-hundredth the military tasks." (Washington Times 5 Dec. 1995) The public have generally received the opposite impression; namely that IFOR will do a great deal more than UNPROFOR.

Article II, paragraph 3 gives 30 days for disarming and disbanding all armed civilian groups except authorized police forces. This article will require very rapid action, closely supervised by IFOR. An undesirable alternative is that these groups become a member of the authorized police force (as in Croatia). The question is who will give the authorization?

Article III, paragraph 1 demands in the first sentence that all forces that are not of local origin should leave RBH.

Article III, paragraph 2 says that "all foreign Forces, including individual advisers, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina." It does not say that they may not return, or that they are not allowed to stay in Croatia and work from there. Neither does it specify that U.S. sponsored training missions are excluded.

Article IV, paragraph 4(b)2 says that the Parties have agreed to be subject to military action by the IFOR if the signatories do not clear areas being transferred to the other Entity. Such difficult provisions--and there are lots of them--are going to compromise the agreements unless they are rigorously enforced by IFOR from the beginning. If they are not, some Articles are not going to be implemented. A clear example of this issue is that Parties must give positions and descriptions of all surface-to-air missiles/launchers, including mobile systems, antiaircraft artillery, supporting radars and associated command and control systems, and the location, type and strength of personnel and weaponry of all Forces. (Article V, paragraph 2 and 3) The provision of this information along with the problems NATO experiences in acquiring it should directly inform the OSCE Confidence-and Security-Building Measures. Indeed this information could form the basis of the OSCE-sponsored measures.

Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization)
The incorporation of the three states into OSCE/CSBM structures is most welcome. The 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) system is also used as a model. It will be necessary, however, to ensure that the arms embargo is not lifted. If the peace agreement is entered into in good faith, there should be no reason to upgrade the armed forces of any of the parties. Any support for increasing armaments of one side must take into account the likely reciprocal effects and possible action-reaction cycle. Furthermore, the present framework of the agreements does not control large quantities of non-CFE weapons.

Note: Article II (f) demands notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programs (Will IFOR support verification activities by the OSCE?)

In Article III, the Parties agree not to import any arms for 90 days and heavy weapons for 6 months after the enforcement of this Annex. Customs controls at borders should be especially scrupulous at this time.

Article IV deals with the military balance. The first paragraph establishes the principle that the balance is based upon the lowest level of armaments, and mandates that after 30 days, negotiations start on both armaments and manpower. Inevitably, the agreement is dependent upon reliable armament and manpower disclosures by the Parties in order to establish a baseline. Then a ratio of forces must be established. If the Parties fail to agree within 180 days, the default baseline to use will be the holdings of FRY, which then will be required to decrease by 25%, while Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina should have 30% of the baseline. Within RBH, the Federation should have 20% and Republika Srpska 10%. Thus, if no agreement is reached, the military balance in Bosnia will be 2:1 in favor of the Federation against Republika Srpska. This would make Republika Srpska more dependent on FRY. If this is in Belgrade's interest, no other agreement will be made.

Further arms control and de-militarization is essential to prevent an action-reaction cycle. The resultant CFE-style agreement will permit an uncontrolled build up of non-CFE TLE and a technological upgrade of TLE. There is a global glut of such weaponry.

Annex 2 (On Inter-Entity Boundary line)
This is the most complex and most discussed Annex, yet it is written in a very simple form. It recognizes the de-facto partition of Bosnia as a result of the expulsion of populations. The short- and long-term damage both locally and internationally of this concession to violence should not be dismissed lightly. In the re-building of civil society every effort should be made to re-build non-ethnic society. The implementation of Annex 3, 10 and 11 will be critical. Note: Article V, the issue of the City of Brcko is not solved. Also note that in the same Article, paragraph 2, there is one arbitrator for the Federation and one for Republica Srpska. However, internal boundaries in the Federation are not mentioned in this agreement. The Federation has not solved this problem. The deadline is 45 days for transferring territories from one Entity to another.

Annex 3 (On Elections)
Note: The OSCE has a key role in organizing elections. The basis is the 1991 census.

Article IV, paragraph 1 gives eligibility to any citizen over 18 whose name appears in the 1991 census to vote in the same municipality where he or she was registered in 1991. The exercise of a refugee's right to vote shall be interpreted as confirmation of his or her intention to return to Bosnia & Herzegovina. This provision together with some provisions in Annex 7 will face refugees with a hard choice.

Annex 4 (Constitution)
In previous constitutions, Moslems were considered as a people (nation or ethnicity). Now they are called Bosniacs (as if Croats and Serbs in Bosnia are not Bosnian) and the language they speak is defined Bosnian. The constitution of the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina is a proclamation, as is usually the case with constitutions. One among many proclamations requiring close monitoring is Article I, paragraph 4 which proclaims that "Neither Entity shall establish controls at the boundary."

Paragraph 7 inaugurates the citizenship of the Entities. The same paragraph (d) allows persons with dual citizenship to vote in RBH, but only if that is the country of their residence. Paragraph 7 (e) says that each Entity is issuing the passports of RBH. Article III, paragraph 2 concerns the responsibilities of the Entities. Paragraph 2 (a) gives them the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent with sovereignty and territorial integrity of RBH. Paragraph 2 (c) makes each Entity responsible for its own law enforcement. (There is no RBH law enforcement and defense). Paragraph 2 (d) gives them the right to enter into agreements with other states and international organizations.

When considering the Articles on Parliament and its procedures, it should be recalled that these provisions are very similar to those of the Bosnian Parliament in 1991. They can only work in a peaceful environment. In Croatia, elected Serbs from Krajina who were members of the Croatian parliament in 1990-91 faced a number of obstacles related to the availability of mail service, staff, telephones, and security, in addition to hate by other colleagues that led to physical fights and unbearable harassment.

A Parliamentary meeting in Sarajevo next year will require great political will and flexibility. For example, Article III, paragraph 3 (h) says that the Decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly shall not take effect before publication. There are many ways to prevent publication.

The Constitution maintains the ratio in parliament of 2:1 (Federation versus Republika), and the procedure does not permit Serbs, Bosniaks or Croatians to be outvoted except on the highest level with international involvement. This means that in practice, resolution of every dispute will require international involvement.

Note that the procedures regarding the Constitutional Court allow the international representatives to make rules and decisions together with either of the two parties (Article VI, paragraph 2 (a) and (b)).

The advantage of having a ratio of 2:1 may become a disadvantage in the future, if the two partners Croats and Muslims, who are considered one Entity, disagree. (See the Muslim-Croat Federation agreement)

Annex 5  
Annex 5 only amends the Geneva Agreement of September 8,1995 by inserting the Arbitration system.

Annex 6  
Unfortunately, this agreement on Human Rights does not take into consideration the war-like situation at hand and thus is very similar to agreements in countries that are not at war. Human rights abuses up to and including murder occur daily in Bosnia, and the penalties mentioned in the agreement will not stop them. The Parties have been subjected to them many times and are no longer afraid. Although the High Representative has the option of punishing the offending party by contracting, acquiring, and disposing of real and personal property, the question is how this will be implemented since law enforcement is in the hands of the Entities and IFOR is not acting as the High Representative's police force. (See Annex 10)

Annex 7  
Annex 7 is the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons. This document is the most comprehensive and complete of all the annexes. It confirms the will of the Parties to accept the return of refugees, including those that are in other countries (Article I, paragraph 1) and calls upon the States that have accepted them to promote their "early return" (paragraph 5).

In Article II, paragraph 2, the Parties are asked to demonstrate good will and positive considerations even to requests for exemption from military service. Similarly, Article VI prescribes amnesty for refugees charged with crime.

This Annex does not follow the 2:1 rule and other procedural possibilities that ensure that no Entity can be outvoted without international representatives. Six months after the war is too early for implementation of the provisions of this Annex. Most of them will require years of hard work.

Finally, in this annex, as in many others, the definition of the Parties is not clear. For example, this document is signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation, and Republika Srpska. If they are the Parties, then the statement of Article X, paragraph 2 -- that the expenses shall be borne equally by the Parties -- is confusing: RBH as one of the Parties consists of two Entities that, at the same time, are the other two Parties.

Annex 8
Annex 8 is about National Monuments. It establishes a Commission to preserve monuments throughout Bosnia that do not necessarily belong to the culture of the ruling ethnicity. It is in the interest of all sides to make sure that these monuments are preserved, no matter to which culture they belong (for example, an orthodox church in Sarajevo or a Moslem mosque in Banjo Luka).

Annex 9  
Annex 9 concerns the establishment of the Transportation Corporation as a public corporation. This very practical step will have a great impact on the peace settlement, as it is going to be one of the first steps testing the willingness of the Parties to cooperate. This Corporation will be established with the signing of the peace treaty in Paris. This Annex also establishes the Commission on Public Corporations headed by a Chairman designated by the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Annex 10  
Annex 10 concerns civilian implementation of the Peace Settlement. It has been agreed upon by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the usual three parties of RBH. This agreement calls upon the UN Security Council to designate a High Representative who is to carry out the tasks of the Agreement and be in charge of the implementation of a peace settlement in RBH. This office will coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies, give them general guidance and get information relevant to their operations. (Article II (c)). It also provides guidance to, and receives reports from, the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force established in Annex 11.

The High Representative convenes and chairs the "Joint Civilian Commission" comprised of "senior political representatives of the Parties." If Croatia and FRY are Parties to this agreement, this appears to mean that they will send their representatives as well as the IFOR Commander or his representative, and "representatives of those civilian organizations and agencies the High Representative deems necessary" (Article II, paragraph 2).

This critical document also describes the relationship of the High Representative with IFOR and the Joint Military Commission. It states explicitly that the High Representative does not have authority over IFOR and that although he/she attends, or is being represented on the Joint Military Commission, it is only for advice on matters of a political-military nature. Due to the importance of the office of the High Representative, he/she has all diplomatic privileges. This importance should also be reflected in a better definition of its responsibility and accountability to the Security Council.

Annex 11  
Annex 11 is on the International Police Task Force. This organization headed by the IPTF Commissioner who is appointed by the UN General Secretary, has no real police task. The IPTF is restricted to monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities (Article III, paragraph 1 (a)). It also has the role of advising (b),training (c), facilitating (d) and assisting (g) police forces in the entities. Article V is about failure to cooperate, but only gives authority to the IPTF Commissioner to notify the High Representative and inform the IFOR Commander. This organization might be very useful if there is a will to cooperate. If there is no such will, the international police force will soon become a focus of dispute. The RBH should therefore have a domestic, multi-ethnic and, if possible, international police force.

Transparency and Intelligence
With regard to transparency, NATO's Principles for Military Support (MC327) states, "In peace support operations short of peace enforcement it is essential that the parties involved are fully aware of and agree to the mission of the peace support force, and that its operations be fully transparent to all parties." The relaxing of this requirement in the Bosnia peace enforcement mission is bound to cause difficulties for the OSCE, the UN and NGOs attempting to provide humanitarian relief. In order to meet NATO's own doctrinal requirements the NATO plan should be public (except, for example, detailed descriptions of circumstances which might trigger withdrawal). The failure to share intelligence has been a significant factor in the failure of past efforts and, at least in the case of the fall of the Eastern enclaves, has cost lives.

NATO is giving considerable attention to improving its intelligence fusion capabilities which will be lead by US EUCOM J2 Brig. Gen. James Miller (Inside the Pentagon, Nov 30). It is vital that similar attention be given to ensuring that efforts of the EU, the OSCE and the UN, operating parallel to NATO, be given full information with which to perform their tasks. Similar policy prevents NATO from giving intelligence to non-NATO members participating in the operation such as Sweden or Russia. NATO policy binding on IFOR is that: "Under normal circumstances nearly all NATO intelligence is supplied to the Alliance by nations for the exclusive use of the Alliance as a whole and for its constituent nations. Intelligence provided by NATO to a non-member nation or any international organization containing non-member nations. Whatever different requirements emerge for peace support operations this fundamental principle must be upheld." (MC 327 Annex D) As the work of arms control, reconstruction and nation-building begins, it is certain that key information especially regarding attempts to oppose these activities will be acquired from intelligence sources. The opportunity to change policy has already been opened by the US DoD's new attempt to produce unclassified data through its Security Policy Board headed by acting deputy assistant secretary of defence Jeremy Clark.

Back to European Security home page

For more information:

Marin Gerskovic is the Director of the Institute for South-Central Europe, 531 College Parkway, Rockville, MD 20850, phone/fax: 301-838-0167, e-mail: maring@aol.com

The Dayton Accords can be found on the Internet at http://www.state.gov/www/current/bosnia/bosagree.html

(U.S. Department of State)

Additional information on Peacekeeping can be found in BASIC Research Report NATO, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations (94.1)