ISSUE AREAS:

A SPECIAL BASIC DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

NEOCONSERVATISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: A VIEW FROM VENUS

23 DECEMBER 2004

Part III: The Future of Neoconservatism in a Bush Second Term

By Elsje Fourie and Ian Davis

1. Introduction and Rational for the Series
2. A Critique of Neoconservatism
3. The Effects of the Iraq War on the Neoconservative Cause
4. A Republican Victory in the Presidential Election
5. The Future of US Foreign Policy in a Second Bush Term
6. Conclusions
7. About the Authors
8. Endnotes

We welcome your feedback - please send your comments to: basicuk at basicint.org

Introduction and Rationale for the Series

There still appears to exist a lack of appreciation as to the scope, role and influence of neoconservatism on US foreign policy outside the United States - even among close allies. "I never quite understand what people mean by this neocon thing". This was the remarkable admission Tony Blair made to BBC journalist, James Naughtie, as late as 2004 and a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein.[1] The Prime Minister's incomprehension proved once again how successful a small group of policy-makers and opinion shapers was in obscuring itself and its motives (until very recently, at least), even at the highest levels.

Now that the American people have re-elected President Bush for a second term, and with a clear popular majority and increased majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives, neoconservatism can no longer be regarded as a passing phase: it is now an era. This three-part series of discussion papers is designed to help the British Prime Minister and other concerned parties (in Europe and the United States) understand the outlook of the neoconservatives who dictated the foreign policy of the first administration of George W. Bush, and are likely to play a leading role in the second.

The first paper in the series provided a brief overview of the contemporary foreign policy-making process from the Vietnam War era to the end of the Clinton administration (see http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc01.htm). The second paper explored how the neoconservatives influenced the Bush administration, and in particular, the policy towards Iraq (see http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm). This final paper in the series offers a critique of neoconservatism and an assessment of its likely influence in the future.

With the re-election of President Bush, the study of neoconservatism's influence on decision-making is more than merely an academic exercise from which one can afford to be a detached observer. The extent to which the doctrine is entrenched in US foreign policy will affect how the most powerful country in the world interacts with other nations and pursues its interests for a long time to come. Prior to November 2, some observers were eager to consign neoconservatism to the dustbin of history, pointing out that its inherent weaknesses had been so aggravated by the carelessness and miscalculations of the Bush administration that it had lost all credibility with the American people. With Iraq in turmoil, they argued that the pendulum was sure to be pushed in the opposite direction with the result that the hawks would be chased from their perches.

But how wrong such assumptions turned out to be; rumours of neoconservatism's demise were greatly exaggerated. Bush achieved what no man has done since his father in 1988, winning more than 50% of the vote. Nonetheless, despite getting the backing of the majority of the American people, valid critiques of neoconservatism still remain. This paper explores some of the weaknesses in neoconservative doctrine and then assesses why, despite such weaknesses, the majority of US voters continued to back President Bush and rejected his opponent. It also discusses the current position of the neoconservatives in the Bush administration and their likely future impact on the direction of US foreign policy.

A Critique of Neoconservatism

On polling day in the US presidential elections there were many both inside and outside the United States who viewed neoconservatism as one of the main threats to international peace and security, and accused it of contributing to the very problems its advocates sought to defeat. Critics had exposed at least five flaws in the neoconservative doctrine, which they regarded as:

• intellectually weak and incoherent;
• undermining an international order based on cooperation and law;
• exacerbating the problem of global terrorism;
• deceptive; and
• unrealistic and overambitious.

1. Intellectual weakness and incoherence

A core argument of the neocons is that aggressive, uncompromising policies forced Soviet capitulation and won the Cold War. However, critics argue that the doctrine twists and misreads history in order to give itself credibility. Reagan was not the constant hardliner people remember. Throughout his presidency, Reagan embraced goals that he had previously scorned, such as glasnost and détente. In his second-term in particular, Reagan switched from hardliner to legacy-seeker. It is virtually impossible, however, to imagine a neoconservative asking an 'enemy', as Reagan did of the USSR, that "for the sake of a peaceful world...let us approach each other with ten-fold trust and thousand-fold affection".[2]

Thus, critics see neoconservatism as prone to imprecise distinctions and wanting in theoretical clarity. In turn, this leads to a lack of convincing definitions for key concepts. 'Terrorism', for example, comes to mean any attack against the United States, and the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan exempts itself from the Geneva Conventions alternately because it is ostensibly a 'liberating' rather than 'occupying' force and that detainees are not prisoners of war.[3]

The neocon ideology is also said to fall victim to outdated, simplistic assumptions that states are the most important actors in international relations, that military, 'hard' security issues matter far more than other concerns, and that large conflicts between powerful states are the norm, when, in fact, they comprise a small fraction of wars today.[4]

Neoconservatives also neglect several key regions-Bush has yet to articulate a comprehensive strategy for policy towards China, Russia and North Korea-and key issues such as economics and the environment. Everything is subordinated to their newfound obsession with rogue states and terrorism, but "just as many issues in the Cold War-era could not be squeezed into the corset of the Soviet-American conflict, it is unlikely that all important problems now can be fitted into this new straitjacket".[5]

2. Undermining an international order based on cooperation and law.

Critics also accuse the current US administration of acting unilaterally and arrogantly and thereby alienating its allies. The United States may indeed be more powerful, in terms of military force, than ever before-it will spend as much in 2005 on defence as all 191 other countries combined.[6] However, the neoconservatives forget that power does not necessarily equal influence, and that legitimacy is an intrinsic aspect of true power. Although the United States is pre-eminent, it is not omnipotent; as Rousseau remarked, "the strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty".[7]

The Bush administration's shunning of key allies, including members of NATO and the institutions of the UN, has been responsible for unprecedented anti-American sentiment, even in the West. Its blunt diplomatic style and actions over the past three years seem almost calculated to offend other traditionally strong allies. And because it is disproportionately preoccupied with its own agenda and the lives of its own citizens, it is difficult to imagine the Bush administration standing for a cause larger than itself and inspiring others. Arguably, the one major exception has been the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief[8] , an exception the United States would do well to make into a more general strategy to gain the support others outside its borders.

Poverty, disease and localised conflict claim exponentially more lives each year than terrorism does, yet the current US administration has expected all countries to reorient their foreign policies to mirror its own and to make Al Qaeda their top concern. [9]

However, the United States cannot afford to go it alone, as its recent, albeit grudging, overtures to the UN prove. The UN, despite faults of its own, does valuable fieldwork to create stable societies in post-conflict regions. Given that the European Union and Japan pay a large proportion of the UN's bills, as Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, asks, "Were Washington to move to an entirely ad hoc approach, why would the rest of the world agree to clean up its messes?"[10]

The US administration views itself as a Gulliver struggling to break free from the Lilliputian entanglements which trap it on all sides, but forgets its own vital historic contribution in forging the laws and institutions so crucial for maintaining global order. By breaking these laws, it is setting a powerful example and a very dangerous precedent. States may learn from the example of Bush's deference to North Korea that they must either obtain nuclear weapons or risk invasion. In addition, the United States risks losing any semblance of moral high ground and reputation as honest broker in the Middle East peace process.[11]

3. Exacerbating the problem of global terrorism.

Neoconservatism assumes that the terrorist 'enemy' is a finite amount of people, when it is in fact a mix of ideologies that rely on the angry and alienated.[12] Attacking Muslim countries does not address the underlying resentment, fear and deprivation that make it so easy for terrorist organisations to recruit new members. Even in Turkey, America's secular Muslim ally, favourable opinion towards the United States fell from 52% to 15% in only three years.[13]

In most of the Middle East, the situation is even worse. Rather than fanning hysteria and panic at home and waging war abroad, however, the US government needs to improve policing, intelligence and international cooperation. Many states in Europe and Asia have learnt to cope with certain levels of political violence and seek to combat it with a mixture of law enforcement and political reforms, including seeking ways to diminish the allure of terrorist groups, rather than by pursuing a war apparently without an end in sight.[14] Small-scale, cheap, low-tech solutions, such as school exchange programmes between Muslim countries and the United States may earn only neoconservatives' scorn, but are likely to be effective in the long term.

4. Deception at home and abroad

Neoconservatives are charged with acting as if moral force and vision can compensate for the manipulation of intelligence and fact. For example, Elliot Abrams, who was convicted of perjury after the Iran Contra scandal, is currently in charge of US Middle East policy after being pardoned by George H.W. Bush. Bartlett accuses the administration of "self-selection bias", charging it with having acted first and then created ex post facto rationalisations.[15] The atmosphere of absolute loyalty and secrecy has further exacerbated this situation, with those who disagree labelled cowardly or unpatriotic.

The neoconservatives knew that the American people would not agree with their reasons for the war on Iraq, and so had to rely on unproven connections between Hussein and terrorism to make their case. Similarly, it convinced the international community that its determination to invade Iraq had little to do with lack of compliance to UN Security Council resolutions by beginning preparations for war with Iraq while it had promised a good-faith effort to first allow Iraq to respond to inspections.

5. Unrealistic and over-ambitious.

Most seriously, opponents view neoconservative assumptions that democracy can simply be installed by force in countries with little recent history of it as symptomatic of gross conceptual overreach and a total lack of pragmatism. Neoconservatism assumes Americans will defend their nation and culture, but, ironically, disavows the legitimacy of patriotism in other countries. Iraq, historically one the most important and developed centres of the Arab world, possesses a civilisation much older than America itself.[16] Yet the neoconservatives have deeply misunderstood and simplified the region.[17] This can partly be blamed on broader factors:

History...has made Americans naïve. It has made Americans the luckiest and least understanding people in the world...The appeal of American isolationism and the awkwardness of American interventionism-both may be owed to the American unfamiliarity with the political oppression and social injustice that is the common experience of most of the rest of the world. Our natural consciousness of freedom has equipped us badly for the spreading of it. This may be history's bad joke on the American century. [18]

Democracy that originates from within a country has generally delivered better results than coerced social engineering. . Indeed, the lengthy and troubling history of Western imperialism in the Arab world has more often contributed to the ignorance, exploitation and corruption the neoconservatives claim to abhor.[19] To draw parallels with post World War II Germany and Japan, as neoconservatives tend to do, is misleading: Japan was a homogenous country which retained a strong symbol of national unity (the Emperor), and Germany had been a democracy until 1933.[20] Both had the psychology of a defeated people,[21] and remained under US-allied occupation for four and seven years, respectively. The Manichean simplicity of the neoconservative formula ignores such vital complexities as ethnic strife, nationalism and culture.

Neoconservatives also assume that a democratic Middle East will automatically mean a pro-American Middle East. Yet true democracy in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East is likely to prove detrimental to US interests, at least in the short-term.[22] As Zakaria points out, in an increasingly democratic world, American power must be seen as legitimate not only by other governments but also by their people.[23] To ostensibly promote democracy in Iraq while supporting un-elected leaders elsewhere (such as President Emomali Rahmonov in Tajikistan) can justifiably be viewed as hypocrisy. Essentially, neoconservatives want only one form of democracy: a specifically Western-style, US-friendly liberal democracy. US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, for example, has assured an interviewer that Iraq will not have an "Iranian-type government," regardless of what Iraqis want.[24]

This attitude extends to the 'new imperialists''' belief that America can be a kinder, gentler empire than the empires of the past. However, dominant powers throughout the ages have viewed themselves as special, only to develop a mindset that views their subjects as inferior and lends itself to inhumane practices.

For a group of people so fond of dicta and so distrustful of human nature, the neoconservatives seem to have forgotten that power inevitably corrupts. And empire is not only corrupting, but also demanding. It requires enormous sacrifices and often results in imperial overstretch. Analysts Tucker et al, writing in the online National Interest weekly, doubt whether "the United States is prepared to undertake the burden of world empire that the British found too heavy for them--to establish its own viceroys, to breed its own governing class, to inure its people to accept a regular drain of casualties on its distant frontiers".[25] It therefore appears the neoconservatives were right to anticipate widespread opposition to their vision of American empire in the Middle East.

The Effects of the Iraq War on the Neoconservative Cause

The validity of the fundamental premises of neoconservatism is being seriously questioned both within, and especially without, the United States. One author calls US strategy in Iraq "the wrongest possible strategy for the wrongest possible moment in the wrongest possible region of the world".[26] Given such inherent problems, regime change in Iraq was never going to be easy, but the Bush administration's organisational deficiencies exacerbated an already difficult situation. Since major combat was declared over, several scandals and misfortunes have further discredited the already unconvincing case for war. First, and most significantly, no WMDs have been discovered and the link between Saddam and 9/11 has been revealed to be a sham. Indeed, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has since declared the war to be illegal.[27]

Second, exiled Iraqi leader Ahmed Chalabi, who provided the Department of Defense with pre-war 'intelligence' (as discussed in the previous paper), has been exposed as a charlatan and his defectors discredited.[28]

Third, the prisoner abuse debacle, which saw pictures of torture at Abu Graib prison become public, has discredited the humanitarian argument for the invasion in the eyes of many observers, and increased levels of humiliation and anger among Iraqis. Indeed, the legitimacy of any future Iraqi government is likely to be tied to expelling US forces from the country.

Fourth, the US and coalition forces have failed to provide security in Iraq. According to one Senator, the army is overstretched, with ten Army divisions doing the work of twelve.[29] Due to fierce urban warfare, especially in the so-called Sunni triangle and Shiite south, casualties on both sides have been heavy. The formal ending of the occupation on 28 June has done little to quell the violence. Although Wolfowitz could not recall before a congressional committee how many Americans had died, the rest of the world is keeping closer track: as of 17 December 2004, 1,457 US and coalition soldiers have been killed since March 2003. The number of Iraqi civilian deaths ranges from between 15,000 to 100,000.[30]

"Any planning is only as good as the assumptions you plug into it"[31] and, in this case, questionable assumptions meant that planning for post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building suffered. New lines of authority have placed the reconstruction effort under control of the Pentagon and National Security Council (NSC). This relieves the State Department of a duty it has performed for 50 years (including in Vietnam and Afghanistan) and for which it has specific training. The NSC is not accountable to Congress, thus giving the legislature no control over how the $20 billion allocated for aid will be spent and leading to allegations of claims for $33,000 trucks, which sell for $14,000 in the United States.[32] Even Condoleezza Rice urged the President to "remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society".[33] By early May, Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority, comprising largely members of the military, had not restored many basic services in Iraq, especially outside Baghdad. Of the 800 staff members, only 17 could speak Arabic and only one was an expert on Iraq.[34]

The situation in Iraq has led to a considerable loss of face for neoconservatives. Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and William Kristol, editor of the influential Washington-based political magazine, The Weekly Standard, have admitted that the "war is already lost or on the verge of being lost".[35] US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has admitted in congressional testimony that he underestimated Iraqi patience with foreign occupation. Many hawks outside the neoconservative cabal have regained their respect for traditional conservatism and their instinctive distrust of government-CNN pundit Tucker Carlson confesses that he forgot that "it's much easier to destroy things than to create them"[36] while David Brooks, senior editor at The Weekly Standard admits to having been gripped by a "childish fantasy".[37] In perhaps the most significant attack on the ideology so far, political economist Francis Fukuyama recently accused Charles Krauthammer, a long-time friend and columnist at The Washington Post, of taking neoconservatism to unrealistic and dangerous extremes, and of an inability to admit failure in Iraq.[38] The fact that Fukayama is a Project for the New American Century (PNAC) signatory and former neoconservative stalwart and that his critique appeared in the National Interest, widely regarded as a neoconservative journal, make his comments all the more interesting.

This attitude has been reflected within the broader public. During the last half of 2003, support for the war dropped from 68% to 55%.[39] In July 2004, 37% professed to feeling safer after the war, compared to 55% who felt less safe.[40] A large majority opposes additional spending in Iraq and believes casualties are at an unacceptable level. This has led to impressive grassroots mobilisation for the liberal cause, both through conventional think-tanks such as the well-funded Center for American Progress and the Institute for America's Future, and new forms of web-based activism epitomised by organisations such as the increasingly influential MoveOn.org. Howard Dean, initially favoured to win the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004, owed his meteoric rise largely to an internet-based campaign that managed to raise millions of dollars through small donations and break previous fundraising records.

There has also been a corresponding surge in popular liberal sentiment in what Katrina vanden Heuvel et al in The Nation term the "political culture wars"[41] -exposés of neoconservativism top the bestseller lists, the left-leaning The Nation is now the highest-circulation political weekly, and Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 broke all box-office earnings records for film documentaries.

Nevertheless, few, if any, neoconservatives have completely recanted over the problems in Iraq - and many will be rejuvenated by President Bush's re-election (as discussed below). Fukuyama's main reservation about the direction the neoconservative doctrine has recently taken is that it will "poison the well for future such exercises",[42] and his criticism is mainly targeted at the most extreme end of neoconservativism. Meanwhile, his less repentant peers, such as Kristol, Krauthammer and others, accuse the administration of fighting the war with half measures and committing insufficient resources to the occupation. "If neocons had been in control", Boot contends, "they would have done far more, far earlier, in both Afghanistan and Iraq,"[43] while former Pentagon adviser Richard Perle regrets that, "we allowed the liberation to subside into an occupation".[44]

To these neoconservatists with a strong imperialist bent, continuous warfare and casualties are the norm to which America must become accustomed. Hence Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's admonition that, "no-one should have expected a cakewalk".[45] Certainly, Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney's continuing aversion to nation building and eagerness to restructure the military led them to take shortcuts. The United States arguably had the economic and military resources to completely subdue Iraq. However, it is doubtful whether most Americans were prepared to pay the enormous price this would entail. In addition, even assuming that an army of 250,000 could have quelled the uprisings, it is questionable whether it would have altered the fundamental dynamic between conqueror and conquered, or merely made the fact of US domination even more visible to the average Iraqi.[46]

On the other hand, those who herald the end of the neoconservative moment would do well to notice that the Bush administration has not articulated any fundamental revisions in foreign policy - and seems unlikely to do so in its second term. President Bush has not wavered in his core foreign policy goals (including support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the 'war on terror' and new counter-proliferation measures) and more than 100,000 US troops will remain in Iraq for at least another year, making it clear that the neoconservatives "have not lost the war for Bush's mind". [47] As the elections approached in November, the foreign-policy decision-making apparatus remained unchanged-not a single neoconservative had resigned or been dismissed.[48]

Domestically, the enactment of the Patriot Act and the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 have given the government unprecedented power. And just as in British politics, where Prime Minister Tony Blair has been a hostage or convert (depending on one's point of view) to the neo-liberal economic legacy of 'Thatcherism', the neoconservative legacy in US politics could be a hardening of foreign policy ground across the political spectrum. Hawkish Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman, for example, was party to the re-launch of the Committee on the Present Danger, the formerly anti-Soviet organisation, which advised against détente in the 1970-80s. This time the Present Danger is terrorism and its sponsors, and the Committee is dominated by neoconservatives.[49]

A Republican Victory in the Presidential Elections

It is worth considering the part played by the neoconservative ideology in Bush's victory in this bitterly fought presidential election and claim to the popular mandate that eluded him four years ago. Clearly, it proved attractive to a nervous public bombarded almost daily with terror alerts and warnings: "The average American feels a threat to his physical security unknown since the early years of the republic".[50] The greatest achievement of the neoconservatives has been psychological, manifesting itself in what has been described as a "siege mentality"[51] among Americans. The country is beginning to adjust to a constant state of war, while reduced media coverage on Iraq gave the mistaken impression that things had quietened down in that country.[52] After all, the United States was in Vietnam for years-with much less of a clear exit strategy than is currently the case in Iraq-before Americans really turned against the war.

It is also clear that Senator John Kerry, the democratic challenger, was unable to offer a coherent easy-to-understand response to 9/11 that the American public could understand and rally behind. As one observer mentions, 'axis of evil' is a far more compelling slogan than 'efficient multilateralism'.53] As a result, the neoconservatives were particularly effective at defining the difference between the two parties and the difference between strength and weakness.

However, many non-security issues were also factors. According to exit polls, more than 20% of voters said moral issues were most important to them - about the same as cited the economy and more than mentioned terrorism.[54] And President Bush's strength among evangelical Protestants, especially strong in the South, was prodigious, with 76% of this group supporting him. [55]

It should also be borne in mind that most presidents running for re-election have been successful. The presidency was famously described by Theodore Roosevelt as a "bully pulpit" from which incumbents can set the agenda and more easily garner attention and resources.[56] Essentially, the election was a referendum on support for President Bush. Senator Kerry was supported less for his policies per se than for his opposition to President Bush.

In 2004 voters were more concerned with foreign policy and security than they have been in decades, and in this regard they continued to trust President Bush more than they did Senator Kerry. With regard to the foreign policy issues that mattered-Iraq and the larger 'war on terrorism', Senator Kerry was unable to sufficiently distinguish himself from President Bush. For example, Senator Kerry was frequently questioned about Iraq and either hedged his answer or stated that he agreed with President Bush's actions, even with the benefit of hindsight. As a democrat trying to unseat a Republican in wartime, Senator Kerry faced a historic challenge. In the final analysis he was not quite up to it.

The Future of US Foreign Policy in a Second Bush Term

The second-term Bush administration is likely to remain substantially influenced by the neoconservative ideology, although this will be partially dependent on who takes the top cabinet posts in his security team.

Most notable of the changes announced to date is the resignation of both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who were considered moderating voices in the Bush administration. His replacement (subject to Senate approval), current National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, is less critical than Powell and suggests that the dye is already being cast in favour of the neocons. Stephen Hadley, who will succeed Rice as the president's National Security Advisor, is considered even more sympathetic to neocons than Ms. Rice. Also significant is that Donald Rumsfeld will continue as Defense Secretary, and that his Deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, will stay as well. With Powell and Armitage gone and these four plus Vice President Dick Cheney in place, the neoconservatives who dominated the first term will continue to hold sway over foreign policy.

Changes and resignations at the CIA also suggest that the Agency's activities will be more clearly moulded to the needs of the second Bush administration. Finally, with several of the new Republican senators being conservatives, getting legislation through the Senate in particular will be considerably easier - although since some are fiscal conservatives, who oppose the high deficit spending of the administration, the neocons are unlikely to have it all their own way.

So what will the next four years mean for America and the rest of the world?

Iraq

President George Bush has already continued his strategy in Iraq with renewed vigour, having almost immediately after the election pressed ahead with a huge assault on Falluja, which the US military sees as the main stronghold of the insurgency. Iraqi elections in January 2005 are also still to go ahead as planned, despite increasing concerns that the insurgency in Iraq is deeply embedded and shows every sign of persisting. US force levels in Iraq are being increased from 138,000 to 150,000, and all the additions are front-line troops. This signals that efforts to create a viable Iraqi army and police force are proving deeply problematic. Moreover, some analysts suggest that it will take five to ten years to build up an indigenous force sufficient to control Iraq, which means that US troop deployments will remain for the foreseeable future.

However, despite all the problems in Iraq, the Bush administration and the majority of US public opinion do not (yet) see the invasion of Iraq as a mistake per se. From this perspective, despite the problems, getting rid of Saddam has 'worked' and the experience in Iraq may therefore not be a significant deterrent to future similar action. This may particularly be the case if the Bush administration withdraws the majority of its forces within a year of the Iraqi elections, thereby reducing its exposure in Iraq. The outcome may then be on-going instability in Iraq (like in Afghanistan), but at a level that the US administration finds acceptable.

Is Iran next?

After Iraq, Iran presents President Bush with his biggest challenge. Pronouncements by neoconservatives and other members of the Bush administration against Iran have been made with increased frequency. It began with the ideologues: Krauthammer warned that, "The long-awaited revolution is not happening. Which makes the question of pre-emptive attack all the more urgent,"[57] and Boot wrote of Iran, "Regime change may seem like a radical policy but it is actually the best way to prevent a nuclear crisis that could lead to war".[58] This sentiment seems to have spread to the Bush administration, with Rice twice indicating on national television that the US government would be forced to act alone if multilateral diplomacy fails to persuade Iran to end its alleged nuclear weapons programme.[59]

President Bush appears content at present to let the current EU-led diplomacy reach its logical conclusion: either a successful agreement in which Tehran is persuaded to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for economic incentives, or the collapse of talks, continued opacity on the part of the Iranians and the likelihood of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declaring Tehran in non-compliance with its Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments.[60] In the latter case, Iran would be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, thereby setting in motion discussion of potential punitive measures, including possible enforced disarmament.

Neoconservatives argue, however, that the United States cannot afford to wait. Some argue that by changing the regime in Iran, the nuclear issue becomes irrelevant. And secret policy directives, including proposals to destabilise the government in Tehran, which were reported to be circulating in Washington in 2004, are likely to return to the fore in the coming months.[61] Others advocate military strikes against Iran's nuclear sites, citing intelligence reports that Iran will be nuclear weapons capable within the next two years. Whether US foreign policy tilts towards preventive intervention in Iran should become clearer in the next 12 months.

Or the UN?

On the day of the invasion of Iraq, Richard Perle, a leading neoconservative and former Chairman of the Pentagon Defense Policy Board, published an article in The Guardian, celebrating the death of "the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world order". With setbacks in Iraq and difficulties in achieving 'regime change' in Iran or North Korea, neoconservatives have begun to target the UN with increasingly vitriolic attacks. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, is currently at the centre of their fire. Prominent neoconservative voices in the media have been calling for the Secretary General to resign over reports linking his son to the alleged corruption of UN officials in the Iraq oil-for-food programme. Some have suggested his replacement with the former president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, who now serves as co-chairman of the international wing of the new Committee on the Present Danger. Secretary of State Powell has recently voiced support for Secretary General Annan, but it remains to be seen whether this support will continue once Secretary Powell has left his post.

Other suggested remedies include the United States leaving the UN, the creation of a community of democracies as an alternative, and withholding or reducing the US contribution to the UN budget (as was done in the late 1980s and through much of the 1990s). In 2005 and beyond, it can be expected that neoconservative campaigns to discredit the United Nations will grow in intensity.

But not North Korea?

The Bush administration continues to show less concern about North Korea. In 2002, Bush terminated the 1994 agreement between Pyongyang and the Clinton administration because of North Korean cheating, but did nothing when the country withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and began reprocessing previously safeguarded plutonium into nuclear weapons. North Korea is also the world's leading exporter of missile technology and the fear is that nuclear weapons technology will follow. However, the Bush policy towards North Korea remains one of drift and oscillation between diplomacy and wielding the big stick. Hence, US air strikes against North Korea's nuclear programme, while a remote possibility, cannot be ruled out altogether (despite the potentially horrendous consequences of North Korean retaliation). And if the US military have already attacked Iranian nuclear sites and the policy is perceived to have 'worked' the threat will seem even less remote.

Israeli-Palestine conflict

President Bush could follow his father and make a serious effort to try and resolve the conflict. (George H.W. Bush helped to set up the Madrid conference that eventually led to the Oslo peace agreement in 1993 between Israel and the Palestinians). The current President Bush has told European leaders, and Prime Minister Tony Blair in particular, that he is committed to seeking such a goal, but his ambition so far has been limited to supporting Prime Minister Sharon's plan to withdraw from Gaza in 2005. Linking the Gaza pull-out to the previously agreed 'road map' (negotiated by UN, the EU, the United States and Russia) is likely to prove difficult, and would require Prime Minister Sharon to sit down to negotiations with the Palestinian successor to Chairman Yasser Arafat. While, neoconservative proposals to extend democracy throughout the Middle East depend on making progress on this conflict, it is not clear that President Bush and his neocon advisors are able or willing to exert the necessary pressure on the Israelis to move the process forward.

Rebuilding US-European relations

After Bush's re-election, his first overseas visitor was NATO's Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Prime Minister Tony Blair visited soon after,[62] and even Germany and France sent their formal congratulations to President Bush.[63] However, in early November, the French President revealed his frustration with the election results at a meeting in Brussels, "European cohesion is naturally the right way to deal with what some people might consider the worries or concerns" as a result of the American election. He then left the meeting early and consequently missed a luncheon that was held for Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allwai.[64]

Thus, differences between the Bush administration and many leading countries in Europe that surfaced during his first term - differences that included Iraq, Israel and the Palestinians, Iran, the Kyoto agreement, the international criminal court, and a raft of arms control issues - are likely to become more rather than less fraught in the second term. Europe's own role in asserting a positive alternative agenda as a balance to a neocon-dominated Washington will be critical. However, the creation of an ethical-centred EU foreign policy counterweight is not helped by foreign policy differences within Europe and a tendency on the part of some former European colonial powers to revert to type, while simultaneously condemning the imperial ambitions of the White House. For example, the French government's recent unsuccessful push to lift an EU arms embargo on China and its military intervention in the Ivory Coast both appear to have been conducted in defence of narrow national interests. The Neocons would recognise and applaud such motives (as indeed the Wall Street Journal Europe editorial did on November 9 in regard to the Ivory Coast intervention).

Conclusions

Until recently, observers often viewed neoconservatism's contemporary influence as an aberration that had confounded the normal US decision-making process and blatantly defied the wishes of most Americans. November's US presidential election puts the situation in a more telling context, however. The story behind the success of the neoconservatives after 9/11 suggests a greater level of continuity. If that success were truly "a perfect storm...a convergence unlikely to be repeated for a very long time," [65] all that would have been required of Americans unhappy with the present situation would have been the patience to wait out this particular period in their country's history. That wait now extends to at least 2008, and possibly beyond.

In the first paper in this series, it was argued that foreign policy-making in the United States falls somewhere between the ruling elite and pluralist models. In other words, although foreign policy may be formulated by certain elites, these elites are not a single homogeneous entity, but may hold a variety of opinions. In addition, they usually need the tacit consent of interest groups and the public, especially over the longer-term.

Therein lies a basic contradiction in the view of current US foreign policy as a terrible mistake. If neoconservatism is so fundamentally abhorrent to most Americans as to represent a complete break with the past, the political system that gave rise to it must be undemocratic and elitist, in which case the past must resemble the present after all. It is more useful, then, to view the system as a functioning but flawed democracy that has previously allowed ideologues to hold disproportionate influence, and has continued to do so again.

The first paper examined the foreign policy decision-making process in place before the administration of President George W. Bush, and found several institutional peculiarities and long-standing trends. These were, among others, a disproportionately powerful presidency, an increasingly influential Department of Defense, which tended to dominate both the Department of State and its own military components and an NSC, which has rewarded political infighting over vision. In addition, a submissive media and Congress, a powerful military-industrial complex and religious right, a discredited CIA, partisan think tanks, and a pliant but casualty-averse public all existed before Bush became president.

The second paper discovered how these trends worked in the favour of neoconservatives after the election of Bush and especially after 9/11. It found that, by making use of these peculiarities, and further entrenching them, the neoconservatives have indeed exercised an immense influence over foreign policy and can be said to have led the administration and American people to war in Iraq.

The neoconservatives were also able to tap into deep-rooted American exceptionalism, patriotism, moral dualism, and redemption through violence. As mentioned previously, Americans on the whole are not neoconservative: most do not envision the United States as an empire and, even if they did, would not be willing to commit the resources needed to maintain a true imperium. Nonetheless, many share the ideology's view of a just and righteous America attacked on all sides by 'evil-doers' and unnecessarily constrained by an uncaring international community. In his support for this thesis and limited comprehension of neoconservatives' true motives, Bush is in many ways an American 'everyman' and reliable indicator of middle-American sentiment. Tucker et al are right to note, "The president is in the mainstream of a deep and mighty American river, a slow and reluctant but overwhelming desire to fight when Americans feel that their lives and freedom are in danger".[66]

Neoconservatism is therefore more entrenched than many of its critics would like to believe. While it has undergone some very real damage in Iraq, there is nothing to suggest that any loss of influence within the administration will be permanent. Its future in the second Bush administration hinges primarily on three factors. The first and most important of these is the level of security Americans feel within the country. It is unlikely that Americans would emulate the Spanish voters who reacted to a terrorist attack that killed more than 200 civilians in March 2004 by turning against the party which led them to war in Iraq and thus probably contributed to their targeting by fundamentalists. "Fear is more compelling than foresight",[67] and further attacks on American soil would likely tempt a panicked and terrified population to cede all control of security issues and foreign affairs to the 'experts' and support whoever promises the most aggressive retaliation.

Second, much will depend on the future of Iraq. Despite an election victory, large swathes of American opinion remain opposed to neoconservatism. Much of this opposition stems more from the administration's policy disasters in that country than from any reassessment of the ideology's merits. Many Americans are not so much disillusioned with neoconservatism as they are fearful of further casualties and another quagmire resembling Vietnam. It may take decades for the true costs or benefits of the war in Iraq to emerge (much as the true price of supporting the Mujihadeen in Afghanistan during the 1980s only became apparent with 9/11). The historical debate about this war could prove as controversial as the contemporary debate,[68] and Americans will base their support for the war-or lack of it-on a continuous cost-benefit analysis. It is too soon to consign Iraq to a future of chaos and control by warlords-it is conceivable that Iraq may yet partially democratise or regain some semblance of stability, vindicating the neoconservatives and adding to pressure for regime change elsewhere. Outside Iraq, the capture of Osama Bin Laden would also strengthen the neoconservatives' case.

Finally, future presidential elections in 2008 and beyond will have important implications for Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and his associates. Claims by a disenchanted left that Senator Kerry and President Bush essentially shared the same views on foreign policy were dubious: there was a difference on everything from Afghanistan to AIDS (but not, most importantly, on most of Iraq policy). A future democratic administration would not appoint any high-profile neoconservatives, relegating them to their Clinton-era position in think tanks and academia. However, the freedom of action of any future Democratic administration in 2008 or beyond is likely to be very limited for a long time to come. Should the neoconservatives be ousted from government in four years time, they will continue to be a formidable, immensely powerful lobby in Washington. Their financial leverage, personal connections and the high level of public support they are able to mobilise through the media and other means will grant them continued influence in the policy of any government regardless of political affiliation.

In the immediate term, with the Republicans remaining in control, the neoconservative moment may just have begun. It will signify an American public increasingly willing to ignore world opinion, rely on military force, and protect its own. This will be especially true if terrorism (or the threat of terrorism) continues in the United States and if the Iraq War begins to claim less American casualties. The governments of Syria and Iran will be at very real risk.

However, there is still a chance to salvage a positive aspect from this rather gloomy conclusion. Neoconservativism's recent travails in Iraq have created an opening for debate and brought under scrutiny both the assumptions that underlie it and the process that contributed to its rise after 9/11. By pushing their agenda so vigorously into mainstream American politics and society, the neoconservatives have exposed the extent of their long-time influence. If the neoconservatives continue to have staunch supporters, they now also have more opponents than ever before. These opponents have a vital but formidable task ahead of them. "The hope to restore Eden through superheroic violence must now give way to sober honesty".[69] The choice is one between a world order based on unilateral assertion of American power and an emphasis on military solutions, and one based on international cooperation and a broader approach to security.

About the Authors

Elsje Fourie originates from South Africa, but has also lived in Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria and Japan. She obtained her BA and BA (Hons) in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Pretoria. In 2003, she was awarded a two-year Rotary Foundation World Peace Scholarship, and recently completed her MA in Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford. As a part of her MPhil in International Relations, which she is undertaking at the same institution, she will complete an internship at United Nations University in early 2005.

Dr Ian Davis is Executive Director of BASIC and has an extensive background in government, academia, and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector. He received both his Ph.D. and B.A. in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, and was formerly Program Manager at Saferworld before being appointed as the new Executive Director of BASIC in October 2001. He has published widely on British defence and foreign policy, transatlantic security, the international arms trade, arms export controls, small arms and light weapons and defence diversification.

This series of discussion papers is based on Elsje Fourie's recently completed MA dissertation, with additional analysis and editing by Dr Ian Davis.

Endnotes

[2] As quoted in Ikenberry, G.J. 2004. "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment", Survival, 46 (1), p. 18.

[3] This allows other countries, such as Israel and Russia, the same luxury of defining terrorism to suit their own interests and deprives the US of the right to object.

[4] Fallows, J. 2004. "Blind into Baghdad", The Atlantic Monthly, January/February.

[5] Hoffmann, S. 2003. "The High and the Mighty", The American Prospect, 13 (24), p28-30.

[6] Zakaria, F. 2003. "The Arrogant Empire". Newsweek US Edition, March 24. At http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3068616/, accessed 20/08/2004.

[7] As quoted in Ikenberry, op cit, p. 14.

[8] For further details, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/hivaids/

[9] Berger, S.R. 2004. "Foreign Policy for a Democratic President". Foreign Affairs, 83(3) May/June. At http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501faessay83306/samuel-r-berger/foreign-policy-for-a-democratic-president.html, accessed 20/08/2004.

[10] Zakaria, op cit.

[11] Scheer, R. 2004. "Column Left: Electorate is Wising Up to the Iraq Blunder". The Nation, June 1. At http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040614&s=scheer0601, accessed 20/08/2004.

[12] As Paul Rogers points out, it is likely that provoking a violent reaction from the United States after 9/11 and a corresponding backlash among Muslims constituted part of Al Queda's strategy. Rogers, P. 2004. A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After, London: Pluto Press, p. 27.

[13] Packer, G. 2004. "A Democratic World", The New Yorker, February 16.

[14] Tucker, R.W. et al. 2002. "One Year On: Power, Purpose and Strategy in American Foreign Policy". The National Interest, Fall 2002. At http://www.nationalinterest.org, accessed 20/8/2004.

[15] Bartlett, B. 2004. "Commentary: Road Maps and Detours". Washington Times, April 21. At http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20040420-084527-8849r.htm, accessed 20/08/2004.

[16] Margolis, E. 2003. "Who's Really in Charge at the White House?", The Toronto Sun, December 14, p5.

[17] The extent of neoconservative's faith in the malleability of culture is evidenced by a document, described by Halper S. and Clarke J. 2004 (America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 21), that was passed around the civilian administration in Baghdad and entitled Should Islam be the Religion of the New Iraqi State? The answer, apparently, was "only as a last resort".

[18] As quoted in Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R. 1996. American Foreign Policy, 5th Edition, New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 259.

[19] Marshall, J.M. 2003. "Practice to Deceive: Chaos in the Middle East isn't the Bush Hawks' Nightmare Scenario, it's Their Plan". The Washington Monthly, 35(4), April 2003. p.28.

[20] Drew, E. 2003. "The Neocons in Power", The New York Review of Books, 50 (10).

[21] Haass, R. 2003. "Interview". PBS Frontline: Truth, War and Consequences, September 15. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/haass.html, accessed 9/6/2004.

[22] If free elections were held today in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden would probably win more votes than Crown Prince Abdullah. Marshall, op cit.

[23] Zakaria, op cit.

[24] As quoted in Judis, J.B. 2004. "Imperial Amnesia". Foreign Policy, July/August. At http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story2582.php, accessed 20/08/2004.

[25] Tucker et al, op cit.

[26] Beatty, J. 2004. "Politics and Prose: History's Fools". The Atlantic Unbound, May 19. At http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/polipro/pp2004-05-19.htm, accessed 5/7/2004.

[27] Kofi Annan interviewed by the BBC, 16 September 2004. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm, accessed 5/12/04.

[28] The fact that Chalabi plotted for years to overthrow Hussein but was never targeted by the Baathist Regime in itself indicates that he was not taken seriously or seen as a threat even within Iraq.

[29] McCain as quoted in Rieff, D. 2004, "The End of Empire", Mother Jones, May 1. For current data on US troop deployments in Iraq see http://globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat.htm.

[30] Rogers, P. 2004. "Iraq Between Insurgency and Uprising". Opendemocracy.net, August 12. At http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/article-2-2046.jsp, accessed 20/08/2004. See also Iraq Coalition Casualty Count http://icasualties.org/oif/ and Iraq Body Count http://www.iraqbodycount.net/. The 'minimum estimate by Iraq Body Count of Iraqi civilian casualties is just under 15,000 (accessed 15/12/04). A study published in The Lancet on 29 October 2004 puts the figure at around 100,000.

[31] Haass, op cit.

[32] Leahy, P. 2003. Floor Debate on the Leahy Amendment To the Iraq Supplemental October 2, 2003. http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200310/100203a.html, accessed 20/7/2004.

[33] As quoted in ibid.

[34] ibid. For a recent discussion on how the Neocons isolated State Department experts on the Middle East, see Glain, S. 2004. "Freeze-Out of The Arabists". The Nation, November 1.

[35] As quoted in Tierney, J. 2004, "The Hawks Loudly Express Their Second Thoughts", The New York Times: Week in Review, May 16.

[36] Carlson as quoted in ibid.

[37] Brooks as quoted in Alterman, E. 2004. "Stop the Presses: Hawks Eating Crow". The Nation, May 20. At http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040607&s=alterman, accessed 5/6/2004.

[38] Fukuyama, F. 2004. "The Neoconservative Moment". The National Interest, Summer 2004. At http://www.nationalinterest.com, accessed 27/08/2004.

[39] PIPA as cited in Kull, S. 2004, "Voice of a Superpower", Foreign Policy, May/June.

[40] Schulman, M. 2004. "TIME Poll Results: Voters and John Kerry." TIME Online, July 25. At http://www.time.com/time/press_releases/article/0,8599,665021,00.html, accessed 20/08/2004.

[41] Vanden Heuvel, K. & Borosage, R.L. 2004. "Victory in 2004-and Beyond". The Nation, July 15. At http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040802&c=5&s=kvhborosage, accessed 20/08/2004.

[42] Fukuyama, F. 2004. "The Neoconservative Moment", The National Interest, Summer 2004.

[43] Boot, M. 2004. "Think Again: Neocons". Foreign Policy, January/February, p. 28.

[44] As quoted in Scheer, op cit.

[45] As quoted in Tierney, op cit. One prominent neoconservative had, in fact, expected that to such an extent that he entitled his 2002 Washington Post column "Cakewalk in Iraq". Adelman, K. 2002. "Cakewalk in Iraq". The Washington Post, February 13, p. A27.

[46] Judis, op cit.

[47] Heilbrunn, J. 2004. "Rumors of the Neocons' Demise are Greatly Exaggerated". The Los Angeles Times, June 16, p. B11.

[48] Interestingly, the single resignation, namely George Tenet, former Director of the CIA has come from one of the few remaining Clinton appointees.

[49] Yglesias, M. 2004. "Present Dangers". The American Prospect Online, July 27. At http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=8226, accessed 20/08/2004.

[50] Zakaria, op cit.

[51] Halper & Clarke, op cit, p. 3.http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm, accessed 5/6/2004.

[52] Sieff, M. 2004. "Today Iraq, Tomorrow Iran". Salon, August 11. At http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/08/11/iran/index_np.html, accessed 20/08/2004.

[53] Packer, op cit.

[54] Burkeman, O. 2004, "Ruthless campaign mastermind got the Republican vote out", The Guardian, November 4.

[55] Kettle, M. 2004. "More states, more votes - A clear winner on any count", The Guardian, November 4.

[56] Mann, T. 2004. "Interview with Thomas Mann on Campaign 2004". USInfo, at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/election04/interview.htm, accessed 5/6/2004.

[57] As quoted in ibid.

[58] Boot, Foreign Policy, op cit, p. 25.

[59] Mann, W.C. 2004. "Rice Cites International Concern over Iran's Nuclear Intentions." The Washington Post, August 9, A16.

[60] For an overview of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons aspirations and the international response, see Chamberlain N. & Andrews, D. 2004, "The IAEA and Iran: Crisis averted - for the time being", BASIC Notes, 23 November, at: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN041123.htm

[61] Rozen, Laura, "The Revolution Next Time", Boston Globe, October 10, 2004.

[62] Kessler, Glenn, "Revived Policy Traveling Abroad," Washington Post, December 5, 2004, p. 17.

[63] "World Leaders Congratulate Bush's Re-election," Xinhuanet, via China View, November 4, 2004.

[64] "Chirac, Old Europe and the Election," Washington Times, November 8, 2004, p. 20.

[65] Rieff, op cit.

[66] Tucker et al, op cit.

[67] Packer, op cit.

[68] Haass, op cit.

[69] Lawrence J.S & Jewett, R. 2002. The Myth of the American Superhero, Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, p. 364.