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A SPECIAL BASIC DISCUSSION PAPER SERIESNEOCONSERVATISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: A VIEW FROM VENUS14 OCTOBER 2004 Part I: An Introduction to US Foreign Policy MakingBy Elsje Fourie and Ian Davis
We welcome your feedback - please send your
comments to: basicuk at basicint.org Introduction and Rationale for the SeriesThe 21st century has been an unusually turbulent one for the United States thus far. In the space of less than five years, the country has witnessed both the most closely contested election in its history (with another close contest imminent) and the largest attack on its own soil. It has launched a 'War on Terror', invaded two countries and suffered serious setbacks in both, but especially in Iraq. This recent reliance on 'regime change' and pre-emption has polarised opinion around the world and within the United States, making the Bush administration the most controversial US administration in recent history. Opponents of the country's foreign policy reorientation point to the influence of a small group of individuals in key positions in and near to the Bush administration. These neoconservatives (as they are known by all but the neoconservatives themselves) have become something of a cause celebre in contemporary US politics. Conventional wisdom holds them responsible for orchestrating a vast conspiracy, aided by several unforeseen coincidences, and thereby usurping control over foreign policy against the will of the American people and their elected representatives. One important source contends that neoconservatism is "little more than an aberration. It runs counter to the political society crafted over half a century by Republican and Democratic institutions alike".[1] By this argument, neoconservatism's position is so precarious that the spate of recent troubles in Iraq has been enough to expose the intellectual poverty of its exponents and shame into obscurity those who advocated the invasion. The neoconservative doctrine is dead, they claim, and will never again be used to justify another war. Another perspective sees the matter in a slightly different light. While it does not doubt that neoconservatism is a very real phenomenon and primarily responsible for recent US actions, it sees it as more entrenched in foreign policy decision-making. It argues that neoconservatism has been an important influence on American foreign policy since at least the Reagan era and has increasingly grown more powerful over the ensuing period. Since the 1994 congressional elections, for example, the numbers of neoconservatives in both the Senate and House has steadily grown, muscling aside even traditional Republican conservatives. According to this viewpoint, any doctrine as successful as neoconservatism must be symptomatic of deeper political and social forces, especially in a democracy. It is therefore careful not to view turmoil in Iraq as any more than a temporary setback to an ideology which will need more than several hundred American casualties and a few photographs to derail it. One author warns that anyone "waiting for a new administration or a new set of policy professionals to rise to positions of influence [...] may be in for a very long wait [...] the substance of American foreign policy will remain roughly the same".[2] However, lack of appreciation as to the scope, role and influence of neoconservatism on US foreign policy appears widespread - even among close allies. "I never quite understand what people mean by this neocon thing". This was the remarkable admission Tony Blair made to BBC journalist, James Naughtie, as late as 2004 and a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein.[3] The Prime Minister's incomprehension proved once again how successful a small group of policy-makers has lately been in obscuring itself and its motives, even at the highest levels. On the eve of one of the most crucial US elections in living memory, this three-part series of discussion papers is designed to help the British Prime Minister and other concerned parties (in Europe and the United States) understand the outlook of the neoconservatives who have dictated the foreign policy of the Bush administration. The series is structured as follows:
This series of discussion papers aims to set out just how deeply entrenched neoconservatism is in US foreign policy and how likely this is to change within the near future. The papers take a predominantly 'procedural approach', emphasising the foreign policy decision-making machinery and process. Over the course of the series the papers explore the route through which neoconservatives came to influence policy and the larger political system within which they operate, and also give some indication as to what the system is likely to allow again in the future. Written by two 'outsiders' (from Venus rather than Mars[4]), the papers draw on a wide range of sources, including newspapers, public broadcasts, news magazines, and, more traditionally, books and academic journals.[5] But the analysis throughout this series is by no means definitive, and it is intended to spark discussion on the eve of a crucial election in the United States. We welcome your feedback and questions, whether you are from Venus, Mars or Downing Street. Please send your comments to: basicuk at basicint.org Also please send us your email address if you would like to be sent the other discussion papers in the series. Foreign Policy: Definitions and ModelsThe era of globalisation has witnessed the growing influence of a number of unconventional international actors, from non-governmental organisations, to multi-national corporations, to global political movements. Traditional, state-centric definitions of foreign policy as "the policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states"[6] are no longer sufficient. Several alternative definitions are more helpful at highlighting aspects of foreign policy traditionally neglected. The first views foreign policy as "those external goals for which the nation is prepared to commit its resources".[7] By focusing on what a country does rather than what it says, this pragmatic definition usefully separates a country's rhetoric from its true intent and its material capabilities. However, lack of action can also constitute a policy-the policy of an isolationist state is defined by its very unwillingness to commit resources. A second conceptualisation of foreign policy is as "the range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage...in order to advance the national interest".[8] Notable here is the recognition that governments do not act as monolithic, static entities, and that non-state actors may at times be as influential as states. However, the assumption that governments always know what is in the "national interest" and always rationally work towards its realisation is debatable. For the purposes of this analysis, foreign policy is taken to mean, "the goals that a nation's officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them".[9] This third, and most helpful definition focuses not only on outcome, but also, crucially, on norms and process. Values are essential to the study of foreign policy, and explain why the policies of different states can vary so dramatically. Means are equally important: what a country does can be less significant than how it does it, as recent US actions illustrate. More controversial than the definition of foreign policy, however, is the matter of how it is generally formulated and how much it reflects popular sentiment. Analysts of US policy generally adhere to one of three models:
The first, the democratic model, holds that policies reflect the preferences of the public, if not directly, then indirectly through electoral processes and representative institutions. In this view, policies are formulated 'by the people, for the people', and the government is a faithful mouthpiece of the wishes of society. However, as one author points out, there is much to disprove this: large portions of the American public do not vote, and officials do not always have accurate perceptions of public preferences, or pander to them even when they do.[10] The democratic model tends to be rather naïve and is even more difficult to apply to the more closed arena of foreign policy-making than to other policy spheres.[11] A modified version of the democratic model, the pluralist model, sees US policy-making, essentially, as a "highly politicized conflict resolution process".[12] While most of the public is uninformed, uninterested and inactive in the decision-making process, their influence is felt through organised interest groups, each representing a segment of society. Decision-making consists largely of bargaining and compromise between multiple power centres.[13] Power is decentralised, as it is distributed along several axes, such as wealth, knowledge and interest. In this "polyarchy", most of the public remains uninvolved, but advocates argue that this limited involvement is preferable to none at all, and that this is the most that can reasonably be expected. This model has been criticised for relying too heavily on behaviourism and empirical measurement, while operating under dubious, undemocratic normative assumptions. In addition, as with the previous model, foreign policy fits less comfortably into this framework than does domestic policy. However, pluralism's ability to make sense of one of the most complex political systems in the world, and the compromise it strikes between the democratic ideal and harder political realities, has made it a more popular explanation than its counterparts. Finally, the ruling elite model posits the existence of a relatively small and cohesive political elite, which uses its power to advance its common interests and policy preferences to the detriment of the rest of society. This elite, or "Establishment", is sometimes said to consist of a few wealthy families, sometimes of the so-called "military industrial complex" and sometimes of a more disparate group of actors. Exponents of this model usually argue for systemic, structural changes in society, as "what holds [elites] together is their common interest in preserving a system that assures their continued accumulation of wealth and enjoyment of social privilege".[14] Elites are inherently conservative and will sanction only incremental changes in policy. There is certainly considerable circumstantial evidence in contemporary American society to support this latter theory. There is a remarkable similarity in the backgrounds and cultures of decision-makers, who tend to be overwhelmingly white, male, Protestant, of Anglo-Saxon heritage (often referred to as "wasp") and from legal or business backgrounds.[15] Alternatives outside the mainstream are often not considered, and policy disputes tend to take place within a rather narrow ideological framework. The ruling elite model can be criticised for oversimplification and for mistaking a natural convergence of interests for conspiracy, an error the more nuanced versions of the model avoid.[16] Congressional Limits on Presidential PowerCentral to pluralism is the notion that the three branches of government should be separate and distinct, with each acting to check and balance the others and thus preventing abuse of power. In the United States, the often-tumultuous relationship between especially the legislative and executive branches has been the subject of much scholarship and debate. The Presidency has seen a slow but constant expansion of power since the days of George Washington, culminating in what Schlesinger has called the "imperial presidencies"[17] of Johnson and Nixon, and continuing today. The official rights and duties of the President as regards foreign policy-making are actually only briefly mentioned in the Constitution, and are rather limited. The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur".[18] However, presidents have frequently bypassed the need for congressional approval by enacting executive agreements: oral or written understandings between heads of government that require authorisation only when funding is required. Executive agreements that the United States is party to now vastly outnumber the amount of treaties to which it is party.[19] This proliferation of executive agreements is worrying because treaties signify a broader consensus and a larger degree of national commitment.[20] With this in mind, Congress adopted the Case Amendment in 1972, which requires the President to report the text of any agreements he enacts, but this has been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The President is also Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, a directive that presidents have often seen as a green light to employ forces wherever and whenever they choose. The President also has the power to appoint about 700 positions in the executive branch. While the Senate must legally concur, it almost never vetoes a presidential appointment.[21] In addition, unofficial, yet very significant, presidential powers include: the power to initiate legislation and the general direction of foreign policy; access to sensitive information and intelligence; and unmatched media coverage, which allows whoever is in the White House to explain his[22] motives and communicate with the public. As a counterweight to the President, Congress has the potentially huge "power of the purse", and must approve all government expenditures. It exercises this power most frequently in matters of foreign trade, and has long been a key player in regulating tariffs. Congress has also made major efforts to influence the foreign aid policy of the United States, for example, towards Cuba and Angola. When Congress does provide foreign aid, it usually does so with detailed instructions and stringent reporting requirements.[23] Congress has been less influential in regulating military interventions, however. It alone can declare war, but several factors inhibit this power.[24] Formal declarations of war are rare in modern times. Indeed, Congress has declared war only five times in US history-even though the United States has been involved in more than 150 significant military actions. And Presidents can create a war situation that in effect forces Congress to toe the line: "it will be argued that, irrespective of the merits of the case, it is dishonourable to deprive men risking their lives for their country of financial support".[25] Under such pressure, individual members of both houses have often hesitated to run the political risk of being labelled unpatriotic. As one senator put it, "so many of my colleagues tell me in the cloakroom and elsewhere, that they disagree with that policy, yet they come on the floor and vote to carry on that policy".[26] In any case, several military interventions, such as Nixon's bombing of Cambodia, have been completed by the time they have come to the attention of Congress. The Vietnam War was the consummate example of the impunity with which an "imperial President" may override opposing congressional sentiment. It shattered the previous underlying consensus that Congress should look the other way, and led to the enactment of legislation to increase transparency. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 made all foreign military intervention subject to Congressional approval. However, the new legislation was little more than window-dressing: it was not matched by greater Congressional assertiveness, and the legislature has continued, at times, to go to great lengths to avoid exercising its powers.[27] No President has ever truly considered himself bound by the law, and many have found ways to skirt around it, as President Ford's decision to undertake military action in response to Cambodia's seizure of a US freighter illustrates.[28] This applies doubly in times of crisis and war, when it is assumed that the executive alone possesses the necessary information and resources to act quickly and decisively. Modern warfare, the argument goes, requires rapid decisions, for which Congress, with its complex procedures, partisanship, overlapping jurisdictions and tendency towards fragmentation, is ill suited. "The shifting coalitions of Congress which serve us so well in the formulation and implementation of domestic policy, are not well suited to the day-to-day conduct of external relations".[29] Each successive crisis in US history, then, has gradually and permanently strengthened the executive, or, in the words of James Madison, the "constant apprehension of War has [had] the...tendency to render the head too large for the body".[30] Congress, thus, does not prevent the President from determining the general course of foreign policy?provided that the President does not make excessive demands on Congress and the public. When a policy becomes too controversial Congress can, and does, step in. In general, however, in terms of defence and foreign policy, the American people tend to identify the President with government far more than they do Congress, making for a policy that is too often personality-driven and idiosyncratic. The Foreign Policy-Making BureaucracyThe executive does not consist solely of the President, but comprises thousands of individuals of varying influence. Each President must decide how to structure his administration's foreign policy decision-making process, and how involved he himself will be. Reagan, for example, opted for a 'hands-off' style, whereas [the senior] Bush and Carter took the opposite approach.[31] The National Security Council (NSC) was established in 1947 "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security".[32] Its statutory members consist of the President, the Vice President, the Assistant for National Security, the Secretaries of State and Defence, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other officials of the President's choosing. Originally marginal, the Assistant for National Security has become a very significant office, and today, the power of the NSC largely depends on the relations between the President and his security advisor.[33] While the Assistant for National Security is, in theory, a neutral facilitator, in practice he/she has often overshadowed the Secretary of State, officially the principal architect of foreign policy. This is due largely to the post being located in the White House compound and to the legacy of several strong, controversial characters such as Kissinger and Brzezinski. The State Department is frequently criticised for its slowness and (some say overly) cautious policies. It has no natural constituencies in the general public and few natural allies in industry or other power centres. "It deals with foreigners, and foreigners do not vote in American elections",[34] thus it has frequently found itself outmanoeuvred and its role diminished. The office of the Vice President is a curious one. Adams[35] called it "the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived".[36] Other than presiding over the Senate, a quite minor duty, Vice Presidents have generally been relegated to ribbon-cutting duties. The office had slightly more status under Carter, Ford and Clinton, but Vice Presidents have usually been hampered by the popular fear that, as the "heirs apparent", they will act against the President's interests. The number of Vice Presidents who have later become President suggests that this concern may not be entirely incomprehensible. The enormous amount of infighting and politics between (and within) departments should not be underestimated. Factions are formed, rumours spread, information leaked, and consensuses forged. When making decisions, each department "will tend to concentrate on acquiring information that protects and advances its own interests or its view of the national interest".[37] This inevitably leads to oversimplification and a favouring of men and women of action rather than deep, strategic thinkers, whose voices tend to get lost in the fray. One of the attributes of a good President is the ability to recognise and rectify imbalances in his administration. Failure to do so can lead to an unrepresentative and irresponsible foreign policy. This is particularly true in times of crisis-the ultimate test of an administration's ability to function effectively-when the need for consensus in order to reduce leaks and for quick, decisive action may hamper long-term planning and careful deliberation.[38] In addition, the democratic political process is inherently geared towards short-term calculations, and the frequent turnover in senior positions generally diminishes the consistency and coherence of policy.[39] The CIA has been the focus of much attention and concern since a series of disclosures in the 1970s uncovered the worrying extent to which the agency had become the armed wing of the executive. The CIA has the legal monopoly on spying and covert operations, and until well into the Vietnam era was held in high public esteem and respect. However, its interventions soon "became more frequent and disturbing, more aggressive abroad and intrusive at home"[40] and it was used more and more frequently as a means for the President to bypass constitutional controls on his power. During the Cold War, the agency participated in sabotage, propaganda, support of opposition groups, destruction of economic facilities, mining of harbours, guerrilla operations, attempted assassinations of foreign leaders (such as Patrice Lumumba in the Congo), and other political and military operations. It sponsored guerrilla wars in more than 20 countries, among them Afghanistan and Iraq. In response, Congress has enacted several restrictions and created intelligence committees to provide oversight. But "legislative control remains inadequate and episodic".[41] The CIA sometimes has access to more information, funds and staff than the State Department at the same country office, and is subject to less control. Coordinated intelligence is indeed a crucial part of a successful national security policy, but the techniques used by the CIA have severely corroded faith in American integrity and nullified any possible gain.[42] It has also led the CIA to neglect its primary role of intelligence gathering and analysis. The Role of Interest GroupsThe prevalence of organised interest groups is one of the most unique features of the American policy-making system. More than 5,000 Political Action Committees (PACs) and other interest groups attempt to influence decision-makers in Congress and the executive. The huge lobbying industry grows during election years and its members often contribute to candidates' election campaigns. Pluralists argue that this is healthy and necessary, and that the countervailing influences and cross-pressures between opposing groups balance each other out.[43] However, as elite theorists point out, not all interest groups are created equal.[44] Coalitions or "Iron Triangles" develop between interest groups, members of Congress and executive agencies. Pro-Israel groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) are some of the best funded in the United States, and severely restrict policy options in the Middle East, irrespective of which party is in the White House. Similarly, powerful domestic constituencies have, in the past, shaped policy towards Greece, Ireland, Cuba, Africa and Eastern Europe. Corporations also have disproportionate influence, by virtue both of their sheer wealth and of the 'revolving door', which is said to exist between the top levels of government and business. Multinational corporations are often subsidised, and in exchange fulfil several roles for the government, such as spreading American culture and technology abroad.[45] However, industry does not always act in unison, and even within industries there may be different, even competing, policy objectives. The so-called "Military-Industrial Complex", defined as "an informal alliance of the military and related government departments with defense industries",[46] also plays a large role in foreign policy formulation. Largely a product of the Cold War arms race, the defence industry has permeated American society and achieved a relationship of mutual dependence and symbiosis with the government. The fact that the defence budget remained at Cold War levels under the Clinton administration and that levels of arms sales overseas actually increased makes sense, considering that one out of every 16 American workers relies directly on the arms industry for their pay cheque.[47] The Pentagon alone subsidises 170,000 contractors.[48] This is not to imply that the military-industrial complex conspires against an innocent American public and single-handedly formulates all decisions. Polls have shown the public to be consistently evenly divided between those wanting more defence spending and those wanting less.[49] The defence lobby is an important actor, but it is not the only one. Nor can the military itself be blamed for rushing to war. In the case of Vietnam, the generals viewed involvement in a land war in Asia as a disastrous decision. Like most democracies, the United States operates on a system of civilian oversight of the military. And as Hilsman states, "It was the 'militarists' in civilian clothes who got us into the [Vietnam] war in the first place".[50] Whatever the solution to weakening the hold of the military-industrial complex, the answer is not to cut the military, which has experienced first-hand the high cost of war, out of the decision-making process. Finally, long before the birth of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), certain think tanks and consulting firms were exercising great influence over the government. Former Pentagon personnel or influential business and academic elites populate many of these think tanks. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) funnels the preferences of the most prestigious and well-connected members of society into the policy-making process. Its magazine, Foreign Affairs, is considered the unofficial mouthpiece of government policy and the country's most influential foreign policy publication.[51] So-called 'out-of-office centres' allow former officials to continue to exert an influence on decision-making. Within the Brookings Institute, for example, Democrats have found a political home in which they can publish, lobby and express policy preferences. The American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation play the same role for Republicans. Although some believed that the cohesion and influence of US think tanks had waned in the 1980s with the ascendance of a new class of professional technocrats, the next paper in the series will show that this has clearly not been the case. The Influence of Public Opinion and the MediaThe interplay between government, media and public opinion in the United States is the source of much debate among academics. Conventional wisdom views the American public as apathetic, uninformed, and inarticulate. In 1983, for example, only 29% of the American public knew that their country supported opponents of Nicaragua's Sandinista government.[52] And more recently, in August this year, 50% of Americans polled still thought that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was giving substantial support to al Qaeda, despite the conclusions to the contrary of the 9/11 Commission and the Senate Intelligence Committee reports.[53] However, American citizens are not uniformly ignorant and their knowledge may vary from issue to issue and over time. According to Holsti, most publics comprise attentive, active members (about 1-15%) and at least somewhat informed members (about 30-50%), in addition to the indifferent majority.[54] Public opinion in America, as in most countries, is undoubtedly reactive rather than proactive, and is unlikely to be a source of innovation or able to initiate significant policies. Nevertheless, it does act as an important constraining influence. Deep-seated American values, cognitions and political culture contribute to the foreign policy 'mood', defined as "the very general attitudes or predispositions that prevail in a nation at any given time".[55] Decision-makers do not always have to follow the prevailing mood, but go directly against it at their peril, as Vietnam proved. They will thus usually try to anticipate the public's likely reaction before making a decision. As White House Chief of Staff, Dick Cheney revealed little awareness of or concern over public opinion, but in later interviews acknowledged the public's constraining role.[56] Public opinion is also usually the arbiter in executive-congressional disputes. Ultimately, a successful long-term foreign policy needs to rest on a consensus in the nation at large. The foreign policy mood has varied through history between the two extremes of isolationism and interventionism, but has always tended to be permissive and to support the status quo. One of the most notable tendencies is the "propensity of the American people to confer overwhelming support on military interventions by the President irrespective of the circumstances".[57] Politicians are usually penalised more for using too little force than for using too much. More so arguably than in any other Western democracy since 1945, there is a tendency to 'rally around the flag' and present a unified front during times of war. A crisis almost always enhances a President's reputation, whereas a domestic scandal usually greatly damages it. Public support for the first Gulf War was evenly divided before the war, but the public soon became largely supportive. This culminated at the end of the war with a frenzy of self-congratulation and an unprecedented 92% approval rating for President Bush (senior).[58] This is not true of extended conflicts, however, and support tends to erode steadily as a conflict continues and American casualties mount. The electorate fears a quagmire more than it does a premature pulling out of troops, or 'cutting and running'. Thus, the US intervention in Somalia in 1992-93 "has been labelled a failure because, although tens and probably hundreds of thousands of foreign lives were saved, a few Americans were killed in the process. In essence, when Americans asked themselves how many American lives peace in Somalia was worth, the answer was rather close to zero".[59] Increasing American military superiority and the limited nature of post-Cold War operations, such as the first Gulf War and the bombing of Kosovo, caused Americans to expect low casualties and minimal sacrifice in all future wars. Public opinion can also be manipulated, and here the media plays a vital role. The government occupies a unique position as media object, from which it can interpret events, define debates and actually create attitudes and opinions before its opponents do. While the media has at times greatly embarrassed the government and published "top secret" or sensitive information, it is very rare for its coverage to actually change official policy. For example, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman denied that news coverage of the "market massacre" and other atrocities in the war led to the eventual deployment of peacekeepers shortly after, in 1994. He held that the policy of non-intervention was already on its way out due to a perceived need for a more aggressive US policy to counter European influence in NATO.[60] The so-called "CNN effect" and the obstacles technology and 24-hour news coverage supposedly create for governments, is probably exaggerated. The government and media routinely cooperate to censor news about military actions, and newscasts usually consist of government spokespersons and their supporters. One study found that the majority of commentators on CNN during the first Gulf War were retired military officers or other elites, who mostly supported the administration's view of the crisis.[61] Indeed, the first Gulf War is in many ways the consummate example of a war whose policy options and preferred outcomes were framed by the administration through the media. For example, the government was able to present Saddam Hussein as the personal enemy of the American people.[62] According to one commentator, discussion of US involvement in wars has run the gamut from open public debate to closed public debate.[63] The second half of the Vietnam War typified the former, characterised by the expression of diverse opinions over a long period of time that eventually had an effect on policy. The latter, marked by a lack of reference to history and a lack of coverage by the media, was typified by the invasions of Granada and Panama. Because journalists tend to view only official statements as "safe", the extent of debate among policy elites and the level of Congressional opposition heavily determine the extent of public debate. To return to the first Gulf War, Dorman writes that "by accepting the frames offered by Bush, the press helped to limit debate at the time when it would have done the most good-before we got in so deeply that war became inevitable. The press didn't know who to turn to for critical reaction to the President's initial policy".[64] Not all media is equally soft on the government, however, and some sources are more critical than others. In this regard, people will usually choose media sources that reinforce their existing opinions. The relationship, then, between these three actors is cyclical in nature, with the government bounded by public opinion, public opinion bounded by the media, and the media bounded by the government. ConclusionsIn modern history, US foreign policy making is largely a top-down process driven by the governing administration. However, the ways in which the various executive bodies, Congress, interest groups, the media, business, the military and the intelligence community interact reveal a much more complex but seemingly malleable process. The American foreign policy-making process is not static-issues and results may vary widely from administration to administration and from era to era. It is determined as much by "tradition, informal relationships and other subtleties" as it is by formal, legal considerations.[65] The process is thus too complex to fit neatly into any one of the three academic models. However, we can make certain generalisations. The primacy of certain actors over others discredits the democratic model, and the reality ultimately seems to lie somewhere between the pluralist and elite models. On the one hand, the staggering size of the decision-making machinery and amount of debate involved suggests a process where political power is decentralised and indirectly responsive to the people. On the other, the remarkable frequency with which some players emerge in different areas of the political arena, and the similarities between seemingly disparate actors suggests a more cohesive set of interests. During his election campaign, when urged to hit his critics harder, Kennedy replied, "That is not a very good idea. I'll need them to run the country".[66] Foreign policy may be determined by certain elites, but usually require at least the implicit consent of society at large, especially when a sacrifice is required of that society. Congress is reluctant to fully exercise its potentially large role, and in the endless struggle between Congress and the President, the latter emerges as the superior. Congress can at best restrain the President, but initiatives and leadership ultimately come from the executive.[67] Bureaucratic relations within the executive depend largely on the President's personal leadership style and on individual personalities, but are generally marked by infighting and rivalry. Interest groups can have an important effect on the process, but not all are equally influential. Public opinion is initially malleable and easily shaped by the media, but can harden into a force to be reckoned with by the government. "The ultimate check on the unwise use of presidential power rests on the public's acceptance of a more sophisticated concept of national interest and a greater awareness of the limits of national will",[68] but this is at best a distant prospect. In the next paper: Who are the neoconservatives? What are their foreign policy beliefs? And how did 9/11 propel an ideology on the fringe of the American media and foreign policy establishment into the mainstream? About the AuthorsElsje Fourie originates from South Africa, but has also lived in Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Austria and Japan. After obtaining her BA and BA (Hons) in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Pretoria, she spent a year as an English teacher and cultural ambassador in rural Japan. In 2003, she was awarded a two-year Rotary Foundation World Peace Scholarship, and was able to undertake an MA in Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford, which she has recently completed. She is currently pursuing her MPhil in International Relations at the same institution. Dr Ian Davis is Executive Director of BASIC and has an extensive background in government, academia, and the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector. He received both his Ph.D. and B.A. in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford, and was formerly Program Manager at Saferworld before being appointed as the new Executive Director of BASIC in October 2001. He has published widely on British defence and foreign policy, transatlantic security, the international arms trade, arms export controls, small arms and light weapons and defence diversification. This series of discussion papers is based on Elsje Fourie's recently completed MA dissertation, with additional analysis and editing by Dr Ian Davis. Endnotes[1] Halper, S. & Clark, J. 2004. America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7. [2] Selden, Z. 2004. "What Europe Doesn't Understand". Wall Street Journal Online, May 26, 2004. At http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110005126, accessed 20/08/2004. [3] Quoted in Ian Gilmor's review of James Naughtie's book, The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency, Macmillan 2004, in The Guardian, September 18, 2004. [4] Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, famously used the phrase "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus" to describe how divisions over Iraq reflect fundamental change in the relations between the United States and Europe. Kagan, R. 2003. Paradise And Power: America And Europe And The New World Order. Atlantic Books. [5] Most of the American news sources have been accessed via the Internet, and thus do not include page references. Great care has been taken to establish the credibility of all online sources and to include their full details, including the dates on which they were accessed. [6] Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 2004a. "Foreign Policy". At http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=foreign+policy, accessed 14/7/2004. [7] Mervin, D. 1993. The President of the United States. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 13. [8] Reynolds, P.A. 1980. An Introduction to International Relations. London: Longman, p. 75. [9] Kegley, C.W. & Wittkopf, E.R. 1996. American Foreign Policy, 5th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 620. [10] Brewer, T.L. 1992. American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 34. [11] A recent paper, which demonstrates quite well the limitations of the democratic model, is Kaufmann, C. 2004. "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War", International Security, Vol.29, 1, pp. 5-48. [12] Ibid, p. 34. [13] Dumbrell, J. 1990. The Making of US Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 53. [14] As quoted in ibid, p. 53. [15] Kegley & Wittkopf, op cit, p. 295. [16] Brewer, op cit, p. 40. [17] As quoted in Mervin, op cit, p. 133. Also see Schlesinger, A. 2004. War and the American Presidency. W.W. Norton & Company. [18] USA. 1787. The Constitution of the United States of America. [19] Mervin, op cit, p. 119. [20] Hartmann, F.M. & Wendzel, R.L. 1994. America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World. New York: Harper Collins, p. 137. [21] Ibid, p. 128. It should be noted, however, that the Senate has implemented numerous 'pocket vetoes': not letting a proposed appointment come up for a vote and waiting until the nominee gives up. [22] All 43 US Presidents have been men and there is little indication that this will change in the near future, although Hilary Clinton is often referred to as a potential future Democratic presidential candidate. [23] Hartmann & Wendzel op cit, p. 141. [24] For an overview, see Grimmett, R. 2003. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance. Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service. [25] Mervin, op cit, p. 123. [26] As quoted in Barrett, D.M. 1990. "Presidential Foreign Policy." In The Making of US Foreign Policy, by J. Dumbrell. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 75. [27] Graebner, N.A. 1993. "The President as Commander in Chief: A Study in Power." In Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars, edited by J.G. Dawson III. Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, p. 46. [28] Hartmann & Wendzel, op cit, p. 138. [29] Tower as quoted in Mervin op cit, p. 129. [30] As quoted in Graebner, op cit, p. 32. [31] Kemp, G. 1998. "Presidential Management of the Executive Bureaucracy". In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. p. 157. [32] Hafner, D.L. 1994. "Presidential Leadership and the Foreign Policy Bureaucracy." In The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, edited by D.A. Deese. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 39. [33] Skidmore, M.J. and Tripp, M.C. 1993. American Government: A Brief Introduction, 6th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 259. [34] Hilsman, R. 1990. The Politics of Policy-Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 194. [35] As quoted in Hilsman, ibid, p. 145. [36] Yet another to hold the office has remarked: "the Vice President is like a man in a cataleptic state: he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain; and yet he is perfectly conscious of everything that is going on about him." Marshall as quoted in ibid, p. 145. [37] Hafner, op cit, p. 45. [38] Kemp, op cit, 166. [39] Quandt, W.B. 1998. "The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy." In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 197. [40] Fisher, L. 1995. Presidential War Power. Lawrence, KA: U. Press of Kansas, p. 162. [41] ibid, p. 162. [42] Hilsman, op cit, p. 200. [43] Kegley & Wittkopf, op cit, p. 314. [44] There are also indications that the views of participants are not as inherently diverse as pluralists would imagine. A poll of major political campaign contributers showed little differences in basic values and beliefs , even between democrats and republicans, with the majority falling in the "hardliner" category and the fewest falling in the "accomodationist" category. Aguilar, E.E. et al. 1997. "The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Campaign Contributers." International Studies Quarterly 41, pp. 355-366. [45] Brewer, op cit, p. 87. [46] Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 2004b. "Military-Industrial Complex". At http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=military-industrial+complex, accessed 14/7/2004. [47] Kegley & Wittkopf, op cit, p. 303. [48] Kegley & Wittkopf, op cit, p. 302. [49] Brewer, op cit, p. 172. [50] Hilsman, op cit, p. 207. [51] Kegley & Wittkopf, op cit, p. 297. [52] Brewer, op cit, p. 54. [53] Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) press release, "Large Majority Perceives Bush Administration Still Saying Iraq Supported Al Qaeda, Had WMD", August 20, 2004. [54] Holsti, K.J. 1995. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 7th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 263. [55] ibid, p. 263. [56] Sobel, R. 2001. The Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Since Vietnam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 273. [57] Mervin, op cit, p. 139. [58] Brewer, op cit, p. 71. Of course, Bush senior plunged in the polls as the 1992 election approached and was eventually beaten by Bill Clinton. The latter's emphasis on the domestic economy ('It's the economy, stupid') rather than foreign policy concerns is widely attributed as the main reason for his success. [59] Mueller, J. 1998. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The People's "Common Sense"". In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 3rd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, p. 54. [60] As quoted in Strobel, W.P. 1999. "The CNN Effect: Myth or Reality?" In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed., edited by E.R. Wittkopf & J.M. McCormick. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 90. [61] ibid, p. 86. [62] Bennett, W.L. 1994. The Media and the Foreign Policy Process. In The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, edited by D.A. Deese. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 182. [63] ibid, p. 174. [64] Dorman as quoted in ibid, p. 173. [65] Skidmore & Tripp, op cit, p. 259. [66] Kegley & Wittkopf, op cit, p. 354. [67] Mervin, op cit, p. 116. [68] Graebner, op cit, p. 47.
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