A SPECIAL BASIC DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

While it can be argued that actors other than the President make many of the most important foreign policy decisions, making the "Bush Doctrine" something of a misnomer, Bush remains the personification of the 'war against terror'. As mentioned in the previous paper, on foreign policy issues, Americans tend to equate the government with the presidency alone. This is derived in part from the American mono-myth, where one solitary male hero must physically defeat evil. The spate of recent action films, such as Air Force One and Independence Day, which portray the President of the United States as an action-adventure hero, who fights terrorists/aliens with his bare hands, is illustrative in this regard.[42] When the German news magazine Der Spiegel created a satirical cover portraying each important national security decision-maker as an action hero, the White House, remarkably, ordered 33 poster-sized covers - their man was cast as Rambo, a superhero known for his willingness to circumvent traditional forms of authority, such as the law and the police, in order to get things done.[43]

Neoconservatism in Think Tanks and the Bureaucracy

Bush, thus, is an impressionable, easily influenced decision-maker in a highly respected, overly powerful role. In such an arrangement, his advisors-the executive's foreign-policy making bureaucracy-become immensely important, and herein can be found the nerve centre of neoconservatism. A network of connections binds a select group of decision-makers and intellectuals in a strong alliance.

Neoconservatives can be broadly divided into two groups, namely committed ideologues and more recently converted practitioners. The former, as the most fervent advocates of the doctrine, comprise a small coterie of East Coast defence intellectuals who have devoted much of the latter part of their careers to advocating regime change in Iraq. Although many have held government posts under the Reagan, Nixon and previous Bush administrations, and hold important positions today, they have generally been viewed as too controversial to hold the highest-profile positions.

The leader of this group and individual who most embodies modern neoconservatism is current Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. [44] As Under-secretary of Defense for Policy in 1992, Wolfowitz drafted the immensely controversial Defense Planning Guidance. This document stated that containment was no longer a valid strategy after the Cold War, advocated that America ensure it remains the sole superpower, and contained one of the first mentions of pre-emptive military action in government policy.[45] When leaked to the press, it proved so contentious that it had to be softened by Cheney-then Secretary of Defense-before it could be released. Only five days after the 9/11 attacks, at a NSC meeting, Wolfowitz, known for his long-standing antipathy towards Hussein and citing a lack of targets in Afghanistan, suggested attacking Iraq instead.[46] After the terrorist attacks on the US homeland, so single-minded were these ideologues that they were immediately "ready with a detailed, plausible blueprint for the nation's response. They were not troubled that their plan had been in preparation for over a decade for different reasons, in a different context, and in relation to different countries and, as such, did not in any way represent a direct response to the events themselves". [47]

Another prominent intellectual, Richard Perle, is the former head of the Defense Policy Board (a powerful advisory group to the government), and was on the advisory board until February 2004. He has consistently been one of the loudest voices advocating the overthrow of Hussein. The "Prince of Darkness", as he was known in the Reagan administration,[48] opposed détente and the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty negotiations in the 1970s. He has had an influence in the government that far surpassed his official role: he admits to telephoning Bush's speechwriter shortly after 9/11 to advise that Bush give a stern warning to state sponsors of terrorism.[49]

Perle, Wolfowitz and former CIA director James Woolsey are all protégées of the late Albert Wohlstetter, an early neoconservative and one of the main sources, together with advisors on Team B and the Committee on the Present Danger, of wildly exaggerated 'reassessments' of the Soviet threat to convince Reagan to enact huge increases in defence spending. [50] Irving Kristol, his son William Kristol, Under-Secretary for Defense Douglas Feith, Lewis 'Scooter' Libby (an influential deputy to Cheney often termed 'Dick Cheney's Dick Cheney'), and Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton are some other important neoconservatives. Many have been colleagues, neighbours and close friends for decades.

The neoconservative intellectuals speak most loudly through think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Security Policy, and PNAC. PNAC's signatories include such important figures as Cheney, Jeb Bush, Libby, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. The think tank had been agitating for Hussein's removal at least since writing a letter to Clinton in 1998 requesting that he make it his administration's top priority.[51]

Although the neoconservatives view the Clinton era as an unfortunate interruption in the execution of their grand strategy, they also admit that the 1990s contained elements of continuity. In 1998, Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which vowed to support efforts to remove Hussein's regime from power. Speaking of his aforementioned draft, Wolfowitz says, "What was considered...to be such an outrageous document was US consensus foreign policy, but during the Clinton Administration...it's pretty much verbatim".[51] The Clinton administration was not averse to taking advantage of America's hegemonic position, and Wolfowitz has admitted to having approved of Clinton's handling of Kosovo.[53] The difference between the two views, ultimately, lies in the emphasis put on national security: the neoconservatives viewed military involvement in the Balkans as crucial to American national security, but did not feel the same about Somalia or Rwanda.

Almost all of the ideologues have one crucial thing in common, namely a connection to Cheney. He is surely "the most influential and powerful Vice- President in the history of the United States".[54] Cheney was charged with heading the transition period from Bush's election in November 2000 to his accession two months later, and had used it to appoint a collection of hard-line allies. He has been called "Bush's personal CIA", and the final voice Bush wants to hear before making difficult decisions.[55] He spends much of his day with Bush, and has unprecedented access to NSC meetings and sensitive intelligence. He meets with Bush every morning and then several more times during a typical day. He presides alongside Bush over meetings with the White House domestic- and economic-policy staff and has two offices in the White House and one in the House of Representatives (as well as the traditional office in the Senate).[56]

Shortly after 9/11, Bush assigned Cheney the task of assessing homeland intelligence regarding the threat of biological and chemical weapons. His unusual influence is aided by his low profile, his lack of a specific portfolio, and the fact that he is not seen as a possible rival to Bush: he has repeatedly shown his unwillingness ever to run for President. He meets privately with most visiting Arab leaders, circumventing Secretary of State Colin Powell. His role as Deputy Counsellor to Nixon during the Watergate scandal, and Rumsfeld's position as his superior, seem to have instilled in both a belief in the imperial presidency based on executive secrecy and complete control of the decision-making process. [57]

However, Cheney and Rumsfeld belong to the second group of neoconservatives, the recently converted but highly-placed. These traditional conservatives-Cheney had had a more conservative voting history than any of his peers in Congress[58] -were decidedly isolationist before the World Trade Center attacks. They shared with neoconservatives an admiration for unilateralism, as seen in America's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December 2001 and blocking of international efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, even though the anthrax attacks in the Autumn of 2001 clearly confirmed the dangers of biological terrorism. And throughout 2002 the administration continued and even intensified its campaign to block the International Criminal Court (ICC) from having jurisdiction over US citizens. But they were initially deeply distrustful of nation-building and overly ambitious plans to revamp the world order. It was only with 9/11-"the great simplifier" ,[59] in the words of Hoffmann-that they became supportive of the neoconservative cause. The previous decade's moral relativity could give way to a return to Cold War-style certainty; values and power could be reunited, and an abstract ideological crusade could be reconciled with the promotion of American security.

Immediately, America began to show a greater reliance on unilateralism and military force. The Bush administration, rather than capitalising on the UK's offer of help in Afghanistan, discouraged its ally from sending regular armed forces, clearly preferring to use its military dominance there as proof of its power and its willingness to use force.[60] It also demonstrated disdain for the Geneva Convention by detaining hundreds of prisoners of war without trial or due process.

The National Security Strategy of 2002 also exhibits a strong neoconservative slant. It posits, "Our responsibility to history is to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil", and the United States must "actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world".[61] It speaks of "a distinctly American internationalism", disparages the ICC and disputes the value of deterrence. In what is probably the document's most crucial sentence, it states, "We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists".[62] It assures other nations that the United States will use force only when the cause is just and the reasons for action clear, assuming that the US alone is the judge of the legitimacy of its own or others' strikes.

It should be noted, here, that the Bush administration is using the term 'pre-emption', a widely accepted international norm, in a misleading manner to mask what is really a far more controversial action, namely preventive war. In keeping with standard definitions of the words, the US Department of Defense's Dictionary of Military Terms defines the former as "an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent", while the latter is defined as "a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk".[63]

Planning for the war in Iraq began in late 2001, and members of the administration reportedly told high-ranking military officials that not only Iraq, but also Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan and Libya would all eventually have to be targeted for regime change.[64] Not unsurprisingly, General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief of US Central Command (and his predecessor, General Anthony Zinni) questioned the wisdom of beginning a second land war in Asia. Most neoconservatives are viewed by the military as 'chickenhawks', having never served in the military (or if they have, not having seen combat). Richard Gephardt, Tom Daschle, Al Gore, George McGovern, Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, Wesley Clark, John Kerry and many other important Democrats have served in the armed forces. In contrast, few influential Republican politicians can claim the same: Roy Blunt, Tom Delay, Rudy Giuliani, George Pataki, John Ashcroft, Jeb Bush, Carl Rove, Gingrich, Cheney, Wolfowitz, Feith, Perle, Abrams-the list goes on. Most of their staunchest defenders in the press, too, have very little experience in this regard, including Sean Hannity, Rush Limbaugh, Bill O'Reilly, Pat Buchanan, Bill Kristol, Kenneth Starr, and others.

They are often distrusted by the career soldiers in the government, some of who accuse them of high-handedness and recklessness in committing troops.[65] Soon, however, the momentum of planning a war turned what even the administration has termed an 'elective' war into an inevitability, and opposition from the military was overruled.

As noted in the previous discussion paper, interdepartmental rivalry has long been rife within the foreign policy-making machinery, with the State Department usually outmanoeuvred and undervalued. During the run-up to the war, the Bush administration witnessed interdepartmental conflicts, especially between the departments of State and Defense that were unprecedented in their openness and intensity. The President, usually intolerant of disagreement within his administration, tolerated open warfare between members of the NSC, and seemed unable or unwilling to impose order.[66] Powell opposed the war-at least initially-reportedly asking Bush, "You understand the consequences? You know that you're going to be owning [Iraq]?"[67] As a result, Powell was largely excluded from major decision-making on this issue. The Defense Department reportedly sometimes failed altogether to attend inter-agency meetings set up by the NSC staff to resolve policy differences.[68]

This dominance of the Defense Department is most clearly exemplified in the debacle surrounding the State Department's 'Future of Iraq Project'. Charged with planning development in a post-war Iraq, the $5 million project produced 13 volumes of extensive recommendations. However, because detailed thought about the post-war situation implied predictions of costs and potential problems, it was seen to weaken the case for war, and the results of the project were ignored.[69] Other officials who broke administration discipline by making financial predictions on the cost of the war faced similar penalties: the chief White House economic advisor was forced to resign after estimating the overall cost of the war at between $100 and $200 billion.[70]

Consequently, the entire occupation suffered from a lack of planning. Against the explicit recommendations of the Future of Iraq Project, Bremer dissolved the Iraqi army and failed to make provisions for a police force. When this later caused widespread looting and violence, one of Bremer's advisors mistakenly argued, "The critical point was that nobody argued we shouldn't do this".[71]

While it is true that war is by its very nature uncertain and chaotic, decision-makers cannot use this to evade responsibility. The neoconservatives were certain that US troops would be welcomed as liberators, especially by the Southern Shiites and Kurds. Decision-makers cannot claim that the aftermath will be easy, and then excuse away instability by saying, as Wolfowitz has, that it "comes with democracy and it's the nature of the beast that it's turbulent and uncertain" [72] or, as Rumsfeld has, that "stuff happens".[73] So confident were the neoconservatives of success, that the Pentagon originally envisioned sending only 100,000 troops to Iraq and called suggestions that more might be needed "wildly off the mark".[74] Ultimately, 230,000 to 250,000 were sent-still half the amount involved in the first Gulf War. [75]

This optimism had much to do with the Department of Defense's reliance on exiled Iraqi leader Ahmed Chalabi, who had assured it that US troops would be welcomed into Iraq with flowers and widespread popular support. Chalabi, a banker, had been tried and convicted in absentia in Jordan for fraud. In 1992, his organisation, the Iraqi National Congress (INC)-largely funded by the CIA-staged a failed coup to overthrow Hussein. In 1998, Congress allocated $97 million to the INC, but stopped the funding after alleged accounting irregularities.[76] When Bush took office, funding resumed, this time in exchange for 'intelligence' about the domestic political situation in Iraq. This was much to the displeasure of officials at the State Department and CIA who distrusted Chalabi and believed that, having lived outside Iraq since the age of 13, he was out of touch with the majority of Iraqis.

In stark contrast, Perle and the Department of Defense praised Chalabi as "the kind of modern liberal leader that we would hope to see, not only in Iraq, but throughout the Arab world".[77] In the summer of 2002, the State Department again attempted to cut off Chalabi's funding, but the Defense Department began to direct secret intelligence funds to the INC.[78] One of the main pillars of the administration's case for WMD in Iraq was testimony from defectors produced by Chalabi. These defectors claimed to have worked on or witnessed programmes to develop chemical and biological weapons. The Defense Department's desire to see Chalabi leading Iraq was especially evident in February 2003, when it flew him into Baghdad without the knowledge of the State Department.

It was mentioned in the first paper that the role of the National Security Advisor varies from administration to administration, but that, with notable exceptions, he/she has not usually had a large role in creating foreign policy. As the office was created partly to act as 'referee' between various decision-makers, the relationship between the National Security Advisor and the president is an important determinant of the influence of the NSC. This proved true, also, in this case-Condoleezza Rice, a classic realist rather than a neoconservative, kept a very low profile throughout the run-up to the war. However, she has an exceptionally close relationship to Bush, and, according to Woodward, was the only person whose opinion on invasion Bush sought directly (she recommended invasion).[79] Critics fault Rice for agreeing with Bush at all times, and for paying insufficient attention to disputes within the NSC. One former top government official complains, "She thinks her job is just to figure out what the president is trying to say and then to say it more articulately".[80] Of course, how true such conjectures are is always difficult to ascertain, especially given the opaque and impenetrable nature of this particular administration.

The role of the CIA in the war is especially noteworthy. The organisation had failed countless times in Iraq, leaving behind a legacy of aborted coups, planned assassinations, and broken promises. In 1991, thousands of Kurds and Shiites were executed by the Hussein regime after the CIA (aided by pronouncements by the Administration) encouraged them to revolt against the dictator, then neglected to support them militarily. This time, the Agency Director, George Tenet, estimating the chances of successful covert action at close to zero, expressly advised the government that nothing but a full military invasion would convince Iraqis of American sincerity and regain their trust.[81] In so doing, he created another substantial pressure for war.

So much had the CIA come to be associated with its clandestine actions, that the Bush administration seemed to forget the Agency's primary duty-that of collecting and analysing information. The CIA, if anything, tends to over warn, but could find virtually no intelligence linking Bin Laden to Hussein or proving that Iraq possessed WMD capabilities. Claims that Al Qaeda had sought uranium from Niger had long been discredited within the intelligence community, but nonetheless surfaced in Bush's State of the Union Speech. In many cases, the administration bypassed the intelligence committee altogether. The quasi-official Office of Special Plans, which Perle openly referred to as "the Iraq war-planning group"[82] and which reported directly to senior administration officials, was accused by many of a prosecutorial approach. The administration also dismissed intelligence from French agents highly placed in the Baathist regime that disclaimed the existence of WMD.[83] Greg Thielman, the former head of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office at the State Department's intelligence bureau, also charged that widespread manipulation of facts took place, and that, in fact, "there was no imminent threat".[84]

Neoconservatism in Interest Groups

As has always been the case in the American foreign policy-making process, some interest groups have a far greater influence than others. Two interest groups, in particular, have been useful in pushing the neoconservative agenda into the mainstream. The first is big business, especially companies within the military-industrial complex. Most of the neoconservatives in government have extensive business interests and have taken advantage of the 'revolving door' between the highest echelons of the public and private spheres.

The most notorious case concerns the multinational conglomerate Halliburton. Halliburton has had the ear of the White House at least since 1992, when its subsidiary Kellogg-Brown & Root (KBR) was awarded the lucrative 'Logistics Civil Augmentation Program' (LOGCAP) contract, described by Briody as "effectively a blank cheque from the government".[84] In 1997, Halliburton lost out on a bid for the LOGCAP contract to rival DynCorp. But the Army still gave Halliburton a no-bid contract to set up some bases in the Balkans, and Halliburton so impressed government leaders that then-Vice-President Al Gore gave it a "Hammer" award for efficiency. The close ties between the government and the company perhaps explains why career politician Cheney, with almost no business experience, was made CEO from 1995 until his nomination in 1999. It was under Cheney that Halliburton gained its greatest leverage in Washington: LOGCAP funding increased from $144 million in 1994 to $423 million in 1996, and in 2001 KBR once again won LOGCAP, this time for twice the normal term length of five years. [86] During the first two years of Cheney's tenure, its expenditure on lobbying to Congress dropped from $1.2 million to just $600 000.[87] Cheney will continue to receive a deferred salary from his former employer until 2005.

The Afghanistan and Iraq wars have been particularly profitable for Halliburton: KBR built the 1,000 detention cells at Guantanamo Bay, as well as the permanent bases at Bagram and Kandahar, Afghanistan. In what was widely criticised as an uncompetitive bidding process, Halliburton won the largest contract awarded to a company to restore Iraqi oil infrastructure (it is the largest oilfield services firm in the world). The company is currently under official investigation on various charges of violating sanctions in pre-war Iraq and in Iran, and of fraud, bribery and overcharging the US government.[88]

Part of Halliburton's power stems from the proliferation of military outsourcing. According to Singer, the US government in Iraq employs at least 15,000 private 'civilian' (often formerly military) contractors, from more than 30 countries.[89] And plans to create 14 'enduring' bases in Iraq have created decades of work for private military companies (PMCs).[90] Their relative numbers in the two Gulf Wars illustrate the increase in the use of PMCs: during the first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor there were 50 military personnel involved. In the 2003 conflict the ratio was 1 to 10. Aside from the potential conflict of interest problem (a vested interest in continued conflict may conflict with the desire to genuinely serve one's country), this trend also throws up problems of control and accountability within the armed forces, as the Abu Ghraib debacle most graphically showed.[91] Contractors are increasingly at the front lines of combat, in "mission-critical" roles, without proper protection, regulation of their actions, or public awareness of their expanding role.

Other companies, too, exploit their connections with prominent neoconservatives. In 2002, Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman-America's 'Big Three' weapons manufacturers-received more than $42 billion in Pentagon contracts.[92] The Carlyle Group, a Washington-based private equity fund, has a reputation for hiring former public officials such as George H.W. Bush and James Baker, the former Secretary of State who led the legal campaign to stop the Florida recount in 2000.[93] The Economist has accused the company, which also administers some of the Bin Laden family's wealth, of cronyism and monopolistic practices.[94]

General Jay Garner was appointed as Director of the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq due to his experience in securing Kurdish refugee areas in Northern Iraq at the end of Desert Storm in 1991. His appointment was controversial, however, because he is the President of an arms company that sells, among others, the Patriot missile used to great effect in Israel and Iraq. As one analyst remarked, "'It seems inappropriate for somebody to step into a humanitarian and administrative role from a company with a role in providing equipment which, albeit defensive, is vital to the success of the US operation".[95]

The war in Iraq played an important role in the rise-from $315 billion to $379 billion-in the defence budget between 2001 and 2003.[96] Many of these corporations and others like them, thus, had both the motive and the means to be powerful advocates for the war. One particularly compelling motive deserves special mention in this regard. Petroleum has long been central to the US presence in Saudi Arabia and much of the Gulf region. US dependency on oil is increasing: in 2000, the US imported 60% of its total oil needs, compared with 42% in 1990.[97] The petroleum industry is one of the major backers of the Bush campaign.

Economic incentives certainly played a role in influencing decision-makers, but it is easy to overestimate the extent to which this was true. Later converts to the neoconservative cause were probably motivated more by such concerns than were Perle, Wolfowitz and their peers. One of the trademarks of true neoconservatism is its lack of concern for the financial implications of policies. Its organisations are more often funded directly by decades-old conservative trusts and foundations than by corporations. Even Cheney and Bush are career politicians and figureheads more than they are genuine Texas 'oilmen'.[98] Their conservative, nationalistic political and social views predate their involvement in the private sector.

This makes the second interest group, namely the Israeli lobby, all the more relevant. Several neoconservative decision-makers have close ties to Israel's right-wing Likud party and/or domestic pro-Israel organisations such as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Some see in Sharon a valuable ally in the "War on Terror" and view Palestinian resistance as similar to the terrorist attacks against the United States. Perle has been honoured by the Zionist Organisation as a "pro-Israel activist" and has ties to the Likud party. He has argued for irrevocable settlement rights in West Bank and reoccupation of areas under command of the Palestinian Authority, "even though the price in blood would be high".[99] In 1970, he was expelled from his position as aide to Senator Henry Jackson when the FBI found he had discussed classified information with an Israeli embassy official.[100]

Perle's alleged conduct in 1970 is not an isolated incident: the FBI is currently reviewing why a series of past counter-intelligence investigations examining the links between high-ranking government officials and Israel was never followed up. According to the FBI, Feith's office in 2001 provided highly classified information, including a draft on US policy towards Iran, to AIPAC, which then passed it on to the Israeli embassy.[101] Two decades earlier, Feith had been dismissed as Reagan's Middle East Analyst under almost identical allegations. A deputy of Perle has also been charged with approving sensitive exports to Israel without following the proper vetting procedure.

The relevance of the Israeli lobby to the war in Iraq is a contentious issue, but there is much to suggest that desire to surround Israel with more sympathetic, democratic neighbours played a role in the decision to invade. In 1996, Perle and Feith authored a now-famous advisory paper for the Likud Prime Minister Netanyahu entitled "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm". The paper explicitly requested that the United States and Israel jointly "focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq - an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right - as a means of foiling Syria's regional ambitions", and warned that "Iraq's future could affect the strategic balance in the Middle East profoundly".[102] Wolfowitz's assertion that "the road to the Middle East goes through Baghdad," which refers to Hussein's aiding of the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, contains the notion that Hussein was the greatest obstacle to the peace process and that deposing him would bring peace to Israel. [103]

The Israeli lobby, which should not be equated with the far more diverse Jewish-American community, has emulated the techniques of economic lobbies to become far more influential than any other ethnic lobby groups. It is often divided on domestic Israeli policies, but is far more united on the matter of US policy towards Israel. It generally supports large-scale US funding for Israel-the country has received over $70 billion since 1979-and unconditional US diplomatic protection in UN and other fora.[104] At its worst, it has been known to engage in whisper campaigns and blacklisting of critics in the government and elsewhere. This is not helped by the fact that critics of Israel in the United States tend to alienate Americans by being either right-wing (Buchanan) or equally left-wing (Chomsky). This lack of a middle ground means that informed centrist criticism that asserts Israel's right to exist in peace and security but seeks to make aid conditional to the behaviour of Israel is often missing.[105] As one author puts it, "Although the role of the pro-Israel lobby is often greatly exaggerated-with some even claiming it is the primary factor influencing U.S. policy-its role has been important...in helping to create a climate of intimidation among those who seek to moderate U.S. policy, including growing numbers of progressive Jews".[106]

This is not to imply, then, as some critics do, that the Israel lobby completely controls America or its foreign policy. As stated in the first section of this series, the foreign policy of the United States continues to be informed by a range of other actors. However, the military-industrial-petroleum complex and Israel lobbies undoubtedly furnished two further reasons to go to war in Iraq. The variety of motives and interests behind the decision is clear in Wolfowitz's statement in a Vanity Fair interview that "For reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason".[107]

Neoconservatism in the Media and Public Opinion

After all their machinations, the neoconservatives ultimately still needed, if not the support, then at least the acquiescence of the American public. Those who argue that foreign policy has been usurped completely against the will of the people have to face the fact that polls show that the majority of Americans backed the war.[108] The same public which had vehemently rejected Wolfowitz's draft-and with it his vision of the world-only a decade earlier, barely noticed it in 2003, or if they did, raised few objections.[109]

To convince Americans of the justness of their cause, neoconservatives made use of certain key allies. First and foremost among these was the media, which helped to 'homogenise' the views of the right.[110] By far the biggest culprit in this regard was the Fox News Channel, a part of Rupert Murdoch's massive worldwide media empire of more than 130 newspapers, 25 magazines and several television channels. Fox's brand of emotive programming, driven exclusively by ratings and packaged as a commodity to be 'sold' to viewers, has made it the most popular 'news' channel in the United States. Its reporters are combative, often openly scornful of guests' views, and primarily driven by ratings. It openly exploits misperceptions and biases: studies have shown that a large majority of Americans held at least one fundamentally mistaken impression about the war in Iraq, that these perceptions contributed to much popular support of the war, and that the source was certain media outlets, among them Fox News.[111] Fox has become, in the words of Halper and Clarke, an "electronic tabloid, engaging people's emotions of fear, dread, anger and revenge".[112]

Moreover, Fox has ties to the US government. John Ellis, head of the network's decision desk and first cousin of George W. Bush, was responsible for first proclaiming Bush's victory in the 2000 elections; other stations soon followed suit although the outcome was still uncertain. Woodward recounts how Fox CEO Roger Ailes-"Bush's media guru"-advised the President, against official government protocol, that the public wanted to see Bush acting more harshly in Afghanistan.[113]

Fox is not a solitary case, however. Conservative talk radio, epitomised by the inflammatory Rush Limbaugh, is a powerful tool of the right. Neoconservatives have also used their connections to the media in other ways: former Ambassador Joseph Wilson's wife had her identity as undercover CIA operative leaked to the press by a senior White House official after Wilson revealed that the claims linking Nigerian yellowcake to Al Qaeda were fabricated. This is a crime, punishable by ten years' imprisonment.

The Iraq war marked the first time since Vietnam that members of the media travelled side by side with US troops in combat. These so-called 'embedded' journalists have been viewed as a great success for giving the public real-time news directly from the front line. However, the method has its pitfalls; journalists are restricted in what they can report, and often begin to so identify with their units that they sacrifice objectivity and lose sight of the larger political context.[114]

As mentioned in the previous discussion paper, lack of debate among elites and within Congress tends to restrict debate in the media. This was especially true after 9/11, when the tendency to 'rally around the flag' prevented the media and public from asking difficult questions about the 'War on Terror'. This, combined with an American public that tends to be permissive and to favour any government action in the face of crisis, resulted in a 92% approval rating for the campaign against terrorism in October 2001[115] -tantamount to an open mandate for the neoconservatives. The attacks on the World Trade Centre served to 'close' public debate to a certain extent, even if debate would later 'open' as foreign policy became more contentious. [116]

The attacks also served to reduce America's aversion to casualties, forcing it to confront death in a way it had never done before. As Vietnam showed, Americans are willing to accept a certain amount of casualties, but only provided they believe the cause is just and necessary. After 9/11 presented Americans with just such a cause, public opinion regarding intervention underwent no less than a transformation. However, fear and anger played a larger role than abstract notions of jus ad bellum. "Fear, the most basic of human emotions... suspends time and thought and renders those in its grip unusually susceptible to demagoguery".[117] For several months after 9/11 (and to a lesser extent since), US citizens were subjected to threats of biological terror, so-called 'dirty bombs' and new suicide squads.

The result was a populace less resistant to US involvement overseas and more willing to take the kind of bold risks the neoconservatives were advocating. The mono-myth of a lone hero in pursuit of righteous retribution resurfaced in the public psyche and allowed Americans to invest great trust in the President. This is ironic given that, in many ways, 9/11 exposed the deficiencies in mono-mythic assumptions: no superman or sheriff intervened at the last minute to save the day, and ordinary people were not passive bystanders but helped each other.[118]

If the media is one arm of neoconservative influence on the public, the religious right is the other. While the Jewish right provides its share of support for the neoconservatives, so-called 'Christian Zionists' are even stauncher in their support, and more powerful due to their larger numbers. The most ardent supporters of Likud in the Republican electorate are certain Protestant fundamentalists, who believe that God bequeathed all of Palestine to the Jewish people and see in the conflict a prelude to the Second Coming.[119] Evangelical theologians have been instrumental in portraying Islam as a fundamentally aggressive religion. They are supported by a wide variety of conservative groups often claiming to represent 'the family' or 'the community' and seeking to uphold what they see as fundamental traditional 'American' values. As one observer points out, the values that neoconservatives aim to advance overseas are largely the Protestant, Christian values that were dominant in 19th century America.[120] The fact that they are no longer the sole values of today's multicultural, diverse America may have more than a little to do with the evangelicals' zeal at promoting them elsewhere.

White evangelical Protestants represent about a quarter of the electorate, making them the most powerful single bloc in American politics.[121] In 2000, according to the Princeton Religion Research Report, 45 per cent of Americans described themselves as 'born-again' or evangelical Christians.[122] Almost 80 per cent of white evangelicals support Bush, a born-again Christian who they view as one of their own.[123] Bush begins each day with a prayer and Bible reading, making him, according to an evangelical movie entitled "George W. Bush: Faith in the White House", the most overtly religious administration in American history.[124]

However, most Americans are not neoconservatives. In a 2003 opinion poll, 59% of respondents agreed that the United States "does not have the right or responsibility to overthrow dictatorships and help their people build a democracy".[125] Most wanted to wait longer for UN support before going to war, and most believed the US government did not have strong evidence that the country was in imminent danger.[126] A full 88% believed pre-war Iraq had no worse a human rights record than some other countries. [127]

Moreover, most Americans would never agree to the kind of long-term, labour-intensive commitment that neoconservatives want in the Middle East. However, they allowed the neoconservatives to implement their vision without widespread condemnation or resistance. Stymied by the cohesiveness of the religious right, fearful of another 9/11 and persuaded by infotainment, they permitted a group of men whose motives they did not understand to lead them into war.[128] The foreign policy 'mood' remained tolerant until the war began, although the final discussion paper will explore whether this has remained the case in the light of the many recent setbacks in Iraq.

Conclusions

Neoconservatism's rise is due to its clear and forceful articulation by a group of well-connected, determined men skilled at bureaucratic infighting and aided by their limited public visibility and accountability. It rests partly on the coming together of several unlikely and unforeseeable contingencies, on personality, and partly on careful, relentless planning by a "small pack of zealots whose dedication has spanned decades, and that through years of selective recruitment has become a government cult with cells in most of the national security system".[129] But, crucially, it was also made possible by certain broader deficiencies, identified in the previous discussion paper, within the policy-making process.

The substance of US foreign policy has certainly changed in the past few years, but the foreign-policy process and machinery has, for the most part, merely witnessed the logical conclusion of certain pre-existing trends. Congress has continued to under-perform, the media has remained a means for the government to shape popular attitudes, and certain lobbies and think tanks have continued to exercise a great deal of influence. The domination of the Department of Defense over the State Department and, to a lesser extent, the military leadership, has persisted. The CIA's role has changed, but as the result of a history that predates the coming to power of the neoconservatives; its record of failed covert action worldwide has robbed it of credibility outside the government and clout within it. This administration has seen a historic reversal of roles between the President and Vice President, but this has surprisingly little substantive impact: a Vice President who is de facto President issues policy decisions from the same Office of the President that is so powerful in modern US politics.

The rise of the neoconservatives has corresponded with a far broader growth in conservatism in the United States, making it less an aberration than a mere distortion of what many Americans believe, Its popularity is the logical conclusion of certain social and cultural trends, combined with an event of unprecedented magnitude which shook the country to its core. For this reason, it shall be argued in the final paper that neoconservatism may well be more entrenched than is commonly believed to be the case.

The attacks of 9/11 have indeed proved transformative, but more for their impact on public opinion and the national mood than on the actual machinery of foreign policy. It is in the context of this mood of fear and revenge felt by decision-makers and the public alike, that the neoconservatives were able to exercise ambitions they had long cherished and to exert an influence on foreign policy out of keeping with the nature of the threat or the strength of their arguments.

About the Author

Elsje Fourie originates from South Africa, but has also lived in Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria and Japan. After obtaining her BA and BA (Hons) in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Pretoria, she spent a year as an English teacher and cultural ambassador in rural Japan. In 2003, she was awarded a two-year Rotary Foundation World Peace Scholarship, and was able to undertake an MA in Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford, which she has recently completed. She is currently pursuing her MPhil in International Relations at the same institution.

This series of discussion papers is based on Elsje Fourie's recently completed MA dissertation, with additional analysis and editing by Dr Ian Davis, Executive Director at BASIC. Matt Martin and David Isenberg at BASIC also provided valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Its final content, however, remains the responsibility of the author.

Endnotes

[1] Quoted in Ian Gilmor's review of James Naughtie's book, The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency, Macmillan 2004, in The Guardian, September 18, 2004.