BASIC Papers
Changing the Frame of the International Debate
over Iran's Nuclear Programme:
Iran's Role in Moving Towards a Nuclear Weapon
Free World
Paul Ingram, Co-Executive Director, BASIC[1]
This Paper is also available in pdf
format.
Summary
This last year there has been a renewed Western
interest in the vision of a nuclear-weapon free world. This
has included the majority of former Secretaries of State and
Defense in the US, and in UK government speeches. This is
remarkable not because it is a new idea - many diplomats in
international fora have referred to the legal commitment to
negotiate towards this objective under Article 6 of the NPT
- but who is saying it, and the urgency of their call for
action. It arises largely from a recognition that the current
discriminatory practices are unsustainable: the nuclear haves
are realising their monopoly will not last forever, and they
view the prospect of nuclear proliferation and the increasing
dangers of nuclear terrorism with alarm.
Iran's nuclear programme has been the focus
of complex international diplomacy and public awareness of
the possibility of proliferation ever since 2002. The debate
has been framed in the context of rights - in particular Iran's
rights under Article 4 of the NPT to develop civil nuclear
technologies. While this may have strengthened domestic support
for Iran's position, it has also alienated potential allies
abroad, worried about Iran's acquisition of a dual-use technology,
even if the intention is not to develop a nuclear arsenal
at this stage. In an age of global communications, domestic
and international debates cannot be separated.
If Iran were to reframe its position in terms
of its contribution to building the frameworks necessary to
move towards a nuclear weapon free world this would indirectly
protect its rights, and develop sympathy abroad. The US movers
of the vision point to the central need for verification measures.
Iran's nuclear programme has involved an intense inspections
process by the IAEA, enabling them to develop their systems
significantly. If the IAEA were given adequate resources by
the international community and full cooperation by Iran to
a degree that respected its legitimate security concerns,
in further developing the IAEA's confidence-building verification
methods Iran could become the ideal ground-breaking non-proliferation
laboratory needed to develop global confidence in a nuclear
weapon free world. Only then, by playing its part and in coordination
with the majority world, could Iran have a chance to turn
the international discourse around, focusing attention on
the existing arsenals within countries possessing nuclear
weapons.
Introduction
This paper seeks to reframe the debate over
Iran's nuclear programme. Currently both sides are locked
in a zero-sum argument over rights and security - the Iranians
claim the right under the NPT's article IV to develop under
safeguards nuclear technologies appropriate to a civil programme
and that there has been no proof of any military intentions
in their programme, whilst the UN Security Council has been
invoking Chapter VII rights to apply sanctions demanding Iran
stop the enrichment programme on the basis that safeguards
arrangements were broken and the development of enrichment
technologies threaten international peace and security. Unfortunately,
there appears to be deadlock, with both sides playing a waiting
game; there is little prospect of this changing until one
side or the other changes its game or looks afresh at its
objectives and strategy.
The Problems behind Iran's Current Position
Recent Security Council Resolutions over Iran's
nuclear programme have referred to the nuclear programme as
a threat to peace and security, and have issued instructions
to Iran to suspend its enrichment programme and all related
activities, under Chapter VII authority.[2] Iranian representatives respond with righteous indignation
as a victim oppressed by those with greater power over it,
and stand by its rights to freedom of action. They point to
the hypocrisy of states standing as their judge bristling
with their own nuclear weapons and embarking on a renewed
push for nuclear power expansion. They point to the lack of
evidence of any military component in the Iranian nuclear
programme, apparently confirmed in the publication of the
US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran summary in December
2007.
This paper does not judge the rights or wrongs
of the situation. Indeed, the focus on rights in this dispute
has only served to heighten the conflict and perceptions of
threat as a result. Iran's choice to so strongly assert its
declared rights as a first principal has strengthened the
spin of those seeking to portray Iran as a principal threat
to international peace and security. Each side has focused
on its own red line - for the Iranians that their right to
enrich the fuel for their civil reactors is recognized - for
the P5+1 that this enrichment is suspended and safeguards
strengthened sufficiently for the international community
to have confidence in the programme. The strategies pursued
by all sides have harmed Iranian interests, but have also
encouraged Iran to stand firm and continue the very enrichment
activities that are perceived by others to be a threat to
the international community. Contrary to the zero-sum perceptions
of many involved in the struggle, this is actually a lose-lose
outcome, particularly damaging when mutual benefits are possible.
It may be that this is inevitable given the
history of distrust and menace both Iran and the United States
have shown towards one another - actions and reactions have
been interpreted consistently in the worst possible light,
and opportunities for reconciliation or joint action have
been squandered. It is as if key actors have hyped the threat
and deliberately spiked the chances of reconciliation for
their own purposes.
Iran is a convenient bogeyman for those resistant
to the idea of multilateral disarmament. Iran's missile development
and its nuclear programme is cited as justification for the
establishment of US missile interceptors in Europe, poisoning
the relationship between the US and Russia. Iran's transparency
failure prior to 2003 shook confidence in IAEA safeguards
and the Agency itself. The possibility of the development
of a nuclear weapon capability by Iran was used extensively
by the British government to justify to its population the
decision in 2007 to start the process of replacing its Trident
nuclear submarines. Unless Iran can shake off this image many
states will continue to isolate the country and use it to
justify actions that undermine global security.
The regional dimension - a struggle for power
and influence - has a powerful grip over the issues, thwarting
many solutions that have been offered. This paper does not
ignore those dynamics, but sees them as the context within
which the proposals within the paper are developed. Iran,
as a large and powerful state within the region, has a right
to exert its legitimate interests beyond its own borders.
Equally, as a member of the international community and specifically
the United Nations, Iran has a responsibility to abide by
the UN Charter and generally by international law, and to
participate in the evolution of international law and norms
that lead to greater stability and reduced conflict. This
does not mean simply accepting the existing power structures,
nor indeed the extensive presence of US forces in the region.
As an open economy in an increasingly globalised world, Iran's
interests clearly lie in integration within the international
community on terms that are respectful to its position.
It is not the concern that Iran is currently
engaged in actual weaponisation of nuclear material that has
motivated action in the Security Council (ignoring perhaps
the latest revelations involving intelligence from key western
states submitted recently to the IAEA), but rather the acquisition
of dual-use technologies by Iran that could be used for rapid
break-out in the future. The fact is, many key states within
the international community do not trust the Iranians with
enrichment or heavy-water technologies, whether or not they
use them for military purposes. And it seems unlikely they
ever will without some radical change in the situation.
This presents a problem that goes beyond the
specific relationship between Iran and the wider international
community, namely
Is it possible to devise rigorous schemes
that build international confidence in a country's nuclear
programme without being prohibitively expensive or intrusive,
and are there direct benefits to Iran of engaging in this
project?
If so, given its current standing with the IAEA
and the United Nations Iran is in an ideal position to develop
these schemes with IAEA inspectors. There are added benefits
to this approach that could have globally-important spin-off
implications. However, we must be alive to the possibility
that it is in fact impossible to achieve international confidence
in an Iranian programme. Are we then doomed to see a protracted
conflict with an uncertain outcome that will harm everyone's
interests?
Are there other routes for the international
community and for Iran to take that will deliver Iranian needs
and objectives without creating a kick-back that undermines
their interests?
These two questions form the heart of this paper,
in an attempt to reframe the debate, and the image of Iran,
transforming it from pariah to leader of the pack in moving
towards global norms and procedures that respond to energy
insecurity and global proliferation.
Iran: intelligent Use of the IAEA Inspectors
Since the outbreak of the current nuclear stand-off
Iranian diplomatic strategy appears to have been to cooperate
with the IAEA just to the extent that this holds off international
action, perhaps in the belief that cooperation is a bargaining
chip, and that to give too much too soon would be to overplay
their hand for too little in return. In each of its reports
the IAEA Secretariat has always pointed to the need for Iran
to cooperate more fully and proactively if confidence is to
be fully established. The Iranian task of judging the necessary
level of cooperation has been challenging, made all the more
so by the entrenched positions taken by the United States
and European officials. The problem is that this strategy
also gives the impression to the 'opposition' in the negotiations
that playing harder ball achieves results.
Iranian spokespeople have talked up references
to the levels of cooperation between Iranian technicians and
inspectors when IAEA Reports to the Board of Governors have
been published, and Western diplomats have pointed to the
holes in the evidence. In sum, we have a situation where the
international community, the IAEA and Iran are inadvertently
developing an IAEA inspections model of containment towards
a state displaying resistance. This resistance creates a feedback
loop of suspicion, whether founded or baseless.
Iran succeeded in making a breakthrough with
the IAEA by agreeing a 'modalities of resolution of the outstanding
issues' and published these on 27 August 2007.[3] In a diplomatic coup it changed the game overnight - by agreeing
what the key outstanding questions were and setting a timetable
for resolving them. This set back efforts by the United States
to isolate Iran, giving Russia and China solid ground for
resisting further sanctions, at least temporarily. Early efforts
by the United States to criticize the agreement were quickly
abandoned when it was clear that they were not going to receive
sufficient international support.
There is perhaps a hint here of a more extensive
alternative strategy for Iran that could further break the
dominant story within the international media. The modalities
plan was seen by many governments as a success for the strategy
of pressurizing Iran into movement. Iran could puncture this
view by voluntarily entering into talks with the IAEA to establish
and develop the nature of a rigorous, robust inspections and
verification regime that would give strong and reasonable
confidence that its technology was secure and not being used
for military purposes, while protecting Iran's legitimate
sovereignty concerns. Why should it do this? Would this not
be giving in to the West and opening Iran up for further demands?
Has Iran not put effort into building confidence by voluntarily
suspending enrichment in 2003 and then again in the Paris
Agreement of 2004, only to have its good faith abused?
By establishing this process Iran could take
the logic of the modalities study to the next stage. Not only
could it cut through the current demands of the UN Security
Council, but it could establish general protocols appropriate
for objective and reasonable verification with IAEA staff.
It would in practical terms take the initiative and control
out of the hands of the Security Council. In short it would
transform its position from a reluctant participant perceived
as a recalcitrant, to a proactive architect of a framework
necessary for the international community.
If Iran could complete the modalities process
and clear up the key questions that pointed a suspicious finger
of blame, it could then place the framework on the negotiating
table as a very real, transparent and negotiable 'carrot'
in return for the file being returned from the Security Council
and Iran given recognition of its rights to retain the enrichment
programme in which it has sunk so much political and financial
capital. This may not be wholly acceptable as a final outcome
of negotiations for the Security Council, but it would go
a long way to reassuring those states with an open mind, and
create the space necessary to allow negotiations to progress.
Proposals to move towards a nuclear weapon free
world
Iranians are generally alive to the idea that
developments in the United States have a big impact on their
own freedom of action. And in the United States change is
in the air. Barack Obama is a personification of a phenomenon
in the United States today centred around a desire for change,
in recognition that the 'old ways' are no longer sustainable.
His rhetoric centred around urgency of the 'now' has resonated
across the spectrum. The failure of the occupation of Iraq
has led many Americans to question the policy of preventive
intervention, or even peace through overwhelming military
superiority; the economic and monetary insecurity experienced
by many in the US has led to a disillusionment with unbridled
consumption; and a growing perception of nuclear proliferation,
along with the fear of nuclear terrorism has led to an important
renaissance in demands that the US lead in moves towards global
nuclear disarmament - only this time those demands are coming
from hard-nosed realists from the very heart of previous US
regimes. The motives are varied, the message the same. George
Shultz and Henry Kissinger are not known as doves in the United
States, but their call, alongside a majority of former Secretaries
of State and Defense, that the US engage seriously with other
nuclear weapon states to build trust and move towards a nuclear
weapon free world, is expressed with urgency. If the nuclear
weapon states fail to respond, the NPT bargain will continue
to fray at the edges, technologies leak (and not just to Iran),
and the probability of the use of nuclear weapons rise, along
with the possibilities that terrorists might yet get their
hands on a warhead. The key concern for many of these individuals,
formerly at the top of the US security and nuclear weapon
decision-making structures, is that the likelihood of use
has started to stack heavily against the United States and
its allies.
The advocates have started a movement involving
elite individuals, NGOs, and governments, to promote the vision,
along with the steps necessary to get there. Some may dismiss
this as a publicity stunt. Even if this were the case, it
clearly demonstrates a recognition that nuclear weapon states
cannot simply go on ignoring the calls from the majority world
to engage in nuclear disarmament, as they have done up to
now. But it's more than simply a wish vision - it also involves
the establishment of very real steps to move in the right
direction, steps like a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty, further deep cuts to arsenals, reduced
notice-to-fire, and other confidence-building measures, that
reduce the likelihood of use and bring us closer to the eventual
goal.
It also demands tight and intrusive verification
measures to prove the disarmament steps states claim to have
made. The British government itself has engaged with the movement.
The UK has teamed up with the Norwegian government and the
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), and in
the words of its Foreign Minister at the time, Margaret Beckett,
is attempting to become a 'disarmament laboratory'.[4] It has also proposed a transparent P5 technical conference
involving nuclear laboratories to discuss verification measures.
While these measures can only be the start of the process,
they mark a departure from the established P5 policies, a
recognition that if non-proliferation objectives are to be
realized, they can only go hand-in-hand with disarmament.
Non-proliferation Laboratory - the Global Context
This movement opens up a crucial opportunity
for Iran to transform its image in the international community,
and hands it an opportunity to play a positive leadership
role in the moves towards a nuclear weapon free world. Just
as the British government has described itself as a 'disarmament
laboratory' in creating a pilot study into the processes necessary
for a verification process to establish the disarmament of
warheads in the nuclear weapon state, so Iran could establish
itself as a 'non-proliferation laboratory'. This would make
explicit the grand bargain between non-proliferation and disarmament.
Indeed, Iran could actively draw the links between the two
in a progressive manner - strengthening further its safeguards
and inspections processes as the nuclear weapon states got
closer to their own disarmament. This would enable Iran to
canvass international support for its position and to apply
real (not simply rhetorical) pressure on the nuclear weapon
states to move forward towards disarmament. A confidence in
both non-proliferation and disarmament is necessary to establish
the steps towards a nuclear weapon free world. By taking a
leadership role in this endeavour with clear common global
advantage Iran would achieve a dramatic diplomatic benefit
and under-cut hostility towards it. It would also greatly
strengthen its hand in international non-proliferation and
disarmament negotiations - its position at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference would be unassailable. It would also weaken the
hand of its opponents in this current dispute, and shift global
attention to their failures to observe their disarmament obligations.
In a time of shifting power - between states and non-state
actors, as well as between states themselves - it would be
those governments that seek to abuse their formal positions
and attempt to cling to the past that would be seen as the
real enemies of pace and stability.
Notes
[1] This is a
paper presented at a conference on Iran's nuclear programme
in Tehran on 9th March, hosted by the Institute for Political
and International Studies (IPIS), a think-tank closely associated
with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic.
BASIC believes fundamentally in dialogue and the importance
of exploring with others mutually-beneficial solutions to
apparently intractable problems. The international dispute
over Iran's nuclear programme is exactly the sort of problem
that demands an understanding from all sides of the perspectives
of others, an effort to speak in a 'language' that it understood,
whether or not there is agreement between these perspectives;
this paper and BASIC's involvement in this conference is in
this spirit. This version of the paper lacks many of the footnote
references that will appear in the final version.
[2] UN Security
Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803.
[3] IAEA Infcirc
711, available http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf.
[4] Foreign Secretary
Margaret Beckett, in a speech to a conference at the Carnegie
Endowment in Washington DC, see: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/BECKETT%
20Carnegie%20Statement%2025.06.07.pdf.
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