BASIC PAPERS

SEPTEMBER 1995 • NUMBER 12 • ISSN 1353-0402

Arming Central and Eastern Europe 

By Tasos Kokkinides and Susannah Dyer

Executive Summary
Large transfers of advanced offensive weapons from the United States to central and eastern European countries (CEE) are being prepared by both the United States and potential recipients, despite the fact that the Soviet military threat to Europe has vanished. Weapons transfers in the pipeline will introduce a new level of high-tech fighter aircraft and helicopters. Over the last few months, there have been a number of developments in this area: Romania has announced that it will manufacture, under licence from the United States, 96 Cobra attack helicopters; Poland is considering acquiring 100 US F-16 fighter aircraft; and the Czech Republic is being offered an undisclosed number of F-16 and F-18 fighters from the United States.

The transfer of state-of-the-art weapons to CEE countries is a short-sighted policy driven by both the suppliers' economic considerations and the desire to maximise political influence in these new democracies. The United States in particular is showing that it intends to use armaments as its principal means of foreign policy in the region. Because CEE countries lack the necessary funds to make "off-the-shelf" purchases, Washington is assembling a foreign aid subsidy package which is sufficiently attractive for countries like Poland wishing to acquire US military equipment.

• This paper argues that weapons transfers, driven by economic and political rather than military considerations, are likely to aggravate already tense relations between NATO and Russia. CEE countries are being offered advanced weapons they do not need and cannot afford. This policy of unchecked weapons transfers could:
  
  
• Further alienate Russia. The policy of selectively arming CEE countries may play into the hands of anti-western Russian nationalists. The qualitative leap in CEE countries' military capabilities may be perceived as a threatening development in both Russia and neighbouring states.
  
  
• Undermine efforts to encourage confidence- and security-building measures in the region and fuel latent political and territorial disputes between certain CEE states.
  
  
• Impose a considerable financial burden on CEE countries and potentially the US taxpayer.
  
  
• Strengthen the officer corps, the least democratic element in the CEE countries.

Recommendations

• There should be a moratorium on transfers of advanced weapons to CEE countries. NATO countries should also develop a policy on transferring the appropriate command, control, communications and intelligence equipment necessary to enable CEE countries to participate in peace-support operations.
  
  
• Further arms control and limitation measures which will be discussed at the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty review conference in Spring 1996 should impose lower ceilings for conventional weapons in the region. Recognizing the eventual expansion of NATO into CEE, the new balance of forces in Europe should reflect this.
  
  
• Instead of subsidizing weapons sales to CEE countries, the United States and other NATO countries should use the funds to assist in the conversion of the region's arms industries to civilian use.

Weapons Transfers in the Pipeline and on the Bargaining Table

Deals Pursued Despite Policy Void
The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme provides the justification for westernising the armed forces of the Partner countries. One of its stated objectives is "the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance".¹³ CEE states see the need for upgrading their defence forces as a top priority in grooming themselves for eventual NATO membership, and appear prepared to allocate their limited financial resources to achieve military compatibility and interoperability with NATO armed forces.

While weapons transfers are seen by some proponents as an easy means of fulfilling interoperability requirements, a policy on arms transfers to the region has yet to be articulated. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Dr Joseph Nye acknowledged that the "transfer that occurs now of excess defense equipment" is "under the excess defense equipment processes of the United States...it is not a NATO process".¹⁴ NATO Assistant Secretary Gebhardt von Moltke, responding to a letter from BASIC, confirmed the lack of coordination saying, "There is no such Alliance policy regarding countries of Central and Eastern Europe...It is left to nations to formulate their own policies on this matter".¹⁵ At a time when many international bodies are seeking controls on weapons transfers, this policy vacuum on NATO's part allows the United States and others to develop policies driven by their own economic concerns, with apparently little thought given to the wider consequences of such transfers.

The lack of NATO policy on weapons transfers to CEE may be a symptom of the increasing militarisation of NATO-CEE relations. The PfP programme, unlike the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) process, emphasises the military instead of the political forms of cooperation. In this structure where the militaries are increasingly "calling the shots", it becomes inevitable that the political ramifications of weapons transfers in the pursuit of military interoperability may be overshadowed.

The absence of a framework for weapons transfers to CEE countries encourages competition among NATO countries and other Western suppliers. For example, in the summer of 1994, the Czech Republic showed interest in acquiring 24 second-hand F-16s from Belgium. The United States blocked the Belgian deal, hoping that it will be able to sell its own surplus fighters to the Czechs.¹⁶ The Romanian decision to choose the Cobra attack helicopter over the Dauphin or Ecureuil followed a long battle between Bell and Eurocopter for the contract.¹⁷ The United States, France and Sweden are also offering competing bids for the provision of fighter aircraft to both Poland and Hungary. Baroness Chalker of Wallasey, British Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, replying to a parliamentary question, confirmed that Britain was not even consulted by Washington on the United States' proposed transfer of military equipment to CEE.¹⁸ In the absence of any common policy of restraint among prospective suppliers to the region, it appears that competition for precious market share will continue to dominate, with the serious political consequences eclipsed by the economic benefits to be gained by the suppliers.

Buying US Weapons:  A Political Decision
Although buying western weapons is not an explicit condition in order for CEE countries to join NATO, these countries believe they have a better chance of joining the Alliance if they do so, a perception which has been reinforced by policymakers in the West. A spokesman for the US Department of Defense, said: "Trying to find ways to harmonize their armed forces with ours will make it easier for them to become members of NATO...Purchasing American or other allied weapons would be one step toward that harmonization, but this isn't something that's going to happen immediately".¹⁹ The pressure to buy western equipment conceals the fact that for fifty years NATO members have been operating different weapons systems themselves. Even at the height of the Cold War NATO forces did not have compatible communications and operated several types of tanks. Today, Germany is even using former Warsaw Pact equipment for its defence, including 24 Russian-made MiG-29 fighter aircraft.

With one eye to the West, CEE officials have been complaining about the bad state of their defence forces and have been advocating a rigorous modernisation programme. As Grzegorz Schmidt, a spokesman at the Polish Ministry of Defence explained, "Basically, we would like to replace everything...But we will start with our fighter aircraft. We have MiG-29s, the most modern Soviet model, but not sufficient for our needs".²⁰

Claims that the armed forces of the CEE countries are not good enough to justify NATO membership are unfounded. A study prepared for the office of the US Secretary of Defence in 1995 describes the situation saying, "The armaments of [the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states] are obsolete if compared with those of the most modern armed forces in the world, such as the United States or Germany. If compared to some of the second-tier NATO countries, such as Spain or Greece, the armed forces of [the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states] (and especially the Central European states) are not that much worse off".²¹

The CEE countries wish to westernize their defences on the assumption that this would signal a break from the communist past and open the door to NATO membership. The absence of an evident military threat to the security of CEE countries does not correspond with the planned qualitative leap in their defence capabilities. The decisions on defence procurement are mostly based on political considerations rather than on the legitimate military needs of the CEE countries.

The Polish desire to acquire US F-16 fighter aircraft is a typical example. Despite the fact that the MiG-29 and the F-16 are comparable, and the Russian-made aircraft much cheaper, Polish defence officials have not concealed their preference for the US-made fighter. A Polish military source reflecting on the options for modernising the Polish air force said, "As for the MiG-29, it is an excellent model with the right costs prospects, but it doesn't exactly project Poland's independence".²² Whilst the desire to diversify one's defence procurement sources may be a prudent policy which will minimise dependence on a single country, Poland and the most of the CEE countries are focusing almost exclusively on Western suppliers.

The Polish Defence Minister Zbignew Okonski openly acknowledged this when referring to the procurement of fighter aircraft, saying, "I do not hide that the decision will be political, connected with our aspirations to join NATO".²³

CEE countries clearly need western help in modernizing their armed forces in order to participate effectively in multinational peace-support operations. To this end, the transfer of non-lethal technology to improve the command, control, communications and intelligence systems (C3I) as well as the mobility of the armed forces of the Partner countries, through the supply of transport aircraft and utility helicopters for example, could be a positive development. The US Regional Airspace Initiative which offers assistance to CEE in order to develop regionally integrated civil/military airspace regimes which are fully compatible and interoperable with Western civil airspace organisations, is another example of sensible technological know-how sharing.²⁴

US Policy Towards CEE
Earlier this year, the Clinton administration abruptly reversed the long-standing US policy allowing only transfers of basic, defensive military equipment to the former Warsaw Pact countries. The new Clinton policy specifies ten countries of CEE which are eligible to acquire sophisticated US equipment, with decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Countries included in the decision are: Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.²⁶ The decision to make the ten CEE countries eligible for transfers of advanced offensive weapons was in stark contrast to the Bush Administration's position on this issue. Bush officials consistently opposed direct and third-party transfers of US F-16s to Hungary and other CEE countries, citing the controversial nature of introducing high-tech western weapons into the region.

Emerging US Policy Undermines Official Objectives

The defense industry and branches of the US military applauded the new Clinton policy, which has opened up a new market for high-tech weapons transfers, and continue to actively support proposals which would allocate funds for weapons transfers. The US Air Force has 350 older F-16 fighter aircraft which it wants to sell overseas at discount prices, hoping to use the money to purchase newer versions of the aircraft for its own forces.²⁷ The US Navy appears to be engaging in a similar marketing strategy, as evidenced by its courting of the Czech Republic for the transfer of used F/A-18s.

The United States has also adopted a policy of providing security assistance to CEE states, with special emphasis on the Visegrad countries. The NATO Participation Act of 1994²⁸, makes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia eligible for the transfer of excess defence articles, the provision of international military education and training, and assistance under the Foreign Military Financing Program. Other PfP countries may also be eligible, pending a determination by the President that they meet certain criteria regarding democratic reforms, PfP participation and contributions to NATO security. Amendments to the legislation currently being proposed in the Senate call for provision of NATO transition assistance to "countries most ready for closer ties with NATO" and insists that the United States "actively assist" these countries in their transition.

Occasional references have been made by the United States regarding the dangers of proliferation in the region, yet such acknowledgements seem only to refer to specific instances of specific technologies. For example, an ongoing interagency review within the US administration is addressing concerns regarding the proposed transfer of E-2 early warning aircraft from the US Navy to CEE countries, as the transfer would include sensitive radar and communications technology. ²⁹ While such concerns would seem to point to need for addressing the broader issue of controlling transfers, the United States appears to be proceeding without hesitation in facilitating transfers to selected CEE countries.

Financing the Transfers
While most NATO Partner countries lack sufficient funds to make "off-the-shelf" purchases of advanced conventional weapons systems, there are a number of financial arrangements which could facilitate the transfer of new or used equipment. The US government is assembling a military assistance package to the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians which would make weapons transfers more economically feasible in the near term. Such a package would please the US Air Force and Navy, as well as US defense contractors, all eager to find a market for their weapons. As one senior Polish official noted, "It's like drug dealers--you first give it to the kids for free". ³⁰

Codevelopment and coproduction packages, second-hand "cascaded" weapons, offset agreements, and sharing purchases with other Partner countries would all make equipment buys more affordable. Current negotiations on financial arrangements signal that both east and west recognize that the purchase of these weapons is, for the most part, beyond the economic means of the CEE countries. Earlier this year, one US official noted that the Clinton administration has an "open mind" about exporting US weapons to Partner countries in the near future, but "We don't want to bankrupt them". ³¹ The CEE countries cannot afford the weapons, so Western governments and defence companies are taking an active role in negotiating financial arrangements in order to assure that this lucrative market for surplus weapons will not be lost.

CEE countries have been quite vocal in emphasising their strong preference for western weapons while at the same time highlighting the extent of their financial needs. In the absence of a significant military aid package from the west, upgrading their older Soviet weapons may be the only viable option. The Czech Republic has flirted with the idea of buying US F-16 fighters, but have been leaning toward upgrading their existing fleet of MiG-21s as a more realistic alternative. Czech defence minister Vilem Holan, acknowledged that the higher cost of the F-16s was prohibitive, noting that "we could have bought some two planes, but they could still not have operated over Czech territory as we have no ground facilities".³²

Likewise, the financing of Poland's prospective purchase of 100 F-16s has not yet been clarified. Poland spends only 2.2 percent of its gross domestic product on defence, and the 1995 Polish defence budget allocates just 60 million zloty for imports of military equipment. This amount, if entirely devoted to the purchase F-16Ds, would cover the cost of just one aircraft. President Lech Walesa has called for a substantial increase in defence spending in Poland, but it is unclear what effect this might have on Poland's ability to purchase US fighter aircraft and other western weapons.³³ During a visit to Washington in February, the Polish Defence Minister Jerzy Milewski presented a list of weapons systems that Poland would be interested in acquiring, but added that Poland could not afford to buy the equipment, "so we are deeply interested in the joint production of anything we need".³⁴

Poland and the Czech Republic may be offered industrial participation in US fighter aircraft update projects to respond to issues surrounding the impact of weapons imports on the domestic arms industry.35 As for the Polish Air Force's desire for F-16Cs or F-16Ds, estimated at a cost of around $25 million, an important factor in the decision is whether Polish companies will be able to produce some replacement parts for the F-16s.³⁶ The $1 billion aid package offered Sweden for Hungary's purchase of fighter aircraft may also set a precedent for the provision of attractive offset packages to compensate for costly weapons purchases.

Weapons Transfers May Heighten Russian Insecurity
Introducing high-tech weapons in the CEE countries would signify a substantial increase in the qualitative power of the armed forces in countries bordering the former Soviet Union. This may alarm Russia and force it to consolidate its influence on the newly independent states of its "near abroad". Not only will Russia lose a potentially lucrative weapons market, much to the detriment of its arms industry, but the correlation of conventional forces in Europe will swing further against it. Moscow may conclude that a renewed effort to modernise its own armed forces is required. This may undermine the negotiations at the CFE review conference of May 1996 and threaten future efforts for arms control and limitation measures in Europe.

CEE countries have traditionally been the major recipients of Russian weapons. Hungary, Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics have all signed agreements with Moscow to receive weapons systems as part-payment of the Russian debt to those countries. When these deals run out, it will be extremely difficult for Moscow to make significant weapons sales to CEE countries. Losing those markets will jeopardize the Russian defence industry and encourage feelings of isolation and encirclement. Andranik Migranyan, a member of Boris Yeltsin's Presidential Council, warned that "the central European countries and former Soviet republics, in joining the PfP and eventually NATO, will push Russia out of their markets as an arms supplier, dealing a serious blow to our military-industrial complex".³⁷

Weapons Transfers May Elevate Regional Tensions
Despite the conclusion of the Pact on Stability in Europe in March 1995 which confirmed the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity and respect for the human rights of the ethnic minorities in CEE, a number of the region's territorial and ethnic disputes remain unresolved. The arming of selected CEE countries could strengthen nationalist, anti-western forces in excluded countries and may encourage a regional arms race. The United States and its NATO allies may end up providing weapons and other forms of military assistance to all CEE countries. Keeping a balance of military forces in CEE may require a policy similar to the ratios which govern existing US supplies to Israel and Egypt and Greece and Turkey.

A report prepared for the Office of the US Secretary of Defense in 1995 warned that "...policymakers need to be careful that US arms sales do not aggravate local rivalries and conflicts [in CEE]. In this sense, the United States needs to pay special attention to how its increasing security ties with one country influence the perceptions of power shifts among the neighboring countries...The United States therefore needs to avoid exacerbating threat perceptions and thereby stimulating a cycle of rearmament in the region".³⁸

The United States and other NATO countries have been encouraging CEE countries to agree on bilateral treaties which would forge friendly relations among neighbouring states. Diplomatic pressure from Washington was instrumental in the conclusion of the Slovak-Hungarian agreement which recognised existing borders and obliged the two states to protect the human rights of their respective ethnic minorities. In praising the Slovak and Hungarian governments for concluding the bilateral treaty, President Clinton said that "resolving the potential sources of misunderstanding and tension in Central Europe is the most important condition for stability in this region and the future of European integration".³⁹

The US diplomatic effort in the case of the Slovak-Hungarian bilateral treaty was a positive development which helped to ease tensions between the two countries. However, conflict prevention and confidence-building efforts in other areas may be undermined when US weapons begin to flow into the region. Washington has been pressing Romania and Hungary to agree on a bilateral treaty and has provided assistance in the establishment of a "hotline" link between the Hungarian and Romanian Defence ministries.⁴⁰ Yet the arming of Romania with 96 Cobra attack helicopters could seriously undermine the successful conclusion of the long-awaited bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary.

The two countries are still at loggerheads over the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Hungary has set the condition of respect of human rights of the Hungarian minority as envisaged in the Council of Europe documents. Romania suspects that Hungary is playing the "ethnic card" in order to interfere in Romanian domestic politics and possibly question the borders between the two countries. Despite extensive confidence-building measures between the militaries of the two countries, the political process of reconciliation remains deadlocked. The danger is that political differences will spill over into the military sphere.

Extensive problems are also evident in Romanian-Moldovan and Romanian-Ukrainian relations. Romania is questioning the right of Moldova to independent status and maintains that Moldova must consider uniting with Romania. Similarly, Romanian-Ukrainian relations remain tense over territorial disputes and the demarcation of territorial waters in the Black Sea.⁴¹ Arming Romania with state-of-the-art attack helicopters could alarm Moldova and Ukraine and undermine the stability of this region.

NATO countries seem unable to grasp that shipping weapons to regions of instability is not an exercise in conflict-prevention. The NATO policy of "cascade", through which thousands of second-hand heavy weapons were transferred to Greece and Turkey, may now be applied in CEE. This cascading of weapons has intensified bilateral problems, has fuelled an arms race between the two NATO rivals and has led Bulgaria, a neighbouring country, to express concern over the arms build-up in the Aegean. Should NATO, or the United States unilaterally, apply a similar policy of transfers to CEE, they risk exacerbating tensions in the region and intensifying Russian insecurity.

Weapons Transfers May Strengthen Anti-Democratic Forces
Despite the considerable change in the military personnel of the armed forces of the CEE countries since the collapse of communism, the military is still run by officers trained in the Soviet era. Democratisation and civilian control of the armed forces in most CEE countries is still inadequate. For example, Poland's senior officers are often accused of interfering in politics and the country is facing a constitutional crisis on the issue of the civilian control of the Polish army. The President and the government are locked in battle over who has overall control of the armed forces. A study prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense concluded that "the principle of full civilian control over the armed forces has not been fully extended to any of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states". The report goes on to characterize the militaries as having "an unintegrated and somewhat autonomous status that does not correspond to the usual position of armed forces in a democratic society".⁴²

There is no clear evidence that giving these officer corps new prestige through strong military support from NATO and the United States will increase their adherence to democratic values. In many developing countries the emphasis on buying arms has in fact strengthened some of the most anti-democratic forces. The US and other NATO countries should concentrate on strengthening civil society in CEE instead of raising the power and prestige of the officer corps.

Conclusion
It is becoming commonplace to emphasise how CEE is riven by insoluble and explosive ethnic disputes. If these gloomy assessmentsare accurate, western weapons transferred now may later be used against the countries that supplied them. By supplying arms to selected countries, Western states may find themselves locked into backing particular regimes through the commercial requirement to fulfil contracts.

While the EU is urging CEE states to solve their bilateral problems and establish good neighbourly relations as a precondition for EU entry, the military authorities in NATO are encouraging weapons transfers to the region. This dichotomy in the Western approach to the region may undermine the security of the region and fuel a renewed east-west confrontation. It is in the West's interest to secure a further package of disarmament and confidence-building measures rather than promoting a military build-up.

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Endnotes

1. "Romania to buy Cobras: offset, finance questions linger", Defense News, 19-25 June 1995.
2. "Poland/Czech Republic - US offers F-16 upgrade work", Flight International, 12 September 1995.
3. German radio broadcast, 20 September 1995.
4. "Poland gets classified look at F-16 fighters", Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 August 1995; "US-Navy may provide used E-2s to C. Europe nations", Defense News, 10-17 September 1995.
5. "Acting Defence Minister speaks of break in deadlock in US-Polish cooperation", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2234 A/8, 22 February 1995.
6. "Arms suppliers see Poland as Central Europe focal point", Defense News, 18-24 September 1995.
7. "Swedes offer Hungary $1 billion aid to help buy Gripens", Defense News, 18-24 September 1995.
8. "Keleti on modernisation of army", Daily Bulletin, Hungarian News Agency MTI, distributed by the Department for Press and International Information Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Hungary, No. 70/1995, 7 April 1995.
9. Volker Ruehe, in response to a parliamentary question in the German Bundestag.
10. "Poland/Czech Republic - US offers F-16 upgrade work", Flight International, 12 September 1995.
11. "Surplus USN stock on offer", Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 September 1995.
12. "Czechs eye used US fighters", Defense News, 18-24 September 1995.
13. PfP Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994.
14. "Hunter, Nye and Carter discuss Partnership for Peace", EUROSEC Transcript, Brussels press conference, 9 June 1995.
15. Correspondence from Gebhardt von Moltke to BASIC, 31 August 1995.
16. "Anticipating NATO expansion, firms gird for defense export competition", Inside the Pentagon, 1 December 1994.
17. "Eurocopter and Bell fight over Romanian license", Flight International, 2 November 1994.
18. House of Commons Official Reports, Hansard, 15 May 1995.
19. US Department of Defense Briefing, 21 February 1995.
20. "Poland turns to the US", Independent on Sunday, 5 March 1995.
21. Thomas S. Szayna and F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Military Reform After the Cold War: Implications for the United States, prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RAND, 1995, p. 30. This paper contains a number of references from this report. While the US DoD has sought and received sound advice, it appears that these recommendations are not being followed.
22. Polish military source quoted in "Fighter buy hinges on Poland's coproduction", Defense News, 11-17 September 1995.
23. "Poland mulls buying at least 100 F-16 fighters", Reuters, 1 August 1995.
24. "US offers regional airspace initiative to the Baltic countries", Weekly Review of Estonian News, 12-18 March 1995.
25. Statement by Darel Johnson, Principal Director, European and NATO Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 16 March 1995.
26. "US allows arms sales to 10 in ex-east bloc", Washington Post, 18 February 1995.
27. ibid.
28. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 was attached to the International Narcotics Control Act.
29. "US-Navy may provide used E-2s to C. Europe nations", Defense News, 10-17 September 1995.
30. Senior Polish military official, interview with BASIC.
31. "Praising Partnership plan, East Europeans eager to work with NATO", Washington Post, 16 January 1995.
32. "Minister says modernization of MiG aircraft makes economic sense", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2392 A/1, 26 August 1995.
33. "President demands government boost defence spending", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2391 A/6, 25 August 1995.
34. "Acting Defence Minister speaks of break in deadlock in US-Polish cooperation", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2234 A/8, 22 February 1995.
35. "Poland/Czech Republic - US offers F-16 upgrade work", Flight International, 12 September 1995.
36. "Poland-US, Lockheed brief officials on F-16s", Bloomberg Business News, 29 August 1995.
37. "PfP: No Russia is too big for this exercise", International Herald Tribune, 24 June 1994.
38. Szayna and Larrabee, p. 48.
39. "Clinton on Slovak-Hungarian treaty", Open Media Research Institute, 14 March 1995.
40. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/2355 A/4, 14 July 1995.
41. "Ukrainian foreign, defence ministers visit disputed island", Open Media Research Institute, 11 August 1995.
42. Szayna and Larrabee, pp. 25, 34.